0:07

The United States use of drones is horrific and it is wrong.

0:12

First of all, as we've learned through many expos age recently, and the media drones frequently kill the wrong people, but even more importantly, why are we killing people to begin with the United States should end all drone warfare and should have a major readjustment of its foreign policy priorities.

0:35

Period. Drones have transformed modern warfare.

0:39

Unlike man planes, they can hover over an area for weeks collecting information ahead of an attack.

0:45

They can also linger afterward observing the aftermath of a bombing.

0:49

Perhaps most critically.

0:50

They allow the us to kill enemies overseas without risking American lives.

0:55

But innocent civilians overseas are dying too.

0:58

According to new reporting from the New York times, hundreds more have died from airstrikes in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.

1:06

Then the Pentagon has officially reported that follows recent news that no one from the U S military would be disciplined for an August drone strike that killed 10 Afghan civilians.

1:17

After the break, we'll discuss the impact of the modern use of drones, both on civilians abroad and on us service members and who should be held accountable when an airstrike kills civilians, I'm Jen white, and you're listening to the one, a podcast, our reminder to have your questions answered on future topics, or just to let us know what you think, tweet us at one eight, we'll be back in just a moment.

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3:25

We're talking about the use of drones and other airstrikes and the impact it has on civilians.

3:29

Joining us now to discuss her new reporting on drones is investigative journalists, Osman Kahn from the New York times magazine.

3:36

She's also currently writing a book about America's air wars Osman.

3:40

Welcome to the program. Thank you so much for having me, According

3:43

to your reporting. The Pentagon says officially that 188 Afghan civilians had been killed by airstrikes since 2018 in Iraq and Syria, the official number is around 1500, but your investigation found that the actual death tolls were much higher.

3:58

How much higher?

4:01

That's a great question. Several years ago, when I was doing ground reporting in Iraq, I found that the rate of civilian death on the ground that I was calculating from airstrikes in the war against ISIS was 31 times higher than what the government was claiming at the time to date.

4:19

What I've been finding is that when outside organizations are the ones who provide the information based on their reporting on the ground, whether that's a reporter or an NGO, the militaries assessment, if they accept it will match that record.

4:36

But if they don't, if they rely only on their own information to do an assessment, I've found that the true rate of civilian death was at twice as high.

4:46

So it's, we're what we do know in instances of what has been deemed credible, like what they accept.

4:54

There's already a rate in which they are still not accepting a large enough number of the reality on the ground, but overall, if you were to just do a sample of whether or not they accept something as credible or not, and compare it to their overall numbers, you're looking at a rate that's even even higher than that.

5:13

Now your reporting included visiting nearly 100 sites of drone strikes across Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.

5:19

What did you learn from being on the ground in those places?

5:23

Right. A hundred airstrikes in these places.

5:25

What I saw was our rate of civilian death and casualty and injury.

5:30

That was much higher than what the government claimed that many survivors suffered disabilities, that children were.

5:38

I think that almost nearly double what the government had calculated about the number of children dying I had found on the ground.

5:46

But in addition to that, there are these survivors who have no idea why they were targeted and who were really left looking for answers, who often can't afford medical coverage for the debilitating, debilitating injuries they suffer.

6:00

And then when I compared sort of what may have gone wrong with, against these documents I obtained, right?

6:08

So I had been seeking to understand the militaries own assessments of what it concluded it had happened in these airstrikes, that it had carried out that where there was maybe a report or an allegation of a civilian casualty.

6:21

So when I would examine that record and compare it to the family on the ground and the reporting I did in that neighborhood, really asking about what was happening at the time and digging deeply into, you know, what the document said and whether it was true was that oftentimes the military failed to realize when it had misidentified a target, for example, when it thought that, you know, a house full of families was an ISIS headquarters, or, you know, when it saw a particular person that because of confirmation bias, this idea that military officials or intelligence analysts may really struggle when they've been told something as a target, for example, a car bomb, right?

7:06

And they're looking for something that's moving in a particular area may struggle to see that as anything other than a car bomb, even when presented with evidence.

7:15

Otherwise, for example, such as the driver of the vehicle, getting out of the car and greeting a group of civilians on the sidewalk, or the fact that the cars description didn't quite match the description of the intelligence tip that came in, that oftentimes in those moments and with that perception of risk and threat, that they can overlook what that target might actually be as a result of that confirmation bias.

7:41

The thing that honestly surprised me most, I think the number one recurring problem that I saw or factor involved in a lot of the civilian deaths was that beforehand they didn't detect civilian presence.

7:56

They had a conclusion that there was no civilian presence at that target where they did a collateral scan, which was maybe sometimes it could just be a few seconds of looking over the area.

8:06

Sometimes it was longer, but in nearly three quarters of the graph of the casualties I documented on the ground, they had not detected civilian presence beforehand when in fact civilians were in that particular place.

8:21

And that to me was quite telling because you know, a major part of the military is on process in targeting.

8:28

You know, there are two parts of that.

8:30

There's positive identification of the enemy and ensuring that, you know, what, who you're targeting is a legitimate target, which you can do, right?

8:37

But the second part is really conducting a pattern of life, understanding what civilians may be there and whether or not, you know, they might be impacted by the strike activity that they're trying to carry out or that they would like to carry out.

8:53

And so when you have such a high rate of failing to detect the presence of civilians, you're really going to be unable to accurately predict how many civilians are going to be killed or injured.

9:05

And thus, this idea that what we're doing is proportional, right?

9:10

That the anticipated military advantage gained is not, it, you know, is, is higher than the cost of life, that there was some kind of proportionality to this goes out the window.

9:23

Yeah. I'd like to add another voice to the conversation.

9:25

Now, retired Lieutenant Colonel Wayne Phelps is the author of on killing remotely, the psychology of killing with drones.

9:32

He's the former commander of a drone squadron with the Marines.

9:35

Wayne, welcome to one a Thank

9:37

you for having me Wayne, as a former commander of a drone squad.

9:41

What's your reaction to Osman reporting?

9:46

Yeah, so I, I think that Osmund's reporting is, is very powerful.

9:50

You know, the military and the press are, were eternally linked through the first amendment of the constitution, right?

9:59

The military swears an oath to support and defend the constitution, which is, you know, the press, the freedom of press to report on those things.

10:09

What's, which ultimately provides us a, a feedback loop that makes us better assuming that we, we take on board all of the things that are in the reports and, and that's the pursuit, right?

10:25

That we want to have a more cleaner war without civilian casualties.

10:33

And we've heard about the unreal underreported, civilian death toll of us airstrikes.

10:37

And again, you ran a drone squadron specifically in your experience, what are some of the benefits of drone warfare?

10:47

Well, drones allow you to have persistence over a target area.

10:51

So there's no there's no rush, or there should be no rush to a strike because of the long endurance of the platforms.

10:58

Plus the, the high definition of the cameras really allows you to conduct that pattern of life like Osman was talking about.

11:07

So you can determine the right time to strike.

11:10

You can figure out the right place where you can mitigate collateral damage or where you can strike a target where it's going to be free of any sort of civilians around there.

11:21

I like to refer to that as tactical patients.

11:24

And when you're using man platforms, sometimes you have a limited window of opportunity in order to, to strike that platform because of their limited time on station.

11:35

However, when you're, you know, employing a drone, you can have that tactical patients Now,

11:42

asthma, according to your reporting, American forces carried out more than 50,000 airstrikes in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, between 2015 and 2020.

11:50

And I want to focus in on the military use of drones for a moment because it goes back much further than that.

11:57

Can you walk us through some of that history?

11:59

Sure. So, you know, the use of drones has been prevalent.

12:03

I think the first us drone strike was int you know, for the purposes of targeting at lethally targeting, someone was back in 2001 and actually that, that airstrike killed an American named Komal Darwish.

12:17

And that was in Yemen.

12:18

And, you know, so the, this use extends back many years and, you know, before we started arming drones, they were used for surveillance purposes.

12:32

They've been expanded in that use.

12:35

Now they can be used for both surveillance and for weapons deployment, but, and, and, you know, certainly I think the giant Colonel Phelps can, can speak better to some of the intricacies of that.

12:49

But precision guided munitions are also something that the military tested over many years that far, you know, you know, as far back as Vietnam, we're trying to use different kinds of precision guided weapons.

13:03

And there have been innovations in that over time to the point where, you know, at one point it may have been laser guided and GPS guided that.

13:12

Now, you know, we have the ability to follow something despite bad weather patterns.

13:18

So the PR precision of the weaponry, the kind of technologies that have developed have really advanced from what we had been using in the past.

13:28

And drones in particular, I think are certainly weapons of choice in particular places.

13:35

But when you're conducting a really heavy bombing campaign, for example, in Iraq and Syria and the war against ISIS or in Afghanistan, you know, the, the pace of airstrikes in 2019 was greater than any other year previously recorded of the U S war in Afghanistan.

13:54

What you wind up having is maybe there are drones involved conducting surveillance, but in reality, a lot of these strikes are happening from all different kinds of aircraft.

14:08

Wayne, what process did you go through in determining whether to carry out a drone strike?

14:17

And usually those decisions are made external to the, the drone crew itself.

14:23

There's either a ground force commander or a, an, an air controller on the ground who is calling for assistance.

14:32

And they're, they're making the decision that something is a valid military target.

14:38

And they're calling in an asset to strike a target such as a drone or, you know, a manned platform.

14:44

So usually it's a, it's an external organization that is doing that work for, for the drone crew and saying, this is, this is your list.

14:55

I want to turn now to a conversation I had with Christopher Aaron.

14:58

He's a former intelligence analyst for the CIA drone program starting in 2006.

15:04

He reviewed videos from drones and shared intelligence analysis with other units.

15:08

He served two six month deployments to Afghanistan in 2006 and 2008.

15:14

And he began by telling me a memory that stands out from his time on the job I

15:19

was working on the program when we took action against Abu L's a who at the time in 2006 was second in command behind a, some have bin Lauden.

15:30

And there came a time where we took action on the target through a series of missile strikes.

15:38

And when it was learned that we had indeed successfully killed, I was a Cari, there was a sense of celebration in the room.

15:48

There's, you know, people giving high fives, cheers celebrations all around as if when you kill an individual like that, it's a done deal that the war is now moving in our favor.

16:01

We are making progress towards stopping the terrorists or the extremists and that chapter of the war is done.

16:09

And so what I saw in myself was after the celebration, the next day, we saw three coffins being carried through the streets, not just one coffin.

16:20

And that's an incident that really struck me as to are we actually conducting these wars in a way that is leading to more security and more peace around the world, or is this in fact, a self perpetuating type of warfare that we're engaged in What

16:38

conclusions have you come to about the effectiveness of us military drone use, and especially as someone who had a front seat view?

16:46

Yeah, that's a good question. I would say that based on my experience, again, I can only talk to my experience.

16:52

What I observed is that the strategy of dropping bombs and missiles on individuals, whether or not those individuals are legitimate terrorists or extremists, the strategy of pinpointing them with these missiles does not result in increased security nor increased peace, whether in Afghanistan or around the world.

17:22

What I saw is that the strategy that we had been implementing was resulting in more suicide attacks on the base, more loss of life, on both sides of the conflict, us NATO life, as well as both legitimate targets and innocent civilians on the Afghany side, and to make matters worse.

17:44

We were losing control of vast areas of Afghanistan that in two six, we had control of the entire Southern region of the country is a state called the province called Kandahar.

17:55

We had lost control of Kandahar between 2006 and 2009 through this strategy.

18:03

What effect did your work as a drone operator have on you mentally, physically in both the short and long term?

18:11

I suffered tremendously in the years after my return, it took me about five years to really get my life turned around again.

18:20

After I returned in 2009, the first couple of years were physiological health issues that I suffered from combination of the stress of the long shifts, the stress of the knowledge of, of taking life, making those decisions, a host of factors that are involved in, in simply being overseas in a war zone.

18:43

I felt at 29 years old, like I was physiologically perhaps 69 years old.

18:49

It took me about two years to recover from those physiological ailments.

18:55

And after that, that then clears the way to work on the psychological, the, the mental toll that that type of work took.

19:05

And I just want to stay for the record.

19:07

Of course, what I went through in my recovery is nothing like some of the innocent casualties had to suffer from in Afghanistan.

19:15

So I want to acknowledge that I have apologized on air several times to the people of Afghanistan.

19:21

However, it's just to say that my experience, of course, doesn't compare to what they have had to go through.

19:29

That said us in the drone program has drone operators, and it's not just myself.

19:34

I am in touch with a number of other individuals who I formerly worked with.

19:39

There is a sense of, of moral regret and this implements in certain ways, for me, the number one way that it manifested was in my dreams where I had a recurring dream for a number of years where I was forced to sit in a chair and my eyeballs were held open almost with tape.

20:03

And I was forced to watch some of the most gruesome torture scenes of human life that one can possibly fathom.

20:12

And it was almost as if in my subconscious, it was saying to me, Hey, you recovered from the physical.

20:19

Now you thought you were going to be behind a screen.

20:22

Now, sit here and watch what you participated in When

20:27

you were in the program. How much concern was there for civilian deaths that resulted from drone air strikes?

20:37

Very little, not none.

20:38

I certainly had some colleagues who in our private discussions, when we'd be taking a lunch break or in between missions would voice their concerns.

20:49

However, generally speaking, there was the attitude that this is simply part of war.

20:55

This is a necessary evil, if you will.

20:58

And so we must carry on.

21:02

Were there any accountability measures in place if civilians were killed as a result of failed intelligence or, or mistakes that were made?

21:14

No, not that I saw.

21:16

You're one of only a handful of former drone operators who have spoken out publicly against their use.

21:22

Why does it feel important for you to do this?

21:26

I reached a point where I said, I can either look back at my life and say that I participated in some atrocities that I do not agree with and just let that stay with me, or I can try to do perhaps one good thing with this throughout the remainder of my life.

21:48

And that's why I've chosen to do what I'm doing.

21:52

I hope that even though I don't have the full picture, no one within the program has the full picture because it's entirely compartmentalized that said, all I can do is speak about my experience.

22:06

And if I'm able to change one heart or one mind.

22:09

So perhaps we pursue a different strategy in dealing with extremists around the world.

22:15

If I'm able to do that, then that is something that I would like to do.

22:21

That was my conversation with Christopher Aaron.

22:23

He's a former intelligence analyst for the CIA's drone program.

22:27

He served two six month deployments to Afghanistan in 2006 and 2008.

22:32

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23:16

this last year and a half, the world's been through a lot.

23:18

So on this season of the StoryCorps podcast, we'll hear stories reminding us that even when times are hard, we can still begin again, listen to our new season, wherever you get your podcasts.

23:30

Let's get back to the conversation about drones and other airstrikes.

23:33

Wayne, you interviewed more than 50 people who have been involved in drone operations for your book, and more than one described a type of intimacy they developed with the people they were targeting on the ground.

23:44

Explain a bit more about where that feeling comes from and how it affects the people you interviewed.

23:51

Yeah, so a lot of the people that I interviewed, particularly the intelligence analysts said that they were watching a target for hours, days, weeks, months, sometimes, even years.

24:02

And as they were developing this pattern of life and determining the right time and place for, for a strike.

24:10

And what they realized was that they were developing this, this one-sided intimacy with this target.

24:17

And that's because they were, they were really recognizing the humanity of that individual.

24:22

They were seeing that person doing normal things that you would, you would do as a human, you know, going to the store, picking your children up from school, playing soccer in your backyard and things like that.

24:36

And they were also witnessing some of the nefarious actions that they were doing, the reasons why they were watching them in the first place.

24:44

I interviewed one analyst who said that he was, he was a father and he was watching this target for a period of about six months.

24:56

And he watched this father take his children to school every day and pick them up and hang out with his kids.

25:06

And he, he said, he knew that this guy was a good father.

25:09

And then when it came time to strike that target, he said it was really difficult for him because he had, he had developed this intimacy with that.

25:19

Well, last week, the Pentagon announced it wouldn't discipline anyone involved in an August drone strike that killed 10 Afghan civilians.

25:24

You said there isn't usually any accountability when drones kill civilians.

25:30

Is there any effort to provide funding for ongoing medical care?

25:35

Because there are also people who are severely injured.

25:39

So Congress for the last five, six years has authorized millions of dollars for what are known as condolence payments to individuals who have been injured or killed or suffered some kind of loss from us, combat operations in Iraq, Syria, and then of Han Hassan as well.

25:55

But despite that money being authorized and available for use by the us military, they have made very few payments.

26:03

You know, the very first payment offer they made for a civilian death or injury in the anti ISIS air war was actually to the subject of a previous investigation of mine, a man named Boston Razo.

26:15

And one thing to know is that these payment offers can be quite poultry in the eyes of, of people who value human life.

26:24

You know, they're, they're often capped at 2000 or $2,500 for a death and Boston.

26:30

Razo this Iraqi man who was targeted, whose family was targeted in this strike, you know, whose daughter was killed, whose wife was killed, whose brother was killed, whose nephew was killed, was offered around $15,000 in the first known the first payment offer of the anti ISIS air war.

26:51

And this was the software was made in 2017 in the time, since in Iraq and Syria, they've made less than a dozen payments at, in Afghanistan.

27:00

The military has reported higher numbers of payments, but it's something that there's not a lot of transparency around.

27:07

It's the subject of, of, you know, an ongoing legal battle that I have with the department of defense and other agencies who have these records that essentially, you know, very few people are being provided payments.

27:21

And one reason for that is that we don't have the same mechanisms that we used to back in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan of the aughts, right?

27:29

Because we don't have soldiers on the ground in the same capacity who would have been distributing that money, who would have been assessing claims.

27:36

We don't have that same infrastructure.

27:38

And I think that's part of the reason why the military doesn't make these payments.

27:42

I think they also in their minds think that those payments should come from their governments, like the government of Iraq or the government of Afghanistan, as opposed to directly from the United States.

27:55

And in addition to that, you know, I think it's, it's, it's really, I want to get back to just the, even the amount being offered, because if you have a life disability, if you have a debilitating injury like this young boy I met, his name was Hudson who was playing outside a high value individual, look at the home of a high value individual in ISIS recruiter, new meal, precaution, you know, Hudson had been outside that home playing.

28:22

And then when this airstrike hit and he was deeply injured, he's now he's shrapnel in his spinal cord.

28:30

I looked at the x-rays, he's confined to a wheelchair, but it's not quite a proper wheelchair.

28:36

It's something his family can barely afford.

28:38

Despite having concluded that, you know, this target targeting of Neil Prakash had killed four civilians in the military, his own records, they've never made a payment offer to that family or to the families of others who were injured or killed in that strike.

28:55

And one other thing to know about that is that Neil Prakash, this man who in the records is confirmed as having been killed, showed up not long after that at the Turkish Syria border, trying to cross, he was alive and well.

29:10

And you know, a lot of the civilians who were impacted are still struggling to pay the most basic medical bills.

29:17

I mean, how much accountability do you think there should be, as you've described the decision-making process, you have the people who are actually pushing the button, but the intelligence side of this is happening somewhere else.

29:30

So how much accountability, accountability should there be and what do you think it should look like?

29:37

Yeah, I think, you know, asthma had some great points in her where she listed nine things that are root causes of why these strikes go wrong in the majority of those were misidentification of targets, you know, not identifying if there was civilians in the target area.

29:58

So the, the majority of them had to do with the intelligence side of, of this strike process or the front side that would, that would actually authorize the strike.

30:11

So when it comes to accountability, I think there needs to be, you know, an investigation of, of each one of those incidents where there's civilian casualties to determine, you know, how did, how did we get it wrong?

30:25

How did we, how do we authorize a strike where there was significant collateral damage?

30:31

Discipline is another, another issue though.

30:35

I think, I think we tend to associate accountability with disciplinary actions and I don't think that's going to be the case.

30:43

People in the military get disciplined when they violate the uniform code of military justice or the rules of engagement or international humanitarian law when they willfully violate those things in these strengths.

30:58

I don't think there's incidents where people are willfully conducting a strike, knowing that there's going to be civilian casualties.

31:05

If, if there are, you know, it's, it's, it's determined at a certain level, it's authorized at a certain level that says that this is of significant enough military value, that it's proportionate enough to the amount of civilian casualties that will occur.

31:22

And that doesn't occur at, at the, you know, the drone crew level that usually is elevated up the chain of command, depending on how high of a collateral damage estimate will occur.

31:35

Wayne, what is your opinion on how the U S military should be using drones if at all?

31:42

Well, I think they should be part of an integrated force as opposed to a standalone force.

31:47

There

31:47

are

31:47

theorists

31:47

about

31:47

air

31:47

power

31:47

that

31:47

think

31:47

that

31:47

we

31:47

can,

31:47

we

31:47

can

31:47

win

31:47

conflicts

31:47

through

31:47

air

31:47

power

31:57

alone. And this is nothing new, although it feels like it's new, it goes back, you know, to world war II and, and even beyond really.

32:06

So when you, when you think that you can win a war solely through air power and not putting your own troops on the ground in harm's way, there are things that are going to be limitations, operational allied forces, a prime example.

32:23

And, and that's, that was even before the use of drones came about, right.

32:29

We executed that entire conflict through the use of air power.

32:33

The initial stages of desert storm was the same way.

32:36

So drones are, are, are not the, the Genesis for the American way of fighting through, through the use of just air power.

32:45

It's just another tool that's been added to the arsenal.

32:48

In fact, I think it's, it's probably a, a good tool for, for the arsenal, because it gives you endurance precision and tactical patients Osman

33:01

very briefly. Where does your reporting go from here?

33:05

Well, you know, I've, I've spent a lot of time trying to understand, you know, what kind of accountability mechanisms there are and you know, what might come out of this.

33:17

What I hope certainly is, is a better understanding of, of these ground realities, you know, as, as of the people who who've experienced this and understanding that firsthand That's

33:31

Osman, Kahn, and investigative reporter for New York times magazine, she's currently writing a book about America's air wharves.

33:36

Also with us Wayne Phelps, a retired Lieutenant Colonel with the Marine Corps and author of on killing remotely, the psychology of killing withdrawns.

33:44

Thanks to you. Both today's producer was Avery JC Kleinman.

33:48

This program comes to you from WMU part of American university in Washington, distributed by NPR.

33:54

I'm Jen white. Thanks for listening.

33:56

And we'll talk again tomorrow. This is one a This

34:20

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0:07

United States used of drones

0:10

is horrific and it is

0:12

wrong. First of all, as we've

0:14

learned through many exposes recently

0:16

in the media, drones frequently

0:19

kill the wrong people. But

0:21

even more importantly, why

0:23

are we killing people to begin

0:25

with? United States should

0:28

end all drone warfare and

0:30

should have a major readjustment of

0:33

its foreign policy priorities,

0:36

period. Drones have transformed

0:38

modern warfare. Unlike

0:40

manned planes, they can hover over an

0:42

area for week collecting information ahead

0:44

of an attack. They can also linger

0:47

afterward observing the aftermath of a

0:49

bombing. Perhaps most critically,

0:51

they allow the US to kill enemies overseas

0:54

without risking American lives. But

0:56

innocent civilians overseas are dying

0:59

too. According to New Reporting

1:01

from The New York Times, hundreds

1:03

more have died from air strikes in Iraq,

1:05

Syria, and Afghanistan. Then the Pentagon has officially reported that follows recent news that no one from the U S military would be disciplined for an August drone strike that killed 10 Afghan the Pentagon

1:07

has officially reported. That

1:10

follows recent news that no one from

1:12

the US military would be disciplined for

1:14

an August drone strike that killed ten

1:16

Afghan civilians. After

1:18

the break, we'll discuss the impact of the modern

1:21

use of drones both on civilians abroad

1:23

and on US service members. And

1:26

who should be held accountable when an airstrike

1:28

kills civilians. I'm Jen

1:30

White, and you're listening to the one eight podcast.

1:33

A reminder to have your questions answered

1:35

on future topics AugustNew to let

1:37

us know what you think, tweet us at 1a.

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3:25

We're talking about the use of drones and

3:27

other air strikes and the impact it

3:29

has on civilians. Joining us now to discuss her new reporting on drones is investigative journalists, Osman Kahn from the New York times us now

3:31

to discuss her new reporting on drones

3:33

is investigative journalist, Osmot

3:35

Khan, from the New York Times magazine. She's

3:37

also currently writing a book about America's

3:39

Air War. OSMID, WELCOME TO THE PROGRAM. THANK

3:42

YOU SO MUCH FOR HAVING ME. Reporter: ACCORDING

3:44

TO YOUR REPORTING THE PENAGON SAYS OFFICIALLY

3:46

THAT one hundred and eighty eight Afghan civilian

3:49

been killed by airstrike since twenty eighteen.

3:51

In Iraq and Syria, the official numbers

3:54

around fifteen hundred, but your investigation

3:56

found that the actual death tolls were much

3:58

higher How much higher? That's

4:01

a great question. Several years

4:03

ago, when I was doing ground reporting in

4:06

Iraq, I found that the

4:08

rate of civilian death on the ground

4:10

that I was calculating from air strikes in

4:12

the war against ISIS was

4:14

thirty one times higher than

4:17

what the government was claiming at the time.

4:19

To date, what I've been finding is

4:21

that when outside organizations

4:24

are the ones who provide the information

4:26

based on their reporting on the ground,

4:29

whether that's a reporter or an NGO,

4:32

The military's assessment, if they

4:34

accept it, will match

4:36

that record. But if they

4:38

don't, if they rely only

4:40

on their own information to do an assessment.

4:43

I found that the true rate of civilian death

4:45

was at twice as high.

4:47

So it's it's we're what we do

4:49

know in instances of

4:51

what has been deemed credible, like what

4:53

they accept there's already a rate

4:55

in which they are still not accepting a large

4:58

enough number of the reality on the ground.

5:00

But overall, if you were to just do

5:02

a sample of whether or not they accept something

5:05

as credible or not and

5:07

compare it to their overall numbers, you're

5:09

looking at a rate that's even even higher

5:11

than that. Now your reporting

5:14

included visiting nearly one hundred

5:16

sites of drone strikes across Iraq,

5:18

Syria, and Afghanistan. What did you learn from being on the ground in those What did you learn

5:20

from being on the ground in those places?

5:24

Right. A hundred air strikes in these places.

5:26

What I saw was a rate of civilian

5:28

death and casualty, an injury that

5:31

was much higher than what the government

5:33

claimed, that many survivors

5:35

suffered disabilities, that children

5:38

were I think they almost

5:41

nearly double what the government

5:43

had calculated about the number of children dying

5:45

I had found on ground. But

5:47

in addition to that, there are these survivors

5:50

who have no idea why they

5:52

were targeted and who are really

5:54

left looking for ants who often

5:56

can't afford medical coverage for the

5:59

debilitating injuries they suffer.

6:02

And then when I come paired sort of

6:04

what may have gone wrong with

6:06

against these documents I obtained. Right?

6:08

So I had been seeking to

6:10

understand the military's own assessments

6:13

of what it concluded it had happened

6:15

in these air strikes that it had carried out,

6:17

that where there was maybe a port

6:20

or an allegation of a civilian casualty.

6:22

So when I would examine that record and

6:24

compare it to the family on the ground,

6:27

and the reporting I did in that

6:29

neighborhood really asking about what

6:31

was happening at the time and digging

6:33

deeply into what the document

6:35

said and whether it was true, was

6:37

that oftentimes the military failed

6:39

to realize when it had misidentified

6:42

a target. For example, when

6:45

it thought that, you know, a house full

6:47

of families was in ISIS

6:49

headquarters, or,

6:52

you know, when it saw particular

6:54

person that because of confirmation bias,

6:57

this idea that military

6:59

officials or intelligence analysts may

7:02

really struggle when they've been told something

7:04

is a target, for example, a carbon.

7:06

right? And they're looking for something that's moving in a particular area may struggle to see that as anything other than a car bomb, even when presented with And they're looking for something that's moving

7:08

in particular area. May struggle

7:10

to see that as anything other

7:12

than a car bond, even when presented

7:15

with evidence otherwise. For example,

7:17

such as the driver of the vehicle getting out of

7:19

car and greeting a group of civilians on

7:22

the sidewalk, where

7:24

the fact that the car's description didn't quite

7:27

match the description of the intelligence tip

7:29

that came in that oftentimes in

7:32

those moments and with that perception of

7:34

risk and threat that they can

7:36

overlook what that target might

7:39

actually be as a result of that confirmation

7:41

bias. The thing that

7:43

honestly surprised me most, I think,

7:46

The number one recurring problem

7:49

that I saw a factor involved in

7:51

a lot of the civilian deaths was

7:53

that beforehand, They didn't

7:55

detect civilian presence. They

7:57

had a conclusion that there was no civilian

7:59

presence at that target, or they did

8:01

a collateral scan, which was maybe

8:03

sometimes it could just be a few seconds of

8:06

looking over the area, sometimes it was

8:08

longer. But In

8:11

nearly three quarters of the grant

8:13

of the casualties I documented on the

8:15

ground, they had not detected civilian

8:17

presence beforehand. When in fact, civilians

8:20

were in that particular place. And

8:22

that to me was quite telling because,

8:24

you know, a major part of the military's

8:27

own process in targeting there

8:29

are two parts of that. There's positive identification

8:32

of the enemy and ensuring that, you know,

8:34

who you're targeting is a legitimate target.

8:37

Which you can do. Right? But

8:39

the second part is really conducting a pattern

8:41

of life, understanding what civilians

8:44

may be there and whether or not

8:47

they might be impacted by the

8:49

strike activity that they're trying to carry

8:52

out or that they would like to carry out.

8:54

And so when you have such a high rate,

8:56

failing to detect the presence of civilians,

8:59

you're really going to be unable to

9:01

accurately predict how many civilians

9:04

are going to be killed or injured

9:06

and thus this idea that what

9:09

we're doing is proportional, right,

9:11

that the anticipated military

9:14

advantage gained is

9:16

not, you know, is is higher than

9:18

the cost of life that there is

9:20

some kind of proportionality to this.

9:22

Goes out the window. I'd like to add

9:24

another voice to the conversation now.

9:26

Retired lieutenant colonel Wayne Phelps

9:29

is the author of on killing remotely

9:31

the psychology of killing with drones. He's

9:33

the former commander of a drone squadron with

9:35

the marines. Wayne, welcome to 1A. Thank

9:38

you for having me. Wayne is a former

9:40

commander of a drone squad. What's your reaction

9:42

to Osmot's reporting? Yeah.

9:46

So I I think that Osmot's

9:49

reporting is is very powerful.

9:52

You know, the military and the press are

9:55

were eternally linked through the the

9:57

first amendment of the constitution. Right? The

10:00

the military swears

10:03

an oath to support and defend the constitution,

10:06

which gives, you know, the press, the freedom

10:08

of press to report on those things, which

10:10

which ultimately provides

10:13

us a feedback loop

10:15

that makes us better assuming

10:18

that we take on board all

10:20

of the things that are in the reports. And

10:24

and that's the pursuit, right, that we want

10:26

to have a

10:29

more cleaner war without

10:31

civilian casualties. And

10:33

we've heard about the underreported

10:36

civilian death toll of US air strikes.

10:38

And again, you ran a

10:40

drone squadron specifically. In your

10:42

experience, what are some of the benefits of

10:45

drone warfare? Well,

10:47

drones allow you to have persistence

10:50

over a target area. So

10:52

there's no there's no rush or there

10:54

should be no rush to because

10:57

of long endurance of the platforms, plus

11:00

the the high definition

11:02

of the cameras really allows you

11:04

to conduct that pattern of life like Osmot

11:07

was talking about. So you can determine

11:09

the right time to strike. You

11:11

can figure out the right place where

11:14

you can mitigate collateral damage or

11:17

where you can strike a target where it's gonna be

11:19

free of of any sort of civilians around

11:21

there. I like to refer to that

11:23

as tactical patience. When

11:25

you're using manned platforms, sometimes

11:27

you have a limited window

11:30

of opportunity in order to

11:32

strike that platform because of

11:34

their limited time on station. However,

11:36

when you're, you know, employing a drone,

11:39

you can have that tactical patience. Now,

11:42

Osmot, according to your reporting American

11:44

forces carried out more than fifty thousand

11:46

air strikes in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan

11:49

between twenty fifteen and twenty twenty.

11:51

And I wanna focus in on the military

11:53

use of drones for a moment because

11:55

it goes back much further than that. Can

11:57

you walk us through some of that history? Sure.

12:00

So, you know, the use of drones

12:02

has been prevalent. I think the first US

12:04

drone strike was in, you know, for

12:07

the purposes of targeting lately

12:10

targeting someone was back

12:12

in two thousand one. And actually, that

12:15

that airstrike killed an American named Kamal

12:17

Durwish. And that was in Yemen. And,

12:20

you know, so this use extends

12:23

back many years.

12:25

And, you know, before

12:28

we started arming drones, they

12:31

were used for surveillance purposes. They've

12:34

been expanded. In that use now, they

12:36

can be used for both surveillance and

12:39

for weapons deployment.

12:42

But it and and, you know, certainly, I think

12:45

the giant colonel Phelps can can speak better

12:47

to some of the intricacies of that. But

12:50

precision guided munitions are

12:52

also something that the military tested

12:55

over many years that far you

12:57

know, you know, as far back as Vietnam, we're

12:59

trying to use different kinds of

13:02

precision guided weapons, and there have been innovations

13:04

in that over time. To the point

13:07

where, you know, at one point

13:09

it may have been laser

13:11

guided and GPS guided that

13:13

now we have the ability to

13:15

follow something despite bad weather

13:18

patterns. So the precision

13:21

of the weaponry, the kind of technologies

13:23

that have developed have really advanced from

13:25

what we had been

13:27

using in the past. And

13:30

drones in particular, I think, are

13:33

certainly weapons of choice in particular

13:35

places. But when you're conducting

13:37

a really heavy bombing

13:39

campaign. For example, in Iraq

13:42

and Syria and the war against ISIS, or

13:45

in Afghanistan, you know, the the

13:47

pace of airstrike in twenty nineteen

13:50

was greater than any other year previously

13:52

recorded. Of the US war and if God

13:54

is done. What you wind up having

13:57

is maybe there are drones involved

13:59

conducting surveillance, But

14:02

in reality, a lot of these strikes are

14:04

happening from all different kinds

14:06

of aircraft. Wayne,

14:09

what process did

14:11

you go through in determining whether

14:13

to carry out a drone strike?

14:17

And usually those decisions are made external to the, the drone crew those decisions are made

14:20

journal to the

14:22

drone crew itself. There's either

14:24

a ground force commander or

14:27

a an an

14:29

air controller on the ground who is

14:31

calling for assistance and they're they're

14:33

making the decision that

14:36

something is a valid military target

14:38

and they're calling in an asset to strike

14:40

a target such as a drone or,

14:43

you know, a manned platform. So

14:45

usually, it's an external organization

14:48

that is doing that work for for

14:51

the drone crew. And saying this

14:53

is this is your legitimate AugustNew.

14:55

I wanna turn now to a conversation

14:57

I had with Christopher Aaron. He's a former

15:00

intelligence analyst for the CIA's drone

15:02

program. Starting in two thousand

15:04

six, he reviewed videos from drones

15:06

and shared intelligence analysis with other

15:09

units. He served two six month

15:11

deployments to Afghanistan in two thousand

15:13

six and two thousand eight. And he

15:15

began by telling me a memory that stands out

15:17

from his time on the job. I was working on the program when we took action against Abu L's a who at the time in 2006 was second in command behind a, some have bin

15:19

was working on the program when we

15:22

took action against Abdul Zakari

15:25

who at the time in two thousand six

15:27

was second in command behind

15:30

Usama bin Laden. And there

15:32

came a time where we took action

15:35

on the target through a

15:37

series of missile strikes

15:39

And when it was learned

15:41

that we had indeed successfully killed

15:44

al Zakari, there

15:46

was a sense of celebration in

15:48

the room. There was people giving high

15:50

fives, cheers celebrations all

15:52

around. As if when

15:55

you kill an individual like that,

15:57

it's a done deal that

15:59

the war is now moving in our favor. We

16:02

are making progress towards stopping

16:04

the terrorists or the extremist and

16:07

that chapter of the war is done.

16:10

And so what I saw myself was after

16:12

the celebration The next

16:14

day, we saw three

16:16

coffins being carried through the streets,

16:19

not just one coffins often. And that's

16:21

an incident that really struck me

16:24

as to, are we actually

16:26

conducting these wars in a way? That

16:28

is leading to more security and

16:30

more peace around the world? Or

16:33

is this in fact a self perpetuating

16:35

type of warfare that we're engaged in? What

16:38

conclusions have you come to about

16:40

the effectiveness of US military

16:42

drone use? And especially

16:45

as someone who had a front seat view. Yeah.

16:47

That's a good question. I would say

16:49

that based on my experience, again,

16:51

I can only talk to my experience.

16:54

What I observed is

16:56

that the strategy of dropping

16:59

bombs and missiles on individuals

17:03

whether or not those individuals are

17:05

legitimate terrorists or extremists.

17:09

The strategy of pinpointing them

17:12

with these missiles does

17:14

not result in increased security,

17:17

nor increased peace. Whether

17:20

in Afghanistan or around the

17:22

world. What I saw

17:24

is that the strategy that we had been implementing

17:27

was resulting in more suicide

17:30

attacks on the base, more

17:32

loss of life on both sides of the

17:34

conflict, US, NATO life

17:36

as well as both legitimate

17:39

targets and innocent civilians on

17:41

the Afghanistan side. And

17:43

to make matters worse, we were losing control

17:46

of vast areas of Afghanistan that

17:48

in two thousand six, we

17:50

had control of. The entire southern

17:52

region of the country is a state

17:54

called the province called Kandahar. We

17:57

had lost control of Kandahar between

17:59

two thousand and six and two thousand and nine

18:01

through this strategy. What

18:03

effect did your work as a drone

18:06

operator have on you, mentally,

18:08

physically in both the short and long term?

18:11

I suffered tremendously in the years after my return, it took me about five years to really get my life turned around I suffered tremendously in the

18:13

years after my return, it took

18:15

me about five years to

18:17

really get my life turned

18:19

around again after I returned in two thousand

18:22

nine. The first couple of years

18:24

were physiological health

18:26

issues that I suffered from. Combination

18:29

of the stress of the

18:31

long shifts, the stress of the

18:33

knowledge of of taking

18:36

life, making those decisions, a

18:39

host of factors that are involved in

18:41

in simply being overseas in

18:43

a war zone. I felt that

18:45

twenty nine years old, like I was

18:47

physiologically perhaps sixty nine years

18:49

old. It took me about two years

18:52

to recover from those physiological ailments.

18:56

And after that, that then clears

18:58

the way to work on the psychological,

19:02

the mental toll that that

19:04

type of work took. And I

19:06

just wanna stay for record. Of course, what

19:08

I went through in my recovery is nothing

19:11

like some of the innocent casualties had

19:13

to suffer from in Afghanistan.

19:16

So I want to acknowledge that. I

19:18

have apologized on air several

19:20

times to the people of Afghanistan However,

19:23

it's it's just to say that my experience, of

19:25

course, doesn't compare to what

19:28

they have had to go through. That

19:30

said, us in the drone program

19:32

has drone operators, and it's not just myself.

19:35

I am in touch with a number of other individuals

19:38

who I formerly worked with. There

19:40

is a sense of

19:43

moral regret. And

19:45

this implements in certain

19:47

ways. For me, the number one

19:49

way that it manifested was

19:52

in my dreams where

19:54

I had a recurring dream for a number of

19:56

years where I was forced

19:58

to sit in a chair, and my

20:00

eyeballs were held open almost

20:02

with tape. And I was forced

20:05

to watch some of the

20:07

most gruesome torture scenes

20:09

of human life that one can

20:12

possibly fathom. And it was

20:14

almost as if in my subconscious, it

20:16

was saying to me, hey, you

20:18

recovered from the physical. Now

20:21

you thought you were going to be behind a screen,

20:23

now sit here and watch what you

20:25

participated in. When

20:28

you were in the program, how much

20:30

concern was there

20:32

for civilian deaths that resulted

20:34

from airstrike. Very

20:37

little, not none. I certainly

20:39

had some colleagues who

20:41

in our private discussions when

20:44

we'd be taking a lunch break or

20:46

in between missions would

20:48

voice their concerns. However,

20:51

generally speaking, there is the attitude

20:54

that this is simply part of war.

20:56

This is necessary evil, if

20:58

you will, and so we must carry

21:00

on. Were there any

21:03

accountability measures in place

21:05

if civilians were

21:07

killed as a result of failed

21:10

intelligence or or mistakes

21:12

that were made. No.

21:15

Not that I saw. You're

21:17

one of only a handful of former drone

21:19

operators who have spoken out publicly against

21:22

their use Why does it feel important

21:24

for you to do this? I

21:26

reached the point where I said

21:29

I can either look back at my life

21:31

and say that I participated in

21:34

some atrocities that I do

21:36

not agree with and

21:39

just let that stay with me.

21:41

Or I can try to do perhaps

21:43

one good thing with

21:45

this throughout the the remainder

21:47

of my life. And

21:50

that's why I've chosen to do what

21:52

I'm doing. I hope that even

21:54

though I don't have the full picture,

21:56

no one within the program has the

21:59

full picture because it's entirely compartmentalized.

22:03

That said, all I can do is speak

22:05

about my experience and if I'm able to

22:07

change one heart or one mind.

22:10

So perhaps we pursue a different strategy

22:13

in dealing with extremists around the

22:15

world If I'm able to do that, then

22:18

that is something that I would like to do.

22:21

That was my conversation with Christopher

22:23

Aaron He's a former intelligence analyst

22:26

for the CIA's drone program. He

22:28

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23:30

get back to the conversation about drones

23:32

and other air strikes. Wayne, you

23:34

interviewed more than fifty people who have been involved

23:37

in drone operations for your book,

23:39

and more than one describe it type of

23:41

intimacy. They developed with the people they

23:43

were targeting on the ground. Explain

23:45

a bit more about where that feeling comes

23:47

from and how it affects the people you interviewed.

23:51

Yeah. So a lot of the people

23:53

that I interviewed, particularly the intelligence analysts,

23:56

said that they were watching a target

23:58

for hours, days,

24:00

weeks, months, sometimes even years.

24:03

And as they were developing this pattern

24:06

of life and determining the right time

24:08

and place for for a strike.

24:11

And what they realized

24:13

was that they were developing this this

24:15

one-sided intimacy with this

24:17

target. And that's because

24:19

they were they were really recognizing the

24:21

humanity of that individual. They

24:24

were seeing that person doing

24:26

normal things that you would you

24:29

would do as a human, you know, going to the store,

24:31

picking your children up from school, playing

24:34

soccer in your backyard and things like

24:36

that. And they were

24:39

also witnessing some of the nefarious

24:41

actions that they were doing. The reasons why they

24:43

were watching them in the first place, I

24:46

interviewed one analyst who said that

24:48

he was he was a father and

24:51

he was watching this

24:53

target for a period of about

24:55

six months. And he

24:57

watched this father

25:00

take his children, you know, to school

25:02

every day and pick them up

25:05

and hang out with his kids. And he he said he

25:07

knew that this Sky was a a good father.

25:10

And then when it came time to strike that

25:12

target, he said it was

25:14

really difficult for him because he had

25:16

he developed this intimacy with that

25:18

target. Well, last week, the Pentagon announced

25:20

it wouldn't discipline anyone involved in an

25:22

August drone strike that killed ten Afghan

25:25

civilians You said there isn't

25:27

usually any accountability when

25:29

drones kill civilians. Is

25:31

there any effort to provide funding

25:34

for ongoing medical care because there are also

25:36

people who are severely injured. So

25:39

Congress for the last five, six

25:41

years has authorized millions of dollars

25:43

for what are known as condolence payments to

25:46

individuals who have been injured

25:48

or killed or suffered some kind of loss

25:51

from US combat operations in

25:53

Iraq's Syria and then Afghanistan as

25:55

well. But despite that

25:57

money being authorized and available

26:00

for use by the US military, they

26:02

have made very few payments. You

26:04

know, the very first payment offer they

26:06

made for a civilian death or

26:09

injuring the anti ISIS air war

26:11

was to the subject of a previous

26:13

investigation of mine, a man named Basim

26:15

Raso. And one thing to know

26:17

is that these payment offers

26:19

can be quite paltry in the eyes of

26:22

of people who value human life. You know,

26:24

they're they're often capped at two thousand

26:27

or twenty five hundred dollars for

26:29

a death. And Bossa Marzzo,

26:31

this Iraqi man who was targeted, whose

26:33

family was targeted in airstrike,

26:36

you know, who's daughter was killed,

26:38

whose wife was killed, whose brother was

26:40

killed, whose nephew was killed, was

26:43

offered around fifteen thousand dollars.

26:46

In the first known the

26:48

first payment offer of the anti isis

26:50

air war. And this was this

26:53

offer was made in twenty seventeen. In the

26:55

time since, in Iraq and Syria,

26:57

they've made less than a dozen payments.

27:00

In Afghanistan, the military has

27:02

reported higher numbers of payments, but

27:04

it's something that there's not a lot of transparency

27:07

around. It's the subject of a of

27:09

a, you know, an ongoing legal

27:13

battle that I have with a Department of Defense

27:15

and other agencies who have these records. But

27:18

essentially, you know, very few

27:20

people are being provided payments and

27:22

one reason for that is that we don't have

27:24

the same mechanisms that we used to

27:26

back in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan of

27:29

the ATS. Right? Because we don't have

27:31

soldiers on the ground in the same capacity.

27:33

Who would have been distributing that money, who would

27:35

have been assessing claims. We don't

27:37

have that same infrastructure, and I think that's

27:40

part of the reason why the military doesn't

27:42

make these payments. Think they also

27:44

in their minds think that those payments should

27:46

come from their governments, like the government

27:49

of Iraq or the government of Afghanistan

27:52

as opposed to directly from the United

27:54

States. States. And in addition to that, you know, I think it's, it's, it's really, I want to get back to just the, even the amount being offered, because if you have a life disability, if you have a debilitating injury like this young boy I met, his name was Hudson who was playing outside a high value individual, look at the home of a high value individual in ISIS recruiter, new meal, precaution, you know, Hudson had been outside that home And in addition

27:56

to that, I think it's

27:59

really I wanna get back to just

28:01

that even the amount being offered

28:03

because if you have a life to bill

28:05

if you have a debilitating injury like

28:07

this young boy I met, His

28:10

name was Husson, who

28:12

was playing outside a high value

28:14

individual look at the home of a high value

28:17

individual, an Isis recruiter named Neil

28:19

Purkash. You know, husband had

28:21

been outside that home playing and

28:23

it when this airstrike hit and

28:26

he was deeply injured. He's now he's

28:28

shrapnel in his spinal cord. I looked at

28:31

the x rays. He's confined

28:33

to a wheelchair, but it's not quite a

28:35

proper wheelchair. It's something his family

28:37

can barely afford. Despite

28:40

having concluded that this

28:43

Target targeting of Neil Prokosch

28:45

had killed four civilians in the military's

28:48

own records. They've never made a payment

28:50

offer to that family or to

28:52

the families of others who were injured

28:54

or killed in that strike. And one

28:56

other thing to know about that is that Neil Prakash,

28:59

this man who in the records

29:01

is confirmed as having been killed showed

29:03

up, not long after that, at

29:06

the Turkish Syria border, trying

29:09

to cross. He was alive and well. And,

29:11

you know, a lot of the civilians who were impacted

29:13

are still struggling to pay the most basic

29:15

medical bills? Wayne, how

29:18

much accountability do you think there

29:20

should be? As you've

29:22

described the decision making process,

29:25

you have the people who are actually pushing

29:27

the button, but the intelligence side of this

29:29

is happening somewhere else.

29:31

So how much accountability should

29:33

there be? And and what do you think it should look like?

29:37

Yeah. I think, you know, Osmud had some

29:39

great points center articles where she

29:41

listed nine things that

29:43

are root causes of

29:46

why these strikes go wrong and

29:49

the majority of those were mis identification

29:51

of targets, not

29:54

identifying that there was civilians

29:57

in the target area. So the majority

29:59

of them had to do with the intelligence side

30:03

of airstrike process.

30:07

Or the front side that would that would

30:09

actually authorize the

30:11

strike. So when it comes to

30:13

accountability, I think there needs to be

30:16

you know, an investigation of

30:18

each one of those incidents where there's

30:20

a civilian casualties to determine

30:24

How did we get it wrong? How did

30:27

we authorize a strike where

30:29

there was significant collateral damage?

30:33

Discipline is another issue,

30:35

though. I think, I think we tend to associate accountability with disciplinary actions and I don't think that's going to be the I think I think we tend

30:37

to associate accountability with disciplinary

30:40

actions and I don't think that's

30:42

going to be the case. People

30:45

in the military get disciplined when they violate

30:47

the uniform code of military justice

30:50

or the rules of engagement or international

30:52

humanitarian law when

30:54

they willfully violate those things. In

30:57

these strikes, I don't think

30:59

there's incidents where people are willfully

31:02

conducting a strike knowing that there's going to

31:04

be civilian casualties. If

31:07

if there are, you know, it's it's

31:10

determined at a certain level. It's

31:14

authorized at a certain level that says that this is

31:16

of significant enough military value

31:19

that it's proportion enough to the amount

31:21

of civilian casualties that will occur. And

31:23

that doesn't occur at, you know,

31:25

the drone crew level that usually is elevated

31:28

up the chain of command depending on how

31:30

high of a collateral damage estimate will

31:33

occur. Wayne,

31:35

what is your opinion on how the US military

31:38

should be using drones, if at all? Well,

31:42

I think they should be part of an integrated force

31:45

as opposed to a stand alone force.

31:50

There are theorists about

31:52

air power that think that we can

31:55

we can win conflicts through air power alone.

31:57

And this is nothing new, although it feels like

32:00

it's new, it goes back, you

32:02

know, to World War two and

32:05

and even beyond really. So

32:07

when you when you think that you can

32:09

win a war solely through air power

32:12

and not putting your own

32:14

troops on the ground in harm's

32:16

way. There are things that

32:18

are going to be limitations. Operational

32:22

allied force is a prime example. And

32:24

then that's that was even before the use

32:26

of drones came

32:29

about. Right? We executed that entire conflict

32:32

through the use of air power. The

32:34

initial stages of desert storm was the

32:36

same way. So

32:38

drones are are not the

32:41

the genesis for the American

32:43

way of fighting through through the use of

32:45

just air power. It's just another tool

32:47

that's been added to the arsenal. In

32:50

fact, I think it's it's probably a

32:53

good tool for the arsenal because

32:55

it gives you endurance,

32:57

precision, and tactical patience.

33:01

Ospent very briefly, where did your reporting

33:03

go from here? Well,

33:06

you know, I've I've spent a lot of time

33:09

trying to understand, you know,

33:11

what kind of accountability mechanisms there

33:14

are and, you know,

33:16

what might come out of this.

33:18

What I hope certainly

33:21

is a better understanding of of these ground

33:23

realities. You know, as

33:26

as of the people who who've experienced this

33:28

and understanding that firsthand.

33:31

That's Osman, Kahn, and investigative reporter for New York times magazine, she's currently writing a book about America's air Osmotcon, an investigative reporter

33:33

for New York Times magazine. She's currently

33:35

writing a book about America's air warps.

33:37

Also with us, Wayne Phelps, a retired lieutenant

33:39

colonel with the Marine Corps and author of

33:41

on killing remotely the psychology of

33:44

killing with drones. Thanks to you both. Today's

33:46

producer was Avery JC Kleinman.

33:49

This program comes to you from WAMU.

33:51

Part of American University in Washington

33:53

distributed by NPR. I'm

33:55

Jen White. Thanks for listening, and we'll talk again

33:57

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