20:00

are going to be electric, I guess, I

20:02

mean, battery electric, maybe a

20:04

small segment of trucks,

20:07

maybe a small segment of trains, but

20:09

basically it's going to be, I guess,

20:11

it's going to be battery electric. A

20:15

lot of people say that shipping

20:17

and aviation will be using hydrogen

20:19

not directly, but as some

20:22

type of derivatives, maybe methanol or

20:25

ammonia, and some

20:27

industries that are hard

20:29

to abate, like steel

20:32

production, for example. And

20:36

maybe the first use that

20:38

we're going to see of green hydrogen, I think,

20:41

is going to be replacing existing

20:43

uses of gray hydrogen, because

20:46

in that case, the only challenge is the

20:48

price of production, because the technology

20:51

to use it and all the applications are there

20:53

already. So that's going to be

20:55

probably fertilizers and maybe oil

20:58

refineries. I don't think we're going

21:00

to have a hydrogen economy, as some people said at

21:02

the time. I never thought that was going to be the

21:04

case. But I think it's

21:06

going to be one

21:09

piece of a very complex

21:12

puzzle to solve this problem. Yeah,

21:14

I mean, the challenges you're describing resonate

21:16

a little with the situation you see

21:18

elsewhere in the world, including the US,

21:20

with very large supply side incentives for

21:22

the Inflation Reduction Act for green

21:25

hydrogen, low carbon fuels, but we need

21:27

the demand signals as

21:30

well. I want

21:32

to come to the role,

21:35

part of the reason, other than you're being a

21:37

great colleague, part of the reason you have remained

21:39

at the center is particularly to work on the

21:41

issue of critical minerals. When we

21:43

think about what the clean energy transition is going to

21:45

look like and which countries are going to

21:47

matter most to it, then the way people

21:49

might have talked about Saudi Arabia or certain

21:51

countries in the oil economy, Chile

21:55

comes up again and again because of its

21:57

pretty massive potentials.

22:00

to supply the world with a lot of the metals

22:02

and minerals that we're going to need. So,

22:04

for those who may not be familiar, just

22:06

start by talking a little bit about what

22:08

resources are in Chile, what current kind of

22:11

production looks like, and how people

22:13

are approaching plans to try to scale that up,

22:15

and then we can come to the challenges and

22:17

the policies that are needed and the investment that's

22:19

needed, and more and more. Yeah.

22:23

So, to start with the basics, I

22:25

mean, as most people know, but

22:27

it's good to kind of go through that very

22:29

quickly. There's no

22:31

energy transition without mining.

22:35

It's that simple. Electric

22:38

vehicles need twice as

22:41

much copper as an internal

22:43

combustion engine vehicle. They

22:46

need lithium. As

22:48

we know, the energy transition is all about

22:51

electrifying our users of energy,

22:53

so replacing fossil fuels with

22:56

electricity, and that needs a

22:58

lot of solar PV generation

23:00

and wind farms, and

23:03

that requires, I mean, a lot

23:05

of copper as well. And

23:08

batteries need other critical minerals too. I'm

23:10

just focusing on lithium and copper because

23:12

those two are important for Chile. And

23:16

also, I mean, transmission lines

23:18

and distribution networks are

23:21

basically copper. Copper is going to

23:23

be the backbone

23:25

of the energy transition. So the

23:27

energy we will be using increasingly

23:29

in the future, we're

23:32

going to get that energy through copper cables.

23:34

That's kind of the simple way to look

23:36

at it. So if we don't

23:38

produce enough copper, the price

23:40

of those cables will go up, and the

23:42

transition will slow down. I mean, that's the

23:45

simple version of the story. And

23:48

if you look at copper production, Chile

23:50

produces roughly 25% of the world's copper.

23:54

We are by far the biggest producer.

23:56

Number two or three are Peru and

23:58

the DRC, with around... mines.

36:01

That discussion was resolved. A

36:03

reasonable piece of legislation was approved a year

36:05

and a half ago or so, and

36:07

that source of uncertainty is not there any longer. Okay,

36:10

so I don't think that is a problem.

36:12

The biggest problem we have is

36:14

that we have been mining

36:17

copper for more than a century in

36:19

Chile. Okay, so most of the big

36:21

deposits are growing old, and

36:23

the grade of those deposits is going down.

36:26

So for people who don't

36:28

follow mining closely, the amount of work

36:30

you need to do to extract the

36:32

same amount of copper, and

36:34

therefore the cost of production is

36:36

going up as those deposits are

36:38

growing older. And the

36:41

amount of investments we need to

36:43

put in place, as we said,

36:45

are huge. And communities

36:47

usually don't approve mining. I think

36:50

that is the biggest challenge we

36:52

have. How we can accelerate

36:55

projects, and

36:58

I think local communities is one issue, and

37:00

permitting is a big issue in Chile, as

37:02

in many other countries. So it takes a

37:04

very long time to get the permits we

37:06

need for mining projects. And

37:09

that is not a problem that

37:11

just the president can solve if

37:14

he wants to, right? Because

37:16

it's a long history of

37:19

different pieces of legislation and

37:21

normative and regularities, I

37:23

mean regulation at different state levels that

37:26

have been kind of accumulating over a

37:28

long period of time. So it

37:30

takes a big

37:32

reform of the whole

37:34

kind of government apparatus to do

37:36

that. And that requires an agreement

37:38

in Congress, and it's going to

37:40

take time and resources. And

37:43

that is a political issue that is

37:45

difficult, right? It's much easier to make

37:47

the political case that you

37:49

want to protect the environment and local

37:51

communities, and therefore you don't want permitting

37:53

reform. Even though

37:56

you could have permitting reform

37:58

and accelerate permitting without... without

38:01

making the standards less

38:03

demanding for companies. But

38:06

most people see it that way. So I

38:09

think permitting reform is the biggest issue if

38:11

I were to pick one. Talk

38:13

a little bit about the politics and how that

38:15

affects the outlook for mining

38:18

and metals production. As

38:21

I said, one of the most

38:23

left-wing leaders, elected president, there has

38:25

been a trend in

38:29

some parts of the world and some parts

38:31

of Latin America toward nationalization. Talk

38:33

about the, say, lithium strategy, for

38:35

example, for Chile, which does

38:38

create a larger role for the state, I believe.

38:40

Tell me if I'm wrong. How

38:42

that works and is that, do you

38:45

view that as a positive or a challenge

38:47

for expanding the production and the way

38:49

you're talking about? I said

38:51

a couple of minutes ago that on copper,

38:53

we have a broad agreement and that's true

38:55

also for energy. We have broad agreement on

38:58

what we want to do. That's

39:00

not the case for lithium, unfortunately.

39:03

So Chile produced over

39:05

50% of the world's

39:07

lithium by, I'd say, 2010. We

39:10

now produce less than 30. And

39:13

the focus is that we will

39:15

keep losing market share in

39:17

the coming years. And that is because

39:20

we don't have broad political agreement. I

39:23

emphasize that, Jason, because I think many

39:26

discussions of the energy transition,

39:28

not just minerals, hydrogen, or

39:31

renewables, or permitting, are

39:33

just, I mean, are policy discussions that

39:36

get politicized and that

39:39

need a long-term perspective and

39:41

stability of policy. And

39:43

I see many countries in which, I

39:45

mean, one government comes into office, and this

39:48

is happening all over Latin America, right? And

39:51

put in place or tries to put in

39:53

place one set of policies without reaching an

39:56

agreement with the opposition, and then four years or

39:58

six years down the road. a

40:00

different coalition is elected, and then they start all

40:02

over again with a different set of policies. That's

40:05

a disaster to make progress. These

40:07

are long-term investments. You

40:09

need to send the right signals to investors, and so

40:11

on. So that is a problem. And

40:14

that has been our problem in lithium. And I

40:16

said that because in lithium, we

40:18

don't have an agreement on where we're going to go.

40:20

And I have to confess that when I was

40:22

in government, we

40:27

conducted an international bidding process to

40:29

invite private companies to develop the

40:31

lithium industry. And the

40:34

data position didn't agree with

40:36

what we wanted to do. And

40:39

then when they came into office, they did something

40:41

different. And I think we, I

40:43

made the mistake of not reaching out to

40:46

the data position enough to reach an

40:48

agreement to make sure that the

40:51

policy we put in place had continuity.

40:54

So this government, what they are doing, and

40:58

the current opposition don't agree with that, which

41:01

is the same problem all over again, is

41:04

they are basically pushing

41:07

the development of lithium projects in which the

41:10

state controls over

41:12

50% of the property or

41:14

the ownership of all lithium

41:17

production operations, with the

41:19

exception of some small

41:23

sunflats. But in all the relevant

41:25

operations, they are seeking

41:29

state control. And there are different cases.

41:31

We, I mean, just a couple of

41:33

days ago, a big agreement

41:35

was reached between CODELCO, the state-owned

41:38

copper company that is now moving

41:40

into lithium, to

41:42

take control of SQM, which

41:45

is one of the biggest copper producers in

41:47

the world that produces lithium in the Atacama

41:49

desert. SQM

41:51

has a contract to

41:54

operate in concessions that

41:56

are state-owned concessions, and SQM

41:58

was leasing those. concessions

42:00

to the state and basically

42:02

CODELCO. The state awarded CODELCO

42:05

a new contract for another 30 years, and

42:08

CODELCO used that leverage

42:12

because the existing contract of SQM with the

42:14

state, it's expired by 2030, used

42:17

that leverage to negotiate with SQM and say,

42:19

okay, now we're going to be partners,

42:22

we're going to own this

42:24

company 5149, and

42:26

the state is taking control of

42:29

SQM's leading production. I'm

42:31

not sure that's the best way to

42:34

go. In that particular case, there were

42:36

several specifics of that specific

42:39

situation that maybe justified

42:41

that way, and I don't think

42:43

we have time to discuss that. But in

42:45

all the other salt floods, they are

42:48

basically inviting private companies to make the

42:50

investment, to produce leading with

42:52

new technologies. The

42:55

state is not putting money, it's just

42:57

offering the resource, and the

43:00

state is getting over 50 percent

43:02

of the ownership of the operations. The

43:09

government says, rightly so, that

43:12

they still see interest

43:14

from many parties to invest.

43:18

That is reasonable because many

43:20

companies want to produce lithium.

43:23

But I don't think that's the best way to

43:25

maximize the production volume, or

43:28

the amount of money, or the share

43:31

of the rents that the state will

43:33

capture. Yeah. Talk about what is.

43:35

What you're describing, we see this time and

43:37

again in countries around the world, oil,

43:40

gas, mining for

43:43

metals. Countries

43:45

want to attract investment and

43:48

set up the terms to make

43:50

sure that that happens. Then

43:53

as resources are discovered, countries understand,

43:55

these are national resources. Countries want

43:57

to make sure that they're. capturing

44:00

the greatest value they can from

44:03

their natural wealth.

44:07

But that can go, as you said, maybe

44:09

too far in the direction where you don't

44:11

have reliability or certainty in

44:14

contracts. And experience

44:16

with nationalization probably

44:18

has, tell me if you disagree, more

44:20

often created

44:22

challenges for developing resources and

44:24

for developing that revenue, then

44:27

making sure that you retain the

44:30

involvement of lots of international

44:32

firms. So what do

44:34

you think the right balance is to make sure

44:36

that the country is getting a fair deal for

44:39

the resources that are its

44:41

natural wealth? I don't

44:43

think there is a specific formula. It's

44:46

a difficult question. I think in corporate,

44:48

I think we are getting this right.

44:51

That is my sense. So

44:53

if you look at taxation of copper in

44:55

Chile, we are in the neighborhood

44:58

of other countries that have

45:00

good copper resources like Canada,

45:02

South Africa, Mexico,

45:04

and so on. So private

45:07

companies, when they

45:09

evaluate where they want to make

45:11

the next mine, they

45:13

see taxation and they say, okay,

45:15

these different locations are

45:17

kind of similar. So

45:21

I think that is reasonable. In the

45:23

case of lithium, however, when

45:26

you look at taxation in Chile, it's

45:29

much higher. And this set of

45:31

kind of risk-return

45:35

features that Chile is offering to companies, I

45:37

don't think that is very attractive. So many,

45:40

many times I think politicians think

45:44

in terms of a time

45:46

horizon that is too short. They

45:48

say, okay, the resource

45:50

is there. We're going to

45:52

be capturing as much percentage

45:55

of the value that has been extracted

45:58

as possible. That's

46:00

the right way to think about it, because

46:05

you need to think long-term, and

46:08

to think about if you were doing a financial analysis,

46:13

you need to maximize the

46:15

NPV of tax revenue. So not

46:17

just how big is the share of the value you're

46:19

capturing, but

46:22

how big is the total production

46:24

of a mineral in your country. So you

46:26

need to maximize the

46:28

company's revenue, but don't send the right signal

46:30

to other companies to come down and invest.

46:35

And over the long run, I don't think that is a good way to

46:37

go for a country. And

46:41

the other thing is that the Chilean lithium

46:43

policy is forcing companies

46:48

to do two things that I think we all agree we want to

46:50

do, and

46:53

one of them is the best way to go. One

46:56

is adding value to

46:58

resources. So pushing

47:00

companies, for example, instead of

47:02

just producing lithium carbonate to

47:05

move down the value chain and produce copper cathodes and

47:07

that type of thing. And

47:10

the second thing is to use certain

47:12

technologies to produce lithium.

47:16

We haven't discussed this much, but

47:18

lithium evaporates. When you produce lithium

47:20

out of brine, you evaporate a lot

47:22

of water that is in the brine, and

47:25

you use a lot of water, fresh water.

47:28

So we all want to produce

47:30

lithium with lower

47:33

environmental or water impact for local

47:35

communities and their environment. But

47:39

I think the way to do that is to increase

47:41

the standards, not to pick up

47:43

a specific technology. Because if you, as a

47:45

government official, pick up specific technology, especially

47:48

when technology is evolving very quickly,

47:50

you might get that wrong, and

47:52

you're, again, putting a restriction into

47:54

companies that other thing is the

47:56

best way to do. We've talked about

47:59

the impact of... of local and national politics

48:01

on the outlook for mining in Chile.

48:04

Talk about geopolitics for a moment, particularly

48:07

China. You mentioned SQM before. I think

48:09

that's about a quarter owned by a

48:11

Chinese company you see

48:13

in the United States, the significant

48:16

backlash and concern about Chinese

48:18

investment and also Chinese exports,

48:22

electric vehicles, solar panels. In Chile, I think there

48:24

are more Chinese

48:26

buses on the streets of Santiago than

48:28

in any city outside China in

48:30

the world. How do

48:32

you view the role of Chinese investment in that

48:35

sector? Is that a positive that's going to help

48:37

it develop faster or do

48:39

similar concerns about security,

48:41

national security, energy security apply?

48:44

I think we need to make a distinction between

48:46

energy and mining. On

48:49

energy, the Chinese

48:51

companies are

48:53

big suppliers of electric

48:56

buses, which I think is a

48:58

good thing. I mean, the state runs

49:00

open, competitive bidding processes

49:03

to buy electric

49:05

buses and whoever offers

49:08

the lowest total cost of ownership

49:11

gets wins. I

49:13

don't think that's a problem. If you,

49:16

at some point, you're too dependent

49:18

on one particular company or country, the

49:20

next bidding process you can buy from

49:22

someone else. I don't think

49:25

that's a big problem for us.

49:28

If you look at energy infrastructure,

49:30

though, I think it gets more

49:32

complicated. Chinese companies

49:34

have bought two

49:38

power distribution companies in Chile and

49:40

they now serve over 50%

49:43

of Chilean households. In

49:46

the case of China, you never know

49:48

who's the final owner and you always

49:50

get the sense that maybe the Chinese

49:53

government is behind that. As

49:57

you know, power distribution is a

49:59

utility. I mean,

50:01

the state needs to define tariffs and

50:03

make sure the quality of service is

50:06

good enough for clients and so on.

50:09

How do you do that when the company

50:11

or the final owner of 55% of your

50:13

power distribution is

50:16

the Chinese government in a way?

50:18

So that is complicated. So

50:22

far, we haven't had any problems. The Chinese

50:24

are making good investments, are deploying technology and

50:26

so on. But I think it could get

50:29

tricky until it does

50:31

not have a

50:34

foreign direct investment

50:36

screening mechanism

50:40

to make sure that we

50:42

don't have too

50:44

big a share of the

50:47

ownership in one particular industry by one

50:49

company or country. So I think that

50:51

could get complicated. We

50:55

have, for example, certain restrictions or vertical

50:57

integration in the power sector. So generation,

50:59

transmission, the distribution. Some people in government

51:02

are trying to change that. That

51:04

would allow the Chinese companies to

51:06

own also transmission infrastructure. That could

51:09

get complicated, I think. On

51:12

mining, the Chinese

51:15

don't have a big presence in mining operations

51:17

in Chile. They, as you

51:19

said, own 24% of the shares of SQM. But

51:24

the other 75% is

51:26

sold by Chilean and

51:28

international investors. And now

51:30

with this agreement with CODELCO, the controlling state

51:33

will be owned by the state. But

51:37

where I think the Chinese angle is

51:39

more complicated is that, and we didn't

51:41

discuss this earlier, but we

51:43

export most of our copper to China

51:46

in the form of copper concentrates. Copper

51:49

concentrates is basically 25% copper, right? And

51:54

the rest is just the soil

51:56

that you extracted from the

51:58

mining operations. have the

52:00

Chinese own most of the

52:02

smelting and refining capacity in the world. So

52:05

we send our copper to the Chinese, they

52:07

do the smelting and refining, and then they

52:09

sell or use the copper,

52:11

the refined copper themselves. And

52:14

they control most of the smelting and

52:16

refining capacity of copper. And

52:18

I think that could be a problem because

52:21

at some point they could, I

52:23

mean, try to extract value out

52:25

of copper producers because they have

52:27

the monopsonic power, right? They are

52:30

the biggest buyer of the product. Private

52:34

companies, Jason, when I talk to them, they

52:36

are not that concerned because they say if

52:38

they try to do that, the Chinese, I

52:40

mean, we could build a smelter and refinery

52:42

in Chile, I mean, in five or six

52:44

years. I mean, that's not the problem. But

52:47

if you look at that dependence from

52:50

the international perspective, the US or

52:52

Europe or South Korea or other

52:55

countries that need copper, that

52:57

could be a problem. I mean, let's

53:00

think about the IRA, for example, for a minute.

53:02

So the IRA says if you

53:05

are selling an electric vehicle in the

53:07

US and that electric vehicle gets

53:10

X percent of the minerals from a

53:12

friendly country, then you can access the

53:14

subsidies. I'm just simplifying it.

53:18

Chile has free trade agreement with the US.

53:20

So Chile is a friendly country. But

53:23

that copper is not going straight from Chile to

53:25

the US. It's going through

53:27

China. So that

53:30

discount is a friendly copper? I

53:32

don't think so. So

53:34

it's very complicated. Yeah, I was going to

53:36

ask you if you see Chile getting caught

53:38

in the middle in potential trade conflict between

53:40

the US or Europe and

53:43

China, not just in

53:46

the way you described, you qualify for

53:48

a tax credit, but diplomatic pressure as

53:50

well to resist or

53:52

limit Chinese investment into the sector. If

53:54

the goal of the

53:56

US is to build resilience and security and

53:58

supply chains by diversifying global

54:01

supplies of metals

54:03

and minerals away from China, you

54:06

could imagine those diplomats saying, well, we don't

54:09

want Chinese to control that production in other

54:11

countries outside China either. Yeah, I

54:13

see that. For a

54:15

small country like Chile, we

54:18

have free trade agreements with around 90% of the

54:20

world's GDP, including

54:22

the US, China, Europe, I

54:24

mean, most big economies. And

54:28

I don't think, even though

54:30

for obvious reasons, I have, I mean,

54:35

we share the values with the US, or

54:37

at least I share the values with the

54:39

US. I lived there through years. I mean,

54:42

I work with the Columbia. I

54:44

feel very comfortable with US

54:46

values, right? So if I

54:49

were my choice, I mean, that's an easy one

54:51

for me. But for a country, you

54:54

need to rely on multilateral

54:57

institutions, on rules.

55:00

You need to have

55:03

trade agreements and relations with different

55:07

countries. We sell most

55:09

of our copper to China, but also

55:11

we sell food,

55:14

fruits, wine, salmon.

55:17

They are a huge trade partner for us. Even

55:21

though we may not share many of,

55:23

I mean, the way

55:26

in which they do many things, I

55:29

mean, we still rely on them

55:31

for many things. So for us,

55:34

the worst scenario, I

55:36

would say, is to be caught up in

55:38

a fight between the US and China, and

55:40

being forced to take sides. We don't want

55:42

to do that. And when I

55:45

say that, I think that's

55:47

true for many other small developing countries as

55:49

well. So we

55:51

need to rely on international institutions.

55:53

And one of my concerns of

55:56

this whole dynamic and the trade

55:58

tensions is that... I think that

56:02

the bilidating is not strengthening

56:06

international institutions. And

56:08

without rules of the game, small countries

56:10

like ours are the ones that

56:12

suffered the most. I think that is for

56:14

me a big source of concern. We

56:17

talked about the water scarcity challenges

56:19

to dramatically increase mining. And a

56:22

big part of that comes from roughly

56:25

15 years of drought reservoirs

56:27

in Chile are running low and

56:30

across, I think,

56:32

across much of Chile, much of the world.

56:34

You're seeing hotter and drier conditions. I

56:37

didn't wanna miss the focusing on the cause or

56:42

the accelerant or the driver of some

56:44

of the drought and

56:46

water issues we're seeing. Can you talk just

56:48

for a moment about how you see the

56:50

impacts of climate change today in Chile? We

56:53

had a severe drought for 10 or

56:55

15 years, as you said. And

56:58

that has had impact, especially

57:01

as unfortunately is the case

57:03

in many locations. It

57:05

has a bigger impact on

57:07

poor people, right? So in

57:09

big cities, water

57:12

utility companies have made the investment

57:14

to basically ensure the supply of

57:16

fresh water for, I mean, drinking

57:18

water for households. But

57:21

in many rural areas, people don't

57:23

have water utilities and they get,

57:26

they are, they're water locally and they are

57:28

suffering. Many people

57:31

are dependent on agriculture

57:33

and drought is hurting them

57:36

as well. So

57:41

floods is a big problem as well, because

57:43

as you know, we have droughts in places

57:45

that where we used to have a lot

57:47

of rain, but then it's raining in places

57:49

where it used to be very dry and

57:52

the desert, it's a desert in the north.

57:54

So we have a very intense rain

57:57

there that is generating

57:59

for coasting. and floods and people are

58:01

hurting too. The

58:03

agricultural patterns of the country are changing

58:05

as well. So different, I

58:07

mean, crops are moving south

58:10

as it's getting hotter. So it's

58:13

having many effects in

58:16

different places. And

58:18

that is the paradox. And what

58:21

is more complicated about this? Because

58:23

in many cases you see those

58:25

impacts, people

58:28

are suffering and their

58:30

tendency is to kind

58:32

of try to protect

58:34

whatever they have left with

58:37

more intensity, right? And

58:40

that is, to a

58:42

certain extent, what is

58:44

making the development of mining

58:47

and renewable energy projects harder.

58:50

So I think that is very complicated. I

58:52

don't think we have figured that out. How

58:56

do we do that? So

58:58

that's what I think it's so important that we

59:01

at the center and other people are thinking about

59:03

these issues. Because a lot of people

59:05

say, we need renewable energy,

59:07

we need to stop climate change. We don't

59:09

agree on that. Most of us agree on

59:11

that. Some politicians, some of the extremes don't

59:13

agree with it. But most people at this

59:15

point agree on that. But

59:18

this is about trade-offs. It's not an

59:20

easy answer. I mean, how

59:23

much mining are we willing to

59:25

allow to stop climate

59:27

change? Even

59:30

though we know mining is gonna have

59:32

negative impacts on local communities and

59:35

local environments. How do we

59:37

solve those trade-offs? Yeah,

59:39

I was gonna ask you to wrap up because

59:41

we're pretty much out of time just by

59:44

talking about what the plans are

59:46

for the critical minerals work here. But

59:48

I think you just described it. And

59:50

really in the last hour, we've talked

59:52

about the impact of geopolitics, how to

59:54

do this activity in a way that

59:56

respects local communities, indigenous communities, the environment,

59:58

how to think about... technologies on the

1:00:00

demand side, maybe that could reduce how

1:00:03

much demand for minerals and mining

1:00:05

we need, and a

1:00:07

range of other questions. So as you said, there's

1:00:09

a lot of work to do and really grateful

1:00:11

to you and your colleagues like Tom Morenhout and

1:00:14

others for the work that you do here every

1:00:16

day to help advance our understanding of these issues.

1:00:18

Juan Carlos, thanks for your time today. No,

1:00:21

thank you so much. You're doing a great

1:00:23

job leading this center and it was

1:00:25

great to be on the show. Thank

1:00:31

you again, Juan Carlos, and thank you

1:00:33

for listening to this week's episode of

1:00:35

Columbia Energy Exchange. The show

1:00:37

is brought to you by the Center on

1:00:39

Global Energy Policy at Columbia University School of

1:00:41

International and Public Affairs. The show

1:00:43

is hosted by me, Jason Bordoff, and by Bill

1:00:45

Loveless. The show is produced by

1:00:47

Aaron Hardick from Latitude Studios. Additional

1:00:50

support from Tom Morenhout, Diego Mesa,

1:00:52

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1:00:55

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1:00:57

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1:01:15

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