0:03

The industry has said

0:05

now we do one thing

0:07

well, which is oil and gas. And

0:10

we can do things on the proximity

0:12

of oil and gas where we can

0:14

invest, where we have expertise and we

0:16

can make money. But

0:18

we are not going to do all of

0:20

the above. We are not renewable companies. To

0:23

limit global warming to one and a

0:25

half degrees above pre-industrial levels, emissions

0:27

should already be decreasing and need to be cut by

0:30

almost half by 2030, which is just six

0:32

years away. But fossil

0:34

fuels experience continued demand and revenue growth

0:36

in 2023. Here

0:39

at CEREWEAK, the world's largest annual energy

0:42

conference in Houston, the energy

0:44

transition is at the forefront of conversations.

0:47

But energy security and different pathways to

0:49

our net-zero goals are also themes of

0:51

the conference. And many companies have been

0:54

recommitting to their traditional oil and gas

0:56

businesses, even as they invest more in

0:58

clean energy. So how

1:00

do we navigate the path to a clean energy future?

1:03

What is the outlook for energy prices and markets? What

1:06

impact will today's geopolitical challenges have

1:08

on the transition? And

1:10

what impact will the many elections around the world

1:13

have on the energy sector in the years to

1:15

come? This

1:19

is Columbia Energy Exchange, a weekly podcast

1:22

from the Center on Global Energy Policy

1:24

at Columbia University. I'm Jason

1:26

Bordoff. Today

1:35

on the show, Javier Blas. Javier

1:37

is an opinion columnist for Bloomberg covering

1:40

energy and commodities. He

1:42

was previously at the Financial Times, where

1:44

he held various positions, including his roles

1:46

as the Africa editor and the commodities

1:48

editor, having initially joined the newspaper as

1:50

a commodities correspondent. Javier

1:53

is co-author of the book The World

1:55

for Sale, Money, Power, and the Traders

1:57

Who Barter the Earth's Resources, released in

1:59

2020. As

2:01

we recorded this interview from Houston, I brought Javier

2:03

in to talk through some of his recent coverage,

2:06

including the last week he spent touring

2:08

the Permian Basin here in Texas, shifting

2:10

political attitudes in Europe, OPEC's

2:13

move to extend cuts in oil production through

2:15

June, and the outlook for

2:17

critical mineral commodity markets. I

2:19

hope you enjoy the conversation. Javier

2:21

Blas, welcome back to Columbia Energy Exchange. Great

2:23

to see you early here in Houston at

2:25

zero week. Thank you for having me again.

2:27

My pleasure. So

2:30

zero week is just kicking off and

2:33

the whole energy world seems to be

2:35

here. So just as a scene center,

2:37

I guess this will probably

2:39

air tomorrow. I'm curious what you are looking

2:42

for. What what do you think the major

2:44

things you're here to pay attention to are?

2:48

I mean, it's a very interesting moment because

2:51

the last few years was all about the energy

2:54

transition and energy. And we were all talking about

2:56

emissions and how the industry was going to reduce

2:58

the emission and the whole particularly

3:01

fossil fuel industry oil and gas

3:03

producers were fighting

3:06

for relevance. They were struggling to

3:08

get investors attention. They were under

3:11

pressure from governments

3:14

to do more on the energy

3:16

transition. And then the last two

3:18

and a half years happened with the

3:21

invasion of Ukraine by Russia. And

3:24

then very high prices,

3:27

OPEC production cuts and

3:29

perhaps a realization that the transition is going

3:31

to take a bit longer than we initially

3:33

thought that it's going to be a bit

3:35

more difficult than we thought. And certainly it's

3:37

going to be a lot more expensive. So

3:40

you have particularly among big

3:42

oil. They are coming back swinging.

3:45

They find themselves relevant again.

3:48

The share price is up on

3:50

the market. Their market capitalization is

3:52

surging. They are paying dividends like

3:54

never before and buybacks like never

3:56

before. So I'm going to be

3:59

very interesting to see. what is the

4:01

message of the oil companies now that

4:03

they feel themselves a bit more safe

4:05

on the ground? What is their message

4:07

for what they are planning to do

4:09

in the next five to 10 years?

4:11

We have already kind of hair spin-offs

4:14

of that coming particularly from Shell, where

4:16

it's a bit more oil than we

4:18

thought, a lot more gas that initially

4:20

they said. While

4:22

everyone is saying we will be net zero by

4:25

2050, they are all saying our emissions are going

4:27

to be a bit higher in the next five

4:29

to ten years. So it's kind of

4:31

kicking the countdown and it

4:33

will be interesting at the same time how

4:36

that message is received by policymakers, particularly American

4:38

and European policymakers. Yeah, I think that's a

4:40

really interesting point and I'm wondering, as you

4:42

know, I've been writing for a while

4:45

about a growing, not shrinking gap

4:47

between ambition and reality pledges and

4:49

targets that are not consistent with

4:52

what today's energy situation

4:54

looks about. So you hear

4:56

increasing talk in circles like this one about

4:59

we need more realism, we need more pragmatism.

5:01

And of course, it is good to be realistic

5:03

and know what the world looks like, not just

5:05

have promises and hope. But

5:08

for many, that is seen to mean we

5:11

need to move more slowly. We simply can't

5:13

move as quickly toward this transition and we're

5:15

faced with a reality of worsening

5:17

climate impacts. Where do you think this

5:19

puts the conversation about

5:22

whether the oil and gas industry

5:24

has a role at the table, should have a role

5:26

at the table? Is this going to be perceived to

5:28

answer your own question by the

5:30

environmental community, by policymakers as

5:34

an argument that that's not going to be possible?

5:37

Well, I see that they deserve a role

5:40

on the table. They need to have a role

5:42

on the table. I don't think that we can

5:44

have a conversation about how we are going to

5:46

be transitioned without listening to the companies that are

5:49

supplying most of their primary

5:51

energy for the world. If you

5:53

put together oil, oil and gas, it

5:56

doesn't mean that policymakers need to

5:58

accept every premise that is coming.

6:00

from the industry. I find very

6:03

sad, for example, when the industry

6:05

is pushing back, or some parts

6:08

of the industry at least, not

6:10

everyone, but when

6:12

parts of the industry push back, for

6:15

example, about methane emission regulation.

6:17

I mean, this is probably the easiest

6:19

way that the industry and the world

6:22

has to tackle climate change. This is

6:24

something that should have been done already

6:26

years ago. And there is a big

6:29

role for these companies to do a lot

6:31

more on that. It

6:33

doesn't mean that tackling methane emissions

6:36

means that you are reducing investment

6:38

in oil and gas, but the

6:40

two things could come at

6:42

the same time. And I think that the

6:45

difficulty over the next few years for the

6:48

industry and policymakers is when we look at

6:50

that famous triangle of energy

6:53

between prices,

6:55

the cost of energy, the

6:59

supply of that energy, the safety of

7:01

supply, and also the environmental

7:04

impact of that energy, how we keep

7:06

those three things working together. Because

7:09

one of the things that we have seen,

7:11

and perhaps one of the biggest dangers that

7:13

I see on the energy transition, and perhaps

7:15

it's unbiased because I'm based in Europe, is

7:18

when you forget, for example,

7:20

about prices, you start risking

7:23

a massive backlash because

7:26

people bought into

7:28

the energy transition on the premise that it was

7:30

going to be green and cheap. When

7:33

you say it's green, but perhaps as

7:35

expensive as before, then

7:37

people, the reaction that we have seen

7:39

in a number of elections, that we have seen it even

7:42

in governments, in places where

7:44

they have been very pro-the-fight-against-climate change, like

7:46

in the United Kingdom at the forefront,

7:48

is starting to roll back on some

7:50

of those targets because they believe that

7:52

both are not there yet. And I

7:55

think that that's a big danger. Yeah,

7:57

I saw a Poll recently in the.

8:00

The U S. Only thirty eight percent of American

8:02

said will pay. A. Dollar a month

8:04

to address climate change. That figures

8:06

down fourteen percent. Since Twenty Twenty

8:08

One may be a recognition is

8:10

increasing economic stress as people feel

8:12

with rising inflation and other other

8:14

economic trends Do see that in

8:16

Europe. there's a lot of discussion

8:18

of the rise of right wing

8:20

populist parties. We saw them. Election

8:23

results in the Netherlands of other

8:25

winners had trouble actually forming a

8:27

government. big you parliamentary elections coming

8:29

up in June and the one

8:31

hand, you might expect that the

8:33

shock of Russia's weaponizing gas exports

8:35

to Europe would make people realize

8:37

if we move faster to decarbonise

8:39

energy systems, you might be less

8:41

dependent on globally traded hydrocarbons exposed

8:43

to geo political risks. But ah,

8:45

but as you talked about, I

8:47

think there are reasons why some

8:50

people are worried that a jagged,

8:52

disorderly transition. Is impacting them in the

8:54

Us in the pocket books in ways that

8:56

are weakening support may be feeling some of

8:58

those parties. Is that what you see? Yeah

9:00

yes he made you are right and yes

9:02

that doesn't have solely what I'm I'm see

9:04

and I think that's a did it did

9:06

that. The course of energy a happy com

9:08

up a big problem for many families and

9:11

yes ah it'll be an incentive to move

9:13

away from fossil fuels but at the same

9:15

time and some other sources of remain quiet,

9:17

quiet, spend save and ah you know when

9:19

you when you look at the costs of

9:21

unelected be a call a. New brand new

9:23

one aim in youtube of the average one

9:25

compared to our I, gasoline or diesel cars

9:28

are you see that he? This is a

9:30

big gap and is a bag that's out.

9:32

You look at their a day mean or

9:35

median average salary in in the Uk that

9:37

that's a significant to spend for many families.

9:39

I think that the all that sort of

9:41

that data to areas in judo there have

9:44

been very important one as we in the

9:46

farming community I mean farmers will be alive

9:48

on these in on these revolution on under

9:50

way that the house was dawn. while

9:53

i'm just kind of forgot how we

9:55

produce our food and you'd have i'm

9:57

an art of we tone it's fun

9:59

my phone on the energy

10:01

transition and protecting nature that by essence

10:03

farmers are very close, they are the

10:05

closest people on our society, close to

10:07

nature. We turn them almost

10:10

against the energy

10:12

transition and climate protection and

10:15

we have seen that in a number of elections in

10:17

Europe. We have seen that playing a role. That because

10:20

of the impact on fuel prices? The

10:22

impact on fuel prices is the impact

10:24

on pesticides and on fertilizer regulation and

10:28

perhaps it is also

10:31

just generally an attack

10:34

on a way of life that

10:37

an imposition from the cities into the

10:39

rural communities. I don't think

10:41

that has been handled very well

10:44

and it's a problem because when

10:46

you look at the background of

10:50

many of the

10:52

policymakers, elected officials

10:54

in Europe, it's a bit different in

10:57

the United States but in Europe, very

10:59

few have a farming background, not even

11:01

the relatives perhaps, I'm the grandson

11:05

of a wheat farmer so I feel

11:07

more attached to it. I think that when

11:09

you talk to farmers in Europe and I

11:11

do spend a bit of time doing that,

11:14

particularly when I go back home, you

11:16

realize that they feel that no one really understands

11:19

their plight. I think

11:21

that that's one. The other one that

11:24

to me is absolutely crucial, particularly on

11:26

the thinking of the current European

11:28

Commission, is the impact of

11:30

the European industry of climate

11:33

change. Not just because

11:35

Europe has been losing some

11:37

energy intensive industries hit

11:40

by the increasing cost of natural

11:42

gas and electricity and those are

11:44

relocating some cases to here, to

11:46

the Texas area, Houston, others

11:49

to China but I think that there is a realization in

11:51

Europe that the energy

11:53

transition could

11:55

mean at the end of certain

11:58

industries in Europe at the hands of Chinese. companies,

12:00

particularly in the automotive sector.

12:03

And that has triggered a lot of

12:05

concerns of countries like Italy and

12:08

Germany about what is the future

12:10

of national champions, like some of

12:12

their car manufacturing brands, how

12:15

those companies will survive on an energy

12:17

transition. And that's another reason why I

12:19

think some European politicians want to slow

12:22

down because they feel that China

12:25

has made the energy transition part of

12:28

his industrial policy and euro

12:30

cool and losing during

12:32

the transition a lot of business

12:34

and a lot of jobs. And

12:36

I think that this later point

12:38

about the industrialization and the suffering

12:40

of European big European industrial champions

12:42

is really playing a big role

12:44

at the mind of top of

12:46

government. As I said, certainly in

12:48

Italy, certainly in Germany, increasingly in

12:50

France, also in Spain. It's

12:53

interesting you say that because I feel like when I talk

12:55

to senior European officials, often what

12:57

you hear is taking

12:59

a victory lap for how successful Europeans

13:01

feel they were in getting

13:03

off of Russian gas. You remember the horror stories

13:05

about how impossible it would be to cope with

13:07

that Russian gas. Now they're even talking about maybe

13:10

limiting or banning Russian LNG into the European

13:12

market. In other words, we can go even

13:14

further than we have already, which seems maybe

13:17

in tension with what you were just saying,

13:19

which is this wasn't

13:21

entirely voluntary efforts to reduce gas consumption.

13:23

This was high prices destroying demand and

13:25

in some cases industrial activity leaving.

13:28

Where do you think the European policy discussion is

13:30

on that? I think you

13:32

hit a very important point because as

13:34

you earlier were talking about the gap

13:36

between ambition and reality on

13:38

the energy transition, I find a very

13:41

interesting gap between what some European policymakers

13:43

say in public and what they are

13:45

saying in private. And I think in

13:47

private, there is a more realisation that

13:50

Europe did a fantastic job of

13:52

getting out of Russian gas.

13:54

That a lot of the measures were

13:56

that renewables, particularly wind and solar, are

13:58

playing a huge But

14:00

there is also realization that Europe got very

14:03

lucky with the weather over the last two

14:05

winters. There have been warmer, in part because

14:07

of El Nino, also climate

14:09

change playing a role. And also that,

14:11

you know, when you look at industrial

14:14

consumption of natural gas down 20%

14:17

from pre-crisis level, and then you look at

14:19

industrial activity in Europe, there is an impact

14:21

and there is a lot of less consumption

14:23

because there is a lot less activity. Even

14:25

in private, that is not acknowledged as a

14:28

great outcome. And

14:31

you still have, I guess, high energy

14:33

prices. It's maybe not five

14:35

and ten times what it was before

14:37

the crisis, but at least twice as

14:39

much as it was before the crisis.

14:42

Yeah, and I forgot that. And you

14:44

know, I think that, you know, we

14:46

tend to tend that every old journalism

14:48

is local. People are interested on local

14:50

news because it's close to them. So

14:52

I just give you my personal example.

14:55

I am paying roughly this winter about

14:57

double the price of energy that I

14:59

paid before the invasion of Ukraine

15:01

by Russia. And that is a

15:03

significant cost for many families and

15:05

that's not going away. And

15:08

you know, relatives

15:10

ask me when we

15:12

are going to go back to normal. And

15:16

the sad answer is probably never. I mean,

15:18

this is a structural move in the cost of

15:20

energy that probably is going to stay with

15:22

us. Gone are the

15:24

days. And it's not only on natural

15:26

gas, it's particularly acute on electricity, which

15:28

is going to be the future. For

15:32

if we electrify everything, but you know, pre-crisis,

15:35

we were in the kind

15:37

of range of 35 to 45 euros

15:39

per megabat hour. We

15:43

are about double those levels. And

15:46

that is a significant cost for families. That's a

15:48

significant cost for businesses. Talk

15:51

a little bit about what you see more globally.

15:53

We were talking about Europe, but just in the

15:55

global market right now, oil

15:58

markets seem relatively. calm about

16:00

conflict in the Middle East. Prices are

16:03

rising to some extent. OPEC

16:05

extended its cuts. A lot of

16:07

uncertainty about the demand outlook. Our

16:10

electric vehicles exponentially growing, hitting an

16:12

S-curve. What's going to happen to

16:14

the Chinese economic outlook? We just

16:17

saw the

16:20

government in China sort of put

16:22

out some targets that

16:25

made people concerned. Maybe they wouldn't stimulate the economy

16:27

as much as people thought. So just give your

16:29

high-level sense and then we can go a bit

16:31

deeper on some of the factors underlying the supply

16:33

and demand side of that. We

16:35

look at fossil fuels. I think that

16:37

the first point I will make is

16:39

that demand for fossil fuels, and that

16:41

includes coal, gas, and oil, continues to

16:43

increase. The

16:45

energy transition in some ways

16:47

has not really started in the

16:50

way that we are not yet eating away our

16:52

consumption of those fossil fuels. That continues

16:54

to go up. I think

16:57

it's particularly concerning that we have not picked

16:59

yet on coal, which should have been the

17:01

first fossil fuel that we

17:03

should have picked. The International Energy Agency believes

17:06

that we will pick on the three sources

17:08

of fossil fuel energy before the end of

17:10

the decade. I think that the industry is

17:12

rather skeptical about it. They

17:15

see more a peak going into the 2030. But

17:17

I believe that

17:22

perhaps the big shift on the debate

17:25

about the peak on

17:27

fossil fuels has been paying less

17:29

attention to the actual day when

17:32

fossil fuel demand will peak and more

17:34

about what comes after. Because

17:37

if we are going to meet some of

17:39

the most ambitious climate change targets, we

17:41

need a peak that looks like

17:44

a peak. It's something, a mountain. You go

17:46

up on one side of the mountain, you

17:48

go down on the other side of the

17:50

mountain, and both look relatively similar in terms

17:52

of how steep they are. I

17:54

think that the consensus now across

17:57

almost everyone in the industry is

18:00

that we peak and then we plateau and

18:02

stay at the very elevated number for the

18:04

years to come. And that

18:06

really changed completely the dialogue in terms

18:09

of the amount of investment that is

18:11

needed, but also in

18:15

how likely is that we hit some of

18:17

the climate change targets post 2030, where

18:20

I think that the gap between what

18:23

I will say is ambition and what

18:25

I see potentially happening, it's much

18:27

larger than what we see right now in 2024.

18:31

So that kind of will be the big picture

18:33

demand wise. I think that we continue to do

18:35

well in terms of or bad. You

18:38

look at that sense for climate change, I

18:40

mean, the demand continues to increase. And if

18:42

you think about the oil market, we

18:45

are back to the historical trend of

18:48

our one and a bit percentage wise

18:50

of annual demand increase. That is not

18:52

to me a weakening. I mean, the

18:54

last two years were the recovery of

18:56

COVID-19. We are back to trend. We

18:59

have not seen really a deceleration of oil

19:01

demand growth. And

19:06

what is very concerning to

19:08

me is that oil demand

19:10

growth continues to be about

19:12

above 1% per year, despite the

19:14

fact that the Chinese economy has

19:16

slowed down dramatically over the last

19:19

few years. And I

19:21

wonder what will be happening with fossil fuel

19:24

energy consumption if China was

19:26

firing on all his cylinders

19:28

as it was doing five,

19:31

10 years ago. Where

19:33

do you see that growth coming from?

19:35

What do you see also as the

19:37

prospects for electrification and transport? There are

19:39

sort of headlines about rental

19:41

car companies and car makers that are pulling back

19:43

on some of their EV plans at the same

19:45

time. China in particular, I mean,

19:48

when you look at how large the increase

19:50

has been in the share of new vehicles

19:52

sold that are electric or the share of

19:54

global spending on energy that is going to

19:56

clean versus fossil fuel, people forget sometimes nearly

19:59

half of that. is just in China alone,

20:01

which does seem for reasons of energy security and

20:03

local pollution to be pushing pretty hard on electrification

20:05

and to try to own some of these supply

20:08

chains globally. So we think

20:10

about oil, where that demand is coming from,

20:13

first and foremost is the

20:15

petrochemical industry. And that's where

20:17

probably 40% of the consumption

20:19

currently is coming. So we

20:21

are demanding more of growth.

20:27

So more plastics,

20:29

essentially more plastics. And that

20:31

is coming from a more affluent middle

20:34

class everywhere. The moment that you

20:36

reach certain thresholds, it has happened

20:39

before on every other country, you

20:41

start consuming more plastics. So

20:44

that's one. The other one, and

20:46

perhaps this is a bit counterintuitive, is

20:49

gasoline. And gasoline should be the first

20:51

place where we should be witnessing

20:54

the impact of the energy

20:56

transition because electric vehicles literally

20:58

go against gasoline. That is,

21:00

that's where they hit harder. The International

21:02

Energy Agency about a year ago put

21:04

out a report that

21:06

said that gasoline demand at

21:09

a global level peaked in

21:11

2019, just pre-crisis or pre-COVID.

21:14

And that consumption will never

21:16

recover above that level, which was

21:19

about around close to 27

21:22

million barrels a day, which is about

21:24

a third of global oil demand is

21:26

gasoline, a bit less than that a

21:28

third. What

21:31

we have seen since then is that global

21:34

gasoline demand in 2023 rose above the level of

21:39

2019 and global gasoline demand continues

21:41

to increase in 2024. It

21:44

will be interesting to see when

21:46

the International Energy Agency updates his

21:48

kind of medium time outlook the

21:50

next five years where they put

21:52

gasoline demand. And

21:54

the problem with that is, the reason

21:57

for that is I Think

21:59

it's twofold. one ease bad diesel

22:01

is lucy market said in Europe

22:03

and a lot of our consumers

22:05

are the team that a diesel

22:07

cars but rather than safety and

22:09

into an electric vehicle data going

22:11

back to gasoline costs are with

22:13

is problematic than that and that's

22:15

the reason that you seats are

22:17

gasoline demanding. Son European countries like

22:19

France or Spain or the highest

22:21

level in Fifteen twenty years mean

22:23

that the moment where guzzling the

22:25

most be going down we have

22:28

gasoline demanding in in France. The

22:30

height as it has meaning to

22:32

the case so that's one reason

22:34

the other recently stats are despite

22:37

increasing sales off or electric vehicles

22:39

date Globalist stock of internal combustion

22:41

engines continue to increase guess we

22:43

added Sally more electric vehicles of

22:46

we continue sally and on our

22:48

saleem or gasoline cars everywhere on

22:50

and they consume they consume a

22:52

lot and the bill that recent

22:55

form on gasoline which I find

22:57

very x that very interesting ease.

23:00

I don't know what caught by Next I

23:03

have a gasoline car I want to taste

23:05

so an electric vehicle but I'm kind of

23:07

thinking wow they saw my seem to base

23:10

your perhaps if I a whole the car

23:12

for another six months of blood moons I'm

23:14

gonna get a better cause of death coming

23:16

on the market or this utopian branch of

23:19

announced new model for twenty twenty five prices

23:21

are coming down. The holding back up with

23:23

on buying a habit is a good A.

23:25

That's a when you have million of people

23:28

doing exactly the same thing waiting for ah

23:30

more innovation. On electric cars on prices

23:32

to calm down. Would you do is

23:34

that more people are running All that

23:36

cost would have less. Ah Assisi

23:39

and ah that that newer cops and

23:41

I seem to daddy salsa we we

23:43

have kind of a slow down. the

23:45

improvement in in I'm. I'm a

23:47

flu fuel efficiency that we used to

23:50

have ah in some countries the has

23:52

completely a stop. and

23:55

that does have an impact on on

23:57

gasoline demand increases on the flip side

24:01

We may have a big increase in

24:03

electric vehicles all of a sudden and

24:05

all at the same time when a

24:07

lot of consumers like me say, aha,

24:09

look, now I have

24:11

a lot of choice because a lot of

24:14

electric vehicles have come into the market, prices

24:16

have come down, this is the moment to

24:18

buy. And then you have a big chunk

24:20

of the population all in almost one go

24:22

shifting from gasoline

24:25

into electric vehicles. But we are not

24:27

there yet, neither in Europe nor in

24:29

America. The trends you're describing,

24:32

maybe at some point that changes with the

24:34

tipping points for EVs you were talking about,

24:38

even with slow growth demand is

24:40

rising, what's happening in China, gasoline

24:43

use rising, all of that sounds

24:45

bullish and it feels like everyone

24:48

says prices are about to go through the roof six months

24:51

from now and they've been saying that for a while. And

24:53

they're not low but they haven't gone

24:56

through the roof either in the 80, 90

24:59

range. So what's

25:01

your outlook for the oil market and why

25:03

are prices not spiking the way some thought

25:05

they might? Well, the

25:07

answer to that is found

25:09

here in Texas, it's the Shell

25:11

Revolution. I think that if

25:15

we were not to have the Shell production

25:17

we will have much, much higher prices. But

25:20

I describe an environment for

25:23

oil demand that in

25:25

any case will look healthy, robust, reasonable,

25:27

you know, demand is growing, there is

25:29

no any problem. And similar to last

25:31

year, the problem for the oil market

25:33

for the bulls for Saudi

25:37

Arabia is not demand,

25:39

it's supply. We

25:41

have a lot of supply coming from the United States.

25:44

We are going to have this year extra

25:46

supply from Canada with the opening of a

25:48

new pipeline that is going to alleviate some

25:50

of the bottlenecks of the Canadian oil industry.

25:52

We will have the typical what

25:54

we have got now used to that is that

25:56

Guyana is putting every year extra oil into the

25:58

market. get more

26:00

oil from here and there. All

26:02

together means that non-opaque

26:05

supply is more or less enough

26:07

to cover all the incremental increase

26:12

in oil demand. And that's why

26:14

the market is taking it quite

26:17

easy. I mean, there is a lot of

26:19

spare capacity in Saudi Arabia. If any surprises

26:21

the Saudis can put more into the market.

26:24

I would not say that oil is cheap,

26:26

however. We are, as we are speaking,

26:28

around $85 brand,

26:31

which is, yes, perhaps we could

26:33

all the inflation accumulator has lost

26:35

purchasing power for oil producers. But

26:37

$85 is a pretty good

26:40

price for some countries. Saudi Arabia

26:43

probably would like it to see

26:45

even closer to $100. But I

26:47

have been talking here in Texas

26:49

the last few days with oil

26:51

companies. I tell you, everyone

26:53

is making a lot of money and everyone seems

26:55

to be extremely happy with prices. So

26:58

you just spent a week in the Permian.

27:00

I want you to talk a little bit

27:03

about what you found. As you said, one

27:05

of the factors, maybe along with weaker demand

27:07

in China for the fact that prices aren't

27:09

higher, is shale what roughly doubled many people's

27:11

expectations last year? Last year

27:14

certainly doubled most people's expectations.

27:16

I think that in some

27:18

cases from the people who

27:20

were more bearish on

27:23

oil supply from the US, probably

27:25

triple their expectations. There

27:27

was a flood of oil into the

27:29

market. I put four Saudi Arabia into

27:32

cutting production quite aggressively to maintain

27:34

the market where the Saudis won, which

27:36

is around on a floor not

27:38

lower than $75 to $80 brand.

27:44

And that was at a time when everybody thought the days

27:46

of a million, a million and a half barrels per day

27:48

per year growth were a thing of the past. Completely over.

27:50

But are we going to keep doing that? How long do

27:52

we do that? I

27:54

think that the biggest concern for OPEC

27:56

today should be that the

27:59

shale oil industry industry can

28:01

do all of the above. In the

28:03

past, shale companies

28:05

could do one

28:08

of two things. They could grow production

28:10

or they could pay

28:12

shareholders, but they couldn't do both

28:14

things. Right now,

28:16

and the big change of last year

28:18

was that the shale companies are not

28:21

only growing production and growing production quite

28:23

aggressively, but they are also paying their

28:25

shareholders. For the very first time since

28:28

the shale revolution started more than a

28:30

decade and a half ago, Wall Street

28:32

is making money out of the shale

28:35

industry. Shareholders, shareholders,

28:37

everyone is making money. That's what we

28:39

have seen investors going by because they

28:42

are recognizing that the companies can grow

28:45

and pay dividends if prices stay at

28:47

a current level. I think that that

28:49

should be very concerning to OPEC. I

28:52

think that there were a number of one-offs

28:54

last year in terms of the

28:59

growth in the US, perhaps from the

29:01

private sector. The companies

29:04

that are not listed on the stock

29:06

market, they have a huge interest in

29:08

trying to increase production a lot because

29:10

a lot of them were for sale

29:12

and nothing gets you a better price

29:15

and a lot of production growth. That

29:18

probably kind of used up

29:20

the increase in shale. But

29:23

even if we don't see the

29:25

industry growing a lot, I mean

29:28

from my conversations in Midland, the capital

29:30

of the Permian in the last few days, I

29:32

think that 400,000, 500,000 borrows a day of annual

29:34

average increase is almost a given. I mean, even

29:40

in the industry doesn't grow much from where

29:42

we are today, we will get already 300,000

29:44

borrows a year because

29:46

you do the annual average of 2024 against

29:49

the annual average of 2023 and the beginning

29:51

of 2023 was a much lower

29:53

level. So we are

29:55

going to continue seeing a lot

29:58

borrows from the US. But

30:01

the shale industry remains as

30:04

sensitive to small changes in prices

30:06

as it has been. So

30:09

at 80 you have healthy

30:12

growth but nothing to write home. At

30:15

85 you have massive increase in production.

30:17

At 90 you have even much higher

30:19

increase in production. You go down to

30:22

70, the production growth

30:24

stops. Below that probably we

30:26

start seeing a drop in

30:28

production. So at

30:30

the end of the day a lot of

30:32

my commentary here is going to depend on what

30:34

the South is deciding and how they decide

30:36

to keep the market. At the moment they

30:38

are opting for a very tight market and higher

30:41

prices which is going to mean more production

30:43

from the US. What did you

30:45

make of there? And by the way just on shale,

30:47

what will be the consequence? And

30:49

again you just spend a week in

30:51

the Permian, the kind of wave of

30:54

large mergers we've seen, Exxon Pioneer, Chevron

30:56

House, Occidental, Crown Rock. Does

30:58

that mean more stability in the

31:01

production outlook? Does that change how

31:03

responsive shale is to changes in

31:05

price? I think that shale

31:08

will remain very flexible and that's what

31:10

everyone likes of the shale industry. One

31:15

of the problems of a CEO

31:17

on what we'll call the oil

31:19

industry was that once you approve a project

31:22

you were committed to that project for the

31:24

next 5 to 10 years. And

31:26

it was very difficult to reverse course or

31:28

kind of fine tune your plans midway.

31:32

You were all in, it was a $10

31:34

billion program and no

31:36

matter where the oil price was you needed to

31:38

go ahead with it. Shale

31:40

allows you to flex up or

31:42

down very quickly and that's why everyone

31:44

is investing on shale because it allows

31:47

you a lot more reaction

31:49

to the market. I have

31:51

thought that... Is that higher now

31:53

because of these uncertainties about the demand outlook

31:55

you talked about before? That's

31:58

one of the reasons you are running a big... international

32:00

oil company, let's say, you know, Exxon

32:02

or Chevron, and you don't know

32:04

what the future looks like. I mean, everyone has

32:06

their own models and their own scenarios, but there

32:09

is a range of uncertainty about what the oil

32:11

demand is going to be 10 years

32:13

from now. Shale gives you a

32:16

lot more flexibility if you need to

32:19

accelerate production. As

32:21

today, we are consuming more oil than

32:23

we thought only a few years ago.

32:26

But that may change very quickly.

32:28

Five years from now, we may need

32:30

less oil, and then shale allows you

32:33

to adapt. I mean, I have said

32:35

that some of the mergers that we

32:37

have seen in the Permian, where particularly

32:39

big oil, have bought into big shale

32:42

operators, it was about future

32:44

proof, their business model allowing

32:46

them to react both sides.

32:48

They have the flexibility if

32:50

oil demand remains more robust

32:53

than that previously thought,

32:55

it allows them to cash on that

32:57

trend. But if oil demand

32:59

surprises to the downside, that also

33:01

allow them to adjust. All

33:04

together, I will have thought that

33:06

the consolidation of the oil industry should

33:09

mean that companies are going to

33:11

be a bit more present trying to not float

33:14

the market. But I think that on the

33:16

Permian, even despite all the consolidation that we

33:18

have seen, that there are

33:20

so many companies, so many operators, and

33:23

so many of them are so hungry

33:25

to increase production that there is still

33:27

more than enough to keep

33:29

the market going and provide a boost

33:31

onto American production. And

33:34

you mentioned OPEC and Saudi Arabia. So just say

33:36

a little more about the strategy you see there.

33:39

OPEC cohesion, OPEC plus, does Russia

33:41

really play a meaningful role? And

33:44

in particular for Saudi Arabia with the decision

33:46

to hold a lot of spare capacity, prices

33:48

at these levels. And

33:50

Saudi just recently scrapped plans to invest tens

33:52

of billions of dollars to increase how

33:55

much oil it could produce. Is that because it

33:57

suddenly thinks electric vehicles and

33:59

the transition and the IEA forecasts are correct

34:01

or is that for another reason? I think that

34:03

the main reason for the I think that there

34:06

are two reasons for the Saudis to have announced

34:08

the scrapping the

34:10

expansion of production capacity. One

34:14

is because I think that

34:16

they recognize that the world perhaps

34:18

is not shifting away from

34:20

oil but certainly shifting away from Saudi

34:22

oil for now because there is plenty

34:24

of new supply coming from the Americas

34:27

not only the US but Canada, Brazil

34:29

and Guyana that means less demand for

34:31

Saudi oil. The other reason is that

34:33

for domestic reasons they do need the

34:35

money so they can't spend it somewhere

34:38

else. We can't debate whether

34:40

current spending trends in Saudi Arabia

34:42

are great when they're just buying

34:44

international soccer teams in

34:46

Europe or golf players

34:49

etc. etc. whether that is good

34:51

use of money for a country that needs

34:53

a lot of development in Saudi Arabia rather

34:55

than subsidizing golf

34:58

tournaments overseas

35:00

but the Saudis do need the money and

35:02

I think that that's a recognition of that. It

35:06

seems that the Saudi strategy and that's the

35:08

upper class strategy at the moment is to

35:11

play the long game. They are thinking

35:14

that oil demand will remain more resilient

35:16

that the International Energy Agency thinks and

35:18

they are thinking that at some point

35:21

the US shale industry growth will slow

35:23

down and that will create again an

35:25

opening for Saudi Arabia and his allies

35:27

to return millions of barrels of oil

35:30

into the market. It's

35:33

risky because we don't

35:36

see yet signs of that. We

35:41

see 2024 to be relatively

35:45

well supplied from non-OPEC

35:47

actors. The same thing

35:49

looks like for 2025 and the

35:53

later, the longer than the

35:55

Saudis wait for that kind of all-illusion moment

35:57

where there is an opportunity to do that.

36:00

opening for the oil, the more the risk

36:03

that oil demand growth starts to

36:05

slow down significantly as we get

36:07

closer to 2030 and beyond.

36:10

So I think that it's

36:13

interesting, I have described

36:15

the Saudi strategy

36:18

as a bit of white and sea in 2024. I

36:21

have also said that it's a year of hope. Because

36:26

by I think the end of this year,

36:28

it will be clear whether the

36:30

strategy of playing the long game

36:32

is working or not. And

36:35

I think that the risk for the Saudis is that I

36:38

think that it's a strategy that it could

36:40

work, but it very much depends on what

36:42

price they are targeting. I think that certainly

36:45

the Saudis could see

36:47

and create a slowdown in US

36:50

oil production growth by keeping

36:52

the market say at $75

36:54

a barrel. But if they

36:56

try to keep the market at close

36:58

to 90 or higher as they seem

37:01

to be doing, it's going to be

37:03

a lot more difficult for the Saudis

37:05

to engineer a slowdown in US shale

37:07

growth. And the

37:09

other problem that they have is not

37:11

just the US shale industry. I mean,

37:13

one of the things that I have

37:16

been most fascinated in this visit to

37:18

Texas is the US Gulf of Mexico

37:20

is again on an expansion growth phase.

37:23

Big oil companies are putting money and

37:25

the Gulf of Mexico new geological plays

37:27

are coming or are going to be

37:29

coming onto a stream relatively soon. And

37:31

we are talking about companies

37:33

making final investment decisions in the Gulf

37:35

of Mexico that we have not seen

37:38

for 10-15 years. At

37:40

current prices, the industry

37:42

is investing because it's making money. What

37:46

I hear you describing is a

37:49

set of company

37:52

strategies reflecting where the world seems

37:54

to be today and is headed that are, I

37:57

think, fundamentally inconsistent with meeting anything close

37:59

to to the climate goals that the

38:01

world has committed to. And so it's

38:03

always hard to generalize and paint

38:06

a broad brush and say the industry. But broadly

38:08

speaking, it would be helpful if you kind of

38:10

disentangle that a little bit. What do you see for

38:13

major companies, for maybe European versus

38:15

American? What's happening with national oil companies?

38:17

And is there an evolution there? But

38:21

I think what I hear you describing is

38:23

a strategy of increasing investment in clean energy

38:25

and picking spots where those can be

38:27

profitable, but fundamentally investing in

38:30

oil and gas business in a

38:32

way that presumes that oil

38:35

and gas demand is going to continue at

38:37

today's levels or maybe even more for a

38:39

very long time to come, which means we're

38:42

not achieving the goals we talked about. Is

38:45

that what you see? How does that

38:47

look different for different players in the industry? And

38:51

what does that mean for how you think, as

38:53

you said earlier in the conversation, policymakers and

38:55

others are going to respond? The idea that

38:57

we're just going to talk about

38:59

these climate goals but not do very much about them

39:01

for a long time to come? It is how I

39:04

see it. I think that a

39:06

big change over the last three,

39:08

four years has been that the

39:11

industry and some policymakers have embraced

39:13

this, have been able to flip

39:15

around the argument. The

39:17

argument, particularly from activists on

39:19

climate, was let's hit supply

39:22

and we will force demand

39:24

down. So it was

39:26

just reducing investment in oil, keep

39:28

it on the ground, divestment policies,

39:31

and so on. I think that the

39:33

industry certainly always disagreed with that and they

39:35

said, well, you need to reduce demand. If

39:38

you reduce demand, we are going to follow

39:40

because we are not going to invest for

39:42

something that is not consumed. I think that

39:44

they have been able to win that argument

39:47

with policymakers and you hear more and more

39:49

policymakers admitting that you cannot reduce supply and

39:51

do nothing about demand because then you end

39:54

with a very imbalanced market and you make

39:56

the energy transition significantly more difficult. I think that

39:59

you have been right. at Columbia very

40:01

good papers about this topic, I

40:03

mean earlier than many others. So

40:05

I think

40:08

that that's absolutely crucial. I mean, the industry

40:10

feels that they want that argument, that they

40:12

want that debate. And they are just

40:14

now saying, give us the demand

40:17

and we will meet that demand. It is lower,

40:19

we will meet a lower demand. If it's higher,

40:21

we will meet that higher demand, but it's not

40:23

for the industry to set the

40:25

level of what oil is gonna be

40:28

consumed. I mean, you could make the argument

40:30

that the industry is doing his best to

40:32

try to, you know, use that demand, keep

40:34

prices affordable, et cetera, et cetera. The

40:37

other thing that to me has been

40:39

quite interesting is, and with a lot

40:41

of different graduations, this

40:45

is not a black and white, but

40:47

I think just generally the industry has

40:50

said now, we do one

40:52

thing well, which is oil and gas. And

40:55

we can do things on the proximity

40:57

of oil and gas where we can

40:59

invest, where we have expertise and we

41:01

can make money. But

41:03

we are not gonna do all of the above.

41:05

We are not, you

41:08

know, renewable companies. And,

41:10

you know, we may do things

41:12

there, but that's not gonna be our

41:15

core. So that's what you see a

41:17

big retrenchment from investment in wind and

41:19

solar to invest perhaps

41:21

more on integrated electricity, which that

41:23

includes also gas, fire,

41:25

power stations, a lot of trading

41:28

around that. But less investment in

41:30

solar panels and wind parks. You

41:32

see a push into bio gas

41:35

or bio, yeah, bio gas, where

41:38

they feel that they have

41:40

an adjacent expertise and

41:43

they are doing electric charging networks, particularly

41:45

in Europe, because they also see us

41:48

a natural extension of the traditional gas

41:50

station projects. But just

41:52

generally I think that the

41:54

companies and

41:56

their shareholders have understood

41:59

that. They're good at

42:01

one thing and then they're going to

42:03

let the rest of the market to

42:05

figure out how to do the transition.

42:07

That creates also great opportunities for green

42:10

companies because they have less competition there.

42:15

But it's also clear that the oil companies

42:18

and that is also exacerbated by the fact that

42:20

profits in renewable energy over the

42:22

last three, four years have not

42:24

been nearly as good as expectations.

42:28

What do you see happening in the

42:30

global gas market? The IEA's projection of

42:32

peak gas demand, is there something

42:34

you think is missing in that? On

42:37

the supply side, are we headed toward a glut

42:39

in LNG by the end of the decade? Are

42:41

we short of gas in the next decade? What

42:44

impact? Maybe talk a

42:46

little bit about Qatar's recent announcement of expansion

42:48

and also the US decision to put a

42:50

pause on new LNG permits,

42:52

export permits. On

42:55

LNG, what is clear is we're going to have

42:57

a lot more LNG coming into the market in

42:59

the next five years. That's

43:02

going to be what I think is

43:04

the third phase of the expansion of the global

43:06

industry coming and Qatar is going to play a

43:08

massive role into that expansion. I

43:16

can't believe that either

43:18

coal or gas demand are going to

43:20

peak in the next few

43:22

years before I

43:25

find it difficult to reconcile that both are

43:27

going to peak. I

43:29

think if gas doesn't do as well

43:32

as the expectations of the oil and gas

43:34

companies, that's going to be positive for coal

43:36

and really bad news for the planet. I

43:38

think that if we get coal demand suppressed,

43:40

it's going to be in great part because

43:42

we're going to be consuming more gas. I

43:45

find it very difficult to have both

43:47

coal and gas peak

43:50

at the same time. Even

43:53

with huge growth in the world. huge

44:00

growth in renewable production

44:03

in China. China is still generating north of

44:05

50% of his electricity.

44:08

The numbers are higher for places

44:10

like India. The important

44:14

point for these

44:16

expansion in renewables is that in

44:19

those developing countries, at the moment, the

44:21

expansion is meeting the incremental demand of

44:23

electricity. And the electricity demand on those

44:25

countries is really rocketing. So

44:28

we have yet to start kind

44:30

of reducing the use of, say,

44:32

coal into the

44:34

base load production. The other very important

44:37

point, and it has come

44:39

to as a surprise to many, and I

44:41

don't know how this is possible, is the

44:43

electrification of everything is going to

44:46

trigger an increase on electricity demand.

44:48

And that seems very obvious, has

44:51

not been obvious in part of the debate.

44:54

So we are going to have to...

44:56

Along potentially with data centers and AI.

44:58

Data centers, artificial intelligence, those are all

45:00

very energy intensive

45:03

applications, but just generally electrifying

45:05

everything, it's just

45:07

going to require more electricity. And

45:09

during the energy transition, we have

45:11

put a lot of emphasis on

45:14

the generation side of electricity. We have

45:16

not yet put enough emphasis into

45:18

the distribution side of that electricity,

45:21

that's the grid, the network, and

45:23

particularly not even the

45:25

high voltage grid. Sometimes it comes down

45:28

to the local grid. I mean, I

45:30

live in West London, an

45:32

area of London where there is a

45:34

cap on development of new housing projects

45:37

because they cannot get enough power to

45:39

them because of their local electricity

45:42

distribution network is completely saturated.

45:45

So that is going to require a lot of investment,

45:48

public money, that governments perhaps have not really

45:50

thought about what it was going to need.

45:52

That is disruptive, it means you're kind of

45:55

putting pilots and no one wants,

45:57

it's breaking... streets

46:00

to buy a new cable, etc. And

46:03

that's all going to take time. And,

46:06

you know, I think

46:09

that the trends are right. The

46:11

electrification of everything is going to continue. But

46:13

again, it just takes a bit more pain,

46:16

a bit more time,

46:19

and a bit more money than expected. You

46:21

co-authored a great book about commodity markets.

46:24

And so metals and minerals are

46:26

incredibly important for the transition. Everyone's

46:29

projecting shortages in the years to come, but

46:31

prices are going down, not up. So,

46:34

you know more about commodity markets than I

46:37

do, but explain that to us and

46:39

where you see the investment. Well,

46:42

we have already a lot of investment

46:45

in metals markets. And, you know,

46:47

just painting every metal market the same

46:49

way is impossible. But

46:51

we see a lot of demand for

46:53

copper in part linked

46:55

to the expansion of electricity grids. It's

46:58

not only the big high voltage cables,

47:00

but it's mostly the kind of the

47:03

in-town, inside the city's networks of distribution. That's

47:06

going to require a lot of copper, a

47:09

lot of appliances

47:12

for houses, etc., etc. All

47:14

copper intensive electric vehicles are all copper

47:16

intensive. There are not that many projects on

47:18

copper coming on the stream, and those projects are complicated.

47:21

They are in more difficult areas

47:23

of the world, etc., etc. And

47:25

that's why we have copper around $9,000

47:27

a ton, which is historically a very high

47:30

price. We

47:32

have other commodities that we wear, the yellow-mid

47:34

expression, freaking out that we were going to run out,

47:37

and we kind of labeled critical minerals.

47:39

I thought that they were far less

47:41

critical than we thought. And they are

47:44

plentiful in supply, cobalt, lithium, nickel. And

47:47

a lot of these projections assume that we

47:49

were not going to get smarter in the

47:51

use of these metals in battery chemistry. If

47:53

I have learned anything from the oil and

47:56

gas industry, if you give enough time and

47:58

enough money for an engineer to... adapt,

48:00

they will come with fantastic technological

48:02

innovations that reduce the consumption of

48:05

everything and make things cheaper and

48:07

more efficient. Engineers are fantastic at

48:09

that. The same thing

48:12

is happening on the battery sector.

48:14

Engineers are re-engineering the chemistry of

48:16

batteries, reducing the use of certain

48:18

metals which are scarce, and that

48:20

is also triggering a slump in

48:22

prices. Everyone invested in the base

48:24

of these very rusty outlooks for

48:27

demand for lithium, cobalt, and now

48:29

they are realizing that everyone did

48:31

the same investment and the

48:33

demand is not

48:35

as high because the chemistry of the batteries is

48:37

starting to change. All of

48:39

a sudden, voila, we

48:42

have much lower prices. The

48:44

industry is a cyclical one.

48:46

It is a

48:48

boom and buzz and that can

48:50

be changed. There are times where,

48:53

for example, Nicole was really worried

48:55

that we were going to face

48:58

a shortage. Some technology

49:01

advances and we discover new ways

49:04

on the metallurgic of Nicole to make

49:06

it in a much cheaper way, perhaps

49:08

not in a very environmentally friendly way,

49:10

but certainly in a cheaper way in

49:13

Indonesia. All of a sudden, all

49:16

the supply that we thought that we

49:18

didn't have, we have it and prices

49:20

have collapsed. We need

49:22

more batteries, EVs, minerals, solar panels. We want

49:24

those to be as cheap as possible, but

49:26

in many countries, if that means

49:29

they come from China, that's a problem. That's a

49:31

bad thing, not a good thing. Talk

49:34

about the rise of industrial policy approaches in

49:36

the US and in Europe. I saw even

49:38

in Brazil, the other day, expressed concerns with

49:40

anti-dumping allegations against the Chinese. How

49:44

do we accelerate this transition and get

49:46

the commodities you're talking about? How is

49:49

the competition

49:51

with China going to complicate that or is

49:54

there a way to square that circle? It's

49:58

a very important question because if you think... about where

50:00

we are on climate change and you believe

50:03

we need rapid action. We need to

50:05

move a well-formed fossil fuels as quickly

50:07

as we can. We need to electrify

50:10

everything. I mean, the Chinese have some

50:12

of their answers, have very cheap solar

50:14

panels, they have cheap

50:16

wind turbines production, they have

50:18

the cheapest electric vehicles that

50:21

they are right now on the

50:23

market at size,

50:26

being able to produce them

50:28

in significant quantities. And

50:30

at the same time, we are slapping

50:33

tariffs on those electric vehicles. So are

50:35

we worried about climate change or are

50:37

we worried about climate change as long

50:39

as it doesn't hurt national

50:42

industries? I mean, China is ahead

50:45

of the Western world

50:47

in certain areas of

50:49

the energy transition manufacturing.

50:52

And I don't see how we can

50:54

meet quickly

50:56

from our climate change targets

50:58

unless we embrace that Chinese

51:01

manufacturing. But doing so means

51:03

providing a massive industrial wind

51:05

to China. And that

51:09

was seen a few years back

51:11

as, well, that's

51:13

the way it's going to be. I think

51:15

that that has changed completely both in Europe

51:18

and the United States. And

51:21

that is another reason why I think that

51:23

the West is going to be a bit

51:26

more slowly in climate change targets because they

51:28

are going to try to do, we are going to try

51:30

to do climate change alongside protecting

51:34

our industrial activity and an industrial

51:36

base. And my

51:38

belief is that policymakers, at least in

51:41

private, when you talk to them, have

51:43

already made their minds that on that

51:45

balance of what is more important, climate

51:48

change, accelerating climate change, fight

51:50

or protecting national industries.

51:54

I think that clearly protecting national industry is going

51:56

to come first. Javier

51:58

Bass, such a busy week here. at zero

52:00

week, but really appreciate you making the time to

52:02

be with us and share your thoughts and insights.

52:04

I always learn so much by talking to you

52:06

and reading your columns, so we'll keep doing that.

52:09

So much more we could have talked about, but

52:11

we'll read your columns to see your thoughts on all

52:13

of that and have you back again soon, hopefully in

52:15

New York. So thanks for your time. Thank

52:18

you so much. Thank

52:22

you again, Javier Blas, and thank you for

52:24

listening to this week's episode of Columbia Energy

52:27

Exchange. The show is brought to

52:29

you by the Center on Global Energy Policy

52:31

at Columbia University School of International and Public

52:33

Affairs. The show is hosted by me,

52:35

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52:37

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53:06

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