0:02

It's hard core history or don't

0:04

them? Throughout

0:08

the entire history the Hardcore History

0:10

podcast we've been talking about nuclear

0:12

weapons. Whether. It's

0:14

on shows that we've done

0:16

about nothing else but nuclear

0:18

weapons like The Destroyer of

0:20

Worlds or the Logical Insanity

0:22

and Logical Insanity. Extra shows

0:24

are the Last Supernova in

0:26

the East show, the Hardcore

0:28

History A Then, and we

0:30

do with friend Kaplan, the

0:32

many common sense shows that

0:34

touched upon nuclear weapons, the

0:36

changes to warfare that they've

0:38

created, and the opportunity that

0:40

they've opened up for dystopian

0:42

outcomes. That we're practically

0:45

unimaginable before their invention. If.

0:49

We wanna think about how we're gonna end

0:51

up with a Statue of Liberty in the

0:53

sand moment in our future? Well, nuclear weapons

0:55

would seem to be the odds on favorite.

0:58

Vehicle for. Creating.

1:00

It. I can't

1:02

think of a more important topic for.

1:05

Discussion. And something that should be. Far

1:07

more a part of our conversation at

1:09

all times than it is. I think

1:12

we've forgotten how it felt during the

1:14

height of the Cold War to consider

1:16

the fact that you can wake up

1:18

and find out that the missiles were

1:21

on the way and then some time

1:23

after the Soviet Union fell. And.

1:25

We entered into that period sometimes referred

1:27

to as the end of History on

1:30

when people sort of forgot. As

1:32

we had referred to it in the. Destroyer

1:34

of Worlds shown that we

1:36

had metaphorically speaking as a

1:38

civilization. A gun pointed at

1:40

our head. Which

1:43

brings me to a new

1:45

book by Investigative Reporter Pulitzer

1:47

Prize finalist Any Jacobson. That.

1:50

She did called nuclear war a

1:53

scenario. When. I got this

1:55

book. I didn't think it was going to be

1:57

for me. Because. It

1:59

is written the. Almost. In

2:01

a dramatic narrative sort of form.

2:03

And I'm not a fiction guy.

2:06

But. Once I got to reading it,

2:09

I realize that that was precisely

2:11

what made it so good. And.

2:13

That so much of what I had read.

2:16

Head. Sort of removed the dramatic

2:18

part of the story that turned

2:20

it into kind of a dry

2:22

history where we were talking about

2:24

in omega tons and blast radius

2:26

and destructive values and our systems

2:28

that were in place and all

2:30

of a sudden sometimes you just

2:33

need a reality check moment that

2:35

brings you back down to if

2:37

you'll pardon the pun, ground Zero

2:39

and reminds you what we're talking

2:41

about here. Not just the destroying

2:43

of all the people, but every

2:45

creation that humankind. Has ever come up

2:47

with now. Does that mean that? That needs to

2:49

be the way it goes. There's.

2:52

Been a lotta military thought into

2:54

the idea of having a nuclear

2:57

war that one can win or

2:59

a limited nuclear war by the

3:01

in jake since book. She goes

3:03

a long way to pointing out

3:05

how unlikely it is you could

3:07

limit a nuclear war once nuclear

3:09

weapons are employed by any one.

3:13

I. Would not like this book is

3:15

it was just some fictional account coming

3:17

out of her brain. But instead she

3:19

talked to dozens and dozens and dozens

3:21

of people. Who are in

3:24

such high positions of authority in terms

3:26

of their closeness to the nuclear weapons

3:28

secrets that there were times in the

3:30

book where she had to be very

3:32

careful to avoid violating things like the

3:34

Espionage act. But.

3:37

All these people were able to give her

3:39

enough information on what they all have thought

3:42

that nuclear war would be like and what

3:44

they studied, on what the war gaming showed

3:46

and with the best guess is are and

3:48

what the procedures and protocols are to give

3:51

her enough material where she could write a

3:53

scenario that gave you a sense of what

3:55

it would be like and it's a page

3:57

turner. There's. a dramatic

4:00

narrative in this that keeps you wondering what's

4:02

going to happen next. Even though you know

4:05

it's going to be terrible, you

4:07

kind of want to figure out in what way it's

4:09

going to be terrible. And by the

4:11

time you're done with the book, there's an

4:13

overwhelming sense, which is the sense you should

4:16

have after any one of our shows on

4:18

nuclear weapons, but she makes it perfectly clear

4:20

in an entirely new way, an overwhelming sense

4:22

that we're not talking about this enough. And

4:26

maybe it's just too hard for us to think

4:28

about, but if thinking

4:30

about it is going to make this

4:32

even one iota less likely, then I

4:35

can't think of anything more important than

4:37

thinking about nuclear war and nuclear weapons

4:39

and where all

4:41

of this stuff is heading.

4:43

Annie Jacobson's new book is Nuclear

4:45

War, A Scenario. It begins one

4:49

second after a nuclear weapon

4:51

is launched in her fictional

4:53

account and then how everything

4:55

proceeds from there. She's currently

4:58

making the rounds on a book tour, so she's

5:00

talked to a lot of people, but perhaps we're

5:02

going to take it in directions they didn't. So

5:05

without further ado, our conversation

5:07

with Pulitzer Prize finalist investigative

5:10

reporter Annie Jacobson talking

5:12

about, well, you know,

5:14

the light area and uplifting

5:16

topics we normally address, things like nuclear

5:20

holocaust. Let's

5:27

start by talking about the

5:29

subject. I mean, you've got to decide you want to spend

5:31

a year or two or more on

5:33

this and it's got to be something you can

5:36

maintain an interest for and maybe feel like you're

5:39

doing some good in the world. So let me

5:41

ask you, why this subject and why now? So

5:44

Dan, I'm an investigative journalist and

5:47

I write about war and weapons

5:50

and national security and

5:52

secrets. And in

5:54

my previous six books, which have

5:57

been about military and intelligence programs,

5:59

everything from the CIA to DARPA,

6:03

I cannot tell you how

6:05

many sources have said to

6:07

me with kind of a swelling

6:09

pride, Annie, I

6:12

dedicated my life to preventing

6:15

nuclear World War III. And

6:18

so during the previous administration,

6:22

when former President Trump

6:24

was talking about fire

6:27

and fury and the sort of

6:29

nuclear saber rattling rhetoric, I

6:32

got to thinking, what if

6:34

deterrence fails? And

6:37

then I took that question to

6:40

the highest level national

6:43

security people I knew

6:45

and the result is the book.

6:49

Okay, so at first when I first opened the

6:51

book, I didn't think I was going to like

6:53

the approach you took, because I don't read a

6:55

lot of fiction. And I opened it up and

6:57

I realized that what you're doing is concocting a

7:00

scenario and I thought, I'm more of a history

7:02

guy, I just want to read facts and figures.

7:04

But then when I got into it, I realized

7:06

that you were helping us overcome something by doing

7:08

it this way. That reminded me of a Bertrand

7:11

Russell quote that I looked up where he was

7:13

trying to explain our inability

7:15

to comprehend what we're talking about

7:17

here. And he said, what perhaps

7:20

impedes understanding of the situation more

7:22

than anything else, is

7:25

the term mankind, when he's talking

7:27

about humankind feels vague and abstract.

7:29

He said, people scarcely realize in

7:31

imagination, that the danger is to

7:34

themselves and their children and their

7:36

grandchildren. And not only to a

7:38

dimly apprehended humanity, they can scarcely

7:41

bring themselves to grasp that they

7:43

individually and those whom they love

7:45

are an imminent danger of perishing

7:48

agonizingly. And I Thought that what

7:50

your book really did, that many of the

7:52

other books I Read on the subject that

7:54

were much more, you know, cut and dried,

7:56

your book gave us the impression that helps

7:58

us to understand. The reality

8:00

that as Bertrand Russell points out,

8:02

is so impossible to conceptualize. And.

8:05

You're absolutely correct. I

8:07

wanted to demonstrate in

8:10

appalling detail just how

8:12

horrific nuclear war would

8:14

be. Why

8:17

let me not a spoil anything for

8:19

anybody out there. But the way that

8:21

the book is organized is it starts

8:23

at one second from the first missile

8:26

launching and within about fifty seven minutes

8:28

the world is for all intents and

8:30

purposes destroyed. So that's a pretty awesome

8:32

that's a pretty in your face or

8:35

historical lesson of the future that you're

8:37

giving us. Yeah, and you

8:39

know what I mean. What a great

8:41

way to say that in your face.

8:43

Because that's exactly what it felt like

8:46

when I was interviewing people like. General.

8:49

Robert Killer, the former Director

8:51

of Strap Com and in

8:53

our discussions we I posed

8:56

to him you know a

8:58

scenario whereby Russia and the

9:00

United States were involved in

9:02

nuclear exchange and he said

9:05

to me, yes, annie, the

9:07

world could end in the

9:09

next few hours And that's

9:11

the kind of jaw dropping

9:13

things that were said to

9:16

me time and time again

9:18

from sources. Who

9:20

went on the record about

9:22

this? I was originally doing

9:24

the reporting during cove it

9:26

when people had a little

9:29

more time to talk to

9:31

somebody like me and that

9:33

was kind of faith and

9:35

circumstance intervening I think in

9:37

my favor because it allowed

9:39

for me to really explore

9:41

how people felt. About.

9:44

What could happen? And so that

9:46

is where I came up with

9:48

the fact based scenario of it

9:50

all. why let me bring

9:52

that up to because i would not have been

9:55

interested had you just sort of extrapolated a little

9:57

data from some secondary sources and but you talk

9:59

to more than a hundred people who

10:01

have found themselves up close

10:03

and personal with how this whole thing works. In fact,

10:05

there were a couple of areas where, you know,

10:08

we felt we were in danger of

10:11

crossing the espionage act line. And that

10:13

to me is what makes this really

10:15

real. You're extrapolating information that

10:17

people who know about this stuff and

10:19

have been intimately into the rooms and

10:21

the conversations and the wargaming and then

10:23

turning it into a scenario based on,

10:25

you know, the best information that's available

10:28

and maybe a little of the best

10:30

information that's not even available. Like I

10:32

said, I read a lot about this

10:34

stuff and you surprised me with a

10:36

number of different things. I mean, for

10:38

example, can we talk a little bit

10:40

about the space-based defense system that maybe

10:42

isn't quite the defense system that we

10:44

in the back of our minds hope

10:46

and pray it is? I

10:48

mean, we can talk about anything because it's

10:51

all sort of one, like,

10:53

oh my God, after the next.

10:56

And you're talking about SIBRS, which

10:58

is the Lockheed built space-based

11:01

system of satellites

11:04

that the United States government,

11:06

the Defense Department has parked

11:08

in geo-sync over

11:10

America's nuclear armed enemies

11:13

and adversaries so

11:15

that we can see the

11:18

hot rocket exhaust on an

11:20

ICBM launch in

11:22

under one second. That

11:25

is an astonishing fact. I mean,

11:27

pretty much like you said, you

11:30

are very learned. So am I.

11:32

And yet to learn that fact

11:35

was news to me that it

11:37

happened so fast. And then

11:39

of course, I think that helps

11:41

your average person on the street

11:43

who I always write for to

11:46

understand that this situation

11:49

is all about seconds

11:51

and minutes, not weeks and

11:53

months. Nuclear war

11:56

happens so fast because an

11:58

ICBM takes only approximately

12:00

30 minutes to get

12:02

from one side of the world

12:05

to the continental United States. Well,

12:07

and this I've explored this issue in

12:10

relation to presidential power because we were

12:12

asking the question once why the president

12:14

has this amount of authority when it

12:16

comes to for example making a decision

12:18

that could kill hundreds of millions of

12:20

people or more and the answer always

12:22

is the time window, right? You don't

12:24

have time to convene Congress and have

12:26

a big debate on the question that

12:29

the very shrinking time window is what

12:31

makes the way it is the

12:33

way the protocol is set up so important. I think

12:35

in your book you talked about maybe six

12:37

minutes of decision-making time, is that correct?

12:40

Yeah, and people often say like

12:42

how do you know it's six minutes and I know

12:44

other people report it differently but you

12:46

know I source everything in the back of

12:48

the book in my notes as you probably

12:51

noticed so that people who have

12:53

those doubts you know how does she know

12:55

that we'll go to the back of the

12:57

book and look how I know that and

13:00

the six-minute window there that you're talking about

13:02

and that's from the moment

13:04

the president is notified of

13:07

an incoming nuclear missile. The

13:09

president has roughly six

13:12

minutes to give

13:14

the counter-attack order

13:16

to STRATCOM and

13:18

that information comes from President Reagan

13:21

who wrote about that in his

13:23

memoir and when he

13:25

describes it he uses the word

13:27

irrational. He's saying like that

13:30

is an irrational amount of time

13:32

to have to make a decision

13:34

about unleashing Armageddon.

13:38

And more than that and this is another one of

13:41

the things that surprised me in the book that I

13:43

wasn't expecting because one would imagine that when a person

13:46

takes office as the

13:48

person who has their finger on the metaphorical

13:50

button so to speak that this would have

13:52

been something thought out, planned to the nth

13:54

degree and well understood and yet in your

13:57

book you point out that by the time

13:59

this scenario actually ends up at the

14:01

foot of the president. They may not really

14:03

even have planned or thought much about it.

14:06

I mean, the number of times that the

14:08

Secret Service in your book bursts into the

14:10

room and grabs the president from underneath both

14:12

armpits and he seems like he's a little

14:15

lost by the whole experience was disconcerting, to

14:17

say the least. And, you know, I

14:19

mean, I don't mean to laugh, but it's like, if

14:22

it wasn't so tragic, it would be comical.

14:25

And again, that stuff is not

14:28

coming from Annie Jacobson's imagination. That

14:31

is coming from, for example, an

14:34

interview I did with the former

14:36

director of the Secret Service about

14:38

what his position would be in

14:41

the event of a nuclear

14:43

strike while you have, you know, the sort

14:45

of Defense Department and the chairman of the

14:47

Joint Chiefs of Staff trying to get

14:50

the president to give

14:52

this counter-attack order

14:55

to STRATCOM. You

14:57

would have this parallel movement

15:00

by the Secret Service, by the

15:02

CAT team. That's the Counter Assault

15:04

Team within the Secret Service. And

15:06

then there's something called the element,

15:08

which is even inside the

15:10

CAT team. Again, details sourced from the

15:13

people who are in the know on

15:15

these things. Then you

15:17

would see this vying for, you

15:19

know, precedence over who

15:21

does what. And

15:24

that's where you begin to

15:27

realize nuclear war is happening

15:29

so fast. This sequence

15:31

of all these events

15:34

that are rehearsed over and over and

15:36

over again in the event that there

15:38

is nuclear war are going to all

15:40

go to essentially hell in a handbasket

15:43

in real time. And

15:46

let's talk power for a minute for people who

15:48

may not understand, just a little bit of background here,

15:50

but the difference between, say, a

15:52

Hiroshima-sized atomic weapon and

15:55

the larger thermonuclear bombs that we

15:57

possess in our arsenal today. Actually.

16:00

Some of the larger ones are even larger

16:02

than what we have in the arsenal because

16:04

they're so large that there's not even a

16:06

good military use for some of them I

16:08

mean for example at the castle Bravo nuclear

16:10

test that's the largest bomb the US ever

16:12

set off 15 megatons That's about a thousand

16:15

times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb and

16:17

then you have the largest one that the

16:19

Soviet Union ever ever Unleashed

16:21

the Tsar Bomba 50 to 58 megatons 3300

16:26

times more powerful than Hiroshima you talk

16:28

about a 1000 you talk

16:31

about a one megaton weapon which is

16:33

about as powerful as 66 Nagasaki

16:36

atomic bombs Let's

16:38

talk about the difference in the power of

16:40

these things compared to you know The only

16:43

images we really have of the post atomic

16:46

Ground zero situation were taken

16:48

of post atomic ground zero

16:50

situations with much much less

16:52

powerful weaponry Mm-hmm the

16:57

Hiroshima bomb for example is

16:59

15 kilotons and again these numbers can

17:01

be dizzying I mean you and I

17:03

both know that yeah, and

17:06

we also know that that

17:08

our job You know is to

17:10

try and make these numbers

17:13

Accessible to people so

17:15

thank you for asking about like in layman's

17:17

terms. What does it really mean? The

17:20

the best way that it was

17:22

explained to me Okay, so

17:24

on the cover of my book. There's a

17:26

there's an mushroom

17:28

cloud and that is the mushroom

17:31

cloud it's a photograph from Los Alamos of

17:34

The Ivy Mike thermonuclear test

17:36

which was actually the first

17:38

proof of concept test in

17:41

the Marshall Islands in 1952 and it's a megaton

17:48

thermonuclear bomb so it is

17:50

almost Hiroshima's

17:55

the man who drew the architectural

17:57

plans for that bomb is

17:59

a man named Richard Garwin, and

18:02

I interviewed him for the book. He's now 95. He

18:04

was 23 or 24 when

18:09

he drew those plans. And I asked

18:11

Garwin the same question you're asking me, which

18:13

is like, explain it to

18:15

me in layman's terms. And

18:18

he said that one

18:20

way to think about it was that the

18:24

thermonuclear bomb has

18:26

a atomic bomb inside

18:29

of the weapon that

18:31

acts as a fuse. And

18:34

when you think about that, that

18:36

the Hiroshima bomb would be essentially

18:38

the ignition point of the

18:40

bigger bomb, you can start

18:42

to get a sense

18:45

of how incomprehensible these orders

18:47

of magnitude of power

18:50

really are. And

18:52

then the question then arises as to

18:55

how one might use something like this

18:57

rationally. And you go over, and it

18:59

is one of the most astounding things,

19:01

how quickly we went from testing the

19:04

first thermonuclear weapon, that's a hydrogen bomb,

19:06

in layman's terms, to how quickly we

19:08

started manufacturing the things. And it's dizzying

19:10

how fast, I mean, at one point

19:12

you said we're making like five of

19:14

them a day. And then

19:17

we get up to more than 30,000 in the

19:19

US. I think the Soviet Union had significantly

19:22

more than that even. What is one

19:24

even conceptualized doing with that number of

19:27

weapons? When you think about deterrence, one

19:30

would think that if you had, oh, I don't

19:32

know, five or 10 large nuclear

19:34

weapons, that would be enough to

19:36

deter anyone. But somehow this whole

19:38

system became a runaway

19:41

formula here for an ever

19:43

increasing number of these weapons.

19:47

Well, let's put it this way. If 30,000 nuclear

19:49

weapons isn't overkill, I don't know what is, but

19:51

we went there and we paid for it, and we

19:53

had them in the arsenal. What accounts

19:55

for that in the people that you

19:57

spoke to that explains that level of

20:00

I mean, it really is madness,

20:02

isn't it? And

20:04

it's ironic that the term mutual

20:06

assured destruction, mad, is what everyone

20:09

quotes. You know, that this idea

20:11

that deterrence, you just have

20:13

a massive arsenal of nuclear weapons pointed

20:15

at the other side and they have

20:17

them pointed at you and therefore you

20:20

will never use them. But

20:22

really, at its core, that

20:24

is utter madness because we

20:27

know that this is

20:29

all a mechanized system.

20:32

It's a machine. Nuclear

20:34

command and control is made up

20:37

of men and machines and all

20:39

machines fail. And so this

20:42

mad situation that we have ourselves

20:44

in, to answer your question, how

20:46

did we get here? The

20:50

only answer is sort

20:52

of a non-answer, which is it's madness

20:54

that got us here. Because when you

20:57

look back at it through

20:59

the lens of history, as I do, and I

21:01

try to take the readers through it quickly or

21:04

rather like parsimoniously, I just, for

21:06

example, like you said, I give

21:08

you the stats of how, of

21:10

year by year, the numbers multiplying.

21:13

When you think to yourself, where was

21:15

the sane person in the room

21:17

to say enough is enough? And

21:20

that person wasn't there. And I think that

21:22

again speaks to why so many of these

21:24

sources in their 80s and 90s agreed to

21:27

talk to me at this moment in history

21:29

right now, because looking

21:32

back, they realize, at least

21:34

it was conveyed to me,

21:37

this sense of like, whoa,

21:39

we used to think once upon

21:42

a time that nuclear war could

21:44

be fought and won. And

21:47

we know now that is not true. And

21:50

yet we have that same legacy,

21:52

the foundation upon which it was

21:54

all built is still

21:56

with us, which is all of

21:59

these nuclear weapons, some of them.

22:01

reduced in arsenal size, but the

22:03

existence of the arsenal was

22:06

born of this time of

22:08

utter madness. Well,

22:10

you just bring up a great point. So where was the

22:13

voice of reason in the room? And you talk about this for

22:15

a minute, so let me quote from the book for a second.

22:17

When you talk about one of those

22:20

seminal moments in the history of nuclear

22:22

weapons and you write quote, in 1960,

22:24

the world's population was 3 billion. What

22:26

this meant was that the Pentagon had paid 1,300

22:30

people to compile a war plan that

22:32

would kill one fifth of the people

22:34

on earth in a preemptive nuclear first

22:36

strike. It's important to note,

22:38

you write, that this number did not account for

22:40

the 100 million or so Americans

22:43

who would almost certainly be killed by

22:45

a Russian equal measure counter attack, nor

22:47

did it account for another 100 million

22:49

or so people in North and South

22:52

America who would die from radioactive fallout

22:54

over approximately the next six months. Then

22:57

you point out that there are people who

22:59

will die that have nothing to do with

23:01

the nuclear war or the powers involved. And

23:04

you quote a Marine Commandant, David

23:06

M. Shoup, who is the

23:09

only person that speaks out in this

23:11

conference where they're kind of in a

23:13

very sort of clinical, almost like accountant

23:15

type fashion going over these casualties that

23:18

non-combatants in countries not even in the

23:20

war would face. And he said,

23:22

all I can say is any plan

23:24

that murders 300 million Chinese

23:26

when it might not even be their

23:28

war is not a good plan. And

23:31

you said that that was the only voice in the

23:34

room that said anything. I mean,

23:36

it just, it's even to hear you read it,

23:38

it astonishes me still. And

23:40

you're referring to this 1960

23:42

meeting of sort of

23:45

generals and admirals who

23:47

had put together the first integrated

23:50

nuclear war fighting plan.

23:52

So hard to

23:54

believe, but before that moment, each

23:57

of the military organizations.

24:00

had its own arsenal.

24:03

I mean, we're talking about the

24:05

Air Force having its nuclear weapons

24:07

and weapons systems, delivery systems, the

24:10

Army having its own, and the Navy

24:12

having its own. And the

24:14

incoming Secretary of Defense at the time got

24:16

word of that and thought,

24:18

oh my God, we have to integrate these

24:21

so that there's one unified

24:23

war plan. And in

24:26

that integration that that

24:29

meeting that you referred to took

24:31

place and one

24:33

individual named John Rubell

24:36

had the chutzpah to write

24:39

about that meeting. Only

24:41

time any eyewitness to that

24:43

event ever wrote about it.

24:46

Rubell wrote about it when

24:48

he was in his 80s and dying,

24:50

like in the early 2000s. And it's

24:52

a tiny thin memoir. Almost

24:55

no one knows about it. I found

24:57

it. I quote from it. Everybody

24:59

seems to be astonished by it. And

25:02

I think with good reason, because these

25:04

are jealously guarded secrets within

25:06

the Defense Department. No one

25:09

is supposed to know about

25:11

them. Well, and

25:13

there were some good books written about

25:15

how the nuclear weapons just ended up

25:17

getting folded into the traditional service rivalries

25:19

and whatnot. I mean, traditionally, for example,

25:21

the Navy was the early service opposed

25:23

to all these nuclear weapons and calling

25:25

them these evil devices and everything until

25:28

they got a hold of some for

25:30

their own ships. And then they became

25:32

a player in the game, too. Let's

25:34

talk about the triad for a minute.

25:36

The fact, I mean, I love a

25:38

term you used, and I'm going to

25:40

use it for the name of the

25:42

show, I think handmaidens of the apocalypse,

25:45

Right? The Idea of the nuclear subs role

25:47

in the traditional triad. For Those who don't

25:49

know, nuclear weapons, there's a triad. And Now,

25:51

if you want to add space, maybe more

25:54

than that. But Traditionally, there are the bomber

25:56

based nuclear weapons. there are the missile. land

25:58

based, missile based nuclear weapons.. The weapons,

26:00

and then there are the submarine ones. And

26:02

the submarine one seem to be the ones

26:04

that were the most terrifying, controversial, and difficult

26:06

for an opponent to deal with in your

26:08

book. The Handmaidens of the Apocalypse you called

26:11

them. Can we talk a little about that?

26:13

Because you said they had a thirty minute

26:15

warning if if the missile was launched for

26:17

example, from ground Zero in another country, but

26:19

you have a lot less than that if

26:21

a sub just pops up off your clothes

26:23

and decides to hit one of your nuclear

26:25

power plants with one. I

26:28

mean, you're absolutely. Right and Vice

26:30

Admiral Michael Connor who is

26:32

a former. Formerly.

26:35

In charge. Of America's

26:37

nuclear sub forces

26:39

told me. That

26:42

it was easier. It's easier

26:44

to find a great fruit

26:46

sized objects in space. Than.

26:49

A nuclear armed nuclear powered

26:51

submarine under the sea. And

26:54

that is a chilling example

26:56

of just how stealthy just

26:59

how impossible the submarines are

27:01

to locate. which is why

27:03

they're called in Washington, the

27:06

Handmaidens of the Apocalypse because

27:08

no one can take them

27:11

out. not ours, and not.

27:13

There's not until they returned

27:15

to port and that the

27:18

fact that they're. Out in

27:20

the sea, lurking around, sneaking

27:22

up to our coast. our

27:24

adversaries and enemies are sneaking

27:26

up to our coasts and

27:29

we are doing the same.

27:31

And the take it on

27:33

leash a sub launched ballistic

27:35

missile in literally fourteen minutes

27:37

from launch order. And

27:40

then that needs to take you

27:43

know? Less than fifteen

27:45

minutes, depending on precisely where

27:47

it is. To.

27:49

Reach it's target. And.

27:52

The fact that each like

27:54

the American Ohio class submarines

27:56

for example, can have nine

27:59

d. Nuclear Weapons On them.

28:01

I mean, That that's.

28:03

Not just a city destroyer,

28:05

that's a country destroyer and

28:07

may. Be a continent destroyer.

28:11

I found it interesting. Is

28:13

the. Adversary that you chose to make

28:15

the one launching the initial nuclear weapons both

28:18

out of the blue as it's called as

28:20

you and for me on in the book.

28:22

because I think you know that when we

28:24

did a nuclear war show we talked about

28:27

I'm. A gun aimed at

28:29

our head. And we talked about a

28:31

generation that wasn't accustomed to having a

28:33

gun aimed at their head, the ones

28:35

that lived in the pre nuclear world

28:37

who then transition to a nuclear world.

28:39

But we wondered about those who are

28:41

born into the nuclear were right, people

28:43

that never knew anything else, and how

28:45

you sort of maybe get use to

28:47

the idea of a gun aimed at

28:50

your head, don't even notice it anymore,

28:52

and maybe start to assume that there

28:54

are enough controls or safeguards built into

28:56

our system or our principal. Adversaries system.

28:58

potentially Us or Russia or China, right?

29:00

If you feel like they're intelligent men

29:02

in charge, there are systems, There were

29:04

controls, there are safeguards, but then you

29:07

use sort of a madman kind of

29:09

scenario to point out that it isn't

29:11

always going to be that way, even

29:13

if that way is deemed to be

29:15

safe. And that's far from a safe

29:17

conclusion. But but what happens if a

29:19

Kim Jon own decides he's got a

29:22

way to win a nuclear war and

29:24

enough of of of a a system

29:26

built for him to survive. It's talk

29:28

about that a little bit. Your choice of

29:30

that as sort of, if you'll pardon the

29:32

pun. Ground Zero in this story. So.

29:37

I. Discussed this idea of a

29:39

scenario with multiple sources and it

29:41

was one of the many conversations

29:44

I had with Richard Car when

29:46

that I'd landed on the scenario

29:48

that eat that I used for

29:51

the book whereby it is a

29:53

rogue both out of the blue

29:55

attack from North Korea And that's

29:58

because I Car when who arguably

30:00

news more about nuclear weapons than

30:02

anyone on this earth and has

30:05

been advising President's. Since

30:07

the nineteen fifties and you

30:09

know, was a founding member

30:11

of Nrl and so he

30:13

knows all about space and

30:15

he knows all about reconnaissance

30:17

and he knows all about all

30:20

of these issues that criss

30:22

cross into nuclear armageddon. and I

30:24

said what is the worst case

30:26

scenario and he said one neolithic

30:29

mad man with a nuclear

30:31

arsenal and he sort of used

30:33

that French phrase are in lol

30:36

the day. Lose which suggests

30:38

you know after me who

30:40

cares? Right after me the

30:43

flood And that is North

30:45

Korea. North Korea is the

30:48

only nuclear armed nation of

30:50

the nine that not only

30:53

does not it here to

30:55

sort of the rules of

30:58

nuclear. Launch Death. Rate.

31:00

If the you could call

31:02

them rules the announcement of

31:04

task to other countries but

31:06

they flagrantly violate them. They

31:08

have launched. Over one

31:11

hundred missiles since January of

31:13

Twenty Twenty Two and after

31:15

you read the book you

31:17

begin to understand once you

31:19

know that it only did

31:21

for the first hundred and

31:23

fifty seconds after launch. Every

31:25

single person in Nuclear Command

31:27

and Control in those early

31:30

warning system organizations are looking

31:32

at that launch a try

31:34

and determine Is it going

31:36

to Moscow? Easy Going to

31:38

the continental United States. if

31:41

so san francisco hawaii oh

31:43

and then they realized wait

31:45

it's going into space or

31:47

it's going into the sea

31:50

of japan and so that

31:52

kind of razor's edge antagonistic

31:54

behavior is so dangerous that's

31:57

why i choose that for

31:59

the opening salvo in the

32:01

bolt out of the blue attack in

32:03

my scenario. Well, then

32:05

that gets to a part of the

32:07

book that I found traditionally troubling, as

32:09

you might imagine. And it's the idea

32:11

that something like that can so quickly

32:13

expand into something that involves a lot

32:15

of people that weren't involved in

32:17

the initial attack. I mean, if there's a

32:19

bolt out of the blue from North Korea

32:22

to the United States, and many people may

32:24

not know that there are now missiles that

32:26

North Korea possesses that can reach the continental

32:28

United States. But why would all of a

32:30

sudden that mean that you have a general

32:32

nuclear holocaust involving the US and Russia? How

32:34

do things within an hour's

32:37

time get to that

32:39

level of freakout? Why can't they be

32:41

contained and just involve the powers that

32:43

are seemingly, you know, the the launcher

32:45

and the target of the attack? So

32:49

for listeners, like we talked about sole

32:51

presidential authority, that the president has to

32:54

make this decision alone about the counter

32:56

attack. And that counter attack is part

32:58

of an American policy called

33:01

launch on warning. And so the

33:03

system is set up that once

33:06

the commander in chief is

33:08

notified of an

33:11

incoming nuclear missile and

33:13

a secondary early warning

33:15

radar system confirms that

33:17

that is, in fact, a ballistic missile

33:20

coming in. The president has that six

33:22

minute window that he must make a

33:24

counter attack. And so now

33:27

you can see how radically the

33:29

clock is ticking and everything is

33:32

unfolding so fast. Here's where errors

33:34

occur. Starting with, as

33:37

Professor Emeritus at

33:39

MIT, Ted Postle, who used to be

33:41

an adviser to the Pentagon, explained

33:44

to me the first like

33:46

real technological, oh, my

33:48

God, everything could go wrong in this moment is

33:50

that. So we spoke about

33:52

the Sibber system that the Defense Department

33:54

has and how incredibly accurate and precise

33:57

it is parked over.

34:00

that other countries able to detect

34:02

missile launch in one second. Russia's

34:05

system claims to

34:07

be on balance, claims to

34:09

have parity with ours, but

34:13

U.S. defense scientists and

34:15

those that are experts in

34:17

Russian nuclear forces alike will

34:20

tell us that their

34:22

Tundra system, the Russian early

34:24

warning satellite system, is

34:26

deeply flawed and it can

34:29

often mistake things like clouds

34:31

or sunlight for

34:34

an ICBM launch. It can

34:36

also misidentify numbers. And so

34:38

in a scenario, I choose

34:41

a very real situation that

34:43

defense scientists are worried about, that Russia's

34:46

Tundra system would see

34:48

this, you know,

34:50

counterattack and immediately

34:52

see it

34:55

as an aggressive attack toward Russia.

34:57

And then here's where we learn the

35:00

most horrifying detail, I think, from

35:02

the whole experience of reporting this book.

35:04

Spoiler alert on my own book. America's

35:08

ICBMs do

35:11

not have enough reach to

35:14

target North Korea without

35:17

overflying Russia. So

35:21

imagine Russia

35:23

having to just believe

35:26

that the ICBMs headed

35:28

their way are going

35:30

to fly over their country, not

35:33

at their country. And that's

35:35

where things can really go wrong.

35:37

You know, it's interesting. I

35:39

realize that this violates every tenet

35:42

of military thinking, but

35:44

it almost makes an argument, doesn't it,

35:46

to share better technology with the Russians

35:49

so that they'd be less likely to

35:51

mistake our incoming missiles that directed at

35:53

them than directed at somebody where they're

35:55

just overflying Russian territory to get to.

35:57

I realize that this is a very

35:59

important thing. violates all of the ideas

36:01

of sharing high technology with a potential adversary,

36:03

but it would seem to work in our

36:05

favor possibly. Let me ask you this because

36:07

you brought up an interesting point, which is

36:10

that the president has sole authority, President of

36:12

the United States, to launch a retaliatory strike

36:14

and to launch on warning, which is the

36:16

protocol. But let's ask the

36:18

different question. In the 1950s

36:20

and whatnot, when the U.S. didn't have a problem

36:22

with the idea of a first strike capability, if

36:25

they were trying to deal with an

36:27

imbalance of conventional forces, for example, in

36:29

Central Europe, does the president of

36:32

the United States have full authority

36:34

to launch a first strike? I

36:37

mean that has been debated, you know,

36:39

over and over and over

36:41

again across the decades. And

36:43

you'll often see situations where

36:46

presidents are cornered into saying,

36:48

you know, we don't

36:50

know, we don't. I remember this

36:53

very vividly during the war on terror

36:55

years with Bush and Cheney in office.

36:58

And I think that presidents always,

37:00

if you look at it, they hedge

37:02

around having a commitment to that. But

37:04

so far, as far

37:06

as I know, no one has actually

37:09

gone on the record to

37:11

put an EO, an executive order

37:13

in play, that we do not

37:16

have a launch on warning

37:18

policy. That I'm not

37:20

a thousand percent sure on because I don't

37:22

address that in the book. But it is

37:27

really indicative of what I

37:29

learned in reporting the book, that whatever

37:32

the position of incoming

37:34

presidents may be, for

37:37

whatever reason, once they take office,

37:40

they must learn

37:43

something from their briefings

37:46

that puts them very

37:49

far away from wanting to

37:51

commit to changing

37:54

the policies, the procedures in

37:56

place in any manner. That

38:00

is very mysterious. Because.

38:02

You've mentioned in the book, the several or

38:05

presidents or would be president had mentioned how

38:07

ridiculous this system was in that it should

38:09

be changed and yet didn't change if president's

38:11

from both major political parties, by the way,

38:14

so you're right, there's a sort of a

38:16

missing ingredient for x. There are one of

38:18

the things that's always fascinated me, and I'm

38:20

I'm sure if you as well are all

38:23

of these are efforts after the nuclear age

38:25

began to try to figure out how to

38:27

live with these weapons on in the best

38:29

possible way. I mean, that's what you get

38:32

these think. Tanks created with your these amazing

38:34

intelligent minds. The John Von Neumann, some people

38:36

like that, I'm you know, coming up with

38:38

game theory and all. did the Prisoner's Dilemma.

38:41

all these kinds of ideas. I'm always fascinated

38:43

with this weird idea of deterrence though. and

38:45

you know, and you mention that the book,

38:47

the idea that it's deterrence fails, the next

38:50

step is to try to reestablish deterrence and

38:52

all that kind of crap on. but I'm

38:54

interested in this idea of having to retaliate

38:56

if deterrence fails. There was a wonderful line,

38:59

I wish I could remember who said it

39:01

or but they were talking about the metaphorical

39:03

red button rights as the you know if

39:05

there were a red button that launch nuclear

39:08

weapons and the idea was that maybe the

39:10

red button shouldn't be attached to anything, that

39:12

there should be any electrical wires attached to

39:14

it at all because of deterrence fails. why

39:17

would you push the button than than kill

39:19

an extra five hundred million human beings when

39:21

it's going to happen. Anyways, I'm other any

39:23

conversations about the idea that it makes no

39:26

sense of deterrence, fails to just go ahead

39:28

and a lot of the enemy even if

39:30

they are the enemy. and of course. Pollute

39:32

the world. Still a bunch of people for example,

39:34

in China who have no dog in the fight

39:36

and things like that. I

39:39

mean that is a great question

39:41

and I certainly am. That and

39:43

I bring that up and book

39:45

and kind of one moment where

39:47

the Secretary of Defense has a

39:49

crisis of conscience. Kind. of like

39:51

you describe their and of course

39:53

again giving away my own book

39:55

does it the commander in chief

39:58

the president is missing having

40:00

been zipped out of

40:03

the White House on Marine One and

40:07

not being able to get out before an EMP

40:10

takes down the helicopter. And

40:13

so the Sec Def who

40:15

has escaped to Raven Rock has

40:18

a crisis of conscience. And this part

40:21

of the scenario comes directly

40:23

from my conversations about

40:26

exactly this with

40:28

former Secretary of Defense, Bill Perry.

40:31

And he's the one who described that crisis

40:33

of conscience to me. Now

40:36

let's keep in mind, Perry is in

40:38

his 90s. And

40:40

so he was

40:43

very clear in our interviews in

40:47

a very melancholy, remorseful

40:49

way, at least

40:51

my interpretation of it, that

40:54

here he was, someone who

40:56

had spent his whole life

41:00

in the defense industry, in

41:02

the military industrial complex, in the

41:04

very center of it, as

41:07

an old man reflecting

41:10

about a crisis

41:12

of conscience. And so we

41:15

have to imagine with kind of a

41:17

deep horror, well, in

41:20

a real scenario, that

41:22

acting president isn't gonna be a

41:24

92 year old man. It's gonna

41:26

be somebody who has

41:29

a different outlook on life and might not

41:31

have that same crisis of conscience. Either

41:34

way, he gets overruled by Stratcom

41:36

in the scenario. So, it's all

41:38

madness, it really is. And I

41:41

think what I would

41:43

hope is that people would read

41:45

this book and be duly horrified

41:47

to kind of ask themselves to

41:50

think about this a little

41:52

bit more deeply and

41:54

instead of sort of playing ostrich, with

41:57

like the head in the sand and

41:59

the neck. exposed because that's

42:01

where it seems to me

42:03

we're all living right now. Well

42:06

you brought up the EMP pulse question, the

42:08

electromagnetic pulse question, and I found that to

42:11

be a part of the book that hit

42:13

me a little differently because anybody who's studied

42:15

the subject at all knows about this, but

42:18

I guess I hadn't followed the natural line

42:20

of thinking to its logical conclusion about what

42:22

that meant. And you talked

42:24

about, for example, something about the weapons which

42:26

you all understand. When they explode, you create

42:28

a dead zone. And what a dead zone

42:30

means is all the people, all the animals,

42:32

all the insects which hadn't occurred to me,

42:35

I mean everything. So it's like the moon. We get

42:37

that. But you talked about the

42:39

idea that a country in this scenario, North

42:41

Korea, could actually hide a weapon in a

42:43

satellite that's orbiting the Earth all the time.

42:46

You wouldn't even know it was there, you

42:48

wouldn't think about it. And then

42:50

that weapon could be exploded at an altitude so

42:52

high most of us wouldn't even be aware it

42:54

had gone off. The resulting

42:57

EMP blast effects, it's

43:00

crazy to say this, but it almost

43:02

seems like if you wanted to look

43:04

at the downstream effects of the nuclear

43:07

weapons, that was almost as

43:09

bad as anything else I read.

43:11

Talk to me a little bit about that scenario,

43:13

first of all, about a nuke and a satellite

43:15

that's orbiting us all the time, but also what

43:17

an EMP blast really means on the ground. That

43:21

was one of the most horrific parts

43:24

to report, and also one of the

43:26

most difficult, because that issue

43:28

has been the subject

43:31

of huge

43:33

polemics. And again,

43:35

this is very inside baseball,

43:37

sort of military and

43:40

PhD people debate

43:43

this issue vociferously.

43:46

In other words, one side says that

43:48

the other side is wrong and that

43:50

side says the other side is wrong.

43:52

And so I had to

43:55

really drill down on this and go

43:57

back to multiple sources, because put simply

44:01

the more liberal-minded people have

44:03

taken the position that the

44:06

EMP threat, a nuclear weapon

44:08

detonated in space, is

44:11

not a real threat and is

44:13

this concocted idea by a bunch

44:15

of hawks who are trying to

44:17

raise money for the EMP Commission.

44:20

That's one set of idea. The

44:22

other is that this is a

44:24

very real threat. For

44:26

listeners, the reality

44:29

that you spoke of is that

44:31

there have been fears expressed that

44:33

North Korea might actually use a

44:36

satellite to carry a

44:38

small nuclear warhead into orbit which

44:40

it would then detonate in space.

44:44

That capability is very real. It

44:46

does exist. The

44:48

argument has been whether or not

44:50

the effects would be,

44:53

as one side likes to call

44:55

it, electric Armageddon or it

44:57

would be a nothing burger in layman's

45:00

terms. I

45:02

went to the people like

45:04

General Two Hill, America's first

45:06

cyber chief under Obama, who

45:09

wrote a paper on EMP and it's still

45:11

classified. Richard Garwin wrote a paper on EMP

45:14

in 1952 and it's still classified. Everyone

45:20

told me in the

45:22

general manner without

45:24

breaking their security clearances

45:26

that this is an incredibly real

45:28

threat. To answer your question,

45:30

what happens on the ground? You

45:32

detonate a small

45:35

nuclear weapon 300 miles

45:41

up in space over the

45:43

central part of America, over Nebraska, say.

45:46

You have this massive

45:49

three-phased electromagnetic

45:52

shockwave, so

45:54

incredibly powerful that

45:56

all of the industrial strength

45:58

surged to pressure. Do not hold.

46:01

And you have a colossal grid

46:04

loss. And you have

46:06

catastrophic failure of basically

46:09

every system you can

46:11

imagine. From railroads to

46:13

ports to airplanes

46:15

to GPS to fiber

46:17

optics. It truly is

46:20

electric Armageddon. You

46:22

mention even cars, which you don't think about, except

46:24

that they're becoming more computerized all the time. So

46:26

they're vulnerable to that too. I

46:28

mean, everything goes out. And I

46:31

describe that in sort of the Shakespearean, I

46:33

do the book in Acts, right? And as

46:35

you know, there's the set up, 24 minutes,

46:37

the second 24 minutes, the last 24 minutes.

46:43

And then we have the aftermath, which is

46:46

nuclear winter. But in that sort of

46:49

Shakespearean, all

46:51

is lost moment in the third

46:53

act. That is when the nuclear

46:55

EMP happens for reasons that you

46:57

will learn narratively, which sort

46:59

of unfortunately makes sense to

47:01

the national security apparatus. And

47:05

that is when, you know, it's sort of

47:08

like just when you thought the nightmare couldn't

47:10

get any worse, it gets worse.

47:13

This brings me to the nightmare getting

47:15

worse question, which is about

47:17

nuclear proliferation. It's

47:20

a weird subject when you realize that

47:22

we're talking about essentially, if we consider

47:24

atomic weapons to be in the same

47:27

general family, we're talking about a 75-year-old

47:29

weapon system at this point. And

47:32

it's weird to expect nations to

47:34

not even be allowed to build

47:37

a weapon system that's three-quarters of

47:39

a century old. It almost smacks,

47:41

I mean, if I was Iran, for

47:43

example, I would want a

47:45

nuclear weapon, and that would seem like

47:47

an absolute national security concern for me.

47:50

Because look at the different way a country with

47:52

a nuclear weapon gets treated versus a country without

47:54

a nuclear weapon. So if you're looking at it

47:57

from the point of view of a have-not. in

48:00

the nuclear race here, having a nuclear

48:03

weapon makes total sense. But for the

48:05

world as a whole, or nuclear powers

48:07

that are already in existence, that is

48:09

the worst nightmare around. And I think

48:11

the question that I have

48:13

is, one, how reasonable is it

48:16

to keep this out of

48:18

the hands of emerging powers and more and more

48:20

of them? Also, if more powers

48:22

get it, is it axiomatic

48:24

that we can expect the

48:27

chances of a bolt of the blue to

48:29

expand from a North Korean possibility to

48:31

multiple countries that don't have nuclear weapons

48:34

now but might in the not-too-distant future?

48:38

You know, when you think about that

48:40

initial buildup of nuclear weapons that we

48:42

were talking about earlier, when it was

48:44

just Russia and the United States, and

48:47

you kind of close your eyes

48:49

and think of all these swords

48:51

pointed at each other except for

48:53

their ICBMs, and you

48:56

think about the standoff, you who

48:58

have written and thought and

49:00

spoken so much about war

49:03

over millennium, right?

49:06

And you think about the duel,

49:09

and you think about two parties, okay,

49:12

and then you're like, en dans, or

49:14

dante, right? But then

49:17

you add multiples into there, and

49:19

you realize how precarious it is

49:21

and how much could go wrong.

49:23

And so what was set up

49:25

for two and then three and

49:27

then a couple more nuclear-armed nations

49:29

is now nine. And

49:32

I think it's impossible to

49:34

think anything other

49:36

than adding multiple

49:38

nations with nuclear weapons into

49:41

this mix is only taking

49:43

us in one direction. Because

49:46

I found in reporting the book, in

49:48

learning from sources, that

49:51

where things really go wrong

49:54

is the other

49:56

nation, other nuclear-armed nations'

49:58

reaction to nuclear weapons. to what those

50:02

who are engaged in a nuclear

50:04

exchange are doing and why. It

50:07

was an interview with former Secretary

50:09

of Defense Leon Panetta that really

50:12

hit home when I asked him

50:14

about this, particularly about what we

50:17

were talking about earlier, whereby the

50:19

missiles have to overfly Russia to

50:21

get to North Korea, and how

50:23

could Russia just take America's word

50:26

at it. And I asked Panetta what

50:28

he thought about that, that sort of

50:30

massive hole in national security. And he

50:32

said, it's a real problem. And he

50:34

also told me that he really didn't

50:37

believe that there was a lot of

50:39

thought put into

50:41

this idea of all

50:44

that could go wrong with

50:46

mad chemistry when the bombs

50:48

start flying. Well,

50:51

and you think about powers that could

50:53

get involved in a nuclear war where

50:55

none of the traditional powers we would

50:57

have assumed would have been involved. I

50:59

mean, in India, Pakistan, nuclear war would

51:01

defy any of the Rand corporation type

51:03

war games that they were working on

51:05

in the 1950s. I

51:08

think about the Bertrand Russell stuff a lot, because

51:10

of course he's the philosopher and mathematician that was

51:12

putting out warnings to the world

51:15

with Albert Einstein and stuff. And

51:18

he makes it, he talked about what we would have to

51:20

do too. And he

51:22

said basically that once the weapons

51:24

have become so powerful that you

51:26

can't imagine a war being fought

51:28

with them, then you have to

51:30

face the humankind, maybe brutal reality

51:32

that maybe we can't have war anymore. And

51:35

I remember the line, and I'm going

51:37

to quote it here because it's such

51:39

a wonderful coder to everything you've been

51:41

talking about. He said, quote, you, your

51:43

families, your friends, and your countries are

51:45

to be exterminated by the common decision

51:47

of a few brutal, but powerful men

51:49

to please these men, all

51:52

the private affections, all the public hopes,

51:54

all that has been achieved in art

51:56

and knowledge and thought and all that

51:59

might be achieved. hereafter is to

52:01

be wiped out forever. Our

52:03

ruined, lifeless planet will continue for

52:06

countless ages to circle aimlessly around

52:08

the Sun, unredeemed by

52:10

the joys and loves, the occasional

52:12

wisdom and power to create beauty

52:14

which have given value to human

52:16

life." End quote. I think of

52:19

what Germany lost in the Second World

52:21

War sometimes and it's

52:23

not just, you know, when you realize it, every

52:25

city, you know, above the level of like Heidelberg

52:28

was reduced to rubble and you think, okay, that

52:30

might have been what was required to get rid

52:32

of Hitler, but what did that do? Well

52:35

that destroyed civilization in that area for

52:37

humankind forever. None of us can ever

52:39

enjoy the history of Germany from, you

52:41

know, like as a World Heritage Site

52:43

if you want to look at it

52:45

that way, but not just that. Generations

52:47

of Germans from now until the end

52:50

of time are now denied that and

52:52

in a nuclear war, one country

52:54

turned to rubble would be minuscule

52:57

compared to what we would have. You make the

53:00

point in the book and I saw it over

53:02

and over, this idea of all the things that

53:04

would be lost. You keep pointing out monuments.

53:06

I mean you mentioned the Colosseum

53:08

in Rome, all these things that

53:10

we think of as having survived

53:12

through the trials and tribulations of

53:14

eons of human wars and yet

53:18

gone in an instant. Can we

53:20

talk about what humankind loses in

53:22

terms of its legacy and heritage

53:24

and everything that's built up over

53:26

millennia in, well, one hour

53:28

in your book? I

53:30

mean I love thinking about that because it is

53:32

the only sort of ray of hope and it's

53:35

why after I talk about nuclear

53:38

winter, which is just

53:40

an astonishing concept that, you know, when

53:42

it came out in 1983, this idea

53:44

nuclear winter that the soot that would

53:47

be lofted

53:51

up into the troposphere after

53:53

the megafires were burning, that

53:55

soot would block out the

53:58

sun's rays

54:00

and the earth would become

54:03

colder and things would

54:05

freeze over and you would

54:07

have nuclear winter. And initially the Defense

54:09

Department took the position that that was

54:11

Soviet propaganda. And now we

54:14

know from state of the art climate

54:16

modeling, and thanks to a couple

54:18

professors who have been on this

54:21

issue ever since, that

54:23

in fact nuclear winter would be worse than

54:25

was imagined in the 1980s. And

54:28

so you are really talking about exactly what you've

54:30

brought up, which is that all

54:32

would be lost. And

54:35

not only would all the monuments

54:38

and the things built

54:40

by human ingenuity and

54:42

human imagination be gone,

54:46

but human brilliance itself.

54:48

Because a drop in 40

54:51

degree Fahrenheit around the

54:53

mid-latitudes would result in

54:56

the death of agriculture, and

54:59

that means man would return

55:01

to a hunter-gatherer state. And

55:04

so it reminds me, you quote

55:06

Bertram Russell, and I'm going to

55:08

sort of paraphrase Einstein, which is

55:10

where he was said, I

55:14

don't know what weapons World

55:16

War III will be fought with,

55:20

but World War IV will

55:22

be fought with sticks and stones.

55:25

You know that reminds me of something

55:27

that philosopher Nick Bostrom, who works at

55:29

the Oxford Future of Humanity Institute once

55:31

said when he was defining the term

55:33

existential threat. Because most of us think

55:35

of an existential threat as meaning we

55:37

would just be eliminated off the face

55:40

of the earth, but he

55:42

includes another definition. And his other

55:44

definition is if humankind were

55:46

to get knocked back in

55:48

a capabilities sense, never

55:51

to regain what they had used

55:53

to possess. So think about losing

55:55

the Roman Empire and all of a sudden you can't

55:57

build the aqueducts in the baths or anything anymore, or

55:59

losing the ability to put satellites into

56:01

space or losing the internet and never getting

56:03

it back again. That's the kind of thing

56:06

you're talking about. Now I always say that

56:08

this is a rainbow and unicorn free zone

56:10

here on this program, but I do want

56:12

to try to end on a more uplifting

56:14

note and just ask you, is

56:16

anybody working on this? I mean when your

56:18

book has the impact that it should have

56:20

given the visibility of it, does that make

56:22

people sit down and go, you know, maybe

56:25

we've been ignoring this for the last, because

56:27

you know the end of history happened when

56:29

the Soviet Union fell. We didn't have to think

56:31

about, you know, the end of the

56:33

world anymore theoretically, but you're reminding us that

56:35

that never went away. Is this

56:37

a problem that people are working on and is

56:40

it something that we can solve? Well

56:42

the ray of hope, I

56:44

think no unicorns, no

56:46

rainbows, just facts here comes from

56:49

the concept of the Reagan reversal,

56:51

right? So when I was in high school

56:53

in 1983, there

56:56

was an ABC mini-series

57:00

called, which I know you know about, which

57:02

is called We Saw. I was in high school

57:05

too, I saw it. Yes, we are

57:07

dating ourselves, but nonetheless this

57:09

is the ray of hope because of

57:11

course, you know, that show

57:13

was horrific. It depicted a

57:16

fictional scenario of a nuclear

57:18

war between the United States

57:20

and then Soviet Russia and

57:22

it terrified everyone. It terrified

57:24

me, it terrified a hundred

57:26

million Americans, but the

57:28

very important American that it

57:31

also terrified was President Ronald

57:33

Reagan, who had been in

57:35

essence a nuclear hawk. Definitely

57:37

had this position of like, more

57:39

weapons are better. We

57:42

want to have American supremacy, you

57:44

know, Mr. Tough Guy. And

57:47

he saw the day after ABC

57:49

mini-series and as he wrote in

57:51

his memoirs, he became greatly

57:54

depressed. Those are his words. And

57:57

as a result, he reached

57:59

out. to Gorbachev. And what

58:02

transpired from their communication

58:04

was the Reykjavik summit,

58:06

which reduced the number

58:08

of nuclear warheads from

58:10

their all-time insane

58:13

high of 70,000 nuclear weapons

58:18

to the approximately 12,500 that

58:23

we have today. That's pretty hopeful

58:25

if you ask me. I

58:27

see it differently, that the president had to see

58:29

a TV show to sort

58:33

of grasp what he'd been in charge of the

58:35

whole time. That strikes me as a little differently.

58:37

Let me ask you, has there been anything I

58:39

haven't asked you today that we need to bring

58:41

up? You know, it's a

58:43

joy talking to you because I love listening

58:46

to warfare reduced to

58:48

its sort

58:51

of human concepts,

58:54

right? Because I think this

58:56

is very interesting to be

58:58

able to talk about weapons

59:00

and war and aggression and

59:03

then the human at the center of it all.

59:06

And how we have these sort

59:08

of big lofty ideas that

59:11

we sometimes, and people like Einstein or Bertram

59:13

Russell, that we quote and we think about.

59:15

And I really am a

59:17

believer in that the conversation

59:20

leads to the

59:22

transformation. I really

59:25

believe that communication

59:27

is where we

59:29

evolve. So I'm

59:32

all for hardcore history

59:34

and the Dan Carlin conversation. I can't

59:36

thank you enough for having me. Oh,

59:39

that's so nice of you. Listen, I always say

59:41

about those people in the stories we talk about

59:43

that they're often trapped in the gears of history,

59:45

but I don't like the idea that that could

59:47

apply just as much to us as

59:50

to them. Annie Jacobson, you've done a wonderful

59:52

job here with this book. I hope a

59:54

bazillion people read it. And wouldn't it be

59:56

the greatest thing in the world to have

59:58

as your epitaph that your book prompted some

1:00:00

actual change in making the world a safer

1:00:02

place. Brilliant.

1:00:09

My thanks to author and investigative reporter

1:00:11

Annie Jacobson for coming on today's program.

1:00:13

Her new book is Nuclear War, a

1:00:15

scenario, and as strange as this is

1:00:18

to say about a book on

1:00:20

factual matters like this, it is a

1:00:22

dramatic page turner. Pick your

1:00:24

copy up wherever you enjoy getting your books, and if

1:00:26

you don't have a preference, well, we'll put a link

1:00:28

to buying it in our show notes, as

1:00:31

we almost always do for books we mention on the

1:00:33

program. Just a quick note,

1:00:35

we are working as always on the next

1:00:37

big hardcore history show. If

1:00:39

you're one of those ones that enjoys when we

1:00:41

play the hits, you should like this next show,

1:00:43

which will probably be a series. Also

1:00:46

a reminder, we do sell the old

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1:01:01

head on over to dancarlan.com and pick

1:01:04

yourself up a few old shows, would you? Hope

1:01:07

everyone's doing well. Stay safe, and until

1:01:09

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1:01:11

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1:01:18

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