Episode Transcript
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One N.A. Member FDIC. Hey
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there, it's Stephen Dubner.
1:04
This week we wanted to share an
1:06
episode from our archives. That's one of
1:08
our most popular episodes. Perhaps because it
1:12
talks about a problem that many of us
1:14
have had. It's called, Why Are There So
1:16
Many Bad Bosses? I hope
1:18
you enjoy it. And if by chance you
1:20
have already listened to this episode, do stick
1:23
around to the end for a
1:25
career update from this person. My
1:28
name's Katie Johnson and I'm a
1:30
data scientist. Johnson is 33 years
1:33
old and lives in England. She grew
1:35
up near Bristol, went to university in
1:37
Birmingham and held a series of increasingly
1:39
impressive jobs at a series of companies.
1:42
These were all what are known as
1:44
IC jobs. IC standing for individual contributor,
1:47
which means what? It is
1:49
someone who makes as
1:52
opposed to managing people who make.
1:54
Johnson Loved being an IC.
1:56
She Loved analyzing data and.
2:00
The was really good at a job. But
2:02
after while she thought it might be
2:04
nice to become a boss. Yeah,
2:06
I wanted to manage more and more people.
2:08
And you wanted to manage more people? Because
2:11
why? You are just power hungry like the
2:13
rest of us? I think that's a couple
2:15
of reasons. Said a fast is that I
2:17
wanted to start getting more autonomy as a
2:19
while I was left on I would be
2:21
working on stuff in my eyes the bow
2:23
and think this isn't the most important thing
2:25
and I thought that is I became the
2:27
leader of the team than I. Would get
2:29
to pick why wet on. Okay,
2:32
that seems sensible. The other
2:34
reason was to have more impact at
2:36
the company's I was working at. Seated
2:38
described this as having a seat at
2:40
the table. Also. Sensible.
2:43
I guess the final reason is. That we all kind
2:45
is not everyone I guess. but I was
2:47
included in this sub at sunset that. Being.
2:50
Most successful mean being more senior
2:52
and so in order to not
2:54
necessarily so others the definitely myself,
2:56
the I had achieved and become
2:58
successful. I needed to keep moving
3:00
upwards within a company. Johnson's.
3:03
Father in his own career had seen
3:05
things differently. Save. My dad has
3:07
been a network engineer he recently retired that
3:09
he's done that for his whole career and
3:11
he had absolutely no aspiration to. Become the
3:13
manager and like why would I want to do that.
3:16
With. Katie Johnson did want to become
3:18
a manager and several firms were willing
3:20
to make her one. She.
3:22
Took the most appealing offer. Add.
3:25
A software from that helps companies
3:27
acquire new customers. And I
3:29
was sent on some management training and to
3:31
do what can only be described as a
3:34
very long personality tests and the idea was
3:36
to tell me what I was good at
3:38
being good at. And. What was
3:40
see particularly good at. Critical. Thinking
3:43
attention to detail, courage,
3:45
oldies entire know think
3:47
he had characteristics. You.
3:49
Can see why Tv Johnson would seem to
3:51
be a great boss. For. New
3:53
job title was Head of Data and
3:56
Analytics. She had roughly ten people reporting
3:58
to her. The. The Ocean
4:00
game with more money, more prestige,
4:02
more leverage to set the agenda.
4:05
Also. However, More. Meetings.
4:08
Oh so many meetings like compared to
4:10
being a data scientist I'd be the
4:12
hots up our meeting in the morning
4:14
and then I just be breaks to
4:17
do coding and thinking and making stuff
4:19
up a high was a meeting I
4:21
think she's days. I used to be
4:23
at me things like seven hours. No.
4:25
Offense, But did you not see that coming? Know.
4:29
I really didn't I thought it would just be
4:31
like my normal decide to stop with a few
4:33
one. To ones on the side that would
4:35
they take advantage of the you're talking about
4:37
the where he didn't get into planes with
4:39
my team is more like the meetings like
4:41
an hour's coffee with someone to try. And
4:44
south about a working relationship with that seems
4:46
times that by like five or ten of
4:48
a team. It's just draining. Keep.
4:53
In mind, this is happening during the
4:56
Pandemic shut down, so all these meetings
4:58
were virtual. And is drained as
5:00
Johnson was from all those meetings See
5:02
was getting good reviews as a manager.
5:04
yes people would tell me what a
5:06
great so by with Tanks I was
5:09
coming across. well. But see
5:11
bound that being a boss made
5:13
her. Miserable. Haven't
5:15
finished my day and my studied spoken to
5:17
the. Living rains blanket over my
5:19
head and cry because I was
5:22
in So much paid I bought,
5:24
I was. In
5:26
retrospect, Tv Johnson had playing
5:28
the aired in wanting to become a
5:30
boss. But it also felt
5:32
that management was the only sensible way
5:34
to advance her career. And if you
5:37
look at how most firms and institutions
5:39
around the world operate. You. Have to
5:41
agree with her. The question
5:43
is, does this standard operating
5:45
procedure produce good bosses? Were
5:47
bad boss or even horrible
5:49
Was. a horrible boss
5:51
is a familiar caricature we
5:54
all know the stereotypes screamer
5:56
see this the idea steeler
5:58
the passive aggressiveness These
6:01
are some of our most enduring characters
6:03
in film. You remember Blake
6:05
from Glengarry Glen Ross, played by Alec
6:07
Baldwin? Put that
6:09
coffee down. Coffee's
6:12
for clothes is on. Do
6:15
call yourself a salesman, you son of a ... Or
6:18
in the film Office Space, when Peter is
6:20
trying to escape the office on Friday
6:22
afternoon and he gets snagged by the boss.
6:25
Hello, Peter. What's
6:28
happening? Um, I'm
6:31
gonna need you to go ahead and
6:33
come in tomorrow. So
6:35
if you could be here
6:38
around 9, that would be
6:40
great. Mmkay? Oh,
6:42
oh, and I almost forgot. I'm
6:46
also gonna need you to go ahead and come in on Sunday,
6:49
too. Then
6:51
there's Miranda Priestley, played by Meryl
6:54
Streep, in The Devil Wears Prada. You
6:56
have no style or sense of fashion?
7:00
Well, um, I think that
7:02
depends on what you're ... No,
7:04
no. That wasn't
7:06
a question. The Horrible Boss
7:09
motif is so attractive that the
7:11
director Seth Gordon made a film
7:13
called Horrible Bosses. Yeah, we gotta
7:15
trim some of the fat around here. Trim the ... What
7:17
do you mean by trim the fat? I want you to fire
7:19
the fat, people. Truly
7:23
horrible bosses do occasionally turn up
7:25
in real life, especially in Hollywood
7:28
itself. The producer Scott Rudin, for
7:30
instance, has been accused of years'
7:32
worth of alleged abuses, like
7:35
smashing an assistant's hand with a
7:37
computer model. But
7:39
even in Hollywood these days, and especially
7:41
in more normal industries, this
7:43
sort of grotesquely is harder to
7:45
get away with. Bosses
7:48
who are outright monsters are more
7:50
likely to lose their jobs. But
7:53
how much attention are we paying
7:55
to the more common type of
7:57
bad boss? Someone who's simply incompetent
7:59
or overstating? stretched, or even just
8:01
miserable being the boss, like Katie
8:03
Johnson was. Do we even know
8:06
how many bad bosses are out there? The
8:09
more you dig, the more you learn that
8:11
the science of boss behavior is not very
8:13
scientific. One Gallup poll shows
8:16
that roughly 50% of American employees have,
8:18
at some point in their career, left
8:20
a job because of a bad boss.
8:23
But an employee might have 10 or 20 bosses
8:26
over a career, so maybe that
8:28
number isn't so bad. A survey
8:31
of European employees found that only 13%
8:33
rated their current boss as bad. So
8:38
maybe the Hollywood caricature is way
8:40
off. Still, considering that
8:42
nearly all of us will at some point
8:44
in our lives have a boss or be
8:47
one, we thought there
8:49
might be some boss questions worth asking.
8:51
And so, today on Freakonomics Radio, when
8:54
a boss is a bad boss, have
8:56
you ever wondered why? There's
8:59
no reason to believe that a great salesperson
9:01
will be a great manager. And
9:03
yet this kind of promotion happens all the time.
9:06
Why is that? There are two ways to
9:08
motivate people. We can pay them a whole lot more, or
9:10
we can give them an opportunity for promotion. Today,
9:14
on the show, why good employees
9:16
become bad bosses and
9:18
whether that will ever change. Spoiler
9:21
alert, probably not. This
9:36
is Freakonomics Radio,
9:39
a podcast that explores the hidden
9:41
side of everything with
9:43
your host, Stephen Guevner. One
9:55
of the reasons I became a writer years ago
9:57
is because I Didn't particularly like.
10:00
Having a boss like eighty Johnson,
10:02
I prefer to set my own
10:04
agenda my own pace. I also
10:07
really like working alone. Also,
10:09
like Katie Johnson, I am not
10:11
particularly fond of meetings, so I
10:14
wouldn't be a very good boss
10:16
either. Fortunately, at Freakonomics Radio, there
10:18
are a couple other people who
10:20
do all the boss east, leaving
10:22
me pretty much free to do
10:25
this what we're doing right now,
10:27
asking questions. Trying to find
10:29
answers. So here's a question. I've
10:31
always been curious about how important
10:33
our bosses anyway, I
10:35
don't mean Ceos the ultimate Boss
10:38
if you're interested in that. We
10:40
once did a series called the
10:42
Secret Life of Ceos. Today we're
10:44
just talking about your standard issue
10:46
middle manager. Do they really matter?
10:51
Yes, broadly speaking, managers
10:53
matter, bosses, matter for
10:55
outcomes. That steve to
10:58
Dallas. He is an Economics professor
11:00
at U C Berkeley Class School
11:02
of Business training ground for future
11:04
bosses. Management is not
11:07
something that to delis himself
11:09
aspires to. Tell. Me: how close
11:11
you are two administrations I know how far
11:13
away to be from you. But. He
11:15
has spent time while on sabbatical working
11:17
as a boss at some well known
11:19
for hims. When. I was at
11:22
ebay and Amazon. I managed teams
11:24
and I enjoyed it very much.
11:26
How do you assess yourself as
11:28
a manager in that realm? I'm
11:30
blushing so. Because
11:33
you're the best ever! Provide
11:35
some pretty good so I'm feeling
11:38
a little uncomfortable. Your positive self
11:40
assessment is based on direct feedback
11:42
or just a general warm glow
11:45
feeling at ebay and Amazon. the
11:47
feedback was actually form of Truth
11:49
Surveys surveys that is. With questions
11:52
like. On. A scale of one to
11:54
five? How much do you agree with? the following
11:56
statement. My. boss generates a positive
11:58
attitude in the team Or,
12:00
my boss is someone I can trust.
12:03
Or, my boss provides continuous
12:05
coaching and guidance on how I
12:08
can improve my performance. These
12:10
surveys led Steve Tadellis to ask
12:12
his own bigger questions about bosses.
12:15
For instance, Does it really matter?
12:17
Do these measures of manager
12:20
skills or characteristics, do
12:23
they really have any value for the firm? Is
12:25
there some way in which managers
12:27
who score higher on these
12:29
surveys are actually contributing more? These
12:34
are eternal questions in the field
12:36
known as personnel economics. You
12:39
could ask the same questions about any manager.
12:41
The head coach of a football
12:44
team, the chairperson of your homeowners
12:46
association, the president of the
12:48
United States. But as
12:50
I mentioned earlier, the academic literature on
12:52
the impact of bosses is not particularly
12:55
advanced. You can see
12:57
why, if you think about it. There
12:59
are so many variables in the relationship between
13:01
a boss and their employees that it can
13:03
be hard to pinpoint the effects of the
13:05
boss. This is why
13:08
most research focuses on one
13:10
single quantifiable metric, productivity.
13:13
For example, there is a
13:16
paper by the late, wonderful
13:18
economist Eddie Lazear, Catherine
13:20
Shaw and Chris Stanton, where
13:23
they show that there is
13:25
variation in output of
13:28
employees based on the managers that
13:30
are in charge of them. That
13:33
paper from 2015 analyzed data
13:35
from a single firm that the researchers
13:37
were not allowed to identify, but it
13:39
appears to be something like a call
13:41
center. The analysis looked
13:43
at what happened when a worker moved
13:45
from what the researchers identified as an
13:47
average boss to a high quality boss.
13:51
Such a move, they found, increased productivity
13:53
by as much as 50%. If
13:57
this were a call center and a given
13:59
worker handled 100 calls
14:01
per shift under an average boss,
14:03
an excellent boss could boost that
14:06
to 150 calls. So at
14:09
least in this type of setting, a
14:11
quote, good boss is doing something right,
14:13
but the data couldn't say what. Steve
14:16
Tadellis wanted to learn more. So
14:18
he teamed up with Mitchell Hoffman,
14:20
an economist at the University of
14:22
Toronto's Rotman School of Management, to
14:24
write a research paper. I
14:26
have access to interesting data and
14:29
people in this company that will
14:31
have to be unnamed, because
14:33
when it comes to personnel data,
14:35
companies are very hesitant.
14:38
Tadellis would only say that
14:41
this firm did high-tech, knowledge-based
14:43
work. Maybe, given his
14:45
history, you might picture a firm
14:47
like an eBay or an Amazon.
14:50
In any case, he is looking at
14:52
a very different type of work than
14:54
the earlier research with its narrow measure
14:56
of productivity. What we're doing
14:59
is opening the hood up a little bit. And
15:01
what sort of data did they have access to? We
15:04
have data that allows us to
15:06
measure the impact of a particular
15:08
manager skill that we're calling people
15:10
management skills, as opposed
15:12
to just do managers matter. People
15:15
management skills, meaning the sort of
15:17
things you find on those employee
15:19
feedback surveys, how well
15:22
the manager coaches and communicates, how
15:24
trustworthy they are. So
15:26
that's the boss data. On the
15:28
employee side, Tadellis and Hoffman had
15:30
a lot of concrete data, subjective
15:33
performance scores, as well as how often
15:35
a given employee was promoted or given
15:37
a raise, the number of patents
15:39
they filed, and whether they
15:41
stayed at the firm or left. In
15:44
these high-tech, knowledge-based companies,
15:47
retention is a very,
15:49
very important focus
15:51
because getting these
15:54
high-skilled workers is not easy, and
15:57
there's a lot of competition. And when you
15:59
lose a an employee, especially an
16:01
employee that's very valuable, then
16:04
it could take months
16:06
to replace them. So
16:08
Tadellis and Hoffman set about to sort
16:10
through all this data to look for
16:12
any causal relationships between the rating of
16:15
a given manager and the
16:17
various outcomes of the employees working under
16:19
them. What did they find? For
16:22
the most part, it was a big bag of
16:24
nothing. We didn't find
16:26
that the ratings of the
16:28
managers seemed to impact
16:31
the subjective performance of their employees,
16:33
their income, their promotions, or
16:35
patent applications in a meaningful way. That's
16:38
right. On all those employee
16:41
outcomes, performance, earnings,
16:43
patents, it just didn't
16:46
seem to matter whether the manager was
16:48
highly rated or poorly rated. But
16:51
there was one other outcome to look
16:53
at, employee retention.
16:56
Bingo. Tadellis and Hoffman looked
16:58
at employees at this one firm who moved
17:00
from a manager with a poor rating to
17:02
one with a high rating. That's
17:05
associated with an attrition drop of about 60%. That
17:08
is huge. And within that
17:11
huge effect was an important nuance.
17:13
What we see then is
17:16
that managers help retain
17:18
better employees more than worse employees,
17:20
which shows that the impact of
17:23
being a better manager is
17:25
strongest where it matters the most. So
17:29
a good boss seems capable of
17:31
keeping the best employees happy and
17:34
presumably productive. Conversely,
17:36
a bad boss might drive
17:38
away the best employees. The
17:41
Tadellis-Hoffmann paper was published in 2021
17:44
in the Journal of Political Economy,
17:46
one of the best econ journals.
17:49
So okay, the economics literature
17:51
on bosses and management just got a
17:53
little bit deeper. But
17:55
remember, employee retention was the only outcome
17:57
where it seemed to matter whether a
18:00
boss was good or bad. And
18:02
if you ask Steve Tadellis a
18:04
more fundamental question, like what does
18:07
a good boss actually do to
18:09
instill this loyalty? This is
18:11
where I have to take
18:13
a step back and say that there
18:15
are certain things that may be outside
18:17
the scope of what economists should be
18:20
dealing with. If you were to make
18:22
a list of things that you would like to measure were
18:24
it possible given the data, what would some of those things
18:26
be? That's a good question. Something
18:29
that's very hard to measure that
18:32
I believe is important
18:36
is compassion. I guess if
18:38
this is going to be on the radio I might lose
18:40
my economist card. Steve Tadellis is
18:42
not the only economist who's been frustrated
18:44
by the lack of evidence for what
18:46
makes a good boss good. Maybe
18:49
compassion is as important as
18:51
he suspects, but we just
18:53
don't have any large-scale empirical
18:56
evidence yet. The
18:58
Stanford economist Nicholas Bloom has
19:00
been studying leadership and management for
19:02
years. And yet, no
19:05
one could really give us a straight answer
19:07
on what to find a good or bad
19:09
leader. You look at the data and there's
19:11
ten different recipes for success. Maybe they each
19:13
work for a particular case study, but I've
19:15
still 20 years later struggled to find anything
19:18
that's the secret recipe beyond saying, sure, there are
19:20
some people the better than others, but it's damn
19:22
hard to tell what it is. This
19:25
has not stopped leadership gurus from
19:27
promoting their pet theories. As
19:30
Bloom puts it, there is a
19:33
ton of BS around this from
19:35
airport bookstore pulp fiction. And
19:38
here's another reason to question the
19:40
literature on management and bosses. As
19:42
we've been hearing, most of
19:45
the boss data comes from employee
19:47
surveys. Have you ever
19:49
taken a survey that rates your manager?
19:52
If so, were you told it
19:54
was anonymous? Did
19:56
you believe it was anonymous? The
20:00
answers Objective. Or.
20:03
Did you may be think? Well, my boss
20:05
thinks I'm good at my job, so I'm
20:07
going to say they're good at there's or
20:09
vice versa. I don't think my boss
20:12
likes me, so I'm sure I can give them a
20:14
good reading. As we
20:16
have said before on the show,
20:18
survey data can be the lowest
20:20
form of data Steer again is
20:22
Steve to Dallas. I'm. Sure,
20:24
you know that economists are very
20:27
weary about using surveys, and economists
20:29
believe in what we call a
20:31
revealed preference approach. Meaning how you
20:33
behave is telling me a lot
20:36
more about you than what you
20:38
say about yourself. Just how
20:40
big is the gap between what people
20:42
say. In how they behave. Over.
20:45
The years I've heard many economists
20:47
good many examples of this gap.
20:50
Steve. To Dallas. Example is my
20:52
all time favorite. There. Is
20:54
a lot of discussion about privacy and
20:56
privacy regulations these days and you hear
20:58
a lot of people saying how their
21:00
privacy is important to them and then
21:02
you turn of them and say here's
21:04
a Snickers Bar could I have your
21:07
mother's maiden name and they say yes,
21:09
Mister Fell It's a little bit confusing
21:11
when you tell me that you really
21:13
care about privacy and then you just
21:15
scroll down on every app you downloads
21:17
and click Yes, Yes, yes, that's doesn't
21:19
tell me that you really care about
21:21
privacy. So the same is true for.
21:23
Many other types of
21:25
behavior. So
21:28
let's keep in mind that much
21:30
of what we have been told
21:32
in the past about good bosses
21:34
and bad bosses is not exactly
21:36
evidence based. Researchers like to Delis
21:38
and Hoffman and Bloom have been
21:41
chipping away at the black box
21:43
of boss behavior, but we've got
21:45
a long way to go. This
21:47
means we need to keep looking
21:49
for good data and asking good
21:51
questions. So coming up after the
21:53
break, who becomes a boss and
21:55
why It's so many people think
21:57
the boss. selection process is so
21:59
stupid, why do firms keep
22:01
doing it? And whatever
22:04
happened to Katie Johnson? I
22:06
get to the end of the day and the last thing I want
22:08
to do is talk to someone else. I'm
22:10
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22:13
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24:01
What I mean is why a given
24:03
employee will rise from the ranks
24:05
to become a manager. Here's
24:08
someone who's been thinking about that a lot. My
24:11
name is Kelly Hsu. I'm a professor
24:13
of finance at the Yale School of
24:15
Management. Kelly Hsu, along
24:18
with Alan Benson and Danielle
24:20
Lee, published a paper in
24:22
the Quarterly Journal of Economics,
24:24
another top journal, called Promotions
24:26
and the Peter Principle. So
24:29
the Peter Principle is a very
24:31
funny and popular management book written
24:33
by Lawrence J. Peter, and his
24:35
book offers an explanation for why
24:38
we might see incompetent bosses everywhere.
24:41
Incompetent bosses everywhere? Okay,
24:44
I'm listening. What is this
24:46
explanation? Let's go back to
24:48
Lawrence J. Peter himself. This is from
24:51
a 1973 documentary. The
24:55
Peter Principle states very simply that
24:57
in any hierarchy, an employee tends
25:00
to rise to his level of incompetence.
25:04
I'm sorry. As many times as I've heard that
25:07
phrase, I still laugh at it just because it
25:10
sounds like it's going to be not
25:12
irreverent, and then it turns immediately irreverent,
25:14
which makes me chuckle. Oh, exactly. I
25:16
think it's a funny idea, but it
25:18
also rings true, and it's funny in
25:20
a kind of unpleasant way, because it
25:22
reminds people how much they dislike their
25:24
bosses. Peter was a
25:27
Canadian education scholar. He
25:29
used his daily observations to form
25:31
a theory about job promotions.
25:34
I saw that very often a competent
25:36
individual was promoted to something
25:39
he couldn't do. I
25:41
saw a competent mechanic where
25:44
I used to take my car. He
25:46
was terrific. He was very responsible,
25:49
very precise, knew exactly what he was
25:51
doing, so they made him form it.
25:53
Now, he's no longer fixing
25:55
cars, and he's trying to manage other mechanics,
25:58
and he's very incompetent. The more
26:01
Peter looked around, the more he
26:03
saw people who were good at
26:05
their jobs, routinely stumbling into bigger
26:07
jobs they weren't good at. In
26:10
any organization where
26:13
competence is essentially
26:15
eligibility for promotion and incompetence
26:17
is a bar to promotion,
26:20
people will rise to the level of incompetence
26:23
and tend to stay there. The
26:25
book he wrote with Raymond Hull
26:27
was called The Peter Principle, Why
26:30
Things Always Go Wrong. It
26:32
wound up selling millions of copies.
26:34
The book was meant to satirize
26:37
corporate strategy. Nevertheless, a
26:39
variety of big firms tried to
26:41
recruit Peter to become their management
26:43
guru. He declined saying
26:46
that he didn't wish to rise
26:48
to his own level of incompetence.
26:51
Kelly Shue again. His idea
26:53
is that firms and organizations tend to
26:55
promote people based upon their performance so
26:58
far. What that means is a
27:00
worker who is good at her job will be
27:02
quickly promoted to a new job role, which might
27:04
require different set of skills. If
27:07
she's good at that new role, she's going
27:09
to be promoted again until she reaches a
27:11
position where she's actually a bad match for
27:13
that new job role and then she will
27:15
no longer be promoted. On the one
27:17
hand, it would seem to make perfect sense that you
27:19
promote someone who's good at their job. You're going to
27:22
promote the bad workers. On the
27:24
other hand, managing is not the same
27:26
as doing. There's no reason
27:28
to believe that a great salesperson who knows how
27:31
to negotiate deals will be a great manager. That
27:34
again is the Berkeley economist Steve
27:36
Tedellis. I look here in
27:38
my company, Berkeley, great researchers often make for
27:40
lousy department chairs. Great engineers
27:43
often make for lousy engineering managers. But
27:46
here's the thing about the Peter Principle. Even
27:49
though the theory had been around for half
27:51
a century, no one had
27:53
ever checked with real data from real
27:55
companies Whether Lawrence Peter
27:58
was right. A
28:00
few observations about car mechanic
28:02
or an academic research or
28:05
turned department chair. Those do
28:07
not constitute empirical proof. Especially.
28:10
In the realm of management and
28:12
all that airport bookstore pulp fiction,
28:14
this is where Kelly, Sue and
28:16
her coauthors come in. They. Wanted
28:19
to see if the Peter Principle
28:21
actually exists. In, it's so what
28:23
should be done about it. First.
28:25
Step. Get. Hold of some
28:28
data. We. Got our data from
28:30
a company that offers sale of
28:32
performance. Management Software and Services.
28:35
Shoe. Can't tell us the name of
28:38
the company but pictures something like
28:40
salesforce. A typical kind of
28:42
our data provider is a from that
28:44
employs. Business to business sales
28:46
workers. And that clients
28:48
from would implode the sales
28:50
numbers and the whole organizational
28:52
structure into. A. Software Program and
28:55
what we're doing is we're studying the
28:57
data that his client for hims uploaded
28:59
into the. Software. Program: How many firms
29:01
and how many workers. We. See
29:03
data for about forty thousand business
29:05
to business fails workers at over
29:08
one hundred and thirty different Us
29:10
based firms. And. How many
29:12
of those were in Managerial Rose? Five
29:14
thousand. Managers. And about
29:17
fifteen hundred promotion events.
29:19
So in terms of empirical studies in
29:21
your realm, this is considered a pretty
29:24
large and robust dataset. Or would you
29:26
like to to be even bigger than
29:28
that? I would. Always prefer a bitter
29:30
dataset. Vote for this type of question
29:32
of. Very large and comprehensive
29:35
dataset. So these are sales
29:37
workers and sales managers. What
29:40
makes sales a good business function
29:42
to study? One. Is important
29:44
a study sales. Workers. Has almost
29:46
ten percent of the Us labor force.
29:49
Or somehow involved in the sales
29:51
function. The other benefit is that
29:53
we have a very good measure.
29:55
Of their performance. So. He
29:57
can test or the stronger performers.
30:00
more likely to be promoted. So
30:02
that makes a lot of sense from
30:04
your perspective as the scholar. From my
30:06
perspective as someone who's not in sales,
30:09
I would think, well, your findings may
30:11
not translate very well that in a
30:13
field like journalism or in healthcare or
30:15
in many other fields, the
30:18
measurables aren't nearly as measurable as they
30:20
are in sales. So how generalizable do
30:22
you think your findings are? I
30:25
believe it's likely to apply to
30:27
other settings where the
30:29
skills required to succeed at one
30:31
level differ from skills required to succeed
30:33
in the next level. So
30:36
some examples are science,
30:38
manufacturing, academia,
30:41
entrepreneurship. Can
30:43
you think of industries or sectors
30:46
where this problem wouldn't apply? It's
30:49
actually hard for me to think of a setting in which
30:51
this problem wouldn't apply at all. I've
30:53
also seen it in the context of
30:55
government structures. A good
30:57
example is actually the ancient
31:00
Chinese imperial examination system. It's
31:03
famous for being a meritocracy even thousands
31:05
of years ago. So you
31:07
would take a test and the top
31:09
scores on the test would become administrators
31:11
within the government bureaucracy. But
31:14
their problem was they would make
31:16
the test based upon familiarity with
31:18
classical poetry and the people who
31:20
are best at that test would
31:22
then become tax collectors, which is a different
31:24
skill set. But ancient
31:27
Chinese poetry was an incredibly
31:29
rich and diverse body of literature, yes?
31:31
I could imagine how a mastery
31:34
or even a deep appreciation of that
31:36
could theoretically apply across
31:38
a number of skills. Theoretically,
31:41
yes. You sound
31:44
unconvinced. And to be fair, I
31:46
do not have the historical data to prove
31:48
that being the best
31:50
at classical poetry means
31:53
you're not the best at tax collection. Since
31:55
you don't have that data, let's look
31:57
at, say, modern US politics. would
32:00
you assess the relationship between
32:02
a person who's electable
32:04
and a person who will govern
32:06
well? Oh, that is
32:08
a very good point. So someone who
32:11
is electable might be very charismatic, very
32:13
good at public speaking, whereas
32:15
the actual function once someone
32:18
has been elected might involve
32:20
being good at dealmaking, back
32:23
office politics, or understanding the actual
32:25
details of the policies that they're
32:28
passing. Do you know anything about
32:30
that question empirically? I'm drawing a blank,
32:32
but you really did raise a very
32:34
good research idea. Maybe I will look into
32:36
this. We've been thinking about
32:38
settings where this type of problem might
32:41
apply for a long time, but somehow
32:43
I'd never thought about the government or
32:45
elected official example you just raised, but
32:47
it seems like spot on for having
32:49
potential as a problem. Okay,
32:52
before I hijacked this conversation with Kelly
32:54
Shue to talk about politics and ancient
32:56
Chinese poetry, we were talking
32:58
about her research paper that tried to
33:01
identify the Peter principle in the wild.
33:04
As Shue told us, she had
33:06
performance data on roughly 40,000 sales
33:09
workers and around 130 companies. The
33:12
next step was to confirm
33:14
that companies indeed use an
33:17
employee's job performance as a
33:19
trigger for promotion. The
33:21
answer? Yes. We
33:24
find that doubling in worker
33:26
sales corresponds to a 30%
33:29
increase in their probability of being
33:31
promoted. Another way to
33:34
look at it is if someone is
33:36
the top sales worker within their team
33:38
of five or six people, then
33:40
that top sales worker has about tripled
33:43
the probability of being promoted
33:46
relative to the average sales worker. Now
33:48
is that alone evidence of the
33:51
Peter principle? No,
33:53
just to promote based upon past
33:55
performance isn't necessarily a Peter principle
33:57
problem because it could be that
34:00
the best salespeople really are the best
34:02
managers of salespeople. In that case, you
34:04
want to promote the best salespeople. Okay.
34:07
So the next step, I guess, is
34:09
seeing whether the best salespeople indeed do
34:11
become the best managers. How do you
34:14
do that? So first, we're
34:16
going to measure the quality of each
34:18
manager. Managers in
34:20
our data are no longer directly
34:22
involved in sales. Their job as
34:24
a manager is to coordinate and
34:27
facilitate the sales of their subordinates.
34:29
And presumably, those subordinates are people they worked
34:31
with side by side and maybe competed against
34:33
just the week before they were promoted. Is
34:36
that the case often? We
34:38
actually see for the most part,
34:40
people when they're promoted, they're rotated
34:42
to a different team, possibly because
34:45
the firm overall is exactly afraid
34:47
of those internal team dynamics that
34:49
you've just described. So
34:52
we don't want to call someone a good manager
34:54
just because her team sells a lot, because
34:56
we're worried that maybe she was lucky and she
34:58
was assigned to great sales workers.
35:01
And those sales workers could have been
35:03
great regardless of her managerial input. To
35:06
get around that problem, we're going to
35:08
measure manager quality as the
35:10
manager's value added to her
35:12
subordinate sales. If my
35:14
subordinates sell more when they work under
35:16
me than when they worked under other
35:19
managers, then I would
35:21
be considered a high quality manager. So
35:27
here's the key question Kelly Shue was asking.
35:30
Does being a good salesperson make you
35:33
a good manager of other salespeople? Here's
35:36
what she found. The manager with
35:38
double, the pre-promotion sales
35:41
as another manager leads
35:43
to about a 6% decline
35:45
in subordinate sales. Oh my
35:47
goodness. Yes, what we find
35:49
is that among promoted managers, those
35:52
with low sales prior
35:54
to their promotion, they are actually
35:56
better at managing their subordinates.
36:00
Let me say that again. Oh my
36:03
goodness. When these firms
36:05
select people to be managers based
36:07
on their current job performance, they
36:09
are actively making themselves worse off.
36:12
In other words, the Peter principle is
36:14
as real as Lawrence Peter said it was.
36:18
And, I'm editorializing here, it
36:20
would also seem to be
36:22
incredibly stupid. If
36:25
the firm's only goal were to
36:27
have the best possible managers, then
36:30
the firm could, by putting more
36:32
weight on collaboration experience and less
36:35
weight on sales numbers, the
36:37
firm could promote better managers and
36:39
raise overall firm sales numbers by
36:41
about 30%. That's
36:44
assuming that collaboration experience is in
36:46
fact more important for a manager
36:48
than just high sales numbers. Still,
36:51
a 30% increase in revenue
36:54
simply by killing off the Peter
36:56
principle? That would seem to be
36:58
a no-brainer. So, does
37:00
this mean that modern firms simply aren't
37:02
aware of the age-old Peter
37:04
principle? Most firms
37:06
are aware of the Peter principle
37:08
problem, and it's a problem
37:10
that they purposely choose to live with.
37:14
Some evidence we have indicating that
37:17
in situations when the
37:19
firm is trying to select a new manager who is going
37:21
to be in charge of a very large team.
37:24
So, that's a situation in which manager quality
37:26
matters a lot. In
37:28
those situations, firms put less weight
37:31
on a worker's sales numbers, probably
37:33
because they know they're going to end up with a
37:36
bad manager. So, Shue is
37:38
arguing that firms know they will get
37:40
worse managers by simply promoting people who've
37:42
been good at their previous jobs rather
37:44
than people who might actually be good
37:46
managers. And yet, for
37:49
the most part, they continue to do
37:51
it, even though it hurts their profits. Why
37:54
would they do that? Economists
37:56
are always telling us
37:58
that companies are, by
38:01
definition, profit-maximizing machines. Knowingly
38:04
promoting a bad manager does
38:06
not sound very profit-maximizing. So
38:08
are companies just making a mistake? A
38:11
firm having a Peter Principle problem
38:13
doesn't necessarily mean that the firm
38:15
doesn't understand what it's doing or
38:17
is making a mistake. So
38:22
what is going on? After the
38:24
break, Kelly Shue gives us some answers. You don't
38:26
want to brag about your pay on your resume.
38:29
I'm Stephen Dubner. This is Freakonomics Radio. We'll
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SI Pc. For
42:00
the break, the Yale Finance professor Kelly
42:02
Sue was telling us about a study
42:05
she and her colleagues published about the
42:07
Peter Principle that the idea that a
42:09
good employee will be promoted to bigger
42:11
and bigger jobs until they get to
42:14
a job they're not been and then
42:16
they tend to stay there for for
42:18
years. The Peter principle was just a
42:21
theory Kelly. She wanted to see if
42:23
it's real using data on thousands of
42:25
promotions. She did find that when top
42:28
performing sales people were promoted into. Management:
42:30
The sales performance on the teams
42:32
to be managed declined. In other
42:34
words, just because somebody is good
42:36
at their job doesn't mean they'll
42:38
be good at managing people doing
42:40
that same job. Shoe also found
42:43
evidence that firms know that the
42:45
best sales people make bad managers
42:47
and they choose to promote them
42:49
anyway. So what is happening? What
42:52
we believe it's happening is the From
42:54
is doing. It's best to motivate workers
42:56
and they face a trade off. Up.
42:59
This is where it gets really interesting.
43:01
Promoting. Based upon past
43:03
performance is very motivating.
43:06
Co. Workers so it's a very strong
43:08
incentive system we can also work
43:10
out is in some ways cheaper
43:12
than offering. Really strong pay for
43:14
performance. For. Their to way
43:16
to motivate people, read and pay them a
43:19
whole lot more. or we can give them
43:21
an opportunity for promotion which they might value
43:23
a whole lot because that's something that they
43:25
can put on their resume and it increases
43:28
their status in society. You. Want
43:30
to brag about your pay on your resume? I
43:32
mean the minute you say that it makes
43:34
me think we maybe we should make it
43:36
more acceptable for people to brag about their
43:39
pay because when that be more efficient in
43:41
the end and encourage less promotion of people
43:43
who are going to be bad managers. That's.
43:46
A fantastic idea. I don't know
43:48
of research testing that directly, but
43:51
I do know in other cultures
43:53
there's differences in it being more
43:55
socially acceptable to talk about your
43:57
compensation. Hundred. Hundred. Half
44:00
joking, but. He. Would be interesting
44:02
if there was some metric are bad
44:04
you get saying. I'm. Really
44:06
good at what I do, and I'm
44:09
so good that I've been rewarded a
44:11
lot of raises and plainly I'm very
44:13
valuable to the from and I could
44:15
be a manager if I wanted, but
44:18
I'm better than that. Battered.
44:20
Incredibly ham handed naive way of
44:23
putting it. But is there any
44:25
mechanism in managerial science for that
44:27
kind of. Delineation between
44:30
success on a financial level,
44:32
of success on a managerial
44:34
lemme. There has been some
44:36
interesting attempts in that direction so
44:38
I've heard of many technology focused
44:40
firms especially those in Silicon Valley.
44:42
They see as as problem that
44:44
they have a pool a very
44:47
talented and skilled engineers and those
44:49
engineers may not be the best
44:51
managers of engineers. Many of those
44:53
firms offer something called a dual
44:55
career track where someone ten rise
44:58
in the ranks of being an
45:00
engineer basically having a higher and
45:02
higher title to to start as
45:04
engineer. Than distinguished engineers
45:06
and lifetime distinguish engineer And
45:09
that's away for. The.
45:11
From to recognize someone's contributions in
45:13
a public way without moving them
45:16
over to management. The.
45:20
Berkeley economist Steve to Dallas has
45:23
also noticed this movement. And
45:25
companies like Bb, Google, Amazon,
45:27
Facebooks, there's the of icy
45:29
and were independent contributor and
45:31
you will have people who
45:33
are at the level of
45:35
V P not managing a
45:37
single person because they are
45:39
just gods in their realm
45:41
of engineering, war, coding or
45:43
architecture and and so on
45:45
by distinguishing between I Seized
45:48
and the so called management
45:50
talents The Sun The look
45:52
We are going to promote
45:54
people. In ways that reward
45:56
them for what they're gray at. You're
45:58
not a great manager. Your. I'm going
46:00
to get incentivized by becoming a
46:02
manager. Has that model.
46:05
Trickled out at all of that hi
46:07
tech realm. One area
46:09
where I have seen it
46:11
is in consulting companies were
46:13
you have the kind of
46:16
deep technical talent think of
46:18
phds, etc that will remain
46:20
and be very heavily rewarded
46:22
for the work they do
46:24
and they will not manage
46:26
people. The.
46:30
Fact that Kelly Sue Ann Steve
46:32
to Dallas can identify handful of
46:34
cases were career success is not
46:36
tied to a promotion into management.
46:39
Well. Those are exceptions that prove
46:41
the rule. As. Shoe found
46:44
in her research, the Peter Principle
46:46
is alive and well. As absurd
46:48
as that may seem, it is
46:50
yet another confirmation that management science
46:53
as lovely of phrases that may
46:55
seem, is not yet very scientific.
46:58
Most. From stick with what they've
47:00
always done. When and employees
47:02
good at what they do. You.
47:04
Turn them into a manager to oversee
47:06
other people who do what they used
47:08
to do, even if they are not
47:10
cut out to be a manager. Lights.
47:13
Our Friends Tv Johnson. The.
47:16
English data scientists we met earlier. I.
47:18
Didn't see that there was another past swear
47:20
by I could be director levels but not
47:22
have died a couple. it's I just didn't
47:25
As a see that. Looking back,
47:27
there were some clues that
47:29
Johnson wasn't quite manager material.
47:32
You. Member: During management training, she
47:34
took that personality test. And.
47:37
She told us the areas where sky high
47:39
scores. Critical. Thinking attention
47:41
to detail parades only
47:43
ten entire know. Pinkie
47:45
Pie Characteristics: Well. Those
47:47
were not be only results of this
47:50
test. Things. That I can
47:52
do by struggle with was compassion
47:54
and save the laces. Sit thirty.
47:56
I saw this eighth and I
47:59
was like. Why didn't anyone see
48:01
this to me before I got this
48:03
job? Because this just screams great data
48:06
scientist, not so great manager. But.
48:08
It was too late. She'd. Already been
48:10
made a manager and as you'll recall
48:12
it was not going well. I
48:14
haven't finished my day and my study Spoken to
48:16
the. Living. Room star blank over my
48:19
head and price. Soon.
48:23
That say, we're tapping the scale
48:25
of zero to ten. Where would
48:27
you put your median the satisfaction
48:29
when you were in I see
48:32
it or a maker. When I
48:34
was amazed that I that myself as
48:36
an eighth and a half by actually
48:38
loved why. Did I absolutely love that?
48:40
The only reason I even to ducks one
48:42
point five points is because that was some
48:44
frustration as I mentioned about not being heard
48:47
and not being autonomous. And then where would
48:49
you put it zero to ten when you'd
48:51
become a full on manager? I would
48:53
say I'd put myself more like a four
48:56
or five or six would be a great
48:58
day. Okay, that's your
49:00
personal satisfaction. I do see
49:03
however on linked in a
49:05
review from your manager. He
49:08
writes: Td is a rounded and
49:10
passionate data leader with all the
49:13
qualities required to inspire, manage, and
49:15
be the team. Plus she's got
49:17
brilliant I see skills to boot
49:20
and he notes that you are
49:22
a real unicorn in the data
49:24
analytics feel, so that sounds like
49:27
you were the best manager ever.
49:29
Yes, It's very nice
49:31
of them. It. Is really nice. Did
49:34
he write that before ft decided to quit?
49:36
He wrote the off death. You.
49:40
Heard that right? Tt. Johnson
49:43
quit. That. Management Job. See.
49:46
Quit being a boss entirely.
49:48
She. Went back to working as a
49:50
data scientist at a different from. I
49:53
don't know if you can ever be
49:55
successful at something. You'd and like I
49:57
want to see something the I Love. I'm
50:00
really passionate by because that be only bates Many other
50:02
people are different the I have to love it have
50:04
to be like on a Sunday nights. I can't wait
50:06
to thought my what's mind get that's why with drinks
50:08
and I with. Nasa, Esa as the Us
50:11
gonna. Have thought my management job so
50:13
before you ever became a manager as
50:15
a maker you said your. Average
50:17
satisfaction. Their happiness as around eight and
50:19
a half. When. You became a
50:21
manager. Dropped her with Call It Five. Six.
50:24
And a great day. What Is
50:26
it now? I said the nine and
50:28
a half nine. I'm super happy. Are you
50:31
getting paid less now as the data centers
50:33
Then you are? As a manager, I'm getting
50:35
paid more. How did that happen? I think.
50:37
That are more individual country to both.
50:40
neither paid good money. I think that
50:42
Discs technical specialists route is becoming more
50:44
prominent and more who boarded and people
50:46
do realize that thou are going to
50:48
be a lot people. Who don't want
50:50
to become the manager and have you
50:53
met as a then I believe you
50:55
looked at the Peter Principle paper. Is
50:57
that right? Yeah, did the way the
50:59
Peter Principle is usually described his to
51:01
me almost comical that people rise to
51:03
the level of their incompetence, which I
51:05
find is a bit cruel sounding because
51:07
one could also say that people rise
51:09
to their ceiling of competence right? And
51:11
then maybe they're not as good as
51:13
out of not like they suddenly turn
51:15
into idiots. but I am curious to
51:17
see your thoughts on the notion of
51:19
promotion. Into Management as a reward for
51:21
being good at what you been doing
51:23
all along To. Me, This is where
51:26
the idea of split in a
51:28
daze. Levels of seniority, sales, Maybe
51:30
you don't become the manager that you can become
51:32
a technical expert and you are. Paid and
51:34
rewarded for that's is something that helps
51:36
the incentives. Why would say on that
51:38
Though it's often we have to steal
51:40
career track of of faith in the
51:43
a manager or you can be authentic
51:45
the specialists that even though you might
51:47
get a quote and quote from Mason
51:49
and be paid more, the technical specialists
51:51
still might be excluded from high level
51:53
conversation. Say it's been a manager just
51:55
had this connotation of seniority stuff a
51:57
typical specialist doesn't necessarily. and you still
51:59
might. Beeping
52:04
he hit. The police in the evening
52:06
of regular people would tunnel and that having
52:08
of the avocado people calling what you folks
52:10
have to come with that. I.
52:15
Would think that many people who are
52:17
promoted from some sort of maker to
52:19
some sort of manager that it would
52:21
be hard. To. Step back if for
52:23
no other reason than seems like losses
52:25
status. Yes, it definitely felt like a
52:28
lot of states. As I guess the
52:30
Me: I'm lucky that I don't care
52:32
what people say as much as other
52:34
people are. so. I'm sure that
52:36
was identified him Personality tests as
52:38
well. Yeah, Complete Faith Seven Power.
52:40
Of think people judge he was as
52:42
as interesting because I didn't know anyone
52:45
who likes the job as much as
52:47
I do says the people to look
52:49
upon me and feel sorry for me
52:51
in that sense the I have chosen
52:53
to go backwards and sense of korea
52:55
hierarchy of a pen palling and sense.
52:58
Of what we value as a career and
53:00
you can tell them that if you hadn't
53:02
done this you and be and signified yeah
53:04
well exactly how I got what I wanted
53:06
a with the. Plan all along the as
53:09
good as a long day. Thanks
53:15
to Tv Johnson for sharing her
53:17
boss and back story. Recently she
53:19
became her own boss. Working as
53:21
a freelance data coach. She. Wrote
53:23
to us. I am optimistic that my
53:25
new venture will allow me to grow
53:27
as a data professional, focusing on the
53:30
elements of leadership I value while minimizing
53:32
my exposure to the parts of leadership
53:34
that I did not enjoy. Thanks
53:37
also to Kelly Sue, Steve to
53:39
Dallas, Nick Bloom and all their
53:41
collaborators for trying to make this
53:43
thing We call management science a
53:45
bit more scientific coming up. Next
53:47
time on the So it's time
53:49
to take a look at one
53:51
of our favorite law's the Law
53:54
of Unintended Consequences. In this case
53:56
applied to the modern workplace. we
53:58
will hear how law those and
54:00
rules that are meant to protect
54:02
certain workers. Next
54:04
time on the show. Until then, take care
54:07
of yourself and if you can someone else
54:09
to. Freakonomics reduce
54:11
produced. I stutter and read but
54:13
radio. You can find our entire
54:15
archive on any podcast app off
54:17
with freakonomics.com where we publish transcripts
54:19
and show notes. This episode was
54:22
produced by Ryan Kelly. We had
54:24
help from Jared Hope. Our staff
54:26
also includes Alina Coleman, Augusta Chapman,
54:28
Eleanor Osborne's Elsa Hernandez Gabriel. Roth.
54:30
Greg Ribbons, Jasmine Klinger, Jeremy Johnson, Juli
54:32
Canter A Weird Bout It's Morgan Levy,
54:34
Neil Caruso, Rebecca We Douglas, Sarah, Lily
54:37
and Zapped with Pinsky Or theme song
54:39
is Mister Fortune by the Hitchhikers. The
54:41
rest of our music is composed by
54:43
Do is Get as always. thank you
54:45
for listening. Do.
54:49
You ever. Want. To
54:51
tell your dean. Thanks so much
54:54
for giving me all this managerial responsibility
54:56
but I don't wanna. I don't want
54:58
my reward for being a good scholar
55:00
to be that I have to do
55:02
a bunch of management. I
55:05
haven't thought about that. The. Radio
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