0:04

So

0:04

maybe at 5, 4 or maybe 5

0:06

o'clock in the morning we were put on alert because

0:09

actually the war started.

0:12

In Mariupol, like, it was pretty asymmetrical war

0:14

for us because our enemy had

0:16

almost everything and we had nothing. As

0:20

for me, it became obvious that our

0:22

enemy has total superiority.

0:24

It's like superiority in the numbers

0:27

of personnel, superiority in numbers of armored

0:30

vehicles in all ways and means.

0:34

Hey, welcome back to the Modern War Institute

0:36

podcast. I'm Jon Amble, editorial director

0:38

at MWI, and this is a special episode.

0:41

The MWI podcast is really our flagship

0:43

podcast, but we also have several others, one

0:46

of which is the Urban Warfare Project podcast

0:48

hosted by Jon Spencer. Jon

0:50

recently had a terrific opportunity.

0:53

He got the chance to speak to Arseniy Fedosuk, a

0:55

Ukrainian non-commissioned officer who took part in

0:57

the defense of the Azov steel factory in

0:59

Mariupol last year. This episode

1:01

is essentially a condensed version of a portion

1:04

of that conversation. Arseniy

1:06

shares some fascinating details of the battle

1:08

based on first-hand experience. He describes

1:10

the numerical and equipment disadvantage of the

1:13

Ukrainians, shares his observations on

1:15

Russian tactics, and more. I think listeners

1:17

will really appreciate hearing it, but since

1:19

it is just a portion of the longer conversation,

1:21

I really encourage you to go and find the Urban Warfare

1:24

Project podcast. You can get it wherever you're listening

1:26

to this one, and look out for the episode that will

1:28

be released on Friday, July 21st. That

1:31

episode will include the much longer conversation

1:33

with this phenomenal guest, and the full discussion

1:35

is exceptional. Before we get to

1:37

the episode, as always, a couple quick notes. First,

1:40

if you're not yet subscribed to the MWI podcast,

1:42

you can find it on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, TuneIn,

1:44

Spotify, or your favorite podcast app. And

1:47

second, as always, what you hear in this episode

1:49

are the views of the participants, and don't represent those

1:51

of West Point, the Army, or any other agency

1:53

of the US government. Alright, here's

1:56

Jon Spencer with Arseniy Fedoseyuk.

2:06

Today's guest on the podcast is Sergeant

2:08

Arseny Fedesuk. Thanks

2:11

for joining us. So just

2:13

to start off, if you don't mind, can you tell

2:15

us a little bit about yourself, where you

2:18

came from and how you came to be

2:20

serving in the Azov in Maryovl?

2:22

I joined military

2:25

in 2014 when the war started. First

2:27

I joined military as a volunteer. I

2:30

had no previous military experience before

2:32

I joined military. Before

2:35

our first battle we had boot

2:37

camp, we obtained

2:39

some basic tactical skills and

2:42

some basic tactical medicine

2:44

skills and that's all.

2:46

After that we went to Iloevsk,

2:49

if you remember, it was one

2:51

of the biggest battles during the first

2:54

period of the war.

2:56

We gained some experience

2:58

actually during the battles. And

3:00

as for me the first year of that war,

3:03

the first year passed in volunteer battalions.

3:06

After that I went back into my hometown,

3:09

stayed there for several months and

3:11

after that I decided to join a professional

3:13

military unit and in 2016

3:16

I signed a contract with Azov, with

3:18

the National Guard of Ukraine and started

3:21

my military career.

3:23

I passed 5 years on active duty

3:26

in Azov Regiment. First 3

3:29

years passed for me

3:32

in an infantry battalion. After

3:36

that in 2019 I

3:38

decided to join reconnaissance and

3:40

I became a sniper.

3:42

So 2 years from 2019 till 2021

3:45

I worked as a sniper.

3:49

3 months before the full

3:51

scale invasion started my contract

3:53

ended and I resigned from

3:55

the military.

3:57

big

4:00

war started.

4:01

I returned back to Marupal because

4:04

I knew that the big war

4:06

should begin. And

4:08

for me it was important to be with my military

4:11

unit, with my friends, with my

4:13

brothers in arms. So I went

4:15

back to Marupal on February 23rd.

4:17

So as for me the big war

4:19

started in Marupal.

4:23

I passed through

4:25

all Marupal campaign when,

4:28

as you know, we got captured by Russia and Russians.

4:31

So all our regiment went to captivity

4:35

and after seven months of military prison

4:38

I was exchanged.

4:40

So when did it start for you? So I know you

4:42

said you rejoined on February 23rd. The full scale

4:44

invasion starts on February 24th

4:47

technically. Where exactly

4:49

were you in Marupal at the

4:51

Azov Regiment headquarters?

4:53

At that time we had several bases,

4:56

three actually. One in Marupal and

4:59

two others in the outlying villages. The

5:02

village of Urzuv and

5:04

the village Yurivka. My company

5:06

was located in the village called Yurivka.

5:09

It's around 40 kilometers

5:11

from Marupal to the west.

5:14

So maybe at 5 o'clock in

5:17

the morning we were put on alert

5:19

because actually the war started.

5:21

We heard explosions,

5:24

made by Russian

5:26

rocket attack. Russians targeted

5:28

Marupal airport and Marupal

5:30

air defense system.

5:33

So the first thing they targeted it

5:35

was a radar.

5:36

And the fact that they destroyed that air

5:39

defense radar made our

5:41

air defense absolutely useless.

5:44

Because without a radar all these systems

5:46

cannot work. So because

5:48

of that in Marupal their airplanes

5:51

fell themselves home.

5:52

And I think in this war we haven't

5:55

seen such intense use of

5:57

airplanes by Russians as we

5:59

in Marupal.

6:01

So, 4 or 5 o'clock in the morning

6:03

we put an alert and we started advocating

6:06

from our base. We started to advocate

6:09

personal ammunition, started

6:11

burning some sensible documentation

6:15

and we started advocating and we went to

6:17

Marupal because it wasn't safe to

6:19

stay on this base. As for me it was

6:21

a surprise that they did not

6:24

launch an attack on our military

6:27

base. From my point of view, from

6:29

like from the military point of view, it would be very

6:31

useful to destroy a base like

6:34

right away from the beginning of the war.

6:37

But they didn't do that and

6:39

actually because of that they faced

6:41

a lot of problems.

6:42

But luckily they didn't launch an attack

6:45

on our base.

6:46

So we had a chance to advocate from

6:49

this base. So we had plenty of

6:51

time. And maybe afternoon

6:54

we were in Marupal.

6:56

We were settled to

6:58

one building when another building. So

7:00

we were moving constantly.

7:02

After that our company were

7:04

settled to a building near

7:07

the school in Marupal.

7:09

And the first week we lived like

7:11

in that building.

7:14

So you moved out of your base, you

7:16

moved into Marupal City, eventually

7:19

a stronger building.

7:21

And that's a week into the war. What's

7:24

next?

7:25

First week there was no combat

7:27

actions in Marupal. We had combat

7:29

actions on the outlying in the outlying villages.

7:32

On the first week we tried to repellent

7:34

them from the outlying villages.

7:37

So the first major battle

7:39

we had in the village called Starykrim.

7:42

It's to the north. So as

7:44

you know Russians advanced

7:46

from three directions. From

7:49

east, from west and then

7:51

the column that went from west is

7:54

separated into two columns and

7:56

they are advancing from the west and from the north.

7:59

The first column who

8:02

tried to enter the city was the column that

8:04

was advancing from the north.

8:06

Because on the east we had all

8:08

defensive lines from the anti-terrorist

8:12

operation and that was pretty

8:14

good defensive lines, it was not so easy

8:16

to go through them. But as

8:19

for other places, our direction, there were

8:21

no defensive lines. And there

8:23

was some kind of betrayal

8:25

from some people

8:27

from Ukrainian state system. Because

8:29

the

8:30

general that was responsible

8:32

for the defense of Muryupol, he

8:35

left the city several days before the full-ski

8:38

invasion.

8:39

And the whole month before the

8:41

full-ski invasion he made

8:43

a lot of obstacles for us

8:45

to make these defensive lines on

8:48

the western and northern directions. So

8:51

the first time our group faced the enemy

8:53

it was the battle in Starykrim.

8:56

I think it was 28th,

9:00

28th of February, yes, if I remember

9:02

it right, yes.

9:04

So there advancing, there was

9:06

a tank column, it was

9:09

considered maybe from four

9:11

to six tanks. And

9:13

there was some armored vehicles to

9:15

provide support for the tanks.

9:19

And what kind of equipment did you have? Did you have mechanized

9:22

infantry, anti-tank guns?

9:25

My combat group, like we have our

9:27

company, Raconis' company, we had one

9:30

BTR-3 with 30mm mortar.

9:35

Oh no, no, we had two BTR-3.

9:38

One of them was destroyed

9:40

several days after this battle.

9:43

And so what about ammunition

9:45

and weaponry, we had light weapons,

9:48

so a K-74, AR-15, RPG,

9:52

anti-tank complex such as Fagot,

9:56

Stugna,

9:57

no, there was no single Stugna in

9:59

Azov. javelin? No,

10:01

no, we were, no. Like

10:03

for that time we can't receive all

10:06

these like Western examples of

10:08

ammunition.

10:09

Because you know, it's politics.

10:12

So we had around 40 in

10:14

Laos

10:15

for all defense of Maruvel. 40 in

10:18

Laos for all the regiment. And our

10:20

company had maybe five or

10:22

six in Laos. And I think that's,

10:25

yes, that's all. So you had on

10:27

February 28th in Starry Cream there's

10:29

a lot of fighting?

10:31

Yes.

10:32

So Russians were trying to move

10:34

their tank columns towards Maruvel and

10:36

we were repelling their

10:38

attacks.

10:39

It started like, actually, that

10:42

day it started and ended as a tank

10:44

fight between our tanks and

10:46

their tanks.

10:48

Also we are using our BTR. It's

10:50

very efficient to use their 30 millimeter

10:53

even to fight against tanks

10:56

because it has a lot of power.

10:59

We burned several tanks

11:01

from one to three tanks. Because

11:04

I don't remember the actual count.

11:07

After that we started

11:09

to hold the defense in this village

11:12

at night as long as

11:14

our group, like we were, we

11:16

have good night skills and

11:18

we had good night equipment.

11:21

Night vision, not Google, but

11:24

PVS-14, a monocular.

11:27

And thermal sites. For example,

11:31

my combat group consisted of 12 people

11:34

and eight of them had thermal sites. It's

11:36

pretty good quantity for such

11:39

a group.

11:40

The next month

11:42

for us passed in night operations.

11:46

We worked predominantly at night. But

11:48

a lot of Marupal was being bombed at

11:50

this point, right? In March a lot of the bombing

11:52

is starting. They started bombing Marupal

11:55

from the very first days of the invasion and

11:58

massive artillery shells.

11:59

That was a pretty casual story

12:02

for all this Battle of

12:04

Mirupal. After maybe third

12:05

week they started

12:07

their extensive use of airplanes.

12:10

Airplanes launched rocket attacks and

12:13

they used unguided aerial bombs,

12:15

FAP 250, FAP 500. This

12:20

number means how

12:23

much does this bomb weight in kilograms.

12:26

So you can imagine just how explosion

12:29

could be there.

12:29

So also we were

12:32

aimed to work at night, but as

12:34

long as in Mirupal

12:36

there was pretty difficult situation

12:38

and human resources were scarce.

12:41

We started to work at

12:43

night, at the day, around the clock.

12:45

And I want to say about Russian tactics in

12:48

Mirupal. They were using

12:50

both mobilized groups and professional

12:53

militaries. And they were using

12:55

such a style to

12:57

assault you in several waves.

13:00

During the first wave they were using

13:02

predominantly mobilized. And their

13:04

aim was to rupture

13:06

our defensive lines and our position.

13:09

After that, after revealing our positions,

13:12

our firing points, they

13:14

launched artillery shellings

13:16

on lead points to destroy them.

13:18

And after that they sent professional

13:22

militaries and they started

13:24

over and over. In

13:26

Mirupal it was pretty asymmetrical war

13:28

for us.

13:29

Because our enemy had almost everything

13:31

and we had nothing. And our nothing

13:34

was very limited in the size.

13:38

I was curious, I know that the bombing

13:40

is non-stop basically from February

13:42

24th on. How did you and

13:45

your fellow soldiers stay safe during

13:47

the bombings? I don't really

13:49

know. Was there basements

13:51

in buildings that you were staying in? We

13:54

lived for that time during all

13:57

these operations in Levitt Bank.

13:59

We lived at the Aesoph Steel in the

14:02

basement. When did you move into

14:04

the Aesoph Steel Factory?

14:06

We moved there at the end of the

14:08

first week. Wow. So

14:11

you used it as a base of operations from beginning

14:13

of March really?

14:14

Yes, it was like our base. Had

14:16

you been in the Steel Factory

14:19

before the war? No, no. Who

14:21

else was there? Was this, were civilians

14:23

already there or not yet? No,

14:26

a lot of civilians were there for the time.

14:28

A lot of civilians were using the shelters, their

14:31

basement like shelters. But

14:33

I saw civilians like only several times

14:35

at the Aesoph Steel. Did they have like a

14:37

different area where they were staying than the

14:40

military? Yes, they had

14:42

separate basements.

14:43

There were some mixed basements where like

14:46

both the military and civilians lived. Because

14:49

a lot of civilians were like relatives

14:51

of the military. Yeah, the families, right?

14:53

Yes.

14:54

And also I have to mention that

14:56

during all the battle of Marupal it was very

14:58

hard to fight because there were a lot

15:00

of civilians. And like before

15:03

each operation we had firstly

15:05

to isolate the territory from the civilians.

15:08

We had to guide them to the shelters, we

15:10

had to tell them. Because

15:13

people got insane.

15:14

Some people got absolutely

15:17

fearless.

15:18

No, people got used to that, shellings,

15:20

to the shootings. And people

15:22

got fearless. We had constantly to guide them

15:25

to the shelters and to watch

15:27

them to stay in the shelters.

15:29

So about this operation, it was battle

15:32

with Garu, the main intelligence

15:34

directorate, the special forces unit

15:36

from the main intelligence directorate. So

15:38

did you always know who you were facing? Because I know you talked

15:40

about DPR and professional soldiers, but

15:43

there was also the Chechens and a lot

15:45

of other forces attacking in Marupal.

15:48

Did you usually know who you were fighting?

15:50

You can find out who you were fighting

15:53

from the appearance of your enemy. So

15:56

if your enemy had poor

15:58

ammunition, poor equipment,

15:59

you can mention that

16:02

it's mobilized. And if

16:04

you face like a professional fighter with

16:06

a good combat vest, with a helmet, with

16:09

googles,

16:10

with some technical equipment, then

16:12

you can think that it's somebody

16:15

professional.

16:16

But during that fight we didn't

16:18

know that it was like a guru.

16:21

We realized it maybe

16:24

the next day.

16:25

So how it was?

16:27

We were put on alert maybe

16:30

at 10am in the morning and

16:32

we were told that there is an

16:35

armored vehicles column that used

16:38

gaps in our defensive lines to infiltrate

16:41

deep into the city, into our defense.

16:43

There was a column that consisted

16:46

of 9 armored

16:48

vehicles.

16:50

It was several typhoon vehicles,

16:53

then several BTR-82.

16:57

So I

16:59

think that was a whole company. As

17:02

we were told after that, their

17:05

aim was to infiltrate into

17:07

the Azov steel factory and naturalize

17:10

our command staff.

17:11

They were very good, equipped very

17:14

good. They had night visions,

17:17

thermal scopes, anti-drone rifles. How

17:20

did you keep Azovstol

17:23

safe? How many forces

17:25

did you have to use to secure the steel

17:27

factory to be a base for you?

17:30

Was it a lot of troops?

17:31

When?

17:33

We're about at the end of March now.

17:35

At the end of March we

17:37

did not use people to secure Azov steel.

17:40

We used people to secure our defensive

17:42

lines all over the city. Because

17:44

the defensive line was pretty long.

17:47

The amount of people was limited. So

17:49

we can't allow ourselves to

17:52

use people to secure this territory.

17:55

There were several checkpoints, and

17:58

there were people on the checkpoints.

17:59

points. And that's all. But

18:02

you had a defensive line outside the city? Yes.

18:04

Also we had positions

18:07

on this hill. That's a hill.

18:09

That's a hide. It's called Cinder Mount.

18:12

Yes, it's made of cinder.

18:14

And you had forces up top there just because they could see

18:16

across the factory?

18:18

We were observing like the coastline.

18:21

Got it. Because I

18:23

don't remember when it was.

18:25

Maybe it was the mid-April

18:28

or the end of April. They were trying to

18:30

assault us by sea

18:32

using the BTR-82. They can swim,

18:35

the type of BTR.

18:36

And they went from this coast right

18:39

here swimming by the sea on this BTR.

18:41

And they were trying to assault

18:43

this cinder mount. Wow. But

18:47

all these intentions were like repelled.

18:49

So what's next? After several days

18:52

we moved to the right bank to help

18:54

our troops on the right bank

18:56

of Marupel.

18:58

I don't remember some like prominent operations.

19:01

It was like a casual work. So

19:03

every night we went to some

19:06

positions and tried to kill

19:08

them at night. Almost every night

19:10

we had some good results. Almost every

19:13

night.

19:13

But as for that time, as for me, it

19:16

became obvious that our enemy

19:18

has total superiority. It's

19:20

like superiority in the numbers of

19:23

personal superiority in numbers of armored

19:25

vehicles in all ways and means.

19:28

And for that time I think that was a matter

19:30

of self-defense. Is there

19:33

a point where you realized that you were

19:35

surrounded and there would be no... Yes.

19:37

Maybe at the end of the march. Like

19:40

all major roads were

19:42

blocked by Russians.

19:44

Did the commanders talk to you guys? Or they said, okay,

19:46

we're surrounded but we're going to fight until the end.

19:49

Yeah.

19:50

And also we were told constantly

19:52

that some help is on

19:54

the way. We need to hold like

19:57

a week, 10 days, 5 days.

20:00

They told us all the time.

20:03

But I did not believe that

20:06

because I realized that the nearest

20:08

Ukrainian positions from Rupel

20:10

was about 100 kilometers. Now,

20:13

in about mid-April, I know that the

20:16

Ukrainian military did send

20:19

helicopter resupply into

20:22

Azostal, right? Yes. They

20:24

sent stingers, javelins.

20:27

No javelins. No javelin? No,

20:29

no, no javelins. And it was

20:32

like a very bad surprise for us because I thought,

20:34

what's the problem? What's the problem for you to send javelins?

20:37

But they did not send javelins. They sent matadors.

20:40

But as you know, matadors are not such efficient

20:43

as javelins. I don't know why maybe

20:46

they did not want to waste javelins

20:48

for this battle because it was

20:50

obvious how this battle will end.

20:52

So they released the videos later of

20:54

the helicopters flying in the Azostal

20:57

and offloading a couple of special forces

20:59

and then putting some of the wounded

21:01

on the helicopters to take them out. Did

21:04

you see any of that or were you busy fighting?

21:06

I saw people that came to Rupel

21:08

as reinforcement on helicopters. Several

21:12

of my friends came here to Rupel on

21:14

the helicopters.

21:16

And mostly they were used

21:18

to hold the defense on the right band

21:20

because

21:20

that was the hottest point

21:23

of all the time in Rupel.

21:24

So yes, I talked to a lot of them.

21:27

And the guys that came to Rupel on helicopters,

21:29

it wasn't like special forces.

21:32

No. No, no, this was like just

21:35

simple guys.

21:36

Volunteers that knew they were flying in

21:39

to something that they might not come out of the

21:41

account of? Yes, they knew that it was

21:43

a one-way ticket.

21:45

They were conscious of that fact.

21:47

The news said that one of the things sent

21:49

in was Starlink.

21:51

Yes, they helped us a lot. Yes.

21:54

Because in any war, communication is

21:56

on the top of the needs. So

21:58

you could tell a difference.

21:59

before the Starlink came in and after,

22:02

what was the difference? It became easily

22:05

to communicate, it became

22:07

easily to coordinate,

22:09

because every squad, every team had

22:11

a map, it was called Kropova. It's

22:14

a Ukraine invention from the past days

22:16

of anti-truistic operation, and we

22:18

are using that map like we are... It's

22:21

a digital map or a physical map? Yeah, it's a

22:23

digital map. On your cell phone?

22:25

On a cell phone, on a tablet.

22:28

Okay, and what's it called? Kropova.

22:30

And on this map,

22:33

you see all your positions, enemies'

22:35

positions. So like when

22:37

I was in Kiev, I studied something like that called Delta.

22:40

That's pretty the same story, yes. Same

22:42

thing, okay. Yes, we had two such

22:45

systems like Kropova and Kombat.

22:47

Okay. The Kombat map is

22:50

refreshing like in real time. If you have to

22:52

turn the connection, you can refresh it.

22:54

And you can see like the newest situation

22:58

on the front line. And it's very important

23:01

to know how defensive line lies.

23:03

Yeah,

23:04

so these maps, these situational

23:06

awareness maps, were different before

23:09

Starlink came in and after they were a lot better. Before

23:12

Stellin came, it was very hard to refresh

23:14

them.

23:15

Okay.

23:16

You had to go to the command post and

23:18

to refresh it manually. So all the

23:20

resupplies have stopped, you said, at the beginning of April. No

23:22

more helicopters. There was like four

23:25

successful helicopter operations.

23:27

Didn't some of those cranium helicopters get shot

23:29

down? I know one of the missions. Two helicopters

23:32

were shot down, yes. Okay.

23:34

Did you know about that? And what did that mean? We

23:36

knew about that because I

23:38

used to read a lot the Telegram

23:41

channels, our enemies' Telegram channels.

23:43

Oh, so you're reading in the battle, you're reading the

23:46

enemies' Telegram channels? Yes, of course, all

23:48

of us.

23:49

Was there anybody in the command post whose job it

23:52

was to like search? Yes, they

23:55

searched through Telegram channels, through

23:58

social media.

23:59

They did really great work. They started

24:02

that work before the full-scale invasion

24:04

during the anti-terrorist operation. They

24:07

even pretended like they

24:09

were chatting with our enemy,

24:11

pretending like to be a woman.

24:13

And while chatting, they

24:15

were receiving some sensible information

24:18

where they allocated their command post.

24:21

So it's social engineering

24:23

skills.

24:24

And that's like in the Azov command post? There's

24:26

like people who's responsible for doing that? Yes,

24:28

yes. There was such people.

24:31

Okay, so beginning in April.

24:33

For that time on the Red Bank we had like

24:35

a double encirclement. There was one big

24:38

encirclement around the city and

24:40

there was a smaller encirclement around

24:42

the Red Bank. So we had a free

24:44

territory in the middle of the Red

24:46

Bank. All other territory cut

24:49

out from the factory. Yes, we were separated

24:51

from our main forces on Azov steel and left

24:53

bank. So we had to move through

24:56

enemy positions to get to our forces

24:58

on Azov steel.

24:59

When did you do that? It was 15th of April.

25:03

So that was like if you remember

25:05

the safe private Ryan. Yeah.

25:08

You remember that scene at the beginning, the

25:11

Amakha beach? Yeah.

25:13

Something like that. That was the pretty ugly

25:15

same story. Because the intensity

25:17

of artillery shelling and firing

25:19

was pretty the same. So we

25:21

had such a plan.

25:22

We had to move in two columns. One

25:25

column went on foot and other

25:28

column on vehicles. Vehicles

25:30

carried injured fighters because

25:33

for that time it was impossible to

25:36

carry injured fighters to the Azov steel directly

25:38

and they were located on

25:40

the field hospitals on the Red Bank. But

25:43

those field hospitals were horrible. That

25:45

was like those pictures from the First

25:48

World War. Every day several people

25:50

were dying because of blood loss,

25:52

inflamations and so on.

25:54

So almost all the vehicles were

25:57

loaded with injured fighters with ammunition.

26:00

with weapons and other column

26:02

went on foot. The size of the

26:04

column that went on foot was pretty big, that

26:06

was around 400

26:07

people.

26:10

Our group was in the one guard of that

26:12

column. As long as we had reconnaissance,

26:15

we had night visions, thermal scopes,

26:17

our aim was to naturalize enemy

26:20

on our way to the edge of steel. Because

26:23

here in the area of the railway

26:26

station, in these residential areas,

26:28

that was all the enemy's defensive

26:31

lines. And they had several defensive

26:33

lines here. We started creating our

26:36

columns on this road and

26:38

this column was

26:39

noticed by our enemy.

26:42

Because as I told before, every

26:44

night they're using drones to

26:47

make surveillance. After that

26:49

they started actually firing.

26:52

I tried to persuade myself

26:54

that it's

26:55

targeted not on our

26:57

column.

26:58

I thought they were targeting other

27:00

targets,

27:01

but

27:03

obviously they were targeting us.

27:05

So despite that, when

27:07

we were showing, we didn't

27:10

stop.

27:11

Because for us it was a question of survival, we

27:13

can't stop. We approached the first

27:15

positions of our enemy using

27:18

our equipment, we naturalized all of them. After

27:21

that, Russians started actually firing on

27:23

all these areas. And actually

27:26

they were destroying their own positions and

27:29

they were killing their own people in

27:31

these positions. But they didn't care about that. Within

27:34

two hours we approached the river of Kalmyus

27:37

and here is the

27:39

old boat station. Boat station.

27:41

Yes. Yes.

27:43

So we concentrated in these buildings.

27:46

How many people? All

27:49

foot columns, so 400 people.

27:52

I'm talking about foot column only because I

27:54

was a part of that column.

27:56

So we were at the beginning of that column,

27:58

our group.

27:59

We concentrated in the buildings, we

28:02

found some boats on that station

28:05

and using the boats we crossed

28:07

the river.

28:08

But my group we decided not to wait

28:11

for the boats and we crossed the river by ourselves.

28:13

We just swimmed through the river.

28:17

So 400 people crossed from the old

28:19

boat station? Yes. Crossed the river

28:21

trying to get to the factory? Yes. And you

28:23

swam?

28:24

We swim, yes. Wow.

28:27

So we crossed the river

28:29

and then we approached

28:31

the factory. The

28:33

vehicle column had the

28:35

worst situation because

28:37

they had to concentrate in

28:40

this area. And this area

28:42

was like... It was easy

28:44

to make large artillery shellings

28:46

here. They were using mortars, grud

28:49

systems, artillery system, everything,

28:51

all ways and means to destroy

28:53

us.

29:00

Hey, thank you so much for listening to the MWI podcast.

29:03

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