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0:25

Hello and welcome to Floss Before our time

0:27

Springy the world's leading thinkers on today's biggest

0:29

I days. My name's Daniel and today I'm

0:32

joined by the lovely Margarita. Great to be

0:34

back and to be joined by Down Again, Today

0:36

we've got on humans and animals on

0:38

what's next for Animal Rights Professor of

0:41

Bioethics at Princeton University, Peter Singer in

0:43

the late great pioneering philosopher of Ethics

0:45

and I'm More Rights Mary mentally weighed

0:47

against the archives today. bring you an

0:49

iconic heads had to in these two

0:52

fascinating figures of animal rights activism. If

0:54

you liked this debate, make sure to check out our

0:56

lineup for this year's how the like gets investable at

0:58

Hey, We're going to be joined by Peter Singer again

1:00

this year so that's can be fun. I heard

1:02

he'll be debating slavery Jacques on the

1:05

relationship between universal morality and humanity. Indeed,

1:07

this can be a fun talk. I

1:09

think I don't think they've ever debated

1:11

in person, so that's going to be

1:13

really interesting In today's debate, however, Singer

1:15

and Midgley explore their life's work, the

1:17

current state of animal rights activism, and

1:20

what would constitute further progress in our

1:22

attitudes towards nature and animals. Before

1:24

we hundred with Roger Bolton. Don't get scribe

1:26

lever of you and your platform of choice

1:28

and busy. I don't Tv for hundreds more

1:30

Podcasts, videos and articles in the world's leading

1:33

thinkers. This

1:35

is Peter Singer American she on humans

1:37

and animals are almost forty years after.

1:39

These two philosophers helped create the idea

1:42

of animal Rights for him. Try and

1:44

find out what do they believe would

1:46

constitute further progress in our attitudes to

1:48

other forms of life. Lock from Melbourne

1:51

is a philosopher, Princeton professor and author

1:53

of Animal Liberation Peter Singer and is

1:55

joining some on here with us who

1:58

has been called the Case Former. Scourge

2:00

of Scientific for tension that was

2:02

the guardian of courses are very

2:04

mixed race with the consider the

2:07

past, present and future of the

2:09

moral status of animals serves as

2:11

the signal Spm with the over

2:13

to thank you. And first let

2:15

me say that it's a pleasure

2:18

and Marriott supposed to be talking

2:20

to you again after many years

2:22

even if it at some distance.

2:26

Because suddenly our we will buy

2:28

into this issue as very. Early

2:30

and was. Good.

2:32

To have our we don't share the same

2:35

position as I'm sure be. Clear

2:37

by the end of the our. I

2:40

think we do have a lot in

2:42

common. I do feel that too her

2:44

allies in the same cause here. So

2:48

I'm my interest in the

2:50

city guys. Back to my.

2:53

Days. as a graduate student in

2:55

Oxford in the early Nineteen seventies

2:57

when as a result really of

3:00

conversations with other graduate students at

3:02

odds with her already. Interested

3:04

in the question of animals and that. How.

3:07

We ought to treat animals. I.

3:10

Tend. To the view that as the

3:12

way in which we think of animals.

3:14

Is another example of that

3:17

familiar wire and on on

3:19

the we have in Which

3:21

and in group. Ah.

3:23

attributes. All. Of

3:26

the words, the role of them. Value. And.

3:28

Word on the moral status to

3:31

itself. And. Develop.

3:33

Some ideology built on that which

3:35

justifies it making use of the

3:38

As group. And why is

3:40

that to the suit? It's own

3:42

interests and without giving you concern

3:44

to that group. And. Way

3:46

familiar with that, of course, in the history of. Racism.

3:49

Of which ah, the most egregious example and

3:51

also the one that I think is really

3:53

most. closely parallel to

3:55

the way we treat animals

3:58

is as slavery by based

4:01

on racial differences, based on particular white

4:04

slavery of Africans. But

4:07

we've seen something similar, of course,

4:09

in the attitudes of

4:11

males to females in many

4:14

times and places. And I

4:17

think that in our attitudes

4:19

to animals we have something

4:21

broadly similar. Now, I obviously don't want

4:23

to push the parallel too far. There are

4:25

important differences as well. But

4:29

we have the idea that only

4:31

humans really matter in

4:33

some way. We have ideologies that support

4:35

that. For example, we have

4:37

religious teachings that say that only humans

4:40

are made in the image of God,

4:42

or God gave humans dominion over the

4:44

other animals, that only humans have immortal

4:47

souls. They resemble

4:49

religious justifications that also

4:51

have existed for male supremacy

4:54

over females and for supremacy

4:57

of some races over others. And

5:00

armed with that kind of

5:03

ideology, and also, of course, with the fact

5:05

that it

5:07

has been in our interest to make use of animals,

5:09

in fact, though that's a part of

5:11

our revolutionary history, it may have been essential

5:13

to us to make use of

5:15

animals for additional protein. But we

5:18

turn that into an ideology that justifies

5:20

us in thinking of animals either

5:23

as not counting at all morally,

5:25

and that has been quite a strong current

5:28

in Western thought, an

5:31

influential one, I think, in some

5:33

areas of Western thought in the Roman Catholic Church, for

5:35

example, right up until the 19th century. And

5:40

it's not that, then, the view that

5:42

their interests are far less than ours,

5:45

that they can be heavily discounted. Perhaps

5:48

that we ought not to be

5:50

wantonly cruel to them, that we

5:52

ought not to, for example, use

5:54

animals cruelly for our entertainment in

5:56

dogfighting or bear baiting, or today

5:59

in bullfighting. that if we

6:01

have some interest as

6:03

we perceive them in using animals

6:05

such as the interest in eating

6:07

them and from that

6:09

follows the interest in raising them

6:11

for our consumption as

6:13

cheaply as we possibly can

6:16

then that

6:18

interest is always

6:21

going to trump their interests or whatever

6:23

interest they might have which would

6:26

be adversely affected by

6:28

us for example trying to

6:31

raising food as cheaply as we can. So

6:34

the interest of animals get

6:36

heavily discounted and the fact

6:39

that in order to raise them cheaply

6:41

we develop technologies that restrict

6:44

even their minimally basic movements such

6:46

as freedom to walk a few

6:49

steps to turn around to bed

6:51

down in straw rather than on

6:53

bare concrete those

6:55

things get forgotten or

6:58

neglected because we feel it's in

7:00

our interest to make use of them. So

7:04

it was essentially that that

7:06

I was objecting to and

7:09

the philosophical foundation for that objection

7:12

for me was utilitarianism.

7:15

I was at the time already

7:17

and I remain a utilitarian that

7:19

means that I think we ought

7:22

to act so as to

7:24

produce the best consequences of our actions

7:27

and by consequences

7:29

I've been concerned with things like

7:32

the satisfaction of preferences avoiding the

7:34

frustration of preferences I'm

7:36

also concerned obviously with pleasure

7:39

and pain as the classical utilitarianist

7:41

would mean. So

7:43

the view that falls out

7:45

of this the ethical view regarding animals

7:47

or in fact regarding any

7:50

sentient beings at all is that

7:52

they are to be included within the sphere

7:54

of morality That they

7:56

are not to be discounted as

7:58

such merely because. They are not

8:00

members of the species homo Sapien. From.

8:04

A them are point of view on talking about. Membership.

8:07

Of the species, Homo Sapien is

8:09

not in itself morally relevant. What?

8:12

Is important is that these things have

8:14

interests. Ah, For example, The.

8:17

Interest: to avoid pain or

8:19

to experience pleasure. For.

8:21

Not to be bored. Or. Not

8:24

to be afraid all one

8:26

way. I think of animals

8:28

philly have a range of

8:30

interests that go beyond pleasure

8:32

and pain or Larry Summers

8:34

appeal for that just as

8:36

a a very basic obvious

8:38

one side of the interests

8:40

of non human animals are

8:43

in avoiding these negative experiences.

8:45

life I know, I fear

8:47

and frustration and boredom and

8:49

so on should cause equally

8:51

with similar interests of. Members

8:53

are in space. Than. A

8:55

three discarded because they non humans. Because.

8:59

They're force will be rise. What do

9:01

I mean by similar interests? And.

9:04

Ah, That will

9:06

depend on the cognitive capacities of

9:09

different been. So. For instance,

9:11

if we talk about boredom, know that they're

9:13

different ways in which. Beings

9:16

like you and me capable of listening

9:18

to this talk, to have to discuss

9:20

abstract ideas, can be bored and perhaps

9:23

taste can't be born in that particular

9:25

why. But that's not to say that

9:27

I can be bought at all. and

9:29

of I don't have an interest in

9:32

nothing. Both Sars Crisis trying to assess

9:34

the interests of animals Pride aside, when

9:36

are they roughly comparable with some interest

9:39

of humans, and when we do think

9:41

that they roughly comparable to give them

9:43

equal rights. So. That's

9:45

the principle of equal consideration and

9:47

interests which I thought, think or

9:50

to govern. Our relation with

9:52

animal. Ah, i don't

9:54

want to go on to long were we just

9:56

as to do agree i think statement and and

9:58

gets to discuss and fairly soon But I

10:00

will just say one more thing because it's bound to come up.

10:03

It doesn't follow from what I've said that

10:06

the killing of a non-human

10:08

animal is

10:10

as serious as the killing of a

10:12

typical, mature human being, again,

10:14

as the killing of one of us. So

10:17

it certainly doesn't follow from my views that

10:21

when I read, for instance, as

10:23

we all did recently of

10:26

the killing of 100 or 150, whatever it was, civilians in

10:29

Syria, I don't dismiss

10:36

that and say, well, yes, but how

10:38

many chickens were slaughtered today worldwide? Many

10:41

millions, hundreds of millions, perhaps. I

10:44

don't equate those, necessarily, because

10:46

the differing capacities of those people

10:49

and of the people who loved

10:51

them and cared for them,

10:54

to feel for them, to miss them, and

10:56

so on, do obviously make

10:58

a significant difference. So

11:01

we can say that

11:03

the wrongness of killing a normal,

11:06

mature human being is a more

11:08

serious matter than the wrongness of

11:10

killing non-human animals. That's

11:12

not a difference of species. That's

11:14

not what I call speciesism. Because

11:17

I think we do have to say, if

11:19

we're comparing the killing of

11:22

humans with similar capacities to non-human

11:24

animals, that at least

11:26

other things being equal, putting aside

11:28

the attitudes of relatives and others who

11:30

love them and care for them, there

11:32

is a similar loss there. So

11:35

it would be speciesism to say, just because

11:38

they're members of our species, killing is much

11:40

more seriously wrong. I think I

11:42

have to start my comment by welcoming

11:44

and celebrating Peter Singer in the

11:46

strongest terms. He put

11:49

this thing on the map of thought.

11:51

There were no courses about it in

11:53

universities before he published

11:56

Animal Liberation, and it's

11:58

made an enormous difference to... the

12:00

general way in which so many others think.

12:03

I had not myself noticed factory

12:05

farming before I read Animal Liberation.

12:08

There's a very good, simple description

12:10

of it, not particularly emotive and

12:14

I was appalled to find that

12:16

this sort of thing was

12:18

going on in the modern

12:20

age and so were plenty

12:22

of others. It caused people

12:25

to notice it. Now of

12:27

course Peter's right in

12:29

saying that one reason they

12:31

hadn't noticed it before may be attributed to

12:34

the churches. That is the exaltation

12:36

of man, this extraordinary

12:39

figure man, had had

12:41

very strong backing from Christianity

12:45

and people had come

12:48

to justify an awful lot of things

12:50

that they did, including slavery, by

12:52

saying we are the children of God and they're not

12:54

quite or something of that sort. Now that's

12:57

of course true but I want to draw

12:59

attention, something which Peter hasn't mentioned,

13:02

that since Christianity became less influential,

13:04

humanism has come in and it's

13:06

just as bad often.

13:08

That is the glorification of

13:10

man is now given

13:12

a justification which is often mixed

13:15

up with evolution. The idea is that it's

13:17

a survival of the fittest. We've done best

13:19

so we obviously deserve to do best and

13:22

that sort of justification I suspect

13:24

has been quite as influential, if

13:27

not more so, in recent times

13:30

as the religious one and

13:32

it hasn't even got the

13:35

advantage that there was some sort

13:37

of moral point with the

13:39

other one and it involves

13:41

a few of ourselves indeed, as

13:44

he says, as being supreme

13:47

because we're so intelligent and rational

13:50

and others are not and this is a

13:53

glorification of the cognitive part

13:55

of ourselves which is frightfully

13:57

misleading which is kind

13:59

of Reading on

14:01

now to transhumanism, which

14:04

is going to be even better when

14:06

we've sort of turned into half computers,

14:08

you know, on various

14:10

ways, which is

14:12

the myth of the present age and I

14:14

think needs much more attention, you see, than

14:16

really, than the book of Genesis, at least

14:18

in this country, maybe not in

14:20

America. But

14:23

this sort of conceit is what has led

14:25

us to trash the environment

14:27

and are still leading us to

14:31

disastrous consequences

14:34

about it. So the

14:36

animals are, the

14:38

problems of the animals are part of that.

14:41

On the sort of eco scale, they

14:44

are part of that because the

14:46

forests are despised in a way

14:49

that earlier people did not

14:51

despise them, along with the animals. On

14:53

the eco scale, I think that's actually

14:57

something we're probably not going to disagree

15:00

about much. On the more

15:02

personal scale, I met or disagree with him

15:04

about something, hadn't I? I

15:07

am much more impressed with

15:09

the value of the species barrier than he

15:11

is. It

15:13

is quite true that we are partial to

15:15

our own species. It is also true that

15:17

we are partial to our own children and

15:20

to those we know and love. This

15:23

is human nature and it's there

15:25

because we are animals. We are

15:28

animals with a quite definite set

15:30

of emotional capacities

15:32

and tendencies. If

15:35

we try to get rid of those,

15:37

if we say the affections are making

15:39

us partial, so let's suppress

15:41

the emotions, we don't get better,

15:43

we get worse. But it is

15:46

essential, of course, to discipline and

15:49

control that partiality by a

15:51

rather wider look. The

15:54

ground to which I look at that point

15:56

isn't utilitarianism or any other

15:58

model theory. the golden rule,

16:01

you should ask, would you like that

16:04

done to you? Do you see? Now I was

16:07

once in charge of some small children

16:09

who were being bullied by an older

16:11

girl and I said to her, you

16:14

wouldn't like that if they did it

16:16

to you and she grinned and said

16:18

they couldn't, could they? Which I

16:20

think is really the reasoning usually involved.

16:23

But I mean it is, there

16:26

is also in our nature and it's in

16:28

our nature not just in our societies a sense

16:31

of fairness, of looking

16:33

at the whole and seeing what

16:37

reason is why somebody should be treated differently,

16:39

should they be from someone else. Very

16:42

small children say it isn't fair, they see

16:44

this before anybody says to them you've got

16:46

to look up for fairness. So

16:49

I'm not going away from our

16:52

nature to some sort of cognitive

16:54

or rational principle in

16:56

order to say that. Of course

16:59

when you've started to think about

17:01

fairness, your rationality is the way

17:03

in which we shall express it.

17:05

Well this is a difference

17:09

which makes me not so

17:11

hostile to the actual eating

17:13

of animals as I

17:15

think I'm here, I think

17:18

for the Inuit who haven't got

17:20

anything to eat except seals, should

17:22

eat seals. And that

17:24

plenty of people who are in a

17:26

rather mixed and confused situation but who

17:28

need some animal food in that what

17:31

else they've got is not quite enough

17:33

for them are entitled to

17:35

kill animals. What they

17:37

should not do is give them

17:39

a hopeless life, a life that

17:41

is no life until they die

17:44

and this is a crime committed

17:46

chiefly by the civilized not by

17:48

the primitive. So I

17:51

mean as the situation

17:53

is now I think I'm

17:56

being asked to say what's the most

17:58

important bit. The most important to

18:00

me is not the redefining of any

18:02

particular word-like person, but concentrating

18:05

on factory farming, on

18:07

the situations in which we

18:09

give these creatures no life

18:12

at all. Experimentation

18:15

probably also does that sometimes, but

18:17

not on quite the same scale.

18:20

So that, I think, is where I'll

18:22

pause. We're going to try and

18:24

break this down to three areas. I'd

18:26

like to take a little bit later the question

18:29

of the species barrier, and finally I'd like to

18:31

end up with, as you were, practical concerns that

18:33

we have at the moment. But

18:35

first, Professor, I'd like to just ask

18:38

you briefly whether you share Mary Midge's

18:40

concern that associated with

18:44

evolutionists, or often associated with evolutionists,

18:46

is an increasing arrogance about their

18:48

ability, or right in a way,

18:52

to deal with animals as they

18:54

think fit. Do you detect that

18:56

yourself? You were asking Emi to

18:58

comment on what Mary Midge said about humanists.

19:02

Only at this stage, on this point,

19:04

the chief says that whereas in the

19:06

past you could, as it were, point

19:09

the finger at religion for an arrogance

19:11

about our superiority to animals, now

19:13

you're seeing through humanism, and particularly

19:15

through the views

19:18

of some evolutionists, a similar arrogance

19:21

about assuming we are superior form and

19:24

can treat animals broadly as we decide.

19:28

Well, I certainly wouldn't blame humanists for

19:31

a particular arrogance

19:33

that is greater than anyone

19:35

else in this society at this time.

19:37

I must say I haven't found that.

19:41

I found, for example, I've had

19:43

discussions on this with Richard Dawkins. You can

19:45

find them on YouTube. I don't

19:48

find his position entirely satisfactory, but

19:50

basically he admits that he really

19:52

ought morally to be a vegetarian.

19:55

He just says he finds it difficult to

19:57

avoid eating meat. So

20:00

I don't find that arrogant. I

20:02

find that actually a

20:07

sound intellectual position, unfortunately,

20:10

not sufficient moral conviction, if you

20:12

like, to push it to its

20:15

proper conclusion. But

20:17

I've encountered that in the

20:19

humanist and atheist circles that

20:21

I move. I've encountered

20:23

a lot more support for the

20:26

idea that we ought to be treating animals

20:29

differently, that we should not separate

20:31

ourselves from them, that essentially we are

20:33

animals, as of course, Mary and I

20:35

agree, and

20:38

that really

20:41

we should

20:43

not be kind of lauded over

20:45

them. They are entitled to

20:47

a very different kind of consideration from what we

20:49

have now. Can we start then on the ethics

20:51

of how we treat animals? I wonder if you'd

20:54

clear something up for me, Professor Singh, which is

20:56

this. You say somewhere that

20:58

all animals are equal, and you're keen

21:00

to break down the barrier between animals

21:02

and humans. And you also say that

21:05

if you like, the rights of

21:07

animals, if I understand correctly, result

21:09

from the fact that they can

21:12

feel pain. Does

21:14

that make you differentiate between animals,

21:16

between different sorts of animals? That our

21:19

approach to animals should be based not

21:21

on, as it were, some basic rights

21:23

that they have. But as

21:25

far as we know they

21:28

feel pain, we should just

21:30

our view towards them. But

21:32

certainly it is essential even

21:35

to get to have moral

21:37

significance, that there

21:39

be some capacity to feel pain,

21:42

or at least to have conscious

21:44

experiences, which can be positive or

21:46

negative. So in

21:49

that sense, I'm not advocating

21:51

that all animals are included

21:53

in a moral sphere, because

21:55

it's quite possible the things that

21:57

are in biological terms animals perhaps. perhaps

22:00

say an oyster, are not capable

22:02

of feeling pain. And if

22:05

that's so, if that's a reasoned conclusion, given

22:07

what we know about oysters and their nervous

22:09

systems, then it doesn't

22:12

matter what we do to oysters as far

22:14

as the oyster is concerned. It may have

22:16

environmental consequences, of course, dredging the sea for

22:18

them, but they don't count

22:20

in the way that animals who

22:24

are able to feel pain or other

22:26

emotions. Some animals we can

22:28

see feel pain, but we

22:30

have to find out, experiment, to find

22:32

out whether other animals feel pain. In

22:34

doing so, we almost invariably

22:37

inflict pain in order to find

22:39

out whether it is experienced by

22:41

animals. So there is not

22:43

a massive amount of evidence, is there,

22:45

that about how much animals and which

22:48

animals feel pain? It's

22:50

the wrong place to start. I

22:52

mean, if somebody says, but

22:54

I don't think your dog feels pain, you

22:57

don't say no experiments have been done on

22:59

this dog. It

23:02

would be so silly. I mean, we have enough in

23:04

common in our nervous- Yeah, the dogs wouldn't argue about

23:06

dogs. Let's try fish. Well,

23:09

no, you have to start with the animals that

23:11

we do know because the depth of the

23:14

point becomes clear at this. When

23:16

you do that, we have always,

23:18

humans have always lived among animals and

23:20

they have enough in common with them

23:22

and the nervous systems of the animals

23:24

that they meet to know

23:27

quite directly, as indeed they do

23:29

with other humans. We do not have to

23:31

do experiments to find out which other- Well,

23:34

let me give you an example. When the big debate

23:36

went on about 15 years ago, about 12 years ago,

23:38

about whether there should be hunting of deer, and

23:41

one looked at what was the argument put forward

23:43

by one side was that deer could

23:46

anticipate pain, understood that they were being

23:48

chased and so on. And then

23:50

one looked at any studies that were

23:53

virtually nil. So is it

23:55

your view that there either is enough

23:57

statistical, as it were, information available, that

24:00

we don't need it for more advanced forms of

24:02

animals. It is that we don't need it and

24:04

it is humbug to pretend that we do. So

24:06

where's the cut-off point? As

24:08

you go down... If you start

24:11

by understanding this, you will see that

24:13

you have to extend it as far

24:15

as you can unless you see reason

24:17

to stop. And how far would you

24:20

extend it? Look, you're misrepresenting the data

24:22

situation, some experimentation was done, which proved

24:24

that they did mind. Yes,

24:26

but acknowledge that how far down

24:29

do you go in the animal world

24:31

before you begin to feel confident

24:33

that either they don't feel pain or they

24:36

feel a minimal amount of pain? I don't

24:38

know. Could you tell me? You don't

24:40

give them pain unless you have very serious reason to

24:42

in any case. And the

24:45

sort of reason that you have

24:47

is to assume for a start that they

24:49

probably do feel things that you feel, unless

24:51

there is reason not to. Now this is

24:53

one of the many situations where philosophers

24:56

start from the wrong end. You

25:00

put the burden of proof on somebody to

25:02

prove that it is so. You have already

25:04

decided that that is what you want to

25:06

do and you're going to do it unless

25:08

somebody stops you. This is the wrong approach.

25:10

Now of course it's true that we can't

25:13

on account of mere practical

25:15

considerations consider locus individually and

25:17

we sometimes can't consider fish.

25:19

But fish have, I mean

25:21

people do, you know, investigate

25:24

the systems of fish which

25:26

are enough

25:28

to tell them if they had these genuine doubts

25:30

in the first place that it

25:34

was absurd to pretend that fish did not

25:36

have pain. Yes, Professor Sinner, whether

25:38

he thinks it is necessary to, as

25:40

it were, establish a flaw with

25:43

animals, which animals experience pain or

25:45

whether we should work on the

25:47

assumption that until proven otherwise

25:49

all animals feel pain. Well

25:51

It depends on what you mean by proven

25:53

otherwise. I mean I Don't think that, for

25:56

example, I gave the example of an oyster.

26:00

The viruses and animals are we

26:02

think I was feeling pain, it's

26:04

it's fully evolved to provide them

26:06

with a danger signals a warning

26:08

you're in a situation that sir

26:10

is threatening or you better get

26:12

out of there and and plane

26:14

does that affect on Valencia with

26:16

annoys the since it can move

26:19

it might be. Reasonable. To

26:21

say well why would it evolve a capacity

26:23

for time on the other the sun and

26:25

the notice If we also see that the

26:27

nervous system by simple as not centrally organized

26:30

with a brain or anything like that as

26:32

as as is that I would say yeah

26:34

there's a farmer facie case the saying that

26:36

I didn't feel pain on. I wouldn't say

26:39

that you have to somehow. Said

26:41

using some burden of proof that you

26:44

do, We have deer. It's clear that

26:46

they're nervous systems are quite like ours,

26:48

and I can't see that any conclude

26:50

honestly begin to.to stay the So how

26:52

does that mean that the more pain.

26:55

Animals. Feed off capable of

26:57

feeling the more rights they

27:00

are have or are they

27:02

just given an absolute standard?

27:04

The rights processing. Well

27:06

you've introduced to have rights. Yeah it's your

27:08

time writing. I have a he said i

27:10

know on a case you dispose of them

27:12

Please. Yes

27:14

As so I mean, I, I, I

27:17

don't really. Consider myself an Animal

27:19

Rights advocates in a philosophical sense on

27:21

a happy to use that label as

27:23

unhappy. I guess to say all animals

27:25

are equal as a kind of a

27:27

shorthand that the public understands quite well.

27:29

I mean that I think we ought

27:31

to radically change the way we treat

27:34

animals as that we doing things to

27:36

them that a silly wrong but erm,

27:38

As it's not that I think that

27:41

they have some basic set of rights

27:43

that we do, I don't start from

27:45

our rights and Dyson. So.

27:47

I would ask you a question in this

27:50

why I would say the more we understand

27:52

about the needs and interests of animals. Then.

27:55

The more consideration we owe.

27:58

Them for those needs and interests and. perhaps

28:01

the more they require so that

28:03

some animals may require

28:05

a lot more space for instance because they're

28:07

the kind of species that has

28:10

an innate desire to travel to move

28:12

around and others obviously social mammals need

28:14

to socialize with others of their type

28:16

whereas some creatures are more solitary and

28:18

don't have an interest in spending time

28:21

with others of their species. So how

28:23

we ought to treat them is going

28:25

to depend on how

28:27

sophisticated their needs

28:30

and interests are. Madam

28:32

Mr. could you say why you think there needs

28:34

to be a species barrier? Well

28:38

there needs to be a species barrier

28:41

for any species because it can't go

28:43

about its business if it goes on

28:45

treating outsiders at the same as con

28:47

specifics. Penguin that insists

28:49

on mating with a walrus

28:51

isn't going to get on very well is

28:53

it? You know I mean primarily

28:56

for reproductive purposes but also in

28:58

social animals because they have they

29:00

share a social repertoire with

29:03

those like them. We've

29:05

been seeing the meerkats lately you know

29:07

and seeing how strong this is and

29:10

very strong in elephants and a lot

29:12

of social creatures. You

29:14

can't develop the skills and

29:17

capacities that go with the society unless

29:19

you have a community of those around

29:21

you who share roughly the

29:24

same approach. Now the interesting thing about

29:26

people is that they can go beyond this

29:28

to some extent which is why

29:30

they have domesticated animals. Most other

29:32

creatures won't start up a friendship

29:34

unless they're isolated on their one

29:37

of them's isolated on their own.

29:39

It won't start up a friendship

29:41

with other creatures around but

29:43

people do and obviously the whole

29:45

business of domesticating from picking up

29:47

wolves and turning them into dogs

29:49

has gone on in that most

29:52

sort of way. This is part

29:54

of our nature and

29:56

I think it's rather a grand and

29:58

celebratiful thing. So I

30:00

can ask you then how you respond

30:02

to what is, I'm told, is a

30:05

review by Professor Singer of Midas Deke's

30:07

Dearest Pet on Bestiality when

30:09

Professor Singer is said to have argued

30:12

that whereas sexual

30:14

activities between humans and animals that

30:17

result in harm to the animal

30:19

should remain illegal, but that, and

30:21

it says it's a quote, sex

30:23

with animals does not always involve

30:25

cruelty and that quote again, mutually

30:27

satisfying activities of a sexual

30:30

nature may sometimes occur between humans and

30:32

animals. Is that, how

30:35

do you respond to that? I don't know enough

30:37

about how it all goes on to comment

30:39

and I think it's a bloody trivial point

30:42

which only the media would have made so

30:44

much of. Well it's not, well it may

30:46

well be a trivial point but it's a...

30:49

In the context of, in the context of

30:51

an animal living. No it's about barriers, what

30:53

we're talking about, animal mistreatment we are indeed

30:55

talking about but also doing about the speciesism

30:58

here and the question of the barriers that

31:00

exist or should exist between species and if

31:02

I understand... Excuse me, but

31:04

I mean I'm not saying

31:06

that this is normal behaviour or that

31:09

it's widespread behaviour so it

31:11

doesn't show that I think that there are no barriers.

31:14

I'm just reporting, what you read is, I

31:16

mean it was a book review and it

31:18

was reported in the book there were many

31:20

illustrations that this can happen and it seems

31:22

to be the case that some humans do

31:25

get sexual satisfaction from contact with animals

31:27

and they can do it in ways

31:30

that some of them, that do not

31:32

actually harm the animals. So that's just

31:34

a description of if

31:36

you like the wide boundaries of human

31:38

sexual taste which we know about already

31:41

I think. And Mary Mitzley is absolutely

31:43

right that it has

31:45

nothing to do with, well

31:48

neither with the species barriers you're raising

31:50

nor of course with the huge amount

31:52

of suffering that humans inflict on

31:54

animals. When

31:57

you're looking at human beings who are in

31:59

a state maybe through

32:02

Alzheimer's disease and so

32:04

on. So that their

32:06

levels of, how can one put this,

32:09

intelligent awareness of the world are

32:11

perhaps less than animals. And that

32:13

one's attitude to human beings in

32:15

those circumstances should not

32:18

be qualitatively different from the

32:20

attitude to animals in

32:22

those circumstances. Is that a fair summary

32:25

of your view? No,

32:28

it's not at all a fair summary of my views. Since

32:31

you mentioned people with Alzheimer's, who of course have

32:34

been people who we have

32:36

known. I mean, my mother sadly had

32:38

Alzheimer's in her last years. And

32:42

so of course we respect them and interact with them

32:45

in a way that reflects the

32:47

fact that we have known and loved them

32:49

for many years and we want to treat

32:51

them with respect. And to

32:54

some extent in the way they would have wanted to be treated, which

32:57

of course may be, that what they would have wanted was

33:00

for someone to give them a lethal injection. That's

33:02

possible in some cases and not

33:04

the case in others. I think

33:06

if you'd made your point with regard to infants

33:10

born with very severe disabilities

33:12

who therefore will never

33:14

be able to be in a

33:17

situation where they have

33:19

any cognitive capacities beyond those

33:21

that are roughly similar to those of some

33:24

species of non-human animals, then

33:27

perhaps I would have been closer to saying that, yes,

33:31

obviously there are still differences. They will still

33:34

have human parents who have

33:36

attitudes towards them that are relevant. But

33:40

I think that that's a closer comparison.

33:42

And part of my point here is that I

33:45

think when people say

33:47

that despite the fact

33:49

that they, these humans are

33:51

born with disabilities,

33:55

that means they will never exceed

33:57

the cognitive capacities of. let's

34:00

say a dog or

34:02

a pig, that nevertheless their lives are

34:05

sacred and nevertheless we must

34:07

treat them in ways that are far

34:09

better than we do treat non-human animals.

34:13

That seems to me to show a

34:15

bias in favour of members of our

34:17

species, which I don't think is defensible.

34:19

Cast me immediately, do you share that

34:21

bias then? The description of a child

34:23

born with such limitations that

34:25

they do not in a sense deserve

34:28

to be considered de

34:30

facto superior to animals. I

34:32

don't think that's the way to look at the

34:34

question at all. Would

34:37

you mind addressing that point though? I'm in respect

34:39

to it, but that is what some people will

34:41

interpret the professor as saying, and I wanted your

34:43

response to that. People

34:47

who have to deal with the fate

34:49

of such children have a very difficult

34:53

problem of balancing such

34:56

value as there is in this life

34:58

against the drawbacks of it. And

35:00

I think it's very

35:03

startling really how the

35:06

principle referred to, which you've referred

35:08

to, is that human life is sacred.

35:11

Now the word sacred is hardly used of

35:13

anything else at present. I haven't said sacred,

35:15

but perhaps by… Look, I'm trying to say what

35:17

I'm saying. Sorry, take part. Sorry,

35:19

I'm not taking part. Well, it really

35:21

is very odd. The

35:24

other context in which it's

35:27

particularly odd is when people

35:29

who are extremely ill

35:31

and dying and wish to die are not

35:33

allowed to die. The reason why they are

35:35

not allowed to die is to me totally

35:37

obscure, seeing that we make so much fuss

35:40

about freedom and all the rest of our

35:42

morality. I think

35:45

it's very odd. The only reason why

35:47

I think that goes on is that

35:49

people are afraid of somebody being sued

35:52

if they let them die. But with respect, I did

35:54

not mention sacred and I didn't mention those things. The

35:57

point I'm trying to get at is whether by

35:59

virtue of… being human in

36:02

those circumstances, regardless of intelligence,

36:05

attributes or whatever, you

36:08

would believe there is a distinction between treating

36:11

the baby described by the professor in

36:14

that way differently from an animal. I

36:17

think that a baby whose

36:19

life is not going to be worth

36:21

living presents a problem

36:23

to those caring

36:26

for it which might quite reasonably be

36:28

solved by letting it go and I think the

36:31

same about a puppy. I

36:34

said it's the life that the being can have.

36:39

Thanks for listening to Lost B2R Times.

36:52

We now have an email, so get

36:54

in contact at podcast.ii.tv with any questions

36:56

for the editorial team or

36:58

the speakers that you heard in today's episode.

37:00

We'll do our best to get answers for

37:02

you in next week's podcast. Thanks for

37:04

listening. So

37:08

you can have this one. Thanks

37:17

for listening to Lost B2R Times. We

37:22

now have an email, so get in

37:24

contact at podcast.ii.tv with any questions for

37:26

the editorial team or the speakers

37:29

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37:31

our best to get answers for you in

37:33

next week's podcast. Thanks for listening. Let's

37:38

jump into Pepper's world of play.

37:41

Look for spring flowers, hunt

37:43

for muddy puddles and

37:45

bravely explore exciting places with

37:47

Pepper Play Socks. Pepper

37:50

Pig is firing kid

37:52

confidence.