Episode Transcript
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0:01
What's up everybody this is Rod
0:03
Clef Jean here with TIAA. More
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my new single Paper Write is on a mission
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cause. Can
0:33
I share something slightly frustrating for me that is
0:35
a problem I never expected to encounter in what
0:37
is nearly my 40th year of life? Always.
0:39
I seem to have developed a cowlick
0:41
that I can't tackle. Do you
0:44
see that right here? Welcome to my world baby. Welcome
0:46
to the party man. I mean I'm like I've had
0:48
curly hair my whole life and like you know it's
0:50
it's I'm not gonna lie last 10 or 15 years
0:52
has been kind of coming and going depending on the
0:55
miracles of modern science I choose to apply to my
0:57
head. But like this is
0:59
a weird one I don't know what to do
1:01
what is this what is this lock of hair doing
1:03
here? There is a solution to this problem and
1:06
it involves one of those
1:08
guys that goes zzzzzzz and
1:11
just keep it really short and
1:13
there are no cowlicks. Alternatively grow
1:15
it longer because I will say I
1:18
used to have longer hair and when I cut it
1:20
short it turned out that I had multiple cowlick
1:22
so there was kind of a mad
1:25
scientist thing going on. I feel like your hair is always
1:27
very straight and coiffed and like well well straightened but is
1:29
your hair curlier than it looks? It's
1:32
a lot of brill cream that goes into Krita's
1:34
look. I guess I could buy
1:36
a comb but it's like so much. Hello
1:46
everyone and welcome back to
1:48
Rational Security. I am one
1:50
of your regular co-host Scott
1:52
R. Anderson reunited again in
1:54
our virtual studio with my
1:56
two regular co-hosts Quinta Jurassic
1:58
and Alan Rosenstein. Hello,
2:01
hello. For at least a
2:03
few more weeks to come, we are thrilled to
2:05
be joined by, of course, co-host Emeritus Lawfare,
2:09
what is your title? Lawfare Editor-in-Chief and
2:12
our boss, our boss. General Busybody,
2:15
Benjamin Wittes. Ben
2:17
thrilled to have you back on the podcast as we're
2:19
digging into a couple of topics that you've written on
2:21
in the last few weeks here. Excited
2:23
to have you back on the podcast. Good to
2:25
be here. And I
2:28
love that Joe Biden-like tripping
2:30
over your words introduction. There
2:32
you go. That is my usual style. It
2:35
worked for him. It seems to work for
2:37
me. We are honored with a particularly bedecked
2:39
Benjamin Wittes today wearing a shirt with a
2:41
collar on it and not
2:43
even like a straight up dress shirt
2:45
with a collar on it. What is the
2:48
occasion? The occasion is a request
2:50
from a distinguished member
2:52
of the diplomatic corps to
2:55
come to an embassy and
2:57
brief this particular embassy over
2:59
lunch. Oh, excited.
3:02
Well, I'm honored to see
3:04
that you still have dress shirts released on
3:06
that front, at least, that they did not
3:08
go the way. I will assure the readers
3:11
who are in need of assurance on this,
3:13
it is not the Russian embassy that
3:15
I am going to brief from the Trump
3:18
trials. That
3:20
would be an invitation to see. I would worry
3:22
about whether you would accept it. They've got a
3:24
kind of a Saudi embassy certified, unfortunately. So I
3:26
worry about who's coming out once you go. I
3:29
would not go in that building. Yeah.
3:31
Well, regardless, we are thrilled to have you
3:33
here today. Bedeck, however you choose to be,
3:35
for what we are calling the Licking the
3:38
Cow edition in honor of my general's
3:40
tutorial challenges on this particular
3:43
day and a lot of days recently in
3:45
regards to my haircut. But haircut or no,
3:47
we have a lot of big news on
3:49
the National Security Front here this week to
3:51
talk about. Topic one, constitutional
3:54
annoyance. Last week, the
3:56
Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Trump v. Anderson,
3:58
the case weighing whether former... President Trump's involvement in
4:01
January 6th should disqualify him from being able
4:03
to stand as a candidate in 2024 under
4:06
Section 3 of the 14th Amendment, at least in
4:08
Colorado. Scott, Scott, is Donald Trump
4:10
suing you? No, not this
4:12
time. We did sue him once. Remember
4:14
that? That was fun back in the day.
4:16
But I mean, we may get the chance again. But I mean,
4:18
there was a case before the Supreme Court last week called Trump
4:20
v. Anderson, and we
4:23
just had to make sure that it was not
4:25
you that was the respondent. No conflict here.
4:27
It's also worth noting that there was
4:29
another case that came up during oral
4:31
argument with the case title also involved
4:33
in Anderson. So Scott,
4:35
you're just you're all over this. I'm
4:37
all over the place. I'm not gonna
4:39
lie, guys, pretty common name. Jillian, Pamela,
4:41
no relation whatsoever, either with me
4:43
or with other law suits, as far as I could tell. So
4:46
sadly, we are just Anderson's, all
4:49
Anderson's kind of scattered to the
4:51
winds with no direct involvement in
4:53
each other's matters. But this particular
4:55
matter, it was notable that the
4:57
justices for one seemed pretty unified
4:59
in their skepticism of the idea that former President
5:01
Trump should be disqualified under Section Three. But
5:04
they were far less unified in regards to
5:06
what the basis for not disqualifying him should
5:09
be with lots of theories coming out in
5:11
questioning. We are now of course
5:13
waiting for an opinion or other disposition of the final
5:15
case. Where do we think it is headed? And what
5:17
will its ultimate impact be on the 2024 election and
5:20
beyond? Part
5:23
two, putting the hurt on her on parenthesis
5:27
there. Not the her locker.
5:30
I tried to do the hurt locker, but
5:32
I couldn't I couldn't go again. I
5:36
also looked into that. Well, I was
5:38
gonna make a joke about how long the report was because
5:40
then it was like five and a half hours long. But
5:42
that's okay. Putting the
5:44
hurt on is we'll
5:47
have to set rest with this one
5:49
because Special Counsel Robert Herr completed his
5:51
investigation into President Biden's alleged mishandling of
5:53
classified documents last week the same day
5:55
as oral arguments in Trump Anderson, in
5:57
fact. And while he opted not
5:59
to bring any charge charges, his lengthy final
6:01
report has caused a stir, not just for
6:03
laying out Biden's apparent mishandling of classified documents
6:05
over an extended period of time, but also
6:08
for citing Biden's advanced age and apparent memory
6:10
issues as grounds for not pursuing a prosecution,
6:13
observations that have reignited anxieties regarding Biden's
6:15
capacity to stand for reelection. Was her
6:17
out of line or just doing his
6:19
job and making these observations, and how
6:21
will his conclusions impact events moving forward,
6:23
including the prosecution of former President Trump
6:25
for his own mishandling of classified documents?
6:29
In topic 3, I can't pay the rent, but you
6:31
must pay the rent. The
6:59
key point being, Donald Trump has once again resumed the
7:01
role as enforcer over the defense
7:18
spending level of NATO members, suggesting recently
7:20
that he would encourage Russia to do
7:22
whatever it wants with any new members who failed to
7:25
meet their commitments. Comments that have
7:27
triggered new anxiety over how NATO may fare
7:29
in a second Trump presidency if former President
7:31
Trump is re-elected in 2024. How
7:34
serious should we take these comments and what should
7:36
folks be doing in response? For
7:38
our first topic, Alan, let me hand it over to you to
7:40
get us started. So as is my
7:42
want when I get the opportunity, I'm
7:44
going to just turn it right back around to an
7:46
expert who has actually listened to
7:49
the oral arguments and was part of
7:51
one of Lawfare's patented multi-author bylines giving
7:53
a recap. And that is, of course,
7:55
Scott Anderson Scott you paid a lot
7:58
of attention to this argument. Can
8:00
you sort of give an overview of sort
8:02
of what the main points of contention seem
8:04
to be or maybe not points of
8:07
contention given just how one side of the argument seemed to
8:09
be, but rather sort of what were the main things that
8:11
the justices were focusing on
8:13
in order to kind of dispose of this case,
8:16
which I think at this point everyone suspects
8:18
will either be an 8-1 or perhaps even
8:20
if they can get Justice Sotomayor on board
8:22
a 9-0 reversal of
8:24
Colorado throwing Trump off the ballot? Yeah,
8:27
I mean it was a really exceptional
8:30
oral argument to listen to because you
8:32
rarely hear them that are just so
8:34
openly one-sided. Honestly, every justice except for
8:37
Justice Sotomayor really was just highly skeptical
8:39
of the idea that former President Trump
8:41
should be disqualified and were a particularly
8:44
hot bench for the
8:46
lawyer, Mr. Murray representing Anderson
8:48
in this matter, who
8:50
faced like a pretty stiff line of question. I think
8:52
handled himself admirably given that there were a number of
8:54
hard questions and digging into a lot of kind of
8:57
parade of horribles that may follow from particular rulings
8:59
of different types, which are always hard questions to
9:01
answer because they're kind of complex hypotheticals that haven't
9:03
been preached before. I just want to say I
9:06
knew Jason in college. He is a great
9:08
dude, incredibly smart, and I just feel
9:10
really bad for advocates when they come up and just
9:12
like it is hard. Yeah,
9:14
he really got the stuffing knocked out of him
9:17
there. But like it's hard when the eight or
9:19
nine people with black robes and life tenure are
9:21
just like not having it. It's just going to
9:23
be a bad day for you no matter what.
9:26
I think that's right. And in part, I
9:28
don't think people really saw this coming. Like
9:31
the academic conversation, the scholarly conversation has been
9:33
all over the place, but there are such
9:35
strong advocates on the political right and the
9:37
political left from originalist perspectives, from lots of
9:39
different perspectives for disqualification that have
9:42
come out pretty vocally in the last few
9:44
months. I was expecting it to
9:46
be people to have hold
9:48
their cards closer to their chest, perhaps, not
9:50
be quite as clear about where they're leaning, but
9:52
I don't think there was much gray area in
9:55
this decision. Quinta, Ben, feel free to disagree with
9:57
me or Alan. I'm sure it's caught up on
9:59
our arguments now. You know, you can listen to
10:01
the day of. So it was pretty exceptional from
10:03
that regard. The main line though seems to be
10:05
that there was a much less agreement
10:07
about what exactly the grounds
10:09
is for determining for President Trump did not
10:11
covered by Section 3 of the 14th
10:14
Amendment. The main argument advanced by Trump,
10:16
who was benefited by having really an
10:18
exceptional oral advocate, much more effective oral
10:20
advocate than in his briefing, I thought,
10:23
in his lawyer, Mr. Mitchell, who did an exceptional
10:25
job in addressing the initial line of arguments and
10:27
got some tough questions himself. I don't think they're
10:29
entirely soft on him on his different theories. But
10:32
the main argument, David Vance, although it's one
10:34
of several, is essentially one based on this
10:37
Griffin's case idea that's referenced to an 1860s
10:39
case, well, that really only wants to interpret Section
10:41
3 of the 14th Amendment. It's not a Supreme Court
10:43
case. It's not binding precedent, but it's kind of
10:46
taken to be maybe some persuasive
10:48
authority that Section 3
10:50
requires some sort of legislative implementation to
10:52
be used. And I think that's
10:54
the argument that I've got the most center of gravity.
10:57
Certainly Justice Kavanaugh seemed pretty heavily bought into
10:59
it, I thought. It is a
11:02
solution to a lot of the anxiety expressed
11:04
by Justice Kagan and Justice Barrett about what
11:07
the procedures should be, how they should be handled,
11:09
all sorts of carry-on risks. Because once you
11:11
say this repair is implementing legislation, it falls
11:13
on Congress to answer those questions. Chief
11:16
Justice Roberts, I thought, also was kind of leaning
11:18
in this direction, or at least it could help
11:20
address the anxieties he had. Justice Gorsuch may be
11:22
less clear, but also a little bit in that
11:24
way. But it wasn't the only
11:26
argument we've heard. We heard different variations of the
11:28
idea that Section 3 just doesn't reach the presidency.
11:31
A lot touched on the kind of infamous argument
11:33
that we've gotten a lot of
11:36
hay over the last few months about
11:38
how finally you can splice the language of
11:41
Section 3 to distinguish whether a president
11:43
constitutes an officer under the United
11:45
States or an officer for certain
11:47
other purposes in the language of Section 3. We
11:50
saw a somewhat more straightforward version of it, of
11:52
all people by Justice Katanji Brown-Jackson,
11:54
who posited why wasn't
11:56
the presidency expressly listed in Section 3,
11:59
if it's so important. Doesn't that inherently
12:01
create ambiguity? And you
12:03
saw other arguments as well about whether this
12:05
was really something that could state should be
12:07
in a position to do given that the
12:09
14th amendment as a whole was generally understood
12:11
to be empowering the federal government over the
12:14
state. So it'd be strange to all of
12:16
a sudden give the state a ton more
12:18
authority to enforce a federal election disqualification. I'm
12:20
actually not sure that doesn't make sense if I'm being honest.
12:23
I don't think that was the ripest line of questioning, but
12:25
the justices, several of them seem kind of persuaded by it.
12:27
And in my mind, that's another one of these things that
12:30
could easily pivot to a Griffin's case type resolution,
12:32
because again, you're kicking the bucket to Congress to
12:34
answer a lot of these hard questions about how
12:36
you should handle this sort of disqualification. The
12:39
way I came out of this, I know that I co-authors in
12:41
the law fair piece, including Ben came
12:43
on this, and I think, Quinta, you said something similar in your Atlantic
12:46
piece. The writing's on the wall. President
12:48
Trump is not going to be this qualified. I don't think there's any doubt about that, whether
12:50
it's 9 0 or 8 1. That's
12:53
the outcome. The question here is what the
12:55
basis is, and that can have knock-on ramifications
12:57
in terms of other points at which maybe
12:59
he will face other legal challenges on the similar
13:02
legal theory. Later, if
13:04
they just dismiss this more or less on procedural
13:06
sorts of grounds, or whether they get all the
13:08
way to the substantive arguments of how to understand
13:11
Section 3, that might resolve it with more finality
13:13
before 2024. Yeah.
13:15
So I am a little bit
13:17
less convinced that Scott, than Scott
13:20
is, that there is a major
13:23
division among the
13:25
justices here about rationale.
13:28
Oftentimes, what
13:30
you will see in an
13:32
oral argument is people, justices,
13:35
exploring different aspects
13:37
of an argument, but
13:39
then kind of in
13:41
conference and as the draft kind
13:43
of congealing around a
13:46
single rationale. And I think you
13:48
have a vision here of what
13:50
that rationale would be,
13:53
which is the idea that a
13:56
state cannot, a single state on
13:58
its own, cannot. not implement
14:02
Section 3 through its regular
14:05
old election law, but requires
14:07
some affirmative action
14:09
from Congress before it
14:12
can adjudicate a Section
14:14
3 question through ballot
14:16
access provisions. I
14:19
don't think there
14:21
appeared to be five votes
14:23
on the Supreme Court for
14:25
categorically exempting the president from
14:28
the coverage
14:30
of Section 3 of the
14:32
14th Amendment. That
14:34
may reflect my own prejudice that I
14:36
think that argument is a weak
14:39
one. But with the exception
14:42
of Justices Gorsuch and Katanji
14:44
Brown Jackson, I didn't see
14:46
any particular attraction to it.
14:49
And so my assumption is that
14:51
you have a
14:53
working majority of eight
14:56
nine justices who
14:58
seem to think that
15:01
not necessarily that Congress needs
15:04
to pass implementing
15:06
legislation for all coverage
15:09
of Section 3, but as
15:11
applied to the president in
15:14
a state or a federal officer
15:16
in a state, cannot
15:21
proceed to use election law
15:23
without some ballot access law
15:25
without some affirmative permission from
15:27
Congress. So I do expect
15:29
some kind of, I think
15:32
I expect a less fractured court
15:34
here than Scott might, but I
15:37
do expect a pretty
15:39
broad ruling in
15:41
terms of the number of justices and
15:43
the ideological sweep, but a pretty
15:45
narrow ruling in terms of what
15:48
they're actually meaning to
15:51
restrict. I
15:53
think I'm in Ben's camp here.
15:55
So Derek Muller, who's an election law expert
15:57
and blogs on election law blog, has a question.
16:00
had a sort of amusing tweet after
16:02
the end of arguments where he
16:04
suggested that the justices were coalescing around,
16:06
and I quote, what I might characterize
16:08
as a hybrid First Amendment due process,
16:10
Griffin's case ballot access rule. And
16:13
I think the- Is that all
16:15
one word hyphenation? There are
16:17
hyphens. But I mean, I think Derek's
16:20
point as I understood it is that the
16:22
clumsiness is kind of the point there. Like
16:24
they seem to be moving toward a way
16:27
of sort of combining different ideas about
16:30
the role, the limited
16:32
role in their view that states can play
16:34
in deciding these issues on a federal level
16:36
for a national candidate. I
16:39
may be wrong. I did not
16:41
see that in the briefing particularly.
16:43
And so it kind of struck
16:45
me as an example of
16:47
the justices just like really
16:49
wanting to find an off ramp.
16:53
I think that they desperately did not
16:55
want to rule for Trump and
16:57
they were trying to figure
16:59
out how. And I think
17:01
also you see this and
17:03
how uninterested they were
17:06
in addressing the merits of the question. It
17:08
took about an hour before anybody raised
17:11
the issue of whether or not January
17:13
6th was an insurrection. And once
17:15
that came up, it kind of didn't
17:17
really come back again except at the very,
17:19
very end of arguments. And there was a
17:22
really striking moment. I don't have
17:24
the wording directly in front of me
17:26
where Chief Justice Roberts, I
17:29
believe he was asking a question
17:31
of Murray sort of said, well, but you know
17:34
what if we have, you know, one state says
17:36
that there was an insurrection and that president Trump
17:38
is disqualified and other states says that there isn't,
17:40
you know what do we do then? Like do
17:43
we have to weigh in on what
17:45
an insurrection is? And
17:48
my answer would be, yeah, like that's what
17:50
this case is. And for
17:53
what it's worth, I was listening to Will
17:55
Bode's podcast with Dan Aps divided argument this
17:57
morning. Will Bode of course being one of
17:59
the two originalists. law professors who wrote with
18:02
Michael Stokes Paulson, the sort of big law
18:04
review article arguing for an originalist interpretation of
18:06
Section 3 under which Trump would be disqualified
18:08
and will made exactly that point that
18:11
the Chief Justice in that question and
18:13
the court generally seemed both
18:16
discomfited by the possibility
18:19
of a variation of resolutions or
18:21
creates states on this question and
18:24
discomfited by the possibility that
18:26
anybody might expect them to resolve
18:29
the issue on the merits. And
18:31
I think also that's
18:33
potentially dangerous. And the reason, and
18:36
this is an argument that Ned
18:39
Foley and Rick Hasen, who are both election
18:41
law professors, and Ben Ginsberg, the longtime Republican
18:43
election lawyer, made in an amicus brief before
18:45
the court, which Murray pointed to
18:47
during arguments, is that
18:50
if the court doesn't address the merits,
18:52
you can end up in a potentially
18:54
dangerous situation of kind of kicking
18:56
the can down the road where, say, Trump wins
18:58
in November, we don't have a dispositive answer on
19:01
the merits, then members of
19:03
Congress might step in on January
19:05
6, 2025, and say, we're
19:09
going to weigh in on this disqualification
19:11
question. And whether or
19:13
not you think that's an appropriate reading of Section
19:15
3, the way that I read
19:18
the Ginsburg class and Foley
19:20
brief was that you're potentially really
19:22
lighting a match and throwing it on
19:24
a pile of gasoline soaked rags there, given
19:26
what happened on January 6, the last time
19:28
around. And so for that reason as well,
19:30
I think it's a mistake for the court
19:32
to kind of punt here. What?
19:35
And that's why I find the argument that a lot
19:37
of people that Derek kind of channeled, although I took
19:39
his comment to tweet a little bit more sarcastic than
19:41
an actual prediction, to some extent. But you saw a
19:43
lot of people like Leah Litman, who's very smart about
19:45
this stuff, and I hesitate to ever second guess her
19:48
on reading the court, because she's much more close to
19:50
court watcher than I am. And
19:52
a lot of other people seem to glom
19:54
onto trying to say like, oh, we see
19:56
all these different arguments kind of knitting together.
19:58
I take because they were kind of reinforcing
20:00
the Justice weren't challenged. challenging each other on
20:02
them. But I think it's a really hard
20:04
opinion to write, particularly if you think the
20:06
court is going to want to actually get
20:08
some finality. Now, maybe they're going to be
20:11
okay with saying Congress will have to reevaluate
20:13
the Section 3 question when they're counting electoral
20:15
ballots. But I think there's a
20:17
pretty strong institutional drive that they're concerned about that.
20:19
And if they're concerned about knock-on effects for the
20:21
states reaching a ruling, I suspect
20:23
they're going to be worried about knock-on effects
20:25
for Congress and electoral count process as
20:28
well, which is why I think you end
20:30
up... The gravitational poles
20:32
seems to be, therefore, back to a
20:34
much more straightforward Griffin's case type argument
20:36
like Trump was advancing as his primary
20:38
argument, which is that Section 3 requires
20:40
legislation of the type anticipated by Section
20:43
5 of the 14th Amendment,
20:45
which is how we understand other portions of
20:47
the 14th Amendment are implemented, not
20:49
exclusively, notably. So like I said, I'm
20:51
not sure this is persuasive from an
20:53
actual case law perspective entirely, but
20:56
the idea that Section 3 requires appropriate legislation
20:58
to implement, which is what Section 5 says
21:00
how all the 14th Amendment will be implemented,
21:02
makes sense. And that gets you to the final
21:05
resolution because that means that there's no disqualification without
21:07
that legislation that does not exist outside of
21:09
one narrow criminal provision, which everyone seems to
21:12
concede would cover this. And that
21:14
means Congress can't disqualify Trump under Section 3
21:16
either. That's different than if you were
21:18
to say, oh, just states can't do this. It's a
21:20
federalism issue, which I think is actually hard
21:22
to read into the structure of the Section 3
21:24
or the 14th Amendment. You'd have a lot of
21:27
background principles doing a lot of work that
21:29
aren't that cohesive. And I don't know, it just
21:31
didn't get you the outcome. The only other outcome you can
21:33
get to is the president's not covered by Section 3. And
21:35
I had it said here, it's again, KBJ kind of coming
21:38
out of nowhere with that support of that opinion. But
21:40
I don't think that that will carry
21:42
the day for the reasons been noted, just didn't seem to have
21:45
enough support. And so Griffin's case kind of outcome comes out. And
21:47
I will say just for the purposes, this is more or less
21:49
what I predicted back when we started talking about this two years
21:51
ago on this very podcast, but
21:54
my mind kind of wandered a little bit in
21:56
between a bit. We came back too, because it's
21:58
much more about first principles and listening. about the
22:00
merits of the argument for the Supreme Court in these sorts of cases,
22:02
I think. I award you two
22:04
gold stars to Hufflepuff, Scott. Thank
22:07
you. That's all I ask. Yeah.
22:09
Yeah. So I think what's interesting
22:11
about the last 10 minutes of this conversation
22:14
we've been having is, again, just this like
22:16
absolute rock solid consensus that the
22:18
Supreme Court is going to reverse. This will not be closed.
22:20
And we're just, you know, fighting
22:22
over exactly how to cobble together an opinion that
22:24
will write. Again, I
22:27
think that seems right to me as
22:29
a descriptive matter. But I think it
22:31
does raise an interesting question that I think is worth
22:33
reflecting on, which is there aren't
22:35
that many cases, I think, in which there's
22:38
such a dramatic divergence
22:40
between kind of
22:42
elite legal opinion going into the case
22:45
and what the justices will
22:48
decide. Of course, we don't exactly know what they'll
22:50
decide, but we're just going to assume here that
22:52
they're going to pretty summarily or pretty easily reverse
22:54
this opinion. I feel like you have
22:57
to almost go back to the kind
22:59
of original Obamacare case in which
23:01
elite legal opinion was there's no way
23:03
that the individual mandate goes beyond the
23:05
Commerce Clause and then the justices are
23:07
like, the individual mandate goes beyond the
23:09
Commerce Clause. Now, obviously, this
23:11
is different here, right? It's not that there
23:13
was overwhelming legal consensus that Trump should be
23:15
disqualified. But there at least I
23:17
think certainly was a lot of very
23:19
serious people on the left, but notably
23:22
and I think most interestingly on
23:24
the kind of institutionalist Fed Soc
23:26
right, for lack of a better term, who
23:29
thought this was very plausible. I mean, I held
23:31
a conference on the
23:33
Section 3 case that was happening
23:35
in Minnesota in early November.
23:37
And again, we had a lot of different
23:39
points of view, but like there were a
23:41
lot of very serious people, mostly from the
23:43
right, saying, yeah, hearing a 17 reasons why
23:45
Trump is disqualified. And then you
23:47
get to the court and it's just like a
23:50
buzzsaw, right? On the right, on the
23:52
left, in the center. Again, I'm
23:54
not necessarily criticizing the folks who
23:56
were putting forward this argument. I thought
23:58
there were sophisticated arguments. and done in good
24:00
faith. And at the end of the day, it's not the job of
24:03
certainly not any legal academics to
24:05
just try to predict what the court will
24:07
do. But it's just, it
24:09
is a really notable divergence. And so
24:12
I'm curious, you know, what, if anything,
24:14
we should take away from that. Ben, what
24:16
do you think? So I
24:18
think there's a few things going
24:20
on here at once. The first
24:22
is that this
24:24
argument, unusually
24:26
among the sort of
24:29
arguments that academics get
24:31
excited about, has
24:33
a very strong textual basis.
24:37
And so therefore it has an
24:39
attraction to liberal
24:42
academics because it's politically
24:44
congenial and because
24:46
it sounds in civil war
24:48
history that they generally think
24:51
is improperly excluded from
24:54
a lot of modern
24:57
jurisprudence. But it
24:59
also has a real appeal
25:01
to conservative originalists, both
25:04
in the popular culture, people like
25:06
David French, and
25:09
in the academic
25:11
world, people like Will Bode and
25:13
Michael Stokes Paulson. So
25:15
that's one element. But the second element
25:17
is the difference between
25:19
legal academics and Supreme Court
25:22
justices, which is that, you
25:24
know, nobody talks
25:26
about the passive virtues
25:30
for academics, because
25:32
there are none. Academics like to
25:34
make interesting legal arguments and they
25:37
like to find theories by which
25:39
things happen. Amen, brother. Justices, you
25:42
know, at brutally roasted, Alan. In
25:45
their self-conception, like
25:47
to figure out ways not to
25:50
do things, and particularly like to
25:52
figure out ways not to
25:54
intervene in the political process. And
25:57
so there's a bit of a methodological difference
25:59
between between the
26:01
two approaches. And you
26:04
can say that, you know, if you
26:06
look at it from the point of
26:08
view of what's an interesting theory, what's
26:10
historically the most compelling and
26:12
what has the strongest textual basis,
26:14
you're gonna reach a different answer
26:17
than if you with one
26:19
eye on Bush v. Gore say, well, what's the
26:21
best way for us to stay the heck out
26:23
of this issue? So I
26:25
think those are the two factors
26:27
that contribute to
26:30
the difference in excitement level. Yeah,
26:32
I would add that I don't know,
26:35
well, I don't know what academic discussion everyone's looking
26:38
at because there's been a lot, and so I
26:40
may only be focusing on a certain corner. I
26:43
will say the discussion that I was
26:45
focused on was much
26:47
more on the
26:49
merits of the question saying
26:52
what is the right answer, and
26:54
that it was striking to me how much
26:56
there was a consensus moving in
26:58
the direction of section
27:00
three mandate, or at
27:03
least allow it on a state level
27:05
disqualification in a way that I don't
27:07
think I would have predicted before the
27:10
Bode-Paulson article. And I do think
27:12
that that speaks to the actual strength
27:14
of the arguments in question. I mean,
27:16
I will say I didn't think that
27:18
section three mandated disqualification and then did
27:20
a bunch of reading and thought, okay,
27:22
I was wrong about that. But
27:25
that is a separate issue from
27:27
what people thought the court would
27:29
do. And I think that
27:31
the court here was kind of caught between on
27:34
the one hand, the strength of the arguments,
27:37
and on the other hand,
27:39
the apparent weightiness
27:42
of saying that a major
27:44
party presidential nominee had committed an insurrection
27:46
and therefore should be fired from the
27:49
ballot. And I mean, a
27:51
representative example, I think Adam Minkowski, who has a
27:53
great legal sub-stack, wrote a long
27:55
post basically saying like, here are all the
27:57
reasons why the 14th amendment very clearly seems...
28:00
to disqualify Trump, I give it a 10%
28:02
chance that the court will actually do this. And
28:05
so it was always a long shot. And
28:07
the only reason that I think the possibility
28:09
wasn't 0% was
28:12
precisely because of how strong the arguments are. That
28:14
said, I think that the way arguments went made
28:16
it pretty clear that like, you
28:18
know, the cake was baked going into this. They knew
28:20
what they thought they were doing. They were just looking
28:22
for a reason to justify it. Well,
28:25
in a lot of the arguments in this
28:27
space, this is unusual for academics and kind
28:29
of commentary. Like they're situating,
28:31
the authors are situating themselves as justices saying,
28:34
we're looking at the legal question here, right?
28:37
Setting everything aside. I think the merits for the reason Quintan
28:39
noted are like pretty strong here. I mean, it
28:41
makes some intuitive sense that after the Civil War,
28:44
if they're worried about disqualifying former Confederates from a
28:46
variety of public offices, that that would reach the
28:48
presidency. And the historical practice is all
28:50
over the place in a way that does not
28:52
comport with the reference rule original understanding, although you
28:54
can pick your history and, you know,
28:57
line things up in a way to make a
28:59
case there, right? But the
29:01
actual Supreme Court that actually deals with the real
29:03
world context, which the Supreme Court operates just doesn't
29:05
decide things strictly on the merits. It
29:07
is influenced by a whole variety of
29:10
other political institutional considerations that, you know,
29:12
derive the outcome. And yeah, the actual
29:14
merits of legal argument, I think, constrain
29:17
legal outcomes within a certain band of
29:19
plausibility. But within that band
29:21
of plausibility, those other factors
29:23
do a lot of work in guiding towards
29:25
where these questions were. If you listen to
29:27
the questioning, that's what's really interesting. When KBJ
29:29
was really hitting on that point about the
29:31
president being not listed in Section 3, what
29:33
does she say? Doesn't that introduce a lot
29:35
of ambiguity in this scenario? They are searching
29:38
for ambiguity so hard because when they find
29:40
ambiguity, that gives them a lot of leeway
29:42
to begin to say, well, now we can
29:44
decide what we think the right outcome is
29:46
institutionally, politically, policy-wise, more or less,
29:48
even though they do it kind of implicitly
29:50
in a lot of arguments. You
29:53
know, that's just that's legal realism, right? Like,
29:55
I think this is a real observation, but
29:57
legal academia, a lot of scholarship doesn't position.
30:00
itself as predicting what this Supreme Court will
30:02
do. They are positioned as saying, here's what
30:04
we think the right arguments are, should be
30:06
based off what we think justices should be
30:08
weighing, and particularly the merits
30:11
considerations that we all agree should
30:13
go into judicial decisions, not those
30:15
high politics and institutional considerations that
30:17
are more controversial and get
30:19
forced out unless you just embrace a much more
30:21
frankly legal realistic mode of this sort of thing.
30:24
So the last question I want to ask before
30:26
we close out is what, if anything, this argument
30:29
and again, let's assume that the decision
30:31
is pretty strong in reversing
30:33
the Colorado Court, what
30:36
this decision says about how the court
30:38
might treat other Trump related matters, right?
30:40
Let's take, for example, the immunity question
30:42
that is currently in front of the
30:45
court with respect to
30:47
Trump's criminal immunity or lack thereof
30:49
in the federal January 6th criminal
30:51
case against him. One
30:54
possibility might be that this is the court
30:56
trying to stay out of these issues. One
30:58
possibility might be that the court might kind
31:00
of try to pair not explicitly,
31:02
but kind of between the lines, a
31:05
win for Trump here with a pretty
31:07
clear, you know, 8-1-7-2-9-0 loss for Trump
31:09
in the immunity case. Quinto,
31:11
what do you think? Read the chicken entrails for
31:14
me, please. Happy to.
31:16
Look, I think in some ways
31:18
that timing for the court is kind of fortuitous
31:21
here. The DC Circuit ruled
31:23
on the immunity issue right
31:25
before the Supreme Court
31:28
heard arguments on the 14th Amendment
31:30
issue, and that does leave them
31:32
kind of a nice way
31:35
to split the baby,
31:37
so to speak, and
31:39
say, you know, look at us, how high
31:41
and mighty we are, how wise, how above
31:43
politics we did with one hand, we take
31:46
from the other. You know, we
31:48
are truly not beholden to Trump in any
31:50
way, yet we are also not partisan Democrats
31:52
either. Can we call that
31:54
the the Rosenstein gambit, the both-size Rosenstein
31:56
gambit? Yeah, I mean, so I will
31:58
say, I think... I think it is interesting
32:02
how quickly the punditry, and I include
32:04
myself in this to some extent, kind
32:06
of began to coalesce around this option.
32:08
I think Adam Lipptak had a New
32:10
York Times story around it. There's
32:13
an extent to which this kind of
32:15
fits very nicely with how John Roberts
32:18
often tries to wiggle
32:20
out of the various political
32:23
corners that he so often finds
32:25
himself in. And I confess
32:27
I will be a little amused if the court
32:29
does end up taking that kind of option and
32:31
everybody congratulates them on
32:33
how wise, how thoughtful, how unexpected
32:36
this solution was. But
32:38
it is what it is. Our nine sages
32:41
will make the decisions that they make. Well
32:44
going from one presidential disqualification to
32:46
another, let us turn our sights
32:48
to the Her Report, which came
32:50
out this past week. Special
32:52
counsel Robert Herr appointed late last year
32:54
after the revelation that a number of
32:56
classified documents were located at President Biden's
32:58
home in Wilmington, Delaware, as well as
33:00
at the Penn Biden Center and a
33:03
few other offices he has used over
33:05
the years. We saw
33:07
Attorney General Merrick Garland appoint Robert
33:09
Herr, a former Republican appointed U.S.
33:11
Attorney, as I recall, to conduct
33:14
this investigation as special counsel looking into
33:16
President Biden's handling of these classified documents
33:18
or mishandling of these classified documents alleged
33:20
at this point. The report
33:22
we got last week handed down in the
33:25
midst of the aftermath of the Trump v.
33:27
Anderson argument essentially was an incredibly lengthy report,
33:29
370 odd pages as I recall, going
33:33
into incredible depth about how these documents
33:36
were handled and then goes
33:38
into decisions about the
33:40
reasoning behind declining to bring criminal
33:42
charges. And among those, even
33:44
though among those 370 pages was a
33:47
lot of documentation of documents
33:49
being that are classified
33:51
or containing classified information, seemingly being quite
33:53
deliberately withheld by President Biden, particularly after
33:56
he left the vice presidency and earlier
33:58
in his career. during his time
34:00
in the Senate, nonetheless, they chose
34:02
not to pursue a prosecution. And
34:04
among the reasons listed and kind of emphasized in
34:06
the report is that he is an elderly man
34:09
who will be in his 80s, advanced age at
34:11
that point. I think the report assumes this would
34:13
not happen until after he were outside, out of
34:15
the White House. And
34:17
that he is somebody
34:19
who had a demonstrated memory lapses
34:21
that would be sympathetic. They specifically
34:23
noted that he had trouble recalling
34:26
the year that his son Beau
34:28
died, at the beginning and end
34:30
of his vice presidency and quoting him on that regards,
34:33
in ways that have really triggered the ire
34:35
of the White House that is very sensitive
34:37
about these sorts of allegations, given that Biden's
34:39
age is a point of concern and contention
34:42
in the 2024 election where he is
34:44
standing for reelection, even though his most likely
34:46
rival appears to be almost the same age.
34:48
But nonetheless, they appear to be a point
34:51
that Biden is particularly sensitive about. Ben,
34:53
you wrote, I thought actually quite a good piece with
34:55
our colleague Matt Gluck on this
34:57
yesterday, kind of laying out your views
34:59
about it. What do you make of this report? What do
35:01
you think are the big takeaways and how do
35:03
they intersect with both the 2024 election question
35:08
and broader policy questions about handling classified
35:10
information? And most notably, the
35:12
fact that we have another criminal prosecution
35:14
taking place right now of a former
35:16
president, former President Trump for mishandling classified
35:18
information as well at Mar-a-Lago. Yeah.
35:20
So there are a lot of
35:23
questions embedded in there and I
35:25
want to disaggregate them a little
35:27
bit. First of all, as to
35:29
the White House's
35:31
anger and the President's personal
35:34
anger at the report,
35:36
I actually thought the report was
35:39
less horrendous than the White
35:41
House did in terms of
35:43
the gratuitous political
35:46
swipes at the
35:48
President. Another one, another good episode title
35:50
you've stolen from me. We've
35:52
got to get you in on this Google Doc right, both of
35:54
these things earlier. In
35:57
context, the references to
35:59
Biden's... memory are genuine
36:03
assessments of how his defenses
36:05
would likely play in front
36:07
of a jury of
36:09
a type that you expect to
36:11
see in a prose memo, which
36:13
is what this document actually is.
36:16
The problem arises because
36:18
the prose
36:21
memos that prosecutors normally write, and
36:23
in which they typically write this
36:25
sort of thing, don't
36:28
normally become public. And this
36:30
document under the regs is
36:32
not supposed to be a
36:34
public document, but the attorney
36:36
general has, starting
36:38
under Bill Barr
36:41
with the Mueller report, but
36:43
continuing under Merrick Garland, the
36:46
attorney general has kind of
36:48
changed this private report requirement
36:51
into a public report. And
36:54
the result is that these comments
36:56
that her made, which
36:59
were, are not inappropriate
37:01
in my view in a
37:03
private prose memo, become
37:05
public. And they happen to track
37:08
rather unfortunately with Republican
37:10
talking points, as well
37:12
as Democratic anxieties about
37:16
having an 80 plus
37:18
year old presidential candidate.
37:21
So look, I think all
37:23
of that is unfortunate for Biden.
37:26
It is not actually the part that
37:29
really interested me in the report, which
37:32
was the, I
37:34
thought, very upsetting portrayal of Biden's
37:37
actual behavior, which has been somewhat
37:40
lost in this whole discussion
37:42
of how offended
37:44
we should be by Mr. Herr's
37:47
behavior. You know, this
37:49
is another president
37:51
who, or
37:53
presidential candidate who has
37:55
retained classified
37:58
information, used it for
38:00
personal purposes. And
38:03
while the case is quite different
38:06
in a lot of respects from
38:08
President Trump's and certainly isn't
38:11
remotely as bad and I'm
38:13
perfectly comfortable with the outcome,
38:16
which is Trump being indicted
38:18
on 40ish counts in
38:21
the Mar-a-Lago case and President
38:24
Biden not being indicted, I think that's
38:26
a perfectly reasonable difference
38:28
under the circumstances. I
38:30
did walk away from it saying,
38:33
gosh, here's yet another person
38:37
who at the highest levels
38:39
of government is unwilling to
38:41
follow the rules. And that
38:43
bothers me
38:45
because a lot of people
38:47
actually take those rules pretty
38:50
seriously and people
38:53
do get in a lot of trouble
38:55
and have kind of career ruining or
38:57
life ruining consequences when they don't.
39:01
The final thing I'll say about it
39:03
is, you know, it really
39:06
reminded me of the David Petraeus
39:08
case. In
39:10
both cases, again, the Petraeus
39:12
case was worse in important
39:14
respects, but in both
39:17
cases, you had a senior
39:19
official who kept notebooks with
39:21
classified information, which he
39:23
shared with, in one
39:25
case, a biographer and in another case,
39:28
a ghostwriter
39:31
and did so kind of knowing that there
39:34
was classified information in there.
39:36
And I, you know,
39:38
just think we should expect
39:40
better of our political leaders.
39:43
And I think that Biden's
39:45
anger at his press conference
39:47
last week really
39:50
missed the point, which was that he
39:53
had aired and it warranted
39:55
a little bit more contrition than he
39:57
showed. Ryan
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You know, and help us stack for a great
40:58
cost. I
41:04
agree. I think that it
41:07
is difficult to discuss this because there
41:09
are so many issues wrapped
41:11
up in this
41:13
one report. As you say,
41:15
then the question about handling of classified information is
41:17
a serious one. I think that there really is
41:20
a, you know, it
41:22
is possible to take this report
41:25
seriously without defaulting
41:27
to focusing
41:30
on the question of age and memory, which I
41:32
feel like is a way that a lot of
41:34
the political press has kind of defaulted to. You
41:37
know, like if you take it seriously, then you
41:39
must yell a lot about how Joe Biden is
41:42
And I don't think that you need to do that. Frankly,
41:46
we owe it to all the people whose lives
41:49
have been ruined because of mishandling
41:51
classified information that was way less egregious than
41:53
this at lower levels of government to take
41:55
it more seriously and, you know, think about
41:57
what this says about how... the
42:00
system clearly needs to be changed because this is
42:02
not working. I also think that
42:04
there are serious implications here about
42:06
how we think about the role of the special counsel
42:09
system, to bend to your point about how
42:11
this is written as a prosecution
42:13
memo. Those include negative information
42:17
about the person being investigated by their very
42:19
nature since it's laying out whether or not
42:21
you're going to prosecute somebody. But,
42:24
and yet, the assumption is that this is going
42:26
to become public and maybe that means that we
42:28
need to think about how
42:31
the special counsel regulations are written
42:33
and whether there are tweaks that
42:36
can be made. I
42:38
don't know if there is a better system
42:40
here, but it does seem to me like
42:43
insofar as the existing
42:45
regs were designed in
42:48
response to the failure of the
42:50
independent counsel statute to allow for
42:52
some level of independent investigation while
42:56
not having a prosecutor go completely
42:58
rogue but also reassuring public
43:00
confidence in the integrity of the Justice
43:03
Department and of these investigations. That
43:06
is not working and I don't know what a
43:08
better system is, but this one is not doing
43:10
it. Alan, I know you have something to say here
43:12
and I will let you jump in before I
43:14
go to the memory issue, which I do think
43:16
matters. Yeah, well, I
43:18
mean, I just, am I
43:20
wrong that there's just a massive amount of
43:22
hypocrisy on this point, right? Like, I
43:25
feel like I was, I'm old enough to remember when Bob
43:28
Mueller wrote a very long, you know,
43:31
report about Donald Trump and,
43:33
you know, concluded that
43:36
Trump should not be or could not
43:38
be indicted or
43:40
prosecuted and then wrote hundreds
43:42
of pages of pretty
43:44
damning stuff about what Trump did and
43:47
liberals were pretty angry when then
43:50
Attorney General Bill Barr tried to de-emphasize
43:53
that portion and yet those many of those
43:55
same liberals seem very angry that Merrick Garland
43:57
did not do the exact same thing here.
44:00
equivalent to? I mean, I'm actually
44:02
not trying to be spicy here. Like, am
44:04
I missing something? Or is this just purely,
44:07
like, people, partisanship is a hell of
44:09
a drug? So, look, there are,
44:11
it is definitely true that I have
44:13
seen people on the left make the argument that
44:15
like, Merrick Garland should have edited the report ahead
44:17
of time or something, which I think is insane
44:19
for all of the reasons that you just set
44:22
out. I will say, as
44:24
someone who spent a fair amount of
44:26
time along with them thinking seriously about
44:28
the way that the regs were and
44:30
weren't working during the Mueller investigation, I
44:33
do think that some of what you're describing
44:35
about Mueller reflects other ways
44:37
that this system is not working, right?
44:40
So, I agree that like, taking
44:42
away from the Herr Report, okay,
44:45
the Attorney General should have no discretion
44:47
to release the report, is
44:49
not a solution precisely because you can
44:52
have scenarios like the Mueller investigation where
44:54
like, we really did need that document
44:56
to become public. That said, I do
44:59
think that, you know, Barr was able
45:01
to take advantage of some of the
45:03
ambiguities and the regs and the limitations
45:06
on independence and the discretion and releasing
45:08
information to kind of warp
45:10
the public conversation ahead of time. It's
45:12
also true that, you know, the public
45:16
did not understand Mueller's investigation to
45:18
be, you know, fully independent and
45:20
nonpartisan. Certainly, like, you know, there
45:22
were plenty of people on the
45:25
left who chose to see it
45:27
that way. And I think it was, to
45:29
be clear, but just in terms of public perception, but
45:31
it was also attacked ceaselessly on
45:33
the right as something that was
45:36
partisan. And so, to the extent
45:38
that the system is designed the way it is to
45:42
re-insure public confidence, that is not
45:44
working. And I think there are
45:46
aspects and tensions in
45:49
how, in the weaknesses of the regs as
45:51
designed, that we see manifesting in
45:53
Mueller and in her in different ways. All
45:56
of which is to say, like, I don't know what
45:58
the solution is, but I do think that it
46:00
is consistent to say across the experiences of
46:02
the last few years this is not working
46:05
so well. But you know it's
46:07
hard for me to imagine a very
46:10
compelling alternative though. Like in both of these
46:12
cases you're put in
46:14
a really difficult situation where you have
46:16
an incumbent president being investigated for really
46:18
potentially troubling actions. I think maybe
46:21
are you can argue somewhere of different scale than others
46:23
or different seriousness than others but I think they're both
46:25
serious enough and and were in consideration. And then
46:27
the Justice Department that is nominally independent but we
46:29
all know in practice isn't always as independent as
46:32
ideally it would be or may not be
46:34
as independent isn't perceived that way. Having to
46:36
make the difficult decision saying here we're not
46:38
going to pursue charges or we don't think it's appropriate
46:40
in these cases and having
46:43
to provide a public reason for that. I can't
46:45
imagine a universe where you could really withhold that
46:47
and and not face political backlash
46:50
and not for reasonable reasons. Like maybe if
46:52
it's you're the president like I generally think
46:54
for anyone almost anyone other than the president
46:56
there would be a stronger case for like
46:58
withholding these memos because generally someone who's not
47:00
pursuing criminal charges shouldn't have their dirty laundry
47:02
aired in public by the Justice Department. I
47:04
think it's 100% true but maybe the president's
47:07
just one of those cases that the nature
47:09
of the office and the politics around it like
47:11
just require that to be the sacrifice here. The
47:14
question I do have though and I want to
47:16
turn me back to you on this Quinta is
47:18
you know I do think her
47:20
maybe could have exercised more discretion in how he framed
47:22
this thing. I don't know if that's a
47:24
matter of like writing the regs better. I think it just may
47:26
have been a choice that her made that
47:28
some people agree with and disagree with. I think
47:30
he probably laid it on a little thicker on
47:33
the memory points and frankly on the sheer volume
47:35
of this report which is longer than the Mueller
47:37
report I think or approaches the Mueller report in
47:39
length and it just does not cover the same
47:41
scope of conduct. Strikes me as like laying
47:44
it on a little thick. I
47:46
don't know how you how you reg around that
47:48
right? Like I think that's just a decision that somebody made
47:50
and the whole point is to give them a fair amount
47:52
of autonomy but I but I do think there's space to
47:54
criticize him in that. What do you
47:56
make of the memory allegations and and the other
47:59
sort of comments about Biden, how problematic do
48:01
you find them and do they raise other concerns for you?
48:04
I agree about the framing. I do think,
48:06
you know, to the extent that Biden's
48:09
defense as he presented
48:11
it to her was,
48:13
you know, oh, I forgot, that
48:16
does seem to some extent to
48:18
be appropriate to include in a
48:20
prosecution memo. I think I will
48:22
say to me personally reading it,
48:24
what really rubbed
48:26
me the wrong way just as a reader
48:30
was the fact that among the
48:34
dates that her stated that Biden
48:36
could not recall was the
48:38
date of the death of his son
48:41
or the year when his son, Beau
48:43
Biden died, which
48:45
in Biden's press conference seemed
48:48
to be the thing that he was the most
48:50
angry about. Now, I'm sure it's also, you know,
48:52
good politically for him to frame this as, you
48:54
know, how dare you attack my family. But I
48:57
mean, I look, I, if
48:59
I try to think about the years when
49:01
people close to me have died in
49:04
sudden and traumatic ways, like, I don't know if
49:06
I could point to the date, right?
49:09
There's I was
49:11
thinking about this in relation to
49:13
something, you know, various like
49:15
negative events in my life that left a big
49:18
impression on me. And I don't know
49:20
if I could pull the date out of a
49:22
hat. And I'm also not 81, which
49:25
I think goes to my to my other
49:27
point, which is like, yes,
49:29
certainly, I am not
49:31
super happy about the fact that
49:34
both candidates in this election are over the age
49:37
of 75. I actually do think
49:39
that that is a substantial
49:41
problem for a number
49:44
of reasons. But I also
49:47
think it is true that, you know, there
49:50
are different forms of memory, there's been
49:53
some interesting writing about doctors and psychologists
49:55
sort of responding to this in light
49:57
of the her report and that If
50:01
this is actually a
50:03
serious problem in the sense that it's,
50:05
you know, impairing Biden's ability to govern,
50:07
I would expect to see a bunch
50:10
of reporting to that effect.
50:13
And I think it is notable that
50:15
we haven't yet seen that, right? Like
50:17
there is a big difference between not
50:20
remembering the year in which
50:22
something happened and
50:24
like having a substantial error and
50:26
judgment in your role
50:29
as president. And
50:31
I think that we haven't really seen anything,
50:33
any reporting to the latter effect yet. So
50:35
I will certainly be keeping an eye on
50:37
that, but that does make me feel a
50:39
little bit differently about how
50:41
this is playing politically. I just want
50:43
to be, I just want to clarify Quinta may not be
50:45
81 in body, but she's still the 81 in spirit. That's
50:49
beyond doubt. Yeah. So
50:51
I have three quick points. The first is
50:53
on the memory point. There
50:55
is nothing in that report that the
50:58
public did not already know. Joe
51:02
Biden has all
51:04
kinds of verbal hiccups,
51:06
whether you attribute those to his being 81 and
51:12
having some degree of
51:14
cognitive decline, or whether you attribute
51:16
it to the fact that he's
51:18
always been that way and he's
51:21
a kind of gaffe machine. He
51:23
trips over things. He replaces
51:25
words with other words. It
51:27
is not wholly unlike George
51:29
H.W. Bush in that regard.
51:32
And there's an aphasic quality to
51:34
his speech that
51:36
he does not appear to notice. So
51:40
he gets very angry when it's
51:42
pointed out to him, but it's,
51:45
that's what her is
51:47
noticing. And he does forget
51:49
details and he gets things
51:51
wrong. That's what's
51:54
in the report and her makes an
51:56
evaluation that this would be a problem
51:58
in front of a jury. I do not
52:01
begrudge him that observation, nor do
52:04
I think it's really,
52:06
it's playing to Biden's weak spot
52:08
in a campaign. And I can
52:10
understand the campaign
52:12
and Biden's anger at that. And
52:15
as Quinto points out, it does involve some
52:18
painful examples, but
52:21
it's really not telling the public anything
52:25
that the public doesn't know. From
52:28
the question of the policy
52:31
of the special
52:33
counsel regs, this is an issue that
52:35
I have for my
52:37
sins in life dealt with for
52:39
literally my entire adult life as
52:42
a professional. And
52:45
it is Alan's point is
52:47
correct that whenever you are on
52:50
the side of an
52:52
investigation, you feel
52:55
like that investigation lacks adequate
52:57
independence and lacks the ability to
52:59
do the things it needs to do. And
53:02
whenever you are sympathetic to the
53:05
subject of the investigation, the investigation
53:07
feels under out of control and
53:10
feels unbounded by the
53:12
norms and behaviors that
53:15
the Justice Department normally does.
53:17
There is no way to
53:19
square this circle. You
53:21
have to make choices. And the choices
53:23
that we have made, which
53:25
we've then bent because we don't
53:27
live under the special counsel rules
53:29
quite as written, are
53:31
that we have rebuilt the
53:34
independent counsel law under the
53:36
rubric of the special counsel,
53:38
the attorney general names,
53:40
and then leaves alone the special
53:42
counsel. And with the solitary exception
53:45
of Bill Barr sort
53:47
of editing, redacting
53:49
parts of the Mueller report
53:51
and mischaracterizing it really doesn't
53:54
get involved. And so in fact,
53:57
the independence is quite extreme, both
53:59
in situations in which
54:02
that independence is salutary
54:04
and in situations like Durham,
54:07
where it's really quite damaging. The
54:10
final point I will make is that, look,
54:13
this really, it is important to
54:15
separate this case from the Trump
54:17
case, which, you
54:19
know, Mr. Her was
54:23
actually quite candid that his
54:25
evidence was not strong enough
54:27
to bring a case quite
54:29
apart from Biden's memory issues,
54:32
that just the evidence that
54:34
this material was willfully as
54:36
opposed to accidentally retained and
54:38
disclosed is not 100%. And
54:43
more importantly, that Biden's cooperation
54:45
with and disclosure of the
54:48
material when found was the
54:50
cooperation was essentially total, the
54:53
investigator was self-reported. All
54:55
of this is radically different
54:57
from the Trump case. And
55:00
so, look, if the question is, should
55:03
we cluck at Biden's conduct,
55:05
I think the answer to that question
55:07
is yes. And I think
55:09
it's worse than Hillary Clinton's. I
55:12
think it's kind of not
55:14
as bad as, but in the
55:17
same general department as Petraeus's. And
55:20
I think it's very unfortunate and ugly.
55:22
If the question is, should he be
55:25
prosecuted, is it similar to Trump's, the
55:27
answer is absolutely not. And
55:29
so I'm not sure that the political
55:32
arena is the wrong arena for people
55:34
to think this through, both
55:36
in terms of evaluating his memory
55:38
and what we should make of
55:40
that, and in terms of evaluating
55:43
how much we want to hold
55:45
against him, the conducting question. Well,
55:48
let's move then to the other presidential
55:50
candidate who made some interesting
55:53
comments about NATO at
55:55
a rally recently. I will simply read them to
55:57
you and I will not do a Trump voice because I'm not going
56:00
at that. So this
56:02
is Imagine Trump's Anglist. Quote,
56:05
one of the presidents of a big country, he's talking
56:07
here about something that he says happened in 2018, stood
56:10
up and said, well, sir, if we don't pay
56:12
and we're attacked by Russia, will you protect us?
56:15
I said, you didn't pay your delinquent?
56:17
He said, yes, let's say that happened.
56:20
No, I would not protect you. In
56:22
fact, I would encourage them to do whatever the hell they
56:24
want. You got to pay. You got
56:26
to pay your bills. So
56:29
this is Donald Trump saying
56:31
not only that he would
56:33
not come to
56:35
the aid of a fellow NATO member
56:38
if they were attacked by Russia, if they
56:40
had not paid, we'll put an asterisk on
56:42
what that means, but that
56:44
he would affirmatively encourage Russia
56:46
to attack them. This continues
56:48
what seems to be his
56:50
persistent confusion over the course
56:52
of six years more
56:54
about what NATO actually is and
56:57
what it means to pay for
56:59
NATO. And these comments have unsurprisingly
57:01
caused a fair amount of alarm.
57:05
Other other NATO members and among
57:08
sort of people in the national security
57:10
space, including former members of
57:12
the Trump administration, such as one
57:15
john Bolton, who has been going around
57:17
basically saying, you know, he is dead
57:19
serious about this, do not think
57:21
that this is a joke or exaggeration. He absolutely
57:23
thinks that this is how NATO works, and he
57:25
will do this. So
57:28
Scott, resident NATO defender, first
57:31
off, can you explain why Trump's interpretation
57:33
of how NATO works is wrong? And
57:36
second off, are we all do? So
57:39
Trump's interpretation is wrong, but there is
57:41
actually a point of merit underlying this
57:43
this line of inquiry that Trump has been pursuing really all
57:46
the way back to 2017 2018 early in his presidency, and
57:48
perhaps even in time
57:51
as a candidate, I think there were some
57:53
comments during the 2016 election. The basic point
57:56
is that about 10 years ago, less
57:59
than 10 years ago, NATO set a
58:01
10-year goal that all NATO members would spend
58:03
at least 2% of their GDP on
58:05
defense spending. They would slowly ratchet that up. And
58:07
now we are almost at the expiration of that
58:09
10-year window. I think it is 2024, maybe
58:12
it's 2025, I can't recall exactly. And
58:15
that only about a third of NATO members have actually
58:17
hit that target. And that's in spite of the
58:19
war in Ukraine, giving a lot of impetus
58:21
to European governments to up their defense spending in a
58:23
serious way. Many of them have, many
58:25
of them have expressed an intent to work
58:27
towards this 2% target that is much more
58:30
serious and committed, and that they've demonstrated more steps the last
58:32
two years than they did over the prior eight. But
58:34
it's a point of, you know, long-standing policy
58:37
concern and frustration by the United States and
58:39
select other governments, because the United
58:41
States does, as a result of
58:43
this, bear a disproportionate
58:46
part of the burden of defense costs,
58:48
and the defense risks entailed in any
58:50
sort of military encounter with Russia or
58:53
with anyone else under the NATO umbrella.
58:55
That said, what this does not mean
58:57
is that this is not an opportunity
59:00
to start ignoring your treaty obligations. The treaty
59:02
obligation to come to the defense of NATO
59:04
partners is not contingent upon full payment
59:06
of this amount, nor could it be because this
59:08
was just kind of a policy decision made decades
59:10
late after the fact. There is supposed
59:12
to be a clear obligation in place. That
59:15
said, another thing to bear in mind is that the
59:17
Article 5 obligation that is the hinge of all this
59:19
actually isn't quite the firm obligation people think it is.
59:21
It is a firm obligation to consult and
59:24
to come to the aid of NATO members, not
59:26
necessarily with military intervention. They
59:28
actually quite expressly don't
59:30
say that as a requirement. And
59:32
that was a matter of design of NATO, in
59:35
part because of U.S. constitutional concerns about
59:37
whether the president or Congress has to
59:39
authorize military intervention, the use of force
59:41
over disease, among other policy considerations. So
59:43
there is lots of wiggle room, even
59:45
within the existing legal framework by which
59:47
a former President Trump, pardon me, a
59:49
future President Trump, could exercise
59:52
as authority's commander-in-chief to say, nope, I'm meeting these
59:54
NATO obligations because I'm holding these meetings. I am
59:56
providing assistance. Maybe I'm setting arms. Maybe I'm doing
59:58
other things that I think are important. think is
1:00:00
appropriate, which is kind of the
1:00:02
standard set by Article 5. But
1:00:05
it doesn't entail fully coming to their defense. And
1:00:07
that's the real harm of Trump's statements here, which
1:00:09
aren't new. I don't think this is surprising for
1:00:11
everyone who's been following Trump on this for the
1:00:13
last several years, but it's disturbing
1:00:15
because the deterrent effect of NATO
1:00:18
hinges on the willingness
1:00:20
of particularly the United States and other NATO
1:00:22
members, but particularly the United States to come
1:00:25
full bore to the defense of NATO allies,
1:00:27
even though they don't have a hard obligation
1:00:29
to do so. And
1:00:31
so when you start signaling weakness in
1:00:33
that commitment, you undermine the credibility of
1:00:35
that deterrent effect. And that's ultimately like the idea
1:00:38
behind NATO isn't to have to go to have
1:00:40
these wars, it's to deter people from starting them
1:00:42
in the first place. And so
1:00:44
for that reason, it's very reasonable for
1:00:46
I think NATO members to have concern
1:00:48
over this, even if it's not anything
1:00:50
new, even if NATO
1:00:53
leadership is very clear, we think the United States will
1:00:55
remain a strong ally of NATO, even
1:00:57
if former President Trump is elected. As they've said
1:01:00
quite expressly, there has to be some anxiety underlying
1:01:02
that because even if Trump doesn't follow up on
1:01:04
these threats, the fact that he's saying them
1:01:06
undermines the effectiveness of NATO as a deterrent.
1:01:08
And in some ways, the fact that some
1:01:10
of his policy advisors like Keith Kellogg have
1:01:12
come out saying, well, here's ways we could
1:01:14
restructure NATO to make what Trump says more
1:01:16
of a realistic possibility other
1:01:19
than the fact that they're kind of foolish proposals
1:01:21
because you would have to have unanimous consent of
1:01:23
NATO to amend the treaty arrangement and pursue a
1:01:25
bunch of other arrangements, or you
1:01:27
would have to trash NATO and just start over from scratch. Like
1:01:30
setting that aside, even they just
1:01:32
go further in undermining the idea,
1:01:34
the credibility of NATO. And
1:01:36
they kind of make the idea that Trump might
1:01:38
actually be pursuing these as policy changes much more
1:01:40
credible in a way that again, I think further
1:01:42
undermines that deterrent effect. Scott, I'm
1:01:45
curious, how much does the recent
1:01:47
law that Congress passed making it
1:01:49
more difficult for the president to unilaterally
1:01:52
withdraw us from NATO? A law that
1:01:54
I will henceforth call the Scott Anderson
1:01:56
saves NATO law because as far as
1:01:59
we can tell, it was inspired by a law
1:02:01
firm piece you wrote for
1:02:03
any current or prospective funders. That's what
1:02:05
we call impact. There we are.
1:02:07
Yes, please. Take note. If
1:02:09
you like NATO, I've got other
1:02:11
ideas. Fund law firm. I
1:02:14
mean, to what extent does that, I
1:02:16
don't want to say obviate, but maybe minimize
1:02:18
the risk of what would happen to
1:02:21
NATO in a second Trump administration? So
1:02:24
it's a big step in the right direction, although
1:02:26
there's actually an additional step that was dropped out
1:02:28
of the law that needs to be taken. It's
1:02:30
something I'm working on a piece on right now,
1:02:33
and I think is a real positive step that
1:02:35
Congress or actually just the House and or Senate
1:02:37
could and should take on its own. What
1:02:40
that provision does is it's pretty straightforward. It says
1:02:42
expressly, the president shall not withdraw from NATO without
1:02:44
permission of two thirds of the Senate, the advice
1:02:46
and consent of two thirds of the Senate or
1:02:49
pursuant to an act of Congress. And then it
1:02:51
says no funds shall be used for that purpose,
1:02:53
absent that permission. There's some other notification provisions, things like
1:02:55
that. But those are the key elements of the law.
1:02:58
The reason that's important is because the president's
1:03:00
authority to withdraw from treaties is something that's
1:03:02
not spelled out in the Constitution anywhere. It's
1:03:04
something the president has only exercised over the
1:03:07
course of the 20th century. Before that, Congress
1:03:09
usually had a role in removing the United
1:03:11
States from treaties, although the ways it did
1:03:13
vary pretty dramatically over the years. And
1:03:16
if we look at this through the lens of how the
1:03:18
Supreme Court and the executive branch tend to think about the
1:03:21
presidential authority implied authorities from the
1:03:23
Constitution, it exists in what is
1:03:25
famously called the zone of twilight, an area where
1:03:28
the president doesn't have an expressive authorization, but
1:03:30
he's not clearly acting contrary to Congress. And
1:03:32
everybody agrees this is an authority to have
1:03:35
to lie somewhere with the political branches because
1:03:38
it's obviously a federal authority that has
1:03:40
to live somewhere. And so
1:03:42
the president essentially often is given a substantial
1:03:44
leeway to act so long as
1:03:46
Congress is silent. But
1:03:49
it presents a much more difficult question
1:03:51
when Congress actually enacts a prohibition. When
1:03:53
you were in a situation that Justice
1:03:55
Jackson famously described as the lowest ebb
1:03:58
in carving out what is known as the... Youngstown framework in a
1:04:00
concurrence opinion in 1952, if I recall correctly, 52 or 54. I
1:04:04
can't remember off the top of my head. But essentially
1:04:06
that means that all of a sudden where
1:04:08
if Congress expressly prohibits something, which this law
1:04:11
does, if the president tries to do it
1:04:13
using implied powers, the presumption of
1:04:15
that framework is that the president doesn't have that
1:04:17
authority unless he can point to some
1:04:19
sort of a constitutional grant that is exclusively
1:04:21
his, meaning Congress has no ability
1:04:23
to even disable him or affect him in
1:04:25
how to do that. I don't think there's
1:04:27
a constitutional grant that express, or at least
1:04:29
the case for it is extremely weak. The
1:04:31
executive branch, no Trump administration itself did release
1:04:33
an OLC opinion in December 2020, as
1:04:36
was leaving office asserting that there was express authority
1:04:38
and exclusive authority in the president doing this
1:04:40
rooted in the logic of a Zivatovsky opinion
1:04:42
that came out in 2015 that I worked
1:04:44
on while I was in government. I
1:04:47
do not think that's a persuasive case. And the
1:04:49
whole point of this provision is to set up
1:04:51
the conditions under which Congress can legally challenge the
1:04:53
president's reliance on that argument, bring it to
1:04:55
the courts, consider the president
1:04:57
to defend his argument for his main court and accept
1:04:59
the consequences. And I think the executive branch will flinch
1:05:02
at that because they do not have a strong argument.
1:05:05
The problem with that is that there's one barrier this rule doesn't
1:05:07
overcome, and that's a standing barrier. It's not
1:05:09
really clear who would actually have the legal
1:05:11
authority to pursue a lawsuit challenging an unlawful
1:05:13
withdrawal from NATO because it's so removed from
1:05:15
most private citizens. I can imagine certain categories
1:05:18
of private citizens that might be able to
1:05:20
pursue that claim, but I'm not sure it's
1:05:22
an airtight standing case. I think the best
1:05:24
way to get standing would be for Congress
1:05:26
to authorize legislation for itself to pursue that
1:05:28
sort of claim. And notably,
1:05:31
because they hinge this on the appropriations clause
1:05:33
by holding off funding, there's actually a DC
1:05:35
circuit, not actually precedent because opinions were
1:05:37
officially withdrawn but recent DC circuit cases that suggest
1:05:39
that actually either the House or the Senate could
1:05:41
probably have standing to pursue that legislation. And so
1:05:43
that's the added step I think the House or
1:05:46
the Senate needs to take to make this airtight.
1:05:48
They need to authorize legislation, or pardon me, litigation
1:05:50
on their behalf enforcing this legal right and should
1:05:52
do it in advance so that the executive branch
1:05:54
knows as soon as we try doing this, it's
1:05:56
going to immediately go to the courts and to
1:05:59
lock in that separate to turn effect. All
1:06:02
that's to say is this just defends formal
1:06:04
US membership in NATO. It doesn't
1:06:06
tighten up the ability of forcing the
1:06:08
president to do anything under Article
1:06:10
Five other than the need to comply
1:06:12
with the treaty application. And under our constitution,
1:06:14
it's not really clear what Congress can do in that
1:06:17
regard. President's commander, chief, he's got a lot of authority.
1:06:19
Maybe Congress could appropriate funds and compel the president to
1:06:21
send them. I actually think there's a good argument that
1:06:23
they could do things like that, but
1:06:25
it's going to be constitutionally fraught. It's going to be a
1:06:28
source of argument. And it's a
1:06:30
much trickier legal question. So preserving membership doesn't
1:06:32
necessarily solve the Trump era concern, but it
1:06:34
does mean Trump can't withdraw the United States
1:06:36
from the Alliance and completely undermine it for
1:06:39
future generations and future presidents that may be
1:06:41
willing to engage it more seriously. Yeah,
1:06:44
I just want to emphasize the
1:06:46
point that Scott, you just made
1:06:48
at the end, which is that even
1:06:51
if this statute can
1:06:53
prevent the formal withdrawal
1:06:55
from NATO, it cannot
1:06:58
prevent Trump from
1:07:00
destroying NATO and doing
1:07:03
it by doing exactly
1:07:05
what he described himself
1:07:07
as doing probably falsely
1:07:10
in that story, which
1:07:12
is by encouraging
1:07:15
an attack on or
1:07:18
even just not discouraging an attack
1:07:21
on a NATO member state and
1:07:23
then refusing to honor our Article
1:07:27
Five obligations when invoked.
1:07:30
NATO, like most treaties,
1:07:33
is a confidence game. And I don't
1:07:36
mean that in a bad way, but
1:07:38
it works because people believe in it
1:07:41
and because countries act like
1:07:44
it's a real thing and it's
1:07:46
a real security guarantee, the moment
1:07:48
that you reveal it is not
1:07:51
a real security guarantee, it
1:07:53
becomes the emptiest of pieces
1:07:56
of paper. And so I
1:08:00
While I do
1:08:02
think a legislation that
1:08:05
discourages the attempt to
1:08:08
destroy the alliance is
1:08:10
very salutary, I
1:08:12
don't want to count on that legislation.
1:08:15
Trump is consistent about relatively
1:08:17
few things in life,
1:08:21
but one thing that he's very consistent
1:08:23
about is that he does not believe
1:08:25
in our overseas alliances and he does
1:08:28
not believe that our that
1:08:31
he believes that our allies are
1:08:33
scamming us for money and
1:08:36
that we're kind of suckers
1:08:39
for this exploitation of,
1:08:41
you know, rapacious
1:08:46
European countries and South Koreans
1:08:48
and Japanese who don't pay
1:08:50
their bills, which of course
1:08:53
Trump doesn't pay his bills, but that's a
1:08:55
different matter. I mean there's
1:08:57
some projection going on there, but
1:09:00
he is very clear about what
1:09:04
he believes and he's been quite consistent
1:09:07
about it over time and I
1:09:10
think we should take
1:09:12
him pretty seriously about that and
1:09:15
not rely, which is
1:09:17
not to say we should not
1:09:19
pass the second part of the
1:09:21
Scott saves NATO bill, but I
1:09:23
don't think we should rely on
1:09:25
these things to, you
1:09:28
know, tyrant proof or to
1:09:30
de-NATO proof the
1:09:33
executive branch. If Trump is elected and wants
1:09:37
to destroy NATO, he
1:09:39
does not need a lot of
1:09:41
formal authority in order to do
1:09:43
that. Well folks, that
1:09:45
is all the time we have to dig into these
1:09:47
topics this week, but this would not be rational security
1:09:50
if we did not leave you with some object lessons
1:09:52
to ponder over in the weeks to come. Alan, what
1:09:54
do you have for us this week? So
1:09:57
I have a really fun new
1:09:59
television. series, Mr. and Mrs. Smith,
1:10:01
that's on Amazon Prime. It's a, I
1:10:04
wouldn't call it a remake. I
1:10:06
mean, I guess it's kind of a remake
1:10:08
of a really fun and quite silly, but
1:10:11
I think quite charming movie from the early
1:10:13
2000s with Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie, where
1:10:15
they play two spies
1:10:18
who unbeknownst to themselves. They
1:10:20
both play spies, but they don't really, the other
1:10:22
are spies and they're told to kill each other.
1:10:24
And that is really fun. This is somewhat different
1:10:26
version of that and it's like an eight episode
1:10:29
first season. It stars Donald
1:10:31
Glover, who many
1:10:34
will know from many wonderful things. If you're
1:10:36
a music fan, you'll know him as Childish
1:10:38
Gambino. If you're a community fan, you'll know
1:10:40
him from community. Also played a pretty great
1:10:43
young Lando Calrissian in the Han Solo
1:10:45
movie. So he created it. He
1:10:47
co-stars with Maya Erskine. It's super
1:10:49
fun. It's super weird in the way that
1:10:51
Donald Glover is super weird, but
1:10:53
it's my kind of weird. So I really,
1:10:56
really recommend it. It's kind of, you
1:10:59
know, it has its fun action moments,
1:11:01
but it's really about if you had
1:11:03
two spies who had to live
1:11:06
together and work together, like what would that actual interpersonal relationship
1:11:08
be like? And it is pretty great.
1:11:11
I love Maya Erskine from her series, Pen 15, which is
1:11:13
one of the things that's beautiful. Oh, I'm so glad you
1:11:15
gave a shout out to that. Oh, I love Pen 15.
1:11:17
It's so good. I haven't seen it, but I do want
1:11:19
to check it out now. Physically painful to watch. It is
1:11:21
painful to watch. Especially as the
1:11:23
only former middle school girl, I will
1:11:26
say. Yeah. Well, anybody who's gone through
1:11:28
puberty would play that very painful to watch. I don't
1:11:30
know. I was a middle school boy. I'm not sure
1:11:32
it's like that much better. It
1:11:35
is brutal, but so funny. And they're so funny
1:11:37
because part of the premise is that her and
1:11:39
her, I think writing and production
1:11:41
partner that are adult women playing middle
1:11:44
school girls with actual middle school age
1:11:46
students and other actors and
1:11:48
actors, it's just phenomenal. So I'm excited to
1:11:50
see her in a dramatic ish. So
1:11:52
like mostly dramatic role in this. I definitely am going to
1:11:54
check that out. Quincea, what do you have
1:11:57
for us this week? I would like to recommend
1:11:59
a. incredibly funny
1:12:01
New York Times magazine article
1:12:03
entitled how Mark Meadows became the
1:12:06
least trusted man in Washington which
1:12:08
is about his rise and fall and the
1:12:13
trail of sadness that he has left behind
1:12:15
him mostly it seems because he has
1:12:17
a habit of promising
1:12:20
various incompatible things to different people which
1:12:22
did not serve him well when he
1:12:24
was Trump's chief of staff. My
1:12:27
personal favorite anecdote is a story
1:12:29
in here about how after he
1:12:32
first won his congressional seat in 2012 and
1:12:35
I quote he promised two different aides that
1:12:37
they would be his chief of staff only
1:12:39
to award the job to a third person
1:12:41
and then cried at one of them when they
1:12:44
could what a legend at it so
1:12:46
as a conflict avoided in person I
1:12:49
feel a little uncomfortably seen there
1:12:51
although I've never gone quite that far
1:12:54
but I highly recommend it it's
1:12:56
a very fun read and quite illuminating
1:12:58
about the former chief of staff. Wonderful.
1:13:02
Well for my object lesson this week we're just coming
1:13:04
off the Super Bowl guys it is the Super Bowl
1:13:06
is my Super Bowl if you will every year it's
1:13:09
a big event I look forward to I usually
1:13:11
cook I just made a big giant pot of nachos
1:13:13
made a bunch of chili I had
1:13:15
a few friends over with little kids that then
1:13:17
proceeded to distract us from actually watching very much
1:13:19
of the actual Super Bowl unfortunately but
1:13:22
I always enjoy it but it also makes me sad
1:13:24
in a way that's only comparable to the day after
1:13:26
Christmas because it means football seasons
1:13:28
over and I will not have sports I actually
1:13:30
enjoyed to watch for a long time at least until
1:13:32
I get into basketball baseball but I
1:13:34
will say there's one thing that gives
1:13:36
me such a joy at the end
1:13:38
of football season which is as somebody
1:13:40
who really follows a lot of like
1:13:43
the inside news and little details there's
1:13:45
a phenomenal set of videos that a
1:13:47
woman named Annie Agar puts together where
1:13:49
she is essentially playing the head
1:13:51
coaches or representatives of all the different teams
1:13:54
in a meeting together having a conversation with
1:13:56
herself she does this repeatedly over the course of
1:13:58
each season I think she's now like a correspondent for some
1:14:01
sports news, I think stadium news service.
1:14:03
But they're really, really exceptionally funny. And particularly if you
1:14:06
get all the inside jokes, and
1:14:08
things that you follow the news closely enough over the
1:14:10
course of the season. They're just phenomenal. I've really, really
1:14:12
gotten into this season, I think they're great. So I'm
1:14:14
gonna give a shout out to her, check them out
1:14:16
on YouTube or Twitter, or you might find them Annie,
1:14:19
A-N-N-I-E-A-G-A-R. They're very clever and very funny. If you are
1:14:21
a sports fan, if you're not a sports fan, then
1:14:23
I can make a lot of sense to you. But
1:14:26
you'll get like a one or two of the jokes.
1:14:28
And like, if nothing else, they're like impressive production beats
1:14:30
for somebody who appears to be doing this out of
1:14:32
their, you know, closet at home. Ben,
1:14:35
I'll hand it over to you. Bring us home. What do
1:14:37
you have for our object lessons this week? So
1:14:39
as those of you who
1:14:42
subscribe to my newsletter, Dogshirt
1:14:44
Daily, know I have been
1:14:46
on a long term
1:14:49
quixotic campaign to
1:14:52
embarrass the New York
1:14:54
Times into stopping using
1:14:58
rhetorical questions as headlines.
1:15:02
They're stupid. The answers
1:15:04
to almost all of them are
1:15:06
obvious. They often don't really suggest
1:15:08
what the story is about. And
1:15:11
I didn't realize until the other day
1:15:13
when I looked at the New York
1:15:15
Times website that I was
1:15:17
actually on a quest to
1:15:20
find the dumbest headline question
1:15:24
ever written. And I didn't
1:15:26
realize this until the other day
1:15:28
when I found the
1:15:31
dumbest ever headline question
1:15:33
in the history of the New York Times. And
1:15:35
I'm just going to read it to you. The
1:15:39
headline of a real
1:15:41
article, I swear I am not making this
1:15:43
up, is Taylor Swift's
1:15:46
next album is the Tortured
1:15:48
Poets Department. What
1:15:50
do tortured poets think? And
1:15:53
I just thought the Holy Grail
1:15:55
has been obtained. I
1:16:00
can retire this particular campaign at
1:16:02
this point. But is
1:16:05
there anything that would be more tortuous to a
1:16:08
poet serious enough to be tortured over it than to
1:16:10
be asked the question of the New York Times finally
1:16:12
and it's about saliary florist? Well,
1:16:14
I'm not sure there is. How do you
1:16:16
find tortured poets? Like, seeking a poet. Hey,
1:16:18
by the way, are you, are you tortured?
1:16:21
How are we defining tortured? Are you totally
1:16:23
a class level tortured? Are you- Are
1:16:26
you stretched on a rack? Right,
1:16:28
and this of course to bring
1:16:30
it back to lawfare, what about
1:16:32
those poets whose treatment amounts to
1:16:35
cruel and human degrading treatment, but
1:16:37
not to torture, right? Like if
1:16:39
you- Or if poets that are
1:16:41
being interrogated in an enhanced way. Like it's just
1:16:43
so stupid. If you've merely waterboarded the poets, you
1:16:47
know, I would sell them like a lot of
1:16:49
questions here that we got to work through. Wow.
1:16:52
Well on that note, that brings us to the
1:16:54
end of this week's episode. But
1:16:56
of course, Rational Security is a production of
1:16:58
Lawfare, so be sure to visit us at
1:17:00
lawfaremedia.org for our own tortured headlines,
1:17:03
occasionally in rhetorical question mode, although I feel like
1:17:05
that may no longer be the case for much
1:17:07
longer. And while you're there, you
1:17:09
can find our show page with links to past
1:17:11
episodes for our written work and the written work
1:17:14
of other Lawfare contributors and information on Lawfare's other
1:17:16
phenomenal podcast series, including The Aftermath now out in
1:17:18
season two. And be sure to
1:17:20
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