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ISC StormCast for Thursday, May 23rd, 2024

ISC StormCast for Thursday, May 23rd, 2024

Released Thursday, 23rd May 2024
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ISC StormCast for Thursday, May 23rd, 2024

ISC StormCast for Thursday, May 23rd, 2024

ISC StormCast for Thursday, May 23rd, 2024

ISC StormCast for Thursday, May 23rd, 2024

Thursday, 23rd May 2024
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Episode Transcript

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0:00

Hello and welcome to the Thursday May 23rd, 2020,

0:02

4th edition of the Sands & Storm Centers Stormcast.

0:08

My name is Johannes Ulrich and

0:10

today I'm recording from Jacksonville, Florida.

0:14

Another Nmap diary from

0:17

Rob today. This

0:19

time, he's talking about how to

0:21

connect Nmap to IP info. So,

0:24

what is all is really about

0:26

including the Shodan diary from earlier

0:28

this week is that with Nmap,

0:31

well, Nmap really has evolved into

0:33

more of a vulnerability scanner than

0:36

just a simple port scanner by

0:38

really being very extensible via these

0:40

NSE scripts. And yes,

0:42

you can reach out to arbitrary

0:45

HTTP APIs with these scripts

0:47

and use this data to

0:49

enrich the results that you're

0:51

getting back from Nmap. A

0:54

real useful trick if you're sort

0:56

of trying to build your own

0:58

little vulnerability scanning scripts because you

1:00

get way more than just haters

1:03

a port open and maybe a

1:05

banner and such, but you can

1:07

actually then interrogate these services and

1:09

like in this case, also then

1:12

collect other data from external services.

1:16

And a few listeners have

1:18

asked about an article that

1:20

was published by Brian Krebs

1:23

about Wi-Fi location services. This

1:25

is based on work done

1:28

by researchers from the University of

1:30

Maryland. So, given that this article

1:32

got quite a bit of requests

1:35

and interests, I figured I'll spend

1:37

a little bit more time talking

1:40

about what these

1:42

Wi-Fi location services or Wi-Fi

1:44

position services are

1:46

and well, how they work.

1:48

So, very basic when you're

1:51

connecting to a wireless access

1:53

point, you're not just connecting

1:55

to a wireless network with

1:57

a particular SSID that's usually

2:00

the string that identifies the network

2:02

to you like you know often

2:04

net gear or whatever but

2:07

you're also connecting to a specific access

2:10

point with a BSS ID

2:12

and that's really the MAC

2:14

address of that access point.

2:16

So if you have a

2:18

network with multiple access points

2:20

they may all have the

2:22

same SSID or the

2:24

network name but each one of

2:26

these access points has a different

2:29

BSS ID or MAC address. Now

2:32

these days of course everybody has

2:34

a mobile device and mobile devices

2:36

often do have very precise GPS

2:39

chips built-in and these devices don't

2:41

really need to use a Wi-Fi

2:44

network to actually do

2:46

geolocation. However they can

2:49

help vendors to

2:51

create databases with a different

2:53

wireless networks and typically the

2:55

BSS ID here is cataloged

2:58

and the way this works is

3:00

that your wireless device may report back

3:03

to the vendor and that's not typically

3:05

Google or Apple that hey I'm currently

3:07

located in this particular location based on

3:10

my GPS and these are

3:12

the wireless access

3:14

points that I'm seeing and this

3:16

is the signal strength of these

3:19

wireless access points. So

3:21

if you now have a

3:23

device without a GPS like

3:25

a laptop or a desktop

3:27

computer the operating system does

3:29

take advantage of these databases

3:31

so it will report back

3:33

to Google, Apple, hey I'm

3:35

seeing in these particular access

3:37

points help me figure out

3:39

where I'm located based on

3:41

the locations reported earlier by

3:43

various devices with GPS and

3:45

the end result is that

3:47

even without a GPS you

3:50

get rather accurate location services

3:52

even in devices like laptops

3:54

and desktops. Now that's

3:56

where Google and Apple differ a little

3:58

bit with Google. Google the device

4:01

will report back. These are the

4:03

BSS IDs I'm seeing and that's

4:05

the signal strength and basically Google

4:08

returns the location of the user.

4:11

With Apple, well, Apple tries to

4:13

balance privacy a little bit at

4:15

least privacy of the Apple customer

4:17

running the Apple laptop. And in

4:20

that case, the device will just

4:22

report back a couple of BSS

4:24

IDs it's seeing and then Apple

4:26

will actually return a large

4:29

number, turns out around 400

4:31

different BSS IDs that

4:35

they have seen in the area. And

4:37

then it's up to the device to

4:39

figure out the location based on that

4:41

data. And the tricky

4:43

part here is that this of course

4:45

puts at risk the privacy of all

4:47

of these operators that are running these

4:49

different wireless networks because with one simple

4:52

API call, you get back the BSS

4:54

IDs and the locations of up to

4:56

400 different access

4:59

points. And these researchers in

5:02

Maryland, they did actually use this

5:04

to do some interesting sort of

5:06

data mining. Because the

5:08

BSS ID is the MAC

5:10

address and MAC address are

5:12

assigned to vendors, they, for

5:14

example, looked at MAC addresses

5:16

associated with Starlink terminals and

5:19

then looked, for example, at

5:21

areas like Ukraine, Crimea and

5:23

such and tried to figure

5:26

out where our Starlink terminals

5:28

located and well, they found

5:30

quite a few of them. Now these

5:32

researchers did notify Starlink about

5:34

these issues in particular, you know,

5:37

the conflict zone like Ukraine, there

5:39

of course, life and safety issues

5:41

involved with this and Starlink did

5:44

publish an update to its firmware

5:46

that will randomize the BSS ID

5:48

and since then there has been

5:50

a notable drop in locatable Starlink

5:53

terminals. Apple and

5:55

Google at least did agree

5:57

on sort of an opt-out mechanism.

5:59

that can be used

6:01

in order to not have

6:04

your particular PSID tracked. This

6:06

requires that you're adding underscore

6:08

no map to the SSID

6:11

of your wireless network. Now,

6:14

this discussion wouldn't be complete with also noting

6:16

that this is far from a new thing.

6:18

The earliest articles I sort of found about

6:20

this were from 2011. So

6:24

about 13 years ago, back then,

6:26

it already mentioned Google using the

6:29

no map suffix in order

6:31

to opt out of this. In

6:33

the past, Google, for example, sometimes

6:35

also has used its Google Street

6:38

View camera cars

6:40

to collect PSIDs. I

6:43

don't think they do that anymore. They've gotten some trouble

6:45

over that. Microsoft had a similar

6:47

system. Not sure if that's still active.

6:49

The problem with Microsoft was they had

6:51

a different suffix that you needed to

6:53

use in order to opt out. For

6:55

them, it was just underscore

6:58

opt out, if I remember correctly. And

7:00

then, of course, you have the problem

7:02

as a user. Well, are you going

7:04

to add no map or opt out?

7:08

I'm not sure if you can do both, like underscore

7:10

opt out, underscore no map. What that

7:12

will do, at least now

7:15

Apple agreed to use the same

7:17

suffix that Google already is using

7:19

for the last 10 plus years.

7:22

And that at least makes

7:24

it a bit easier to opt

7:26

out. Then there's the question, does

7:28

it actually help to set your

7:30

Wi-Fi network to hidden? Well, what

7:32

hidden does is it doesn't send

7:35

any beacons to actually advertise

7:37

the network. But if the network is

7:39

in use, you can still actually

7:42

see the traffic and still see

7:44

the SSID. And remember that these

7:46

BSS IDs are being reported, at

7:48

least in part, by systems connected

7:51

to the network. So this is

7:53

not like what happened 10 plus

7:55

years ago, but you had these

7:58

Google camera. events

8:01

that would passively collect that

8:03

data. So your best

8:05

bet at this point, if you don't

8:07

want to contribute to the database, is

8:09

to add an underscore no map to

8:12

your SSID, or

8:14

use a very generic SSID, maybe

8:16

randomize the MAC address of your

8:18

access points, if you can do

8:20

that, it depends on the access

8:22

point, to make

8:25

it basically more difficult to locate

8:27

a particular access point that may

8:29

be associated with you. Only

8:32

the BSSID is reported by these

8:34

APIs, not the SSID as far

8:36

as I know. So let's say

8:39

you're using your last name or

8:41

your address as your SSID, an

8:44

attacker wouldn't necessarily be able to

8:46

pinpoint your particular network using this.

8:48

If they only know the SSID,

8:52

they have to know the

8:54

actual BSSID. So

8:56

sorry for spending all the podcasts talking

8:59

about this one topic, but I figured

9:01

it was a sufficient interest to actually

9:03

do so. Thanks for

9:05

listening, and I'll add a couple

9:07

links also to the older articles in

9:10

the show notes. Thanks and talk to

9:12

you again tomorrow. Bye.

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