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Each week we explore some

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up next on Spycast. Critical

1:23

thinking, a courage

1:27

to speak truth and discipline

1:29

to remove yourself from the

1:31

latest narrative that's pervading a

1:33

conversation. To really ask yourself

1:36

what's the basis for that narrative. This

1:47

week I was joined in the studio by

1:49

Michael Collins, the current acting

1:51

chair of the National Intelligence Council.

1:54

The NIC is an incredibly important, yet

1:56

often overlooked constituent of the Office of

1:58

the International Spy Museum. of the Director

2:01

of National Intelligence. Among

2:03

many other roles and responsibilities, the

2:05

NIC is responsible for the production

2:07

of the annual threat assessment and

2:09

the global trends publications. With

2:12

decades of experience in the IC as an

2:14

analyst and a seasonal leader in the field,

2:17

Michael Collins is perhaps the ideal

2:19

person to help our listeners better

2:21

understand the NIC and the

2:23

critical Bridget bills between agencies and

2:26

the intelligence they collect. In

2:28

this episode, Michael and I discuss the

2:31

role of the National Intelligence Council,

2:34

National Intelligence officers and their work

2:36

around the world, the

2:38

products of the NIC, including

2:40

the annual threat assessment and

2:43

the importance of intelligence diplomacy

2:45

and objective analysis. The

2:48

original podcast on intelligence since 2006, we

2:52

are Spycast. Now

2:54

sit back, relax and enjoy

2:56

the show. Well,

3:00

thanks ever so much for joining me to

3:03

speak about the National Intelligence Council, Michael. I'm

3:05

really looking forward to speaking to you. Thanks

3:07

for having me. Thanks for the invitation. Yeah,

3:10

absolutely. So I think

3:12

the National Intelligence Council is

3:14

one of those things that people that

3:16

study this stuff have heard of, but

3:18

even some of them don't really know

3:20

what's going on. So I think

3:23

the best way to approach this is just if

3:25

you were to describe to the average

3:28

American, what is the

3:30

National Intelligence Council and

3:32

why it's important, how would you do so? Thank

3:36

you very briefly. I would say the National Intelligence

3:38

Council is the lead

3:40

entity in the US government charged for

3:42

making sure our national security decision makers

3:46

have the best analysis of

3:49

the globe and the information

3:51

informing those assessments possible

3:54

across the entirety of the IC. The

3:57

National Intelligence Council within the larger fabric

3:59

of the. intelligence community is

4:01

the responsible

4:04

agent for the

4:07

generation representation

4:09

of, and

4:11

maximum utilization of the

4:14

analysis of global affairs from

4:17

across the board. Originally

4:19

founded in 1979, or actually on

4:21

our 45th anniversary this year, within

4:24

CIA, within CIA originally it was

4:27

the hub for doing more longer

4:29

term estimative analysis. Whereas most

4:31

of the analysis on the day to day was

4:33

done elsewhere. It is

4:36

constituted by the national

4:38

intelligence officers of

4:40

the US intelligence community. We have 18

4:43

in the national intelligence

4:45

council currently, each one of

4:47

which is responsible for some region in the world

4:49

or some functional area in the world. And

4:52

their responsibility is to husband together the best

4:54

of what the IC is saying or thinking

4:57

about on all the issues

4:59

they cover. And increasingly drawing

5:01

in the perspective from the external

5:03

community, the academics, the private sector,

5:05

and pulling together the best insight

5:08

we can provide for the policymakers.

5:11

I'll say three things functionally. So

5:13

never before actually has the

5:15

national intelligence council been

5:18

as much at the

5:20

center of the day to day policy deliberations

5:22

as it currently is. I

5:24

think it's a good sign for our

5:26

policy leadership to wanna know the full range

5:29

of views across the IC when

5:31

they're making a hard decision, as opposed to just

5:34

saying, what is the view of one particular agency?

5:36

So the national intelligence council is playing that

5:38

role increasingly on a day to day. Second

5:41

point, it remains the

5:43

lead agency for the national

5:46

intelligence estimates, the signature products

5:48

of the IC that are looking out five,

5:51

10, 15 years, for example, when

5:54

we're making broad determinations on things

5:56

going forward. And third,

6:00

We are sort of the hub as you think about the

6:03

IC's analytic outreach with the private

6:05

sector where we can

6:08

bring together and through the National Intelligence Officers

6:10

bring together community of interest to help study

6:12

and collaborate on issues. We work

6:14

together. We are also the

6:17

artery that produces the annual threat testimony for

6:19

the DNI which it gives her, you know,

6:21

her addresses every year. So,

6:24

just a few things I would like to follow up

6:26

on there. So, 1979, so

6:28

this is under Stansfield Turner as

6:30

the Director of Central Intelligence.

6:32

What's the initial impetus behind it? Like, why

6:35

does it get set up then? He's

6:38

not remembered particularly fondly

6:40

as one of the great all-time

6:42

directors of Central Intelligence, but I think

6:44

he did do a lot of quite

6:46

important stuff. Yeah, I think the original

6:48

basis with his predecessor being the Office

6:50

of National Estimates was to

6:53

hold together a

6:56

smaller group that removed from the

6:58

day-to-day to do more forward-looking strategic

7:01

estimates largely at the time than

7:03

the foundation of the National Intelligence

7:05

estimate itself. Now, CIA,

7:07

of course, before the turnover in the early 2000s when

7:09

the stand-up of ODNI occurred

7:14

when the

7:16

National Intelligence Council moved from CIA

7:18

to the DNI, that

7:20

larger shift was made largely

7:23

to bring together the larger

7:25

IC as opposed to just having

7:27

the analysis being

7:29

centered in one particular agency even if you

7:31

were coordinating with other agencies. The

7:33

logic before being that CIA was still,

7:35

and still is, it's a center where

7:38

it doesn't have a policy arm, so

7:40

therefore the presumption of potential bias with

7:42

the policy, the CIA as the center

7:45

for intelligence, the director at

7:47

the time, the director for Central Intelligence, the

7:49

former title of CIA, that's why

7:51

it began there. For

7:54

the National Intelligence Council, so

7:56

1979 it set up, but

7:59

from 1944 to... until the early

8:01

2000s, the CIA director is

8:03

Joe Harteid. He's the director of the

8:05

CIA, and he's the director

8:07

of central intelligence. So he's meant to make

8:10

sure that everybody's in coordination.

8:12

But then into the 2000s, after 9-11, you

8:17

get the office of the director of national intelligence.

8:19

And then the NIC moves over

8:21

to the ODNI. Did it

8:24

stay the same in terms of

8:26

the people that make it up? When

8:28

it was at CIA, it was

8:30

only CIA people, whereas now I've heard

8:33

you speak in other forums, that people

8:35

from NYPD, people from just

8:38

various intelligence agencies across the government. So

8:40

help me understand that. It is far

8:43

more diverse. It

8:45

is far more diverse. I mean, it was before they

8:47

had representatives serving for other agencies who would rotate over

8:49

to the CIA on occasion to

8:51

take on one of the assignments. But the

8:53

core structure organization of

8:56

the National Intelligence Council constituted

8:58

by the national intelligence officers

9:01

has generally been the same, but increasingly, and

9:03

especially since the turnover. And even

9:06

so, it's really, really important for, I

9:09

think, so for the NIC, for

9:11

us to have representatives from across

9:13

all of the agencies as national

9:15

intelligence officers or as deputy national

9:18

intelligence officers within the NIC supporting

9:20

those portfolios. But also increasingly, so

9:22

we're trying to draw in experts

9:24

from the outside, from the private

9:26

sector, academia, industry, business. And we

9:28

well understand that increasingly

9:30

so, expertise,

9:33

understanding, we need that. We need diversity. We

9:35

need to challenge ourselves on our

9:38

thinking and our analysis. And so that's really, really

9:40

important to bring that about, both in

9:42

the genuine interest to bring in perspective from

9:45

others that may have not grown

9:47

up necessarily in the IC, but

9:49

also to show that one of our core missions

9:51

is to draw in and

9:53

engage the private sector. We need them to

9:55

help us better study and understand the issues

9:57

of the world. I'm

12:00

CIA originally, I've managed

12:02

analytic programs in

12:04

CIA, mostly on East Asia, a little bit

12:06

on the Middle East. I

12:08

was the deputy assistant director for

12:10

the East Asia Mission Center in CIA, and

12:13

then the chief strategy officer for CIA for

12:16

Director Burns most recently before I came to this

12:18

job. But I've worked on

12:20

product for the National Intelligence Council

12:22

as an analyst, for example, we

12:24

encourage this as well. Even

12:26

if you're not working directly in the NIC, you

12:29

can take the pen on a paper, a

12:31

national intelligence estimate from where

12:33

you actually sit. And in previous lives

12:35

I've had, I've done that from

12:38

other jobs I've had within CIA. Let's talk

12:41

about China a little bit more just for

12:43

a moment. So, you know,

12:46

thinking about the first 20 years of

12:49

the NIC or the first period of time, looking

12:52

at the Soviet Union, you've

12:54

got different norms, different values, different

12:57

political systems, different relationships between the

13:00

state and the market, just

13:02

really different visions of what

13:04

human life should be like. Is

13:07

it different with China? Because, tell

13:11

me if you disagree, but China doesn't

13:13

seem to be proselytizing. It doesn't seem

13:15

to be wanting to convert every other

13:17

country in the world to communism in

13:19

the same way that the Soviet Union

13:21

did. So what does that

13:23

entail for national security? One

13:27

thing is still fundamental and very similar, which

13:29

is the Communist

13:32

Party of China, and increasingly so under

13:34

this particular leadership of the Communist Party

13:36

of China, I want to stress that,

13:39

is doubling down on an authoritarian model, a

13:42

model that is inherently in conflict with the

13:44

model that the US government and our partners

13:46

around the world champion. And

13:48

so for that reason, there will be

13:50

inherent conflict, competition at a minimum

13:52

between the two of them, and

13:54

as it was between us and the Soviet Union. That

13:58

was not necessarily as strong. or

26:00

we could be talking about programmatic issues

26:02

as well. And things we wanna do

26:04

from a strategic standpoint, our outreach program,

26:06

for example. But I

26:08

think the other point worth stressing here is the NIC

26:10

is an entity that sits within the office of the

26:13

director of national intelligence, right? When the move happened, so

26:16

it is an element within what

26:18

ODNI is for the IC to

26:21

integrate the IC together in a cohesive

26:23

whole, which is why it was stood

26:25

up originally and part on the terrorism

26:27

side to connect the foreign with the

26:29

domestic, that integrative function that ODNI services

26:32

reflected, obviously, in the national intelligence strategy the

26:34

director most recently put out. Those are six

26:36

core elements that are not for ODNI, specifically

26:38

their goals for helping the IC to be

26:41

better at something, all of which

26:43

are to help further integrate and find commonality

26:45

across them. The NIC sits within ODNI as

26:48

a part of that integration. We do analysis, we

26:50

help to integrate the analysis literally and pull that

26:52

together in such a way, but there are other

26:55

elements of ODNI who

26:57

through the national intelligence strategy that

26:59

they're governing are trying to

27:01

find best resources,

27:03

capability, talent, et cetera,

27:06

partnerships in an integrated way that

27:08

support the entirety of the IC. And

27:10

where is the National Intelligence Council based?

27:12

Is it the Intelligence

27:14

Community Campus at Bethesda? No, it's still at

27:17

CIA. Still at CIA. We're still at the

27:19

CIA headquarters. Although I

27:21

find myself going to Liberty Crossing quite

27:23

often where the ODNI leadership is. Yeah,

27:25

yeah, I can imagine. So

27:29

I feel like we've

27:31

got a good understanding of this now.

27:33

Help me understand the products. So let's

27:36

just break them down one at a

27:38

time. So we have the National Intelligence

27:40

Strategy, we've got the

27:42

annual threat assessments, and we've

27:44

got the National Intelligence Estimates.

27:47

Tell us about each of them and how are

27:50

they different? Okay,

27:52

so let me

27:54

begin with the National Security Strategy. So

27:56

obviously the US National Security Strategy governs

27:58

the national security community. and

28:00

says what it is the US government is trying

28:02

to accomplish methodically that

28:04

informs therefore the intelligence that we produce.

28:06

I will say for the first time

28:08

in recent memory, the new

28:11

national security strategy has

28:13

the word intelligence actually in it. I think it's a

28:15

good thing. This is 2022. The

28:17

2022 one, right? Where we recognize that intelligence

28:21

itself is a national security asset,

28:23

just like military, diplomatic, economic,

28:26

political, all their elements of power,

28:28

intelligence itself, as I said, the

28:30

decision advantage we owe our policy

28:32

maker and what intelligence can

28:34

do around the world is itself

28:36

really, really important to US national security objectives.

28:40

And so that national security strategy

28:42

then sets up the national intelligence

28:44

strategy, which shows

28:47

how the national intelligence community is prioritizing the

28:49

things we need to be better

28:52

at the requirements to support

28:54

the national security, largest

28:57

national security strategy. The

29:00

products that we produce, so I'm doing

29:02

this from a strategic framework, right? So

29:04

if I went from the US strategy

29:06

to the US national intelligence strategy

29:08

and the components within that and what

29:10

we need, the strategic

29:13

estimates we say we wanna work on, the

29:15

programmatic things I said proactively that the NIOs

29:17

or the NIC as a whole says, these

29:19

are the things we really need to double

29:21

down on because our strategy is

29:23

saying this, that informs

29:26

the national intelligence estimates that

29:28

we say we're going to produce for

29:31

the policy maker looking out, it

29:34

can be over a five year period, it can be 10 year period, they

29:36

could actually be very current, they don't actually have to be necessarily

29:38

forward looking. We also,

29:41

by the way, increasingly try to

29:43

make those available transparently in the

29:45

DNI's transparency initiative. Most

29:48

recently, we, I think, put on our website

29:51

an estimate we did on global health,

29:53

for example. There's one on there

29:55

on Iran we produced released recently and most recently,

29:57

I think as of yesterday, we put out a

29:59

paper on how we... to think about non-state actors

30:01

and international affairs. So you have to

30:03

think about those as how are we identifying

30:05

those longer term ideas that we have to

30:07

work on, not in silo certainly, but what

30:10

we say the national strategy is saying, what

30:12

our policymakers are saying in return. I

30:14

would say the more day-to-day kind of product, it's not

30:17

day-to-day necessarily, but there are other products that

30:19

Nick produces that are not of that nature

30:21

that are more quick turnaround because

30:23

of the policy meetings that

30:25

will be happening downtown. There's a decision

30:28

being made on something related to the

30:30

Russia-Ukraine war, a decision being made on

30:32

China or pick your issue, right? They

30:35

will come to us to say, hey, we

30:37

need some analysis to support that next week,

30:39

can you produce that? And those take different

30:41

forms, but they're more smaller scale,

30:44

I would say. But they can

30:46

be just as strategic. I always say the

30:48

strategy is not a time determined issue, right? It

30:51

can be strategic about something you're trying to accomplish

30:53

next week. What is necessary to bring that about?

30:56

So the national intelligence estimate, so that's more

30:58

of a rolling product and that can be

31:00

on a variety of things. Is

31:03

that correct? Yes. Yeah, yeah.

31:05

Those can be on any

31:07

given major topic for which we want the IC

31:10

to step back and say, where is this issue

31:12

trending over the next five, 10, 15 years?

31:15

Energy security. It can be, yes, I'm sure

31:17

they can be functional or they can be country specific. What's

31:19

the state of warfare over the next

31:21

five to 10, 15 years? What

31:23

is misinformation? Disinformation as a

31:26

phenomena actually matter. How does that

31:28

playing out? What's happening in the

31:30

global technology arena that we should

31:32

stay on top of? And yes, we do these

31:34

recurring estimates of country specific topics that we probably

31:36

need to look at. I also wanted

31:38

to stress, even beyond the NIEs,

31:41

we have this product we produce called

31:43

Global Trends, which looks

31:45

out multiple decades. We put it out every

31:47

five years, right? To say what is the

31:49

state of the world trending toward? And

31:52

that's what we do especially closely

31:54

with the private sector, taking advantage of

31:56

the work they do on similar issues.

31:59

And then... Last, I would say the other

32:01

annual thing that we're responsible for is the

32:03

ATA, the Director's Annual Threat Assessment that

32:06

she delivers to Congress publicly.

32:09

The most recent one was this year, and

32:11

that also has things

32:13

by geography and by function

32:17

like disruptive technology, the environment, China,

32:19

Russia, it can be all of

32:21

those things. Yes, and it's

32:24

also, if you look at her delivery this

32:27

year, we

32:29

make sure that the audience understands

32:31

the intersections across these. So

32:35

most recent, last couple of

32:37

we've stressed the great power competition, clearly a

32:39

factor we have to stay on top of.

32:41

At the same time, we have to stress

32:43

and we spend a lot of time looking

32:45

at these transnational issues that also

32:47

matter to national security and frankly, human

32:49

security. And then there are

32:51

these flashpoints or hotspots that we expect

32:53

in the world. You can't analyze or assess

32:55

those or even understand them in vacuums.

32:58

Because one actually influences the other. So there's

33:01

a, to my point I

33:03

said earlier about sort of getting back to great power

33:05

rivalry. Yeah, great power rivalry pervades a lot of what

33:07

we're covering. And there's

33:09

an interesting part in the

33:12

most recent documents. So you mentioned number one

33:14

positioning the IC for

33:17

intensifying strategic competition. And

33:20

here's a quote here, the People's Republic

33:22

of China is the only US competitor

33:25

with both the intent to reshape

33:27

the international order and

33:29

increasingly the economic, diplomatic,

33:31

military and technological power to

33:34

do so. So I think

33:36

that that's, it's interesting that that's number one

33:38

and it really spells out what's

33:41

at stake here, I think. Correct,

33:43

and that explains why, as I

33:46

said earlier about what we're prioritizing, certainly the

33:48

National Intelligence Council, others are doing the same

33:51

across the IC for

33:53

thinking about that issue as

33:55

it most consequentially affects

33:57

other issues. And again, even if it's...

33:59

It's not necessarily though stuffing

34:02

a room with a bunch of China analysts

34:04

as much as we need more of them.

34:06

It's also to be effective at it. You've got to

34:09

understand, as I said earlier, what the

34:11

global coverage arena, use that term, what

34:14

influences others, what

34:16

are those vulnerable domains in the globe

34:18

that are at risk. If

34:20

we're not doubling down, which we are positioned

34:23

in the IC for major power competition,

34:26

China being the leading most consequential issue,

34:28

if you will, we also really need

34:31

to understand technology. We also really need to

34:33

understand business. We also really need to understand

34:35

media and what influences others.

34:37

We have to really understand misinformation,

34:39

disinformation, foreign malign influence as

34:41

a factor, including in elections, right? Because

34:44

those are all other issues saying

34:47

nothing necessarily about China, that

34:49

if we're not really smart on them, we're not going to effectively manage

34:52

the analysis needed on the China issue.

34:55

And I think this is an interesting

34:57

question. For your role, would

35:00

you say that you're more of a coordinator,

35:02

manager, leader, leader, strategist, diplomat,

35:05

or all of the above?

35:08

Probably all of that. I'll

35:13

say this, reflect on a person or not. One

35:15

of the things that really attracted me to this

35:17

assignment, I really

35:19

enjoyed being the chief strategy officer for CIA and

35:22

enjoyed the work I was doing there. It

35:24

was exciting to sort of

35:26

get back to analysis itself. I

35:30

grew up as an analyst. That was the

35:32

majority of my career as CIA was being

35:34

an analyst or running analytic programs. But

35:37

even in other assignments when I was a deputy

35:40

for one of our mission centers where the operation and

35:42

analysis were integrated or as a CSO, and

35:45

probably reflecting on my background before coming

35:47

into the US government, the

35:50

scholarship of international affairs

35:53

is really exciting to me. I mean, it's not always,

35:55

I mean, I know we're

35:57

in the spy museum, right? And your audiences are

35:59

looking at... that, you know, the espionage piece of

36:01

intelligence. And that's really, really important and it's exciting.

36:03

And I know some of the things we've done

36:06

in that arena, I can't speak to of course.

36:09

And that's a critical part of the information

36:11

that we ultimately need to make the analysis

36:13

in many unique ways. You know, for

36:15

all that we say broadly about what is increasingly

36:17

available in the open arena, and I mean this

36:20

to inform our analysis, there are some very critical

36:22

things that the intelligence screening only knows because of

36:24

things we do in that

36:27

undisclosed, if you will, arena. But

36:29

it was exciting for me to get back to thinking

36:31

about the substance and how

36:33

we're studying the world. And so

36:35

as much as my job on any given day, I

36:39

am an administrator, I'm

36:41

managing a personnel matter, or I'm

36:43

being a diplomat, or I'm thinking

36:45

about something programmatic, I

36:47

really enjoy the time I'm able to spend

36:49

with the NIOs, the deputy NIOs, or even

36:51

the representatives of the IC who engage on

36:54

issues to say, what are we really thinking

36:56

here? Do we really got this right? Have we really thought

36:58

through where this may go and

37:01

what it means for the policymaker? You're

37:04

like the cop who became a manager and an

37:06

office who now gets to go back out on

37:08

the street to some extent. Yeah, I guess, that's

37:11

a huge place to say that, yes. For

37:13

those audience out there who appreciate that part

37:15

of the, yes, correct. And

37:19

for your role, who

37:21

are some of your main interlocutors? Like, who

37:24

are the people that you speak to, like

37:26

on a daily basis? Obviously, the national intelligence

37:28

officers, people on your staff, but who else?

37:30

Well, I mean, it's obviously the ODNI leadership

37:33

for all the work product we

37:35

produce, but as well the responsibility

37:38

we have for supporting the director, as

37:41

I said earlier, not just her testimonies, but her

37:43

engagements, her partnerships

37:46

around the world. The policymaker

37:48

downtown, probably is having a good pulse on

37:50

what's important to them in

37:52

the analysis that they need from us and what

37:54

we're producing, engaging

37:56

the rest of the intelligence community, the

37:59

heads of the... the analytic arms within

38:01

the respective agencies, so

38:03

that we are in fact, you know, trying to do

38:05

our best job to work together. And,

38:08

you know, you always want elements

38:11

to write their product on a given area,

38:13

right? But, you know,

38:15

there's also meaning, as I said earlier, to

38:17

the IC writing in a more, you know,

38:19

integrated way. I also take seriously the

38:21

time I spend engaging

38:24

the private sector, increasingly

38:26

so. This

38:28

director has made it a

38:31

priority for the intelligence community to be more

38:33

normal, I'll use that word, with

38:35

the private sector, for everything I said earlier about

38:37

what we need from them, the private sector, from

38:39

any of the issues we're covering. I said, I

38:42

rattle off a bunch of them, technology, business,

38:44

it's the private sector, or the academic arena

38:46

who knows that really well, we need their

38:48

insight. That's where we're

38:51

going to, we will need technology, we'll need

38:53

innovation, we'll need talent, so we have to

38:55

partner with them. And for

38:57

those two reasons, we have to take seriously our

38:59

sort of our third way to think about this,

39:01

we have to help protect them from the threats

39:04

that are out there. The private sector is increasingly

39:06

seriously part of this geopolitical

39:08

threat arena. And

39:11

so as important as they increasingly are, we have

39:13

to take seriously our relationship and engage it with

39:15

them. That's something I also do, and last, spend

39:18

the time I can with our partners around the world, the

39:21

heads of analysis in our intelligence

39:24

organizations and partners around the

39:26

globe, for the same reasons that,

39:28

we're charged with giving our policymakers the best, they're

39:30

charged with giving their policy makers the best. And

39:35

I take seriously the role that objective analysis

39:37

can actually have from an effects standpoint, collectively,

39:41

from a national security standpoint, if we're challenging

39:44

false narratives, for example, President

39:46

Putin's false narrative about why he needed

39:48

to invade Ukraine, right? The ability, the

39:51

success, the intelligence community had collectively with

39:53

partners to say, what he's doing

39:55

is not true, right? I say that

39:57

because that's another important function, I believe sincerely about

39:59

the role. of objective analysis in your national affairs.

40:12

For your current job, do you interact

40:14

much or at all with the House

40:16

and Senate committees on intelligence? Yeah,

40:19

I do when necessary in terms of

40:21

those sort of formal regular engagements we

40:23

should be having with our oversight. We

40:25

take that engagement very seriously. Of course,

40:27

working with the ODNI leadership

40:31

who synchronize our engagement with the Congress.

40:33

But our NIOs also do as well.

40:36

And again, to my point earlier about a flat

40:38

organization, you know, they'll keep me informed, of course,

40:40

when they're called upon to go to the Hill. But

40:43

they're awful. They're there a

40:45

lot. And to my point, I said earlier, that's a

40:47

good thing. Again, the

40:50

Congress, the White House and the House community is

40:52

saying, what does the IC, what's the view of

40:54

the IC on something? And so

40:56

when they're asking the NIO to attend, that's

40:58

because they want the NIO and expect the

41:00

NIO to speak for the

41:02

community, represent the community. They will sometimes

41:05

bring other members of the agencies

41:07

that will also be in attendance, depending on

41:09

the issue that's being discussed. But the

41:12

NIO never goes down. I never go down

41:14

as I said, it's important to me, speaking

41:16

for the NIC. You're actually

41:18

speaking for the IC. The

41:21

NIC is an entity, but it's not an entity

41:23

actually onto itself. So we do have a

41:25

view. We have a view of issues we cover. But

41:27

your job function is to say, what is the community's

41:29

pulse on this issue? And you're representing that on the

41:32

Hill quite often. I

41:34

mean, this is a slightly unfair question because

41:36

it could easily be another entire podcast. But,

41:38

you know, so

41:40

just for example, so we have an exhibition next

41:43

door. One day I'm walking here

41:45

to the studio, I walk past one of

41:47

the people in ground services. Quite

41:49

often, there are students who do this part

41:51

time. I said, what are you reading? What

41:54

do you think you're reading? The National

41:56

Intelligence Strategy. I

41:59

mentioned that you were... coming in and I know

42:01

that people like him will listen to this. So

42:03

the question is what makes a good

42:05

analyst? And

42:08

what's the bad one? So

42:11

what makes a good analyst and then there's what makes

42:13

a good analyst in international affairs. So obviously what makes

42:16

a good analyst is a more functional question. One

42:19

is you've gotta have a desire

42:22

to learn something and

42:25

to explain. I stress this because I think

42:28

sometimes I hear too often, and we

42:31

focus on programs of analysis. I stress the

42:33

program of research and analysis. So an

42:35

analyst should want to explain something and

42:41

the real good analyst or the impactful

42:44

analyst is trying to explain something we don't yet have

42:46

an answer to. So you

42:49

gotta be inquisitive. You gotta be, you

42:51

wanna know something more. You

42:53

really need to understand and be good at basing

42:56

your judgments on the evidence

42:59

and explaining what the evidence comes from, where it

43:01

comes from. Critical thinking

43:03

skill is obviously a top

43:06

notch requirement for anybody, frankly, an intelligence

43:08

community, but especially for the analyst. You

43:11

just don't take something you heard the other day and

43:13

say, oh, I'm gonna tell the president this because I

43:15

heard it on Pick Your

43:17

Platform, for example. So

43:20

making judgments that

43:23

obviously you can base on clear

43:26

evidence and understanding the sourcing

43:28

pertaining to it at

43:30

the same forecasting.

43:33

So what you're saying and explaining

43:35

about what is happening in a

43:37

given issue with the framework

43:40

you've established saying, I think

43:42

over time and space, these factors are most

43:44

important to that issue. Can I apply it

43:46

to looking ahead? And that's where I get

43:48

to the national security analyst. The national security

43:50

analyst, one needs to really care about national

43:52

security. That my job function is

43:54

I'm an analyst for national security. So I should be

43:57

thinking about international affairs. I should think about the United

43:59

States. You should be thinking about

44:01

the United States being successful in international affairs.

44:03

You're not championing nor cheerleading for the United

44:05

States, but you're trying to take

44:08

an objective course toward providing analysis that

44:10

helps the United States and our partners

44:12

frankly to succeed. But in the

44:14

same lane, you've got to be

44:16

thinking about in those frameworks you've built. When

44:18

I look ahead, where is that phenomenon potentially

44:20

going that the policymaker could tap

44:22

into effectively? Critical

44:25

thinking, a courage

44:28

to speak truth, to

44:31

a given issue and discipline

44:33

to remove yourself from the

44:36

latest narrative that's pervading

44:38

a conversation to really

44:41

ask yourself, what's the basis for that narrative?

44:43

What's the basis for the information coming in?

44:46

I'll say this as well and close on this, on

44:48

this particular point, I have young kids and

44:51

I worry every given day about stuff

44:53

they see on social media, right? We

44:55

take very seriously our job

44:57

function to model how you

44:59

critically think about the information you're absorbing

45:02

and seeing coming across your screen every

45:04

day before you express an opinion on

45:06

something. I stress that. Before you express

45:08

an opinion on something, you've thought about

45:11

the information that you've seen, you've thought

45:13

about the sourcing for it, you've questioned

45:15

its veracity and you've ultimately come to

45:17

the conclusion this, or

45:20

you're open and or you're open to

45:22

an alternative. We're at this then, we're

45:24

at the answer differently, I would expect

45:27

to see something else. One

45:29

thing that I'm interested in, could you just explain

45:31

to our listeners, we've

45:33

spoke about intelligence analysis and the

45:36

National Intelligence Council, but not all

45:38

intelligence analysis is equal. Can

45:40

you tell them a little bit more about strategic

45:43

intelligence, estimate of anticipatory,

45:46

those types of things and match them

45:48

on to the products that the National

45:51

Intelligence Council puts out? So

45:53

I guess it

45:55

falls back to the question you're being asked or

45:57

the question you're trying to answer. you

46:00

could get a question that says, did

46:02

that thing happen yesterday that was actually reported

46:04

in the press? And

46:06

so you have to apply analytic rigor based

46:09

on the information you have available

46:12

to answer that question without

46:15

bias, obviously with empirical

46:17

basis. That could be a

46:19

quick turnaround product or you're just trying to answer a

46:21

question, the IC thinks this thing happened. It

46:24

happened before, whatever. Then you could get a question that

46:26

says, we're really wrestling with this

46:28

issue downtown. We don't know how to get

46:30

country X to move on this particular issue.

46:33

Tell me what really influences that country.

46:36

So you go back and you have to

46:39

sort of research over time and space, looking

46:41

at similar events, what affected that country's disposition

46:43

before. So you're providing the policymaker

46:45

framework with which to think about how

46:47

you could affect that particular issue. That's an

46:49

example of a quick turnaround kind of question

46:51

you need an answer to, but it's more

46:54

of a looking forward. How could I affect

46:56

this country's disposition? And then

46:58

there's sort of the longer

47:00

term question, whether somebody's asking it or you think

47:02

you need to ask it, right? This is, I

47:04

said this earlier, I don't think the NIOs nor

47:06

the NIC is just responsive to questions. We have

47:08

to think proactive about the questions that need to

47:10

be asked and we should answer, what

47:13

is the state of misinformation and disinformation in

47:15

the world today? So you're

47:18

taking a broad look at going

47:20

forward that particular phenomena, understanding and

47:22

assessing it. So the latter lend

47:24

themselves more toward the national intelligence

47:26

estimates, the more estimated forward looking

47:28

product. But this is

47:30

why even the terms themselves can be misleading.

47:32

I can be estimated in

47:35

something I've asked my NIO to write

47:37

tomorrow for something estimating what might happen

47:39

two months from now on the front

47:41

lines between Russia and Ukraine, for example.

47:44

Or I could be estimating a phenomena over five, 10,

47:46

15, or 25 years

47:49

in case of global trends, for example, 20,

47:51

25 years. So as

47:54

I said to your question, the product, it's

47:57

not necessarily the product form, you

47:59

know, it's sort of. what the question that's

48:01

been asked and, you know, what

48:04

the policymaker most needs for whatever

48:06

they give an issue they're wrestling with, if

48:08

that makes sense, I'm sorry. Just a couple

48:10

of final questions. One

48:12

is, you know, you've spent your

48:15

career in the intelligence

48:17

community. What are the one

48:19

thing that you have found in

48:21

your career or the directors

48:23

are saying to you now, they're like, I

48:26

just wish the American public knew

48:28

this one thing about intelligence that

48:31

they don't quite seem to understand

48:34

or the most misunderstood thing

48:36

about intelligence. Like I've spent

48:38

my whole life here and here's the

48:40

thing that I commonly come across or

48:42

here's the thing that people commonly say

48:45

to me, I just wish the person

48:48

in Peoria, Illinois knew this.

48:52

Would there be one? Yeah, thanks for the question. I'll

48:54

just say two, one at a strategic level, one more

48:56

on a more tactical

48:58

level or practical level. The

49:01

first is that the

49:05

intelligence officer, him

49:07

or herself, and especially the analyst, the

49:10

point I made earlier about speaking truth to

49:12

power without bias,

49:15

without being the arm of

49:18

another government agency, the

49:21

misperception that I often see

49:23

outside of the government of

49:26

what role the intelligence community is

49:29

playing in something that it never

49:31

actually played. We

49:33

take very seriously and with

49:35

very strong means of accountability,

49:39

the intelligence organizations, obviously following the

49:41

law, but even beyond the law,

49:44

to the point I said about our culture

49:46

and our integrity. Bias

49:48

is something we

49:51

always try to avoid and

49:53

anytime we are in any situation, feeling

50:01

pressure from somebody on the outside, be

50:03

it in a government agency or elsewhere,

50:05

or even within organizations to say certain

50:07

things for a particular reason, the

50:10

blood of the intelligence community pushes back

50:12

against that instinctively. Whatever realm

50:14

of, or whatever role you

50:16

play in the intelligence organization. And

50:18

I wish people outside kind of more understood

50:21

that, that we

50:23

take very seriously our independent

50:25

analysis. Speaking,

50:27

making judgments on issues that

50:33

we think the facts substantiate without

50:36

any consideration for politics,

50:39

motivation, other personal

50:42

or other objectives people may have.

50:44

And we have review chains mentioned earlier,

50:47

where we go through to ensure that is the case.

50:51

To the same, as a strategic level, that

50:53

we're our national security asset. To the point I

50:55

said about the national security strategy, now having it

50:57

in there. You want your

50:59

intelligence community to be successful for what I just said.

51:02

Because increasingly that is where the United

51:05

States and the security of the United

51:07

States is increasingly going to depend. The

51:10

other point I was gonna mention was, I

51:12

know sometimes we too narrowly define

51:14

the word intelligence as something secret.

51:17

And that hurts us. That's the point

51:19

I said earlier, I think and

51:22

define the word more literally. Am

51:24

I smarter on something? However, I

51:26

got the information necessary to be smarter

51:28

on it. And I say

51:31

that because that's an open invitation for

51:33

those whether in the intel community or

51:35

outside the intel community to contribute. We

51:38

need your intelligence, we need your insight, we need

51:40

your expertise and we'll be knocking on

51:42

your door. You should knock on our door. And

51:45

to that end, I mentioned earlier, I

51:47

think the director's transparency initiative where we

51:50

are trying to more regularly and openly

51:53

to share our views on issues is

51:56

important. We need perspective, we need people to

51:58

challenge us. We are humble. we

52:01

will make mistakes. We will

52:03

make mistakes because as I said earlier, we're

52:05

trying to make judgments that mean something. If

52:08

all we tried to do was not make

52:10

mistakes, then we'll provide the

52:12

least common denominator analysis or the CYA analysis,

52:14

that isn't helpful. We should be fired if

52:16

that's all we're doing, right? So

52:20

don't think of the intelligence organization only

52:22

as much as there are of course,

52:25

strong secrets that need to be protected and

52:27

sources and methods need to protect for all

52:29

the things I said earlier. Increasingly for the

52:31

intelligence that, to the point I made earlier,

52:33

the United States needs to be successful. We've

52:36

got to be partnered with and engaging more

52:38

of the private sector, the public sector, et

52:40

cetera, for everything they do. And

52:44

final question, you mentioned

52:46

that you have kids. So

52:48

when you read in preparation for

52:51

this interview, I read all of

52:54

the documents that the NIC produces

52:56

are the most recent ones. A

52:59

lot of them are, you know, they

53:01

can be quite uncomfortable reading sometimes because

53:04

just the nature of the world, that's just

53:06

the way things are. So the question is,

53:08

how do you stay rosy

53:11

or optimistic about the future

53:13

when you're dealing with

53:15

all this stuff or when you're working in the

53:17

intelligence community for 30 odd

53:20

years? How do

53:22

you keep your spirits off? I think

53:24

it's called the pessimism of the intellect

53:26

and optimism of the world. How do

53:29

you keep going? Thanks for

53:31

this question. That's just one thing I'm sort of reflecting

53:33

on myself, but I'm reflecting on what others have observed

53:35

in me. I think I

53:38

can tend to be a bit of a unicorn

53:41

in the Intel community. It's customary in

53:43

the Intel community for the Intel officer

53:45

to be pessimistic. Say

53:47

the world is ugly, lots of threats out there.

53:50

Bad things are happening. I did

53:53

my job if I told you something bad is happening.

53:56

I have always throughout my career taken seriously what

53:58

I call the third paragraph. conversation.

56:00

I've very much enjoyed it. Thank you

56:02

for the opportunity. Really appreciate it. Thanks

56:22

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