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The Peloponnesian War, Part 1: Plague, Attrition, and a Decade of Bloodshed

The Peloponnesian War, Part 1: Plague, Attrition, and a Decade of Bloodshed

Released Wednesday, 15th May 2024
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The Peloponnesian War, Part 1: Plague, Attrition, and a Decade of Bloodshed

The Peloponnesian War, Part 1: Plague, Attrition, and a Decade of Bloodshed

The Peloponnesian War, Part 1: Plague, Attrition, and a Decade of Bloodshed

The Peloponnesian War, Part 1: Plague, Attrition, and a Decade of Bloodshed

Wednesday, 15th May 2024
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0:00

Wonder. He plus subscribers can listen to Tides

0:02

of History early and ad free right now.

0:04

Joined one to replace in the one to

0:06

React or on Apple podcasts. Smoke

0:18

hung in the air, thick and gray.

0:20

Occasional gusts of wind blew through the

0:23

narrow alleys of the town and scented

0:25

swirling along, but always it returned, replenished

0:27

by the building still smoldering and flaming

0:29

in the early morning light. The

0:33

sun rose over a town of war with itself.

0:36

Here in their bodies lay on the packed

0:38

dirt of the streets, surrounded by drying pools

0:40

of blood. The light

0:42

of dawn glistened off the bald head of an

0:44

older man who had nearly made it inside a

0:47

temple. Nearly, but not quite.

0:49

His corpse was sprawled on the steps leading

0:51

up to the entrance, close to the promise

0:54

of asylum for too far. A

0:56

woman stood over the man's body, weeping

0:58

softly while her two young girls looked

1:00

on, Stone faced with shock, not understanding

1:02

what had happened. A

1:04

few hours ago, the girl's father had been one

1:07

of the towns leading citizens and oligarch. No

1:09

longer the polis was under new

1:12

management. The

1:14

surviving oligarchs, a dozen men were penned

1:16

in the towns a gora, the marketplace

1:18

at the center of the houses and

1:20

shops. Soldiers in bronze helmets carrying long

1:22

spears stood guard over them. their ships

1:24

long been try rooms saturday anchor in

1:27

the harbor down below. The Athenians had

1:29

come up the hill in the night,

1:31

lead into the town by the oligarchs

1:33

opponents democrats who were willing to open

1:35

the gates and return for control of

1:37

the polis. They.

1:39

Not the soldiers had wielded the

1:41

knives, swords, and spears that took

1:43

the lives of the oligarchs. No

1:46

conflict was bloodier than civil conflict.

1:48

Nothing more better than the settling

1:50

of long simmering scores the Democrats

1:52

had suffered in the past. their

1:55

fathers and uncles executed, they themselves

1:57

sent into exile, their property confiscated,

1:59

they. Simpli returning the favor and

2:01

the Athenians in the midst of this

2:03

long brutal war had given them the

2:06

opportunity to do so. Smarter was far

2:08

away and so was assets at this

2:10

conflict was here and now. The

2:13

oligarchs sat in a cluster, their

2:15

injuries bound by strips of their

2:18

to and cloaks. Some more books

2:20

of the utmost despondency, tears running

2:22

down their cheeks. Others simply waited

2:24

and passes they knew or at

2:26

least strongly suspected what would happen

2:29

next. Their wives and children clustered

2:31

around the edge of the a gore up with dogs.

2:34

Your Representatives of The Demos, The people

2:36

signal to the Athenian soldiers. They use

2:38

their spears to rouse the oligarchs from

2:40

a mix of seats and hurt them

2:42

together. It wasn't the

2:44

first time he's Athenians seamless and it wouldn't

2:47

be the last. The only question was whether

2:49

they would have to think the graves. The

2:53

Peloponnesian war began in earnest, and for thirty

2:55

one bc, For the

2:57

next decade, like clockwork, the forces of

2:59

Athens and Sparta and are various allies,

3:01

clashed in theaters across Greece. Get

3:04

armies in the field and fleets see where only part

3:06

of the story. The. War wormed

3:08

it's way into the insisted conflicts that

3:10

always defined life and Greek Police, making

3:12

the factional divisions between the people in

3:15

the oligarchs far bloodier and more tragic

3:17

than they had ever been before. Today

3:20

on tides of History will discuss

3:22

this first long stage of the

3:24

Peloponnesian War. There's.

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4:30

everybody from wondering what come to another episode

4:32

of Tides of History I'm Patrick women like

4:34

so much for joining me. When.

4:37

The Peloponnesian War finally flared into life,

4:39

and for thirty one Bc, nobody knew

4:41

that it was the beginning of a

4:43

conflict that would last for nearly thirty

4:45

years. The great historian facilities

4:47

the essential chronicler of the war, tells us

4:50

that she started recording what happened from the

4:52

very beginning, believing that it would be a

4:54

great, more and more worthy of relations and

4:56

any that had preceded it. He says. Perhaps

4:59

if more Athenians and Spartans of that

5:02

time have the same insight to cities

5:04

did taking note of the intense preparations

5:06

both sides had made for war that

5:08

you powers wouldn't have what so carelessly

5:10

into a devastating confrontation. Or

5:13

maybe two Cities is giving himself a little

5:16

too much credit for that Unique viewpoints and

5:18

he just started keeping track because he knew

5:20

that he himself as a relatively young Athenians,

5:22

would participate in those of us. Who

5:25

doesn't think that there are times of the

5:27

most important and impactful the world has yet

5:29

seen? Not everybody's gonna be right about that.

5:32

But two cities, at least from his perspective,

5:35

may well have been. Outbreak

5:37

of the Peloponnesian or was the beginning

5:39

of something different, a new scale and

5:42

intensity of warfare in a land that

5:44

was plenty familiar with the concept. But

5:47

even the most astute observer if we give

5:49

two cities the benefit of the doubt on

5:52

that front couldn't have known just how long

5:54

things would go on or how deep the

5:56

effects would be. A

5:59

quick note before we move on, as in

6:01

the last episode, I'm relying on Two Cities

6:04

in the Addition, edited by Robert Be Strasser

6:06

as the landmark Two Cities, along with recent

6:08

narratives by Donald Kagan and Jennifer Roberts. Tensions

6:12

between Athens and Sparta were nothing new. and

6:14

for thirty one bc. The.

6:17

Two most powerful states in Greece had been

6:19

at odds with one another for much of

6:21

the fifth century, and even before start A

6:23

had been intimately involved in the turmoil surrounding

6:25

the birth of Athenian Democracy in the last

6:27

decade of the six centuries, intervening both to

6:29

remove the tyrant hideous and also to button

6:31

to crush the nascent democratic movement. The

6:34

Spartans showed up late to the battle of

6:36

Marathon after the Athenians had defeated the first

6:39

person incursion. and for ninety bc, something the

6:41

Athenians never let them forget when the person's

6:43

came again. And for eighty Bc, the To

6:45

Police were able to put aside their differences

6:48

just long enough to defeat Xerxes on land

6:50

and sea. Each claimed his own

6:52

victory in that war: Athens of Salaam, Us

6:54

and Sparta potato. But.

6:56

Their newfound amity didn't last long.

6:59

Ideologically, Athens and Sparta li at opposite

7:02

ends of the Greek political spectrum. Athens

7:04

was the most radical democracy with the

7:06

greatest powers allotted to the people, While

7:08

Sparta still technically a duel monarchy with

7:10

a pair of kings, was in actuality

7:13

a narrow over guards. There

7:16

were many with in both cities who

7:18

were inherently suspicious of the other of

7:20

them are also some mainly Athenians. You

7:22

admired their opposite number as I Spartan

7:24

sentiment in Athens became dominant in the

7:26

League for sixties B C and anti

7:28

Athenian sentiment in Sparta grew in parallel

7:30

with it. As Athens turned it's deeley

7:33

and League of Allies and to an

7:35

Athenian empire, smartest suspicion of Athenian intentions

7:37

grew. The. Results

7:39

of that was what scholars called the

7:41

first Peloponnesian War. From. For

7:43

sixty to for forty six, Sparta and

7:45

Athens were drawn into a series of

7:47

what amounted to local and regional conflicts

7:49

throughout Greece. But. You major

7:52

powers rarely confronted one another directly, but they're

7:54

broader interests were always have played no matter

7:56

who was fighting or were. And.

7:58

that was the basic dynamic that essentially ensured

8:01

another war was coming, despite the 30-year peace

8:03

treaty on which Athens and Sparta had agreed

8:05

in 445 BC. Fourth

8:08

Eucidities, the fundamental cause of the war

8:10

was Spartan suspicion of Athens' growing power

8:13

and ambition. In a

8:15

land with two great powers organized into

8:17

separate blocks, the Athenian Empire on one

8:19

side and the Spartan-led Peloponnesian League on

8:21

the other, any victory for one

8:23

was a blow to the other. In

8:26

this conception, power was a zero-sum game.

8:29

They were forbidden from interfering with each other's allies,

8:31

but neutrals were free to pick sides. The

8:34

problem was that a neutral polis could tip the

8:36

balance of power in the direction they chose. This

8:40

gave every war between cities an outsized

8:42

importance in the larger political context. And

8:45

in a Greece where police went to war

8:47

with striking regularity, marching out every year or

8:49

two to do battle with their neighbors over

8:51

what Herodotus had called small pieces of not

8:53

very good land, the result was

8:55

a powder kick waiting to explode. The

8:59

actual cause of the Peloponnesian War

9:01

proper, when it came, seemed almost

9:03

impossibly minor. An internal

9:06

conflict within the small city of Epidomenus,

9:08

located in the far northwest, what's today

9:10

Albania. The larger cities

9:12

of Corcura and Corinth were soon drawn in.

9:15

Corcura was a neutral, but Corinth was

9:17

a long-time ally of Sparta. Facing

9:20

destruction at the Corinthian hands, Corcura turned

9:22

to Athens for aid. Paying

9:25

carefully the consequences and being quite aware that

9:27

their intervention might lead to the outbreak of

9:29

a general war with Corinth, and thus likely

9:31

Sparta as well, the Athenians decided

9:33

to intervene on Corcura's side. The

9:36

ships they sent to Corcura in 433 BC

9:38

were drawn into an open naval battle with

9:41

Corinth's larger fleet. The battle

9:43

was a draw, but Corcura survived and the

9:45

Corinthians were incensed. They

9:47

saw an opportunity to pay back the Athenians

9:49

for what they saw as interference soon afterwards.

9:53

The city of Poteidaea was a colony

9:55

of Corinth located in the Chalkidike, a

9:57

series of three peninsulas stretching into the

9:59

Aegean-like fields. fingers in far northeastern Greece.

10:03

Unlike Korkura, Poteidaea retained extremely close

10:05

and deferential ties to its mother

10:07

city of Corinth. Every

10:09

year the Corinthians sent out magistrates to help

10:12

govern the city on behalf of the Poteidaeans.

10:15

Yet Poteidaea was located in a

10:17

strategically important place, directly on the

10:19

sea route to the Black Sea,

10:21

while also offering trading access to

10:23

Macedonia and the interior of Thrace.

10:26

As such, Poteidaea was a valued member of

10:28

the Delian League and had been paying tribute

10:31

to Athens for decades. The

10:33

Macedonian king, a man named Perdicus II, had

10:35

been fomenting revolts against Athens in this region

10:37

for a while. Between Poteidaea's

10:40

tight Corinthian ties, now a liability after

10:42

the incident at Korkura, and the meddling

10:44

of Perdicus, the Athenians saw trouble on

10:46

the horizon. They ordered

10:48

the Poteidaeans to pull down their city's land walls

10:51

to make it impossible for the polis to hold

10:53

out in the event of a rebellion against Athenian

10:55

rule. To make

10:57

the point completely clear, they also demanded

10:59

that the Poteidaeans get rid of their

11:01

Corinthian magistrates and give hostages to the

11:03

Athenians to guarantee their good behavior. The

11:07

Poteidaeans, bolstered by secret promises that Sparta

11:09

would invade Attica, the Athenian homeland in

11:12

the event of a conflict, went ahead

11:14

with their rebellion. The

11:16

Spartans did not, in fact, invade Attica,

11:18

but individual Corinthians sent a substantial number

11:21

of mercenaries and volunteer soldiers to aid

11:23

their colony against the Athenian response. When

11:26

the Athenians besieged Poteidaea, these

11:29

Corinthian volunteers were stuck inside

11:31

the city. The edge of the precipice

11:33

was clearly visible now. Corinth,

11:35

Sparta's most important ally, had

11:37

incited one of Athens' tributary

11:40

allies to revolt. Even if the

11:42

Corinthians inside Poteidaea were technically volunteers, they were

11:44

clearly present on their city's behalf. The

11:47

Corinthians, for their part, could claim that

11:49

the treatment of their colony was unacceptable

11:52

and that the Athenians owed their citizens,

11:54

stuck inside Poteidaea, some deference. Still,

11:57

there was a chance to walk it back to prevent

11:59

a general con... conflict. Neither

12:01

side took advantage of that chance. Instead,

12:04

both marched headlong toward the abyss.

12:08

Once again, it was Corinth that took the

12:10

fateful steps. They summoned a

12:12

meeting of the Peloponnesian League to plead their case

12:15

to Sparta and the other allies, and Thucydides tells

12:17

us at length what they had to say. Not

12:20

the exact words, but the gist of their arguments

12:22

as he understood them. It

12:24

was the Spartans' fault, the Corinthians said, that

12:26

Athens was now able to treat other Greeks

12:28

so poorly. Quote, For the true

12:31

author of the subjugation of a people

12:33

is not so much the immediate agent

12:35

as the power which permits it, having

12:37

the means to prevent it, particularly if

12:39

that power aspires to the glory of

12:41

being the liberator of Hellas. The

12:44

Spartans, the Corinthians were saying, went around proclaiming

12:46

themselves to be the defenders of Greek liberty.

12:48

Yet whenever they had been presented with

12:50

concrete opportunities to prove that, by intervening

12:53

against the Athenians, they had refused to do

12:55

so. And now the problem

12:57

was worse than before and would only grow harder to

12:59

deal with. Quote, You alone

13:01

wait until the power of an enemy is

13:03

becoming twice its original size instead of crushing

13:06

it in its infancy. This

13:08

was a brilliant piece of rhetoric from the Corinthians.

13:11

It attacked the Spartans' self-image as defenders of

13:13

Greek freedom, an idea they had cherished since

13:16

before the Persian Wars. It

13:18

challenged their concrete powers, the leaders of

13:20

the Peloponnesian League, and it

13:22

played on their ongoing fears of Athenian

13:24

power, fears that the Corinthians knew precisely

13:26

how to exploit. In

13:29

the end, the Corinthians threatened to leave the

13:31

Peloponnesian League altogether, adding that they would try

13:33

to peel off Sparta's other allies as they

13:35

departed. The

13:37

Athenian envoys who happened to be present at the meeting

13:40

of the Peloponnesian League were allowed to give a brief

13:42

address of their own. In it,

13:44

they defended their city's past actions from their integral

13:46

role in the defeat of the Persians to the

13:48

acquisition of their The

13:51

Spartans had been unwilling to continue fighting the

13:53

Persians after Plataea, and so that leadership had

13:55

fallen to the Athenians by default. Once

13:58

they had the empire, the Athenians said that. they couldn't very

14:00

well give it up, quote, it

14:02

was not a very remarkable action if we

14:04

did accept an empire that was offered to

14:06

us and refused to give it up under

14:08

the pressure of three of the strongest motives,

14:10

fear, honor, and interest. And

14:12

it was not we who set the example, for it

14:15

has always been the law that the weaker should be

14:17

subject to the stronger. Besides,

14:19

we believed ourselves to be worthy of the

14:21

position. Now, whether

14:23

that's really what the Athenian envoys said, it's safe

14:25

to say that it reflects the opinion of elite

14:27

Athenians at the outbreak of the war. They

14:30

couldn't give up their empire without putting themselves at

14:32

risk of disaster. And besides, what

14:34

was really wrong with an empire anyway?

14:38

In the end, the Spartans' choice was made for them,

14:41

not so much by the Corinthians, or the

14:43

Athenians, or the Potadaeans, or the Quercureans, but

14:45

by the fundamental structural conditions of political life

14:48

in Greece at the time. Police

14:50

were tied to one another in myriad

14:52

cross-cutting ways that guaranteed conflict at every

14:54

turn. Private citizens could

14:57

pursue their own interests, and in so

14:59

doing, involved their polis as a whole

15:01

in unexpected conflagrations. Mother

15:03

cities claimed rights over their colonies, even

15:05

as those colonies were full-blown cities with

15:07

their own interests to pursue. Alliances

15:10

and straightforward calculations of power and benefit

15:12

might be contradicted by the ideological claims

15:14

to authority and honor that gave a

15:16

polis its sense of itself. That

15:19

was how seemingly minor and unimportant clashes

15:21

on the very fringes of the Greek

15:23

world, and Epidomnes, and Potadea, became the

15:26

immediate causes of the most devastating war

15:28

the Greeks had ever known. It

15:30

was baked into the nature of the relationships

15:32

that polis had with one another, for better

15:35

and worse, relationships that had developed over the

15:37

course of decades and centuries. Thucydides

15:40

was crystal clear about this. When

15:43

it finally began, the war hadn't sprung

15:45

into being overnight. It was

15:47

the product of years and years and

15:50

years of conflict, slights and insults, threats,

15:52

real and imagined, and clashing understandings of

15:54

who was owed, what for their part

15:56

in events that stretched back to the

15:58

Persian wars and even beyond. On. A

16:02

voice vote in the Spartan assembly approved

16:04

the war. Despite the misgivings of more

16:07

than a few Spartans who knew the

16:09

Athenians and the resources at their disposal,

16:11

the current events were overjoyed and already

16:13

had plans for how to conduct is

16:16

coming war. Still, all was not yet

16:18

lost. A Spartan embassy presented one final

16:20

ultimatum to the Athenians and offered that

16:23

the Athenians couldn't possibly accept a tacit

16:25

demand that they give up their empire.

16:27

The great statesman terribly his address the

16:29

Athenian assembly and laid out precisely why.

16:32

They couldn't afford to agree to the

16:34

Spartan demands. They would

16:36

accept arbitration, but not capitulation, and

16:38

the Peloponnesian war was finally about

16:41

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hundred Five hundred. Both

18:20

sides had good reasons to feel confident and

18:22

the opening months of for thirty one B

18:25

C after the Embassy's had failed and bore

18:27

began to seem inevitable. For.

18:29

Sparta. Things look pretty straightforward, with a

18:31

massive advantage in both quality and numbers

18:33

of heavily armored hop light infantry, the

18:35

citizen core of any Greek army. They

18:38

were almost certain to win a full

18:40

scale battle against the Athenians. All.

18:42

They had to do was invade Attica, the

18:44

region surrounding Athens in order to force that

18:46

battle. Either the Athenians would come

18:49

out and fight and be the seated. Or.

18:51

They would have to suffer the humiliation of

18:53

letting the Spartans burn their crops, destroy their

18:55

farms, and starve them into submission. From

18:58

where the Spartans for standing, neither option

19:00

seemed particularly viable. The sure

19:03

the Athenians my the of the last year

19:05

but after that I couldn't sit behind their

19:07

was forever or so the most popular lines

19:09

of reasoning among the Spartans and their allies

19:11

said. The Athenians by contrast,

19:14

would have to do something totally unique in

19:16

the history of Greek warfare. Fight

19:18

a patient defensive war that allow the enemy

19:20

to do precisely what he wanted to do

19:22

while attempting to win the initiative. Not on

19:25

land, but it's see where the Athenians advantages

19:27

and ships in naval skill would give them

19:29

the edge. The three or

19:31

four to one advantage the Athenians had and ships

19:33

was just the tip of the iceberg. They.

19:36

Also had dramatically more cash on hand

19:38

and the ability to raise more and

19:40

an emergency. Years. Of

19:43

imperial tribute had left Athenian coffers

19:45

overflowing with more than six thousand

19:47

talents on hand, while the entire

19:49

Peloponnesian leak had practically no cash

19:51

reserves at all, Even

19:53

if Attica was thoroughly blockaded by land,

19:55

the Athenians could still bring insufficient supplies

19:57

by seat. While the Spartans.

20:00

Wasted their energy on futile destructions. The

20:02

Athenians would be bleeding them dry in

20:04

a war of attrition and resources. Not

20:06

one of brave deeds on the battlefield.

20:10

But. That was much easier said than done.

20:12

To. The Athenians really sit tight behind

20:15

their walls and the fort scattered around

20:17

Attica and watch the Spartans destroy their

20:19

livelihoods. It. Was a new

20:21

and untested strategy when that no other

20:23

state in Ancient Greece even could have

20:25

considered attempting before this time. More

20:28

between police was a matter of the citizen

20:30

soldiers marching out for a single campaigns maybe

20:32

even a single battle and then returning home

20:34

to harvest their crops. Perhaps.

20:37

They would do it again the next year, but

20:39

the fighting was always discontinuous. This.

20:41

Was what through cities meant? When he said that,

20:43

he knew from the beginning that the Peloponnesian War

20:45

was going to be something different. The.

20:48

Great Athenian Statesmen Periclean address the city's

20:50

assembly at length, in speeches, facilities for

20:52

counts, laying out his plan and detail,

20:55

Facilities would have known what he said because

20:58

he was probably present in person for those

21:00

discussions. At. Worst, He got the

21:02

gist of what Periclean had discussed second hand

21:04

from others who were there. It's.

21:06

Worth remarking on how unusual that

21:08

is. In. All events in history.

21:10

There are only a couple of occasions when our

21:12

major source for a conflict was privy to any

21:15

of the planning that went into a military campaign.

21:18

The combination of two cities the man,

21:20

Kirklees, The Order and the Athenians need

21:22

to have their war aims and plans

21:24

discussed in public. For to a to

21:26

sleep provides us with insights we would

21:28

never otherwise have. Not.

21:31

All among the Spartans and their allies

21:33

were so convinced that the war would

21:35

go quickly. One of the to Spartan

21:37

kings or could domus had warned the

21:39

precisely the dynamics I just mentioned at

21:41

the meeting with the Peloponnesian League. Voted

21:43

to go to work and saddens are

21:45

to Domus was nobody's fool. A moderate

21:47

with long experiences and military leader and

21:49

plenty of first hand knowledge of the

21:51

Athenians in their ways get in Sparta.

21:53

As elsewhere in the Greek world, there

21:55

were political factions. those who

21:57

cautioned that war would be neither short

21:59

more easy, were at present outnumbered by those

22:01

who believed that the time had come to take

22:04

a stand. As it happened,

22:06

most of the Greeks probably agreed with them. The

22:09

Spartan slogan that they were fighting for the

22:11

freedom of the Greeks and always had been

22:13

resonated with more of those Greeks than the

22:16

Athenians' protestations that their empire had been justly

22:18

earned. What Pericles was

22:20

staking his strategy on was the belief

22:22

that internal opinion within Sparta would shift

22:24

faster than Athenian resources would dry up.

22:28

Sparta had two kings but five Ephors,

22:30

the city's chief magistrates, and ending the

22:32

war only required a majority vote of

22:34

those Ephors. All

22:36

it would take was for one or two Ephors to

22:38

decide that the war was fruitless and it would be

22:41

over. Athens didn't

22:43

have to win it, it just had to not

22:45

lose. When

22:47

the war began in 431 BC, it

22:50

wasn't a Spartan invasion of Attica, but

22:52

a Theban attempts to take the nearby

22:54

city of Plataea that launched the proceedings.

22:58

The Apoebes, the most powerful city of Boetia in

23:00

northern Greece, was a Spartan ally. Plataea,

23:02

an Athenian ally. In

23:04

an incident halfway between forests and tragedy,

23:06

a Theban advance force attempted to take

23:08

the city in a rapid coup, with

23:10

the main Theban army following behind them.

23:13

The Plataeans fought back. They

23:16

trapped the advance force inside the city and killed

23:18

or captured almost all of them. The

23:20

Plataeans then executed 180 prisoners,

23:23

a shocking act to pay back the

23:25

Thebans for an undeclared nighttime attack in

23:27

peacetime. Both the sneak

23:30

attack and the execution of the captives were

23:32

almost unprecedented. Both would set

23:34

the tone for the war to come. Shortly

23:37

after, left with no other choice, Sparta

23:39

and its allies assembled their main army,

23:41

some two-thirds of the total hoplites available,

23:44

and Archidamus led them toward Attica. Archidamus

23:48

took his time, first attacking an Athenian

23:50

fortress outside the Athenian heartland before entering

23:52

Attica proper. When

23:55

criticized for this delay, Archidamus replied, quote, do not

23:57

think of their land as anything but a hostage

23:59

for it. us. The better it

24:01

is cultivated, the better hostage it will be.

24:05

This was sound strategic logic, there was no

24:07

benefit in ravaging Attica before the grain was

24:09

ripe, and by waiting until the end of

24:11

May, Arcadamus ensured that he held maximum leverage.

24:14

Moreover, Arcadamus didn't particularly want to

24:16

fight, much less begin a full-blown

24:18

war under conditions that didn't favor

24:21

Sparta. When he

24:23

delayed still further, holding back from ravaging

24:25

the most valuable farmland in Attica even

24:27

after arriving, the goal was clear. To

24:30

force the Athenians to the bargaining table. The

24:33

question was whether Athenian resolve and

24:36

Pericles personal prestige could

24:38

hold out against the Peloponnesian League's destruction

24:40

around Athens. For

24:43

the time being, it did hold. Arcadamus

24:45

and his army stayed for a month,

24:47

exhausting their provisions but accomplishing nothing aside

24:49

from discomforting the Athenians stuck inside the

24:52

city's walls. In response,

24:54

the Athenians sent a hundred of their own

24:56

ships along with perhaps half that number of

24:58

Allied vessels, all of them loaded with hoplites

25:01

and archers, to accomplish a series of limited

25:03

goals. First, they opportunistically

25:05

raided the coastline, avoiding pitched battles

25:07

at all times. Second,

25:10

they seized a series of strategically located

25:12

towns and islands off the coast, providing

25:14

bases for future operations.

25:17

Finally, the Athenians took the nearby island of

25:19

Ijina, which had been one of Athens' main

25:22

rivals at sea for centuries. This

25:24

time, the Athenians were determined to end the

25:26

rivalry for good. They

25:29

took the whole island, expelled the

25:31

entire population, and resettled Ijina with

25:33

their own colonists. Never

25:35

again would the approaches to the Piraeus,

25:37

Athens' main harbor, be threatened by Ijina.

25:40

Finally, with the Peloponnesian army dispersed after

25:43

its campaign, Pericles himself led an Athenian

25:45

army to ravage the territory of Megara,

25:47

a Spartan ally located directly on the

25:49

route from Attica to the Peloponnese. This

25:53

was a low-risk move, one that at worst

25:55

would demonstrate that the Athenians were capable of

25:57

doing something. At best, it might

25:59

make Megara a defect. In

26:01

the north, the siege of Pote dea,

26:03

the beginning of which predated the formal

26:06

start of the war, continued, draining the

26:08

Athenian treasury and sapping Athenian morale. The

26:11

war showed no sign of abating as 431 gave

26:14

way to 430 BC. Arcadamis

26:17

returned to Attica at the head of a

26:19

Peloponnesian army and this time spared no part

26:21

of the fertile plains surrounding Athens. For

26:24

forty days they burned crops uprooted ancient

26:26

olive trees and vines and destroyed the

26:29

homes of Athenian citizens, doing their utmost

26:31

to attack both their livelihood and their

26:33

willingness to continue fighting. Yet

26:36

Athens did not yield and in response

26:38

Pericles led a much larger seaborne force

26:40

to attack the city of Epidaurus in

26:42

the Peloponnese, located down the coast from

26:44

Athens and adjacent to the territory of

26:46

Corinth. Soon after

26:48

setting out however, the fleet and the

26:50

4000 hoplites aboard returned to Athens. Why?

26:54

Because a plague had broken out in

26:56

the city, a devastating epidemic ravaging the

26:59

thousands of people crowded into the city

27:01

thanks to the presence of the Peloponnesian

27:03

army in Attica. We

27:06

don't know precisely what pathogen caused what is

27:08

commonly known as the plague of Athens. The

27:11

most likely candidates are typhus or typhoid

27:14

fever with a smaller possibility of a

27:16

viral hemorrhagic fever like Ebola. Thucydides,

27:19

who was in Athens at the time, suffered

27:21

from it and describes the symptoms in detail.

27:23

Quote, people in good health

27:25

were all of a sudden attacked by violent

27:27

heats in the head and redness and inflammation

27:29

in the eyes. The inward parts

27:31

such as the throat or tongue becoming

27:33

bloody and emitting an unnatural and fetid

27:35

breath. These symptoms were

27:37

followed by sneezing and hoarseness after which the

27:39

pain reached the chest and produced a hard

27:41

cough. When it fixed

27:43

in the stomach it upset it and discharges

27:46

of bile of every kind named by physicians

27:48

in Sui accompanied by very great distress. Externally

27:51

the body was not very hot to the touch but

27:54

internally it burned so that the patient could not

27:56

bear to have on him clothing or linen even

27:58

of the very lightest description. This

28:01

sickness wasn't necessarily fatal, but if it

28:03

descended into the bowels, Thucydides tells us,

28:05

it almost always was. If

28:08

a person happened to survive, she or he

28:10

was blessed with immunity from the disease, a

28:12

small consolation to those who suffered lasting damage

28:14

and had watched their friends and family perish.

28:19

The plague never affected the besieging Peloponnesians,

28:22

and it never entered the Peloponnese. As

28:25

devastating as the death and disease was on

28:27

its own, it was the social disruption and

28:29

political damage that were far more serious for

28:31

Athens. Pericles, who

28:34

had planned and implemented a strategy that wasn't

28:36

getting visible results and presided over a city

28:38

hollowed out by plague, was a convenient target.

28:42

The many enemies and critics of Pericles momentarily

28:44

prevailed, and the Athenians sent envoys to Sparta

28:46

to sue for peace. Had

28:49

the Spartans offered less onerous terms, the Athenians

28:51

might well have accepted. But

28:53

the Spartans continued to demand that the

28:55

Athenians give up their empire completely. This

28:58

was plainly unacceptable, and the Athenians

29:00

refused much to Pericles' relief. He

29:04

addressed the assembly, arguing that the basic strategic

29:06

calculus of the war hadn't changed at all.

29:09

If they made peace now, they would have suffered for nothing.

29:12

The real danger, Pericles said, came not from

29:14

fighting on to a stalemate, but from making

29:17

a bad peace and giving up the empire.

29:20

Quote, By now the empire you

29:22

hold is a tyranny, he said. It

29:25

may now seem wrong to have taken it, but

29:27

it is surely dangerous to let it go. Although

29:31

Pericles won the battle on strategy, his

29:33

enemies succeeded in having him charged with

29:35

corruption. He got off with a

29:37

fine, but spent the coming winter out of office. While

29:41

Pericles was on the sidelines, events took a turn.

29:44

The siege of Putadea continued in the north. Due

29:47

to a fortuitous stroke of luck, the

29:49

brilliant Corinthian commander of the besieged and

29:51

a number of Peloponnesian ambassadors fell into

29:53

Athenian hands. When

29:55

the ambassadors arrived in Athens, they were

29:57

immediately executed and tossed into a pit.

30:00

hit, denied any sort of trial or proper

30:02

burial. When challenged,

30:04

the Athenians claimed it was in response

30:06

to Spartan summary executions of those they

30:08

captured at sea, mostly Athenians and their

30:10

allies. Pote Dea soon

30:12

fell, however, ending the drain on the treasury. Still,

30:16

the Athenians had spent half of

30:18

their accumulated wealth. They had

30:20

suffered a plague. They were unclear

30:22

as to whether Pericles was the right man to lead

30:24

them into the future. After two

30:26

years of war, things weren't looking great for Athens.

30:30

Pericles returned to office in the next summer,

30:33

July of 429 BC, with things at a

30:35

low ebb. Platea was

30:37

under siege from the Spartans, and a campaign

30:39

in the Chalcidecae in the northwest had gone

30:41

disastrously for Athens. Four

30:43

hundred and thirty hoplites and a number of generals were

30:45

lost in a clash at the city of Spartolas. The

30:49

Spartans assembled a fleet, but the Athenians managed to

30:51

defeat it in a pitched battle, and

30:53

sniffed out and defeated an attempted surprise attack on

30:55

their port of Pareas. But

30:57

as these events were happening, with Athens itself

31:00

under threat, Pericles himself was

31:02

stricken with plague and died a slow,

31:04

painful death. The

31:06

architect of Athenian strategy, the city's leader for

31:09

more than thirty years, the rock

31:11

on which Athenian empire had been built,

31:13

was now gone. What

31:15

would Athens do next? Have

31:23

you ever covered a carpet stain with a rug? Ignored

31:26

a leaky faucet? Pretended your half-painted

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living room is supposed to look like

31:31

that? Well, you're not alone. We've all

31:33

got unfinished home projects. But there's

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what to tackle next, because Thumbtack is the

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all those unfinished home projects and say hello

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to caring for your home the easier way.

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Insert a Pgp. Parkway

32:07

successors were nowhere close to as capable as

32:09

the great statesman had been. Quote.

32:12

More on a level with one another to

32:14

seduce wrote send grasping at supremacists, they ended

32:16

by committing even the conduct of state affairs

32:19

to the whims of the multitude. This,

32:21

as might have been expected, produced a host

32:23

of blunders. As for

32:26

Twenty eight bc dawn the fourth year of the

32:28

war, it showed no signs of abating. If.

32:30

Anything it's scope was growing. The

32:33

kings of thrice and massive on large populace

32:35

kingdoms to the north of the Greek mainland

32:37

wants their own war against both one another

32:39

and the Greek cities of the tuck Dk.

32:42

A small Athenian fleet raided the

32:44

coast of the Peloponnese, accomplishing little.

32:46

there was trouble brewing in Athens

32:48

empire to as the powerful island

32:50

of Lesbos began plotting a revolt

32:52

against Athenian rule. Recent

32:55

envoys to Sparta to suss out support

32:57

for their cause, but were forced to

32:59

launch the rebelling prematurely when the Athenians

33:01

discover their plans. The result was yet

33:03

another painful seat, dreading resources and manpower

33:05

the could have been put to use

33:07

elsewhere. It's fourth hearing what the envoys

33:09

from Methylene, the leading city of Lesbos,

33:11

had to say when they were trying

33:13

to justify the rebellion at the Festival

33:16

of Olympia cook we did not become

33:18

allies of the Athenians for the subjugation

33:20

of the Helen's but allies of the

33:22

how leads for their liberation from the

33:24

meat in. The person's. We

33:26

could no longer trust Athens as a leader. How

33:28

could we put our trust in such friendship or

33:30

freedom that had here. The

33:33

Spartans agreed to throw their support behind My

33:35

cleaning and the rebels on Lesbos, but their

33:37

attempt to relieve the pressure of the siege

33:39

with an attack on Attica went nowhere. As

33:43

the siege of Might Illini continued, the Athenians

33:45

deed for money grew. The.

33:47

We're maintaining two hundred and fifty ships and at

33:49

least two thousand and hop lights in the field

33:51

at any given time. Paying. Wages for

33:53

rowers and soldiers and buying supplies.

33:56

The drain on Athens treasury was

33:59

alarmingly quick. And the war

34:01

tax raised a considerable sum from

34:03

Athens on citizens more was necessary.

34:06

A dozen ships set out to collect

34:08

tribute from Athens allies, effectively extorting money

34:10

under threat of violence. This.

34:12

Was effective in some places, but one of

34:14

the expeditions commanders and a group of soldiers

34:16

were cut off and cut down and carrier

34:18

on the coast of Asia Minor during the

34:21

course of their activities. This

34:23

didn't exactly prove that the people of Might

34:25

Illini were wrong about their complaints regarding the

34:27

Athenians on their empire, and the Athenians future

34:29

actions showed just how right they were. The.

34:32

Spartans had promised aid over so leisurely and

34:34

sending a fleet across the Aegean to help

34:36

my salinas that the city surrendered to the

34:39

Athenian besieged. It's without much of a fight

34:41

before the Peloponnesian really force arrived. Too.

34:44

Late to eat rebels in my to leaning,

34:46

the Spartan commander Our Kiedis was presented with

34:48

a plan to attack the Ionian cities of

34:50

Asia Minor. This was as

34:52

two cities points out, a good plan

34:54

quote they're coming was welcome everywhere. The

34:56

object would be by this move to deprive

34:58

Athens of her teeth source of revenue he

35:01

writes. But. Out see

35:03

this blue the opportunities and managed to

35:05

squander any potential good by tickets and

35:07

butchering many of his prisoners on the

35:09

island of Ceos. Al

35:11

Qaeda eventually sailed for home without accomplishing

35:14

anything positive. The.

35:16

Athenians meanwhile were trying to decide what to

35:18

do with the rebels of might. Illini. They

35:21

decided immediately to put to death Spartan commander

35:23

who had a to the rebellion. But then

35:26

they went a step further. They.

35:28

Ordered pockets the Athenian general who had taken

35:30

my to leanings to put to death all the

35:32

adult males of the city and make slaves

35:34

of the women and children. even those who

35:36

had no part in the rebellion. The

35:39

politician clients who is now most and savor

35:41

with the Athenian people after the death apparently

35:43

made a long speech exhorting them not to

35:45

change their minds but to go ahead with

35:48

the punishment Dumping merciful, he said quotes for

35:50

if they were right and rebelling you must

35:52

be wrong and ruling. however if

35:55

right or wrong you determined to rules you

35:57

must carry out your principles and punish the

35:59

my to lean as your interest

36:01

requires, or else you

36:03

must give up your empire and cultivate honesty

36:05

without danger. Luckily

36:07

for the Mytileneans, another orator, Diodotus, spoke

36:10

in favor of sparing the people of

36:12

the rebellious city. Diodotus's

36:14

more moderate approach prevailed by the slimmest

36:16

of margins, and almost equal number of

36:19

hands were raised for both, and

36:21

the reprieve arrived in Mytilene by fastship

36:23

just in time to save the people

36:25

of the city. Plataea,

36:28

which had been under siege since the beginning

36:30

of the war four years earlier, wasn't as

36:32

lucky as Mytilene. The city

36:35

finally fell to the Spartans, or more properly to

36:37

the Thebans, whose sneak attack had marked the actual

36:39

beginning of the fighting of the war. Presented

36:42

with the same dilemma, the Spartans, urged

36:44

on by the Thebans, decided on an

36:46

opposite course. They massacred the 200

36:49

remaining Plataean defenders and their 25 Athenian

36:51

allies, and took the remaining women as

36:53

slaves. The city itself

36:55

was raised, down to the foundations. The

36:57

land leased to the Thebans and resettled

36:59

with colonists loyal to Thebes. In

37:04

427 BC, the focus of the war shifted to

37:06

one of the places where it had begun. Quarkira,

37:09

the Corinthian colony whose conflict with

37:11

its mother city had helped spark

37:13

the whole war. Corinth

37:16

attempted to bring Quarkira over to its side

37:18

by releasing the Quarkirean oligarchs they had held

37:20

captive for years, with the understanding that they

37:22

would detach the city from its alliance with

37:25

Athens. The result was an

37:27

abortive sea battle, the arrival of a large

37:29

Athenian fleet, and the triumph of the people

37:31

of Quarkira over the oligarchs. The

37:34

people wasted no time in killing their

37:37

oligarchic enemies. Some

37:39

of them were killed on temple altars, others

37:41

walled up until they starved, still others hung

37:44

from the trees planted in sacred groves. Famine

37:47

soon followed, and the killings intensified

37:49

rather than prevented future violence inside

37:52

Quarkira. That Was the

37:54

nature of civil conflict, and the broader

37:56

context of the Peloponnesian war made such

37:58

conflicts all but inevitable. Or as

38:00

factions within city sought support from the

38:02

Spartans or Athenians to advance their own

38:05

domestic goals. On.

38:07

And on the war went. And.

38:09

Athenian expedition what to Sicily a harbinger

38:11

of disastrous events in the offing. A

38:14

decade later, and the Athenians again sent

38:16

out naval expeditions to pick off likely

38:18

targets along the coast. The

38:20

Athenian general Demoss Bunnies attempted a bold

38:22

strategy using a tiny Athenian forced to

38:24

rouse allies and rebels to attack, but

38:26

lisa from the rear. Thebes.

38:29

Was smart as most important allies and an

38:31

attack there would shift the balance of the

38:33

war with little risk assets. Dumbest.

38:35

The his failed and feel badly but

38:37

he put his lessons to good use.

38:40

Shortly after Demoss than he was asked to

38:43

take command of of force of Athenian allies

38:45

facing the Spartan invasion and central Greece. Dumbest

38:48

And he set a trap for the Spartans. Knowing

38:50

that they would attack he used the terrain

38:52

to his advantage beating the Spartans and when

38:55

ill conceived assault or he had a flanking

38:57

force, hop flights and light armed troops behind

38:59

the sunken road. When. The Spartans

39:01

did attacks dumbest and he's hidden force hit them

39:03

in the rear. The Spartans

39:05

broke and ran, leaving behind their

39:08

dead including to generals. In.

39:10

The aftermath of the battle, Dumbest, The

39:12

Nice negotiated a clever truce with a

39:14

Spartan counterpart. They would be

39:16

allowed to escape but not their local

39:18

allies there by discredit in the Spartans

39:21

even further as quotes which prayers and

39:23

so seekers and two cities words. Demoss.

39:26

Than he does attack the Spartans impeccable

39:28

reputation on the battlefield and their credit

39:30

with her allies at once. When.

39:33

The Spartans and the other Peloponnesian departed

39:35

safely to Boston. He and his allies

39:37

cut down the remaining enemies to a

39:39

man. The next year

39:41

of the war for twenty five B C belonged

39:44

to Damascus. A nice. He.

39:46

Came up with a brilliant plan to

39:48

plant a fort on the coast of

39:50

the Peloponnese at a place called Peelers

39:52

just fifteen miles from Sport itself. in

39:55

six days the mosque many soldiers but

39:57

the series of haphazard fortifications When

40:00

the Spartans learned of this, the Keter mines

40:02

among them grasped the potential danger of an

40:04

enemy foothold so close to home, from which

40:07

the Athenians could both launch raids and, much

40:09

worse, stir up the helots to revolt against

40:11

their masters. They immediately gathered

40:13

an army and sent their fleet south from Quarkera

40:15

to deal with a problem. Badly

40:18

outnumbered but confident, Demosthenes, accompanied by

40:20

just sixty hoplites and a few

40:22

archers, repelled an amphibious attack. And

40:25

when the full Athenian fleet arrived, they won a

40:27

complete victory over the Spartans at sea. The

40:31

420 Spartan hoplites who had come by

40:33

land were trapped, stuck by land, and

40:35

blockaded by sea, at a place called

40:37

Sfectaria. For Sparta, this

40:39

was an utter disaster. Those

40:42

420 hoplites, of whom 180 were

40:44

full Spartiates of the finest families,

40:46

represented a tenth of their total

40:49

military manpower. The

40:51

Spartans immediately called a halt to hostilities to

40:53

negotiate their release, and they were willing to

40:55

make peace to avoid demographic doom. Yet

40:58

they couldn't agree on terms, and in the

41:00

end, the Athenians assaulted the besieged Spartans.

41:04

Despite their sterling military reputation, the

41:06

Spartans were utterly routed. The

41:09

Athenians took 292 prisoners, including 120 Spartiates, while 128 lay dead at Sfectaria.

41:18

In the eyes of the Greeks, Thucydides wrote,

41:21

it was the most unexpected event in the war.

41:23

It was simply unbelievable that the Spartans would

41:26

ever surrender. Suddenly

41:28

all the leverage lay with the Athenians. If

41:31

the Spartans invaded Attica again, the

41:33

Athenians threatened, they would execute every

41:35

single one of their Spartan prisoners.

41:38

The Athenians put that leverage to good use,

41:41

seizing the initiative to end the ongoing disorders

41:43

at Corcora in favor of their democratic allies.

41:46

As 425 BC melted into 424,

41:48

the eighth year of the war,

41:51

things were looking good for the

41:53

Athenians. After years of plague and mixed results,

41:55

the Athenians were finally ready to go on the

41:57

offensive. This also happened to

41:59

be the end. year, our friend Thucydides, son of

42:01

Alloris, the author of the history on which

42:03

we rely for these events, was elected a

42:06

general in Athens. The

42:09

results of the Athenian offensives that year were

42:11

mixed. In Sicily, where the

42:13

Athenians had been attempting to intervene for a few

42:15

years, they failed to do much of note, and

42:17

the generals responsible were either exiled or fined. Another

42:21

attack on the Pelopodnesian coastline, this one on

42:23

the town of Kithara, was a crushing success.

42:26

The Athenians aimed to do the same as they had

42:28

at Pelos, setting up a base from which to harass

42:30

the interior of the Peloponnese. They

42:33

succeeded, and the inhabitants of Kithara were

42:35

scattered across the Aegean. But

42:37

some of the other residents of the town had

42:39

been natives of the island of Igena, Athens' old

42:41

enemy, who had been displaced at the start of

42:43

the war and then resettled in the Peloponnese. The

42:47

Igenteans, already refugees, were either killed during

42:49

the sack of the town or put

42:51

to death in the aftermath. However,

42:54

war had been conducted in Greece in the past,

42:56

it was clear that the rules were changing. Not

42:59

just defending soldiers, but even civilians were now

43:01

in serious danger of summary execution. That

43:04

strategically vital Megara, which controlled one of the

43:06

key routes into the Peloponnese, another

43:08

Athenian assault very nearly succeeded in taking the

43:11

city and turning it toward Athens. But

43:14

at the last minute, the democratic plotters inside

43:16

the city were betrayed, and a Spartan relief

43:18

force arrived. The oligarchs

43:20

inside the city f the

43:26

rest of the war. The

43:29

real action however, was in the north. The

43:32

Athens' entrepreneurial relief force arrived. The

43:34

oligarchs inside the city f was

43:38

cemented as a Spartan ally for the rest of the war.

43:42

The real action however, was in the north. The

43:46

Athenians invaded Boetia using two separate prongs,

43:48

one led by the general Demosthenes and

43:50

the other by the general Hippocrates, while

43:53

simultaneously supporting uprisings within Boetian towns

43:55

and cities led by democratic elements.

43:59

At worst, the Athenians figures that they could

44:01

plant a series of fortresses on the borders

44:03

of Boetia, as they were in the process

44:05

of doing in the Peloponnese, bases from which

44:07

to raid and ravage and tie down much

44:09

larger numbers of enemy soldiers. But

44:11

the complex operation soon turned into a disaster,

44:14

as Hippocrates led his prong of the invasion

44:16

into a pitched battle with the Boetians at

44:18

a place called Delium. The

44:20

Boetian commander, Pagandus, lined up the Thebans

44:23

and his phalanx in an innovative formation

44:25

twenty-five men deep instead of the usual

44:27

eight. While that

44:29

deeper formation held the Athenians, two squadrons

44:31

of Boetian cavalry circled around the back,

44:33

breaking their line and causing a mass

44:36

rout. The philosopher Socrates

44:38

was one of the lucky Athenians who escaped with

44:40

his life, but many more did not.

44:43

Around a thousand Athenian hoplites were killed

44:46

in the fighting, along with many more

44:48

lightly equipped troops, among them Hippocrates himself.

44:52

At the same time, events still further north

44:54

in Thrace and the Greek cities in the

44:56

northwest of Aegean were also turning against the

44:58

Athenians. The brilliant

45:01

Spartan general Bracitus, who had earlier rescued

45:03

Megara from the Athenian invasion, was leading

45:05

a small force north to the Chalcadice.

45:08

If he could take and hold the region,

45:11

Athens' route to the Bosporus and thus its

45:13

all-important supply of grain could be cut off.

45:16

Through clever diplomacy, Bracitus managed to get

45:18

his army of helots and mercenaries through

45:20

unfriendly territory. Directed

45:22

by the presence of Bracitus, numerous Athenian

45:24

allies and subjects revolted. All

45:27

Bracitus had to do was take Amphipolis a

45:29

short distance further north and the Athenian cause

45:31

would be in serious trouble. With

45:34

Bracitus outside the walls, the Athenian garrison

45:36

commander at Amphipolis called for help to

45:38

none other than our friend Thucydides, the

45:41

historian, who was commanding the Athenian fleet

45:43

nearby. Thucydides was

45:45

half a day's sail away, however, and

45:47

by the time he arrived, Amphipolis had

45:49

surrendered to Bracitus. This

45:51

was yet another disaster. Rebellions

45:53

broke out throughout the region with factions inside

45:56

the towns and cities calling to Bracitus for

45:58

aid. cause

46:00

suffered, and Thucydides was recalled, held on

46:02

charges of treason, and exiled for twenty

46:05

years the remainder of the war. By

46:09

this point, both sides were ready for peace. The

46:12

Spartans wanted their hostage citizens back. The

46:15

Athenians were exhausted. A

46:17

truce was declared in March of 423

46:19

BC, but the Boetians rejected it, as

46:21

did the Corinthians and Magarians. Caius

46:24

II objected, and continued to support rebellions

46:26

in the northern Aegean against his orders

46:28

and the truce. When

46:31

the Athenians sent a force north to deal

46:33

with the rebellious cities, they were determined to

46:35

both recover their lost possessions and to do

46:37

so without the mercy they had previously shown

46:39

by Delini. Led by

46:41

the politician and general Cleon, who had previously

46:43

advocated for that policy of terror, the Athenians

46:46

quickly returned most of the rebel cities to

46:48

the folds. But at

46:50

Amphipolis, Cleon faced off with Bursitis, who

46:52

badly routed the Athenian general. Cleon

46:55

died in the fighting. Thucydides does himself

46:58

no favors by saying that Cleon fled the

47:00

battle, and was surely a product of his

47:02

bitterness over his trial and exile. The

47:04

rest of the Athenians regarded Cleon as a hero. For

47:08

Caius II fell in the battle, and with those

47:10

two deaths, the two men most dedicated to continuing

47:13

the fighting were now gone from the scene. The

47:16

Athenian politician Nikius negotiated a peace that

47:18

was supposed to last fifty years, ending

47:21

a full decade of fruitless, damaging, and

47:23

violent war in 421 BC. But

47:27

the peace of Nikius did not, in fact, last

47:30

fifty years. War would soon

47:32

break out again, bloodier than before. That's

47:35

where we'll pick up next time on Tides of

47:37

History. Tides

47:46

of History is written and narrated by me, Patrick

47:48

Lyman, sound designed by Gabriel Gull

47:50

for airship. The sound engineer

47:52

is Sergio Enriquez. Tides of

47:54

History is produced by Morgan Jaffe. From

47:56

Wunderi, the executive producers are Jenny

47:59

Lower-Bekman and Marcelluso. Thanks

48:01

again for listening. Until next time, for Wundery,

48:03

this is Ties of History. Nancy's

48:13

love story could have been ripped right out

48:15

of the pages of one of her own

48:17

novels. She was a romance

48:19

mystery writer who happens to be married to

48:21

a chef. But this story

48:23

didn't end with a happily ever

48:26

after. When I stepped

48:28

into the kitchen, I could see that Chef Brophy

48:30

was on the ground, and I heard somebody say,

48:33

call 911s. As writers,

48:35

we'd written our share of murder mysteries.

48:37

So when suspicion turned to Dan's wife

48:40

Nancy, we weren't that surprised. The first person they

48:42

looked at would be the spouse. We understand that's

48:44

usually the way they do it. But we began

48:46

to wonder, had Nancy gotten

48:48

so wrapped up in her own novels,

48:50

there are murders in all of the

48:53

books. But she was playing them out

48:55

in real life. You

48:57

can listen to Happily Never After, Dan

48:59

and Nancy, early and ad-free right

49:01

now by joining Wundery Plus in

49:04

the Wundery app or on Apple

49:06

Podcasts.

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