0:00

Enough news this week to last a month.

0:03

Non-stop barrage is pound northern Israel.

0:06

A vote in the Knesset deepens

0:08

Israel's rift, guns leaving the government. And the

0:10

most daring hostage rescue mission we have seen

0:12

since the beginning of the war, it's unholy,

0:14

I mean, a levy of Channel 12, usually

0:17

in Tel Aviv. And

0:19

I'm Jonathan Friedland of The Guardian in

0:21

London. It's

0:32

unholy, two Jews on the news. Like

0:36

you say, lots of news. I mean,

0:38

my day job requires me to be

0:40

focusing on what was meant to be

0:42

the big story of this period, the

0:44

summer general election. Let's just first of

0:46

all query the word summer, because I'm

0:48

talking to you in a place that has not seen

0:50

sunlight for some time. I mean,

0:52

the our idea of a kind of

0:54

summer diversion, I was meant

0:57

to be going to the cricket this evening.

0:59

The forecast is for nonstop rain. But

1:01

even the election is not quite living up to billing.

1:03

I mean, I think people saw this

1:05

opening moment, didn't they, of Rishi Sunak

1:07

announcing the election as buckets of rain

1:09

were dropped on top of him. Did

1:12

he have to do that in the rain or just happened while he was

1:14

talking? No, I mean, it's

1:16

so strange because it had been raining. And then

1:18

there was this break where everyone thought, you know,

1:20

if you know this country, it pauses for 40

1:23

seconds and then starts raining again, you know. And

1:26

his advisers were, you know, apparently were torn

1:28

on this issue. The optics are

1:30

you normally announce it outside Downing Street, but you

1:32

know, do it in a room with a roof.

1:35

So that was and he started he sort of started as he meant to

1:37

go on really, because it's

1:40

been just one optics nightmare

1:42

after another. But the to the point

1:44

where some people are, you know, I've written a couple of

1:46

people have written. Is this maybe not

1:48

an election campaign? Is it maybe a kind

1:50

of performance art installation? You

1:52

know, where where is she sitting? She's

1:54

trying to stage the

1:56

most hapless tin-eared campaign you've

1:59

ever seen. Anyway, I mean, we

2:01

mustn't dwell on this because it's just

2:03

my obsession. But last week was the

2:05

D-Day commemorations, a

2:07

very big deal in the British collective

2:10

memory. And he went

2:12

there to the beaches of northern France,

2:15

but left early. And

2:17

so there's a photograph of world

2:20

leaders on the beach, Joe Biden

2:22

and Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Schulz.

2:25

And then David Cameron, former

2:27

Prime Minister, now Foreign Secretary,

2:30

deputizing for the Prime Minister, who had

2:32

to go back to do a pre-recorded

2:35

interview with one of

2:37

the TV networks here. It wasn't even live. Why did

2:39

he have to do it? So you begin to think

2:41

maybe it's like Jewish reference,

2:44

maybe it's a bit like Max Biala Stock

2:46

and Leo Bloom in The Producers, who deliberately

2:48

want their show to fail. Is

2:50

that what's going on here? Anyway, that's the sort of

2:53

daytime activity for me as a Guardian

2:56

writer, but obviously lots and lots of

2:58

news going on. Luckily,

3:01

Israeli politics is so boring, you have nothing

3:03

to talk about really, right?

3:06

It's the weather and politics and neither of

3:08

them compared to what's going on where you

3:10

are. Yeah, you guys got

3:12

the weather all wrong. That we know. That's a conclusion we

3:15

can arrive at. So there's

3:17

so much going on. Where do you want

3:19

to start from and what is happening in

3:21

Israel? Obviously, a big story as we talk

3:23

in Thursdays, the barrage is coming from the

3:25

north. We will go into all that with

3:27

our special guest, Amos Har-El. I

3:29

mean, do we want to

3:31

start with the major mission rescue

3:34

operation this week, which left

3:37

Israelis finally smiling after such

3:39

a long time and

3:41

realizing that good news is still possible in

3:43

the world we live in? I mean, it's

3:45

been a few days, but still just that

3:47

moment when every Israeli, and I think we

3:49

can also say it extended to the Jewish

3:51

world, this sort of moment of

3:54

happiness, knowing that Noah Ar-Gamani and Shlom Yeziv

3:56

and then Mugmihir Zhan and Andrei, because of

3:58

all of them, all of them. of

4:00

them abducted from the Nova Party are

4:02

okay. No al-Gamani really becoming the way

4:04

she was abducted in her personal story

4:06

with her mother having terminal cancer, all

4:08

of that. She became, I think, a

4:11

symbol of the horrendous

4:13

act Hamas did on October

4:15

7th, abducting these young people from a

4:18

party. She's 26 years old. I think only

4:21

a person with no heart could not

4:23

have tears in his eyes to see

4:25

that picture of her and her father

4:27

reuniting at the hospital. She

4:29

looked well. She looked okay. She

4:32

was sitting with her friends. She's this young woman

4:35

who her life essentially stopped on October

4:37

7th, and so many people were so

4:39

worried about what had happened to her.

4:41

And here it was, the rescue

4:44

mission of the IDF, the special forces of

4:46

the police and all of them, the Shinbets, of course,

4:49

all of them together in this really heroic

4:51

mission, the Israel that we want to

4:53

believe we still are really. And I

4:55

think that was, I think, the

4:57

highlight of this week. Yeah, I mean,

4:59

and you say around the Jewish world, it

5:01

really did go around.

5:04

And one of those four hostages

5:06

you mentioned, for example, is one

5:08

of those hostages adopted by the

5:10

Jewish community I'm a member of.

5:12

There is a chair in the

5:14

synagogue each week with a

5:16

photograph of a

5:18

missing, a hostage still in

5:21

captivity. And there's half a dozen of

5:23

them and the pictures change each week.

5:25

And Shlomi Ziv was one of those. And

5:28

his face was there, present and

5:30

in his absence, as a member

5:32

of our congregation. So it absolutely went around

5:34

the Jewish world. I think one thing that

5:37

I particularly found very moving was the site,

5:39

and again, these went viral, of

5:41

these notes that were put on the

5:43

doors of people who are orthodox,

5:46

religiously observant, and therefore, because it happened

5:48

on Shabbat on the Sabbath, weren't

5:51

able to know, they didn't have the radio

5:53

on or their phones on, and therefore, letting

5:55

neighbors know that look for hostages

5:58

have been released. It was Wonderful

6:00

news. And of course, all you need

6:02

to know about Israel, that was 15 seconds of

6:04

a lifeguard on a beach telling everyone there that

6:06

the hostages have been released and everyone cheering. That's

6:09

all you need to know about Israel and that

6:12

those 15 seconds really. Now,

6:14

and one of the points that you and

6:16

I have talked about a lot is that to

6:18

be outside Israel in these moments is to be

6:21

in that narrative. And like I mentioned, you know, with the

6:23

synagogue and so on. And on the

6:25

other hand, you are seeing things exposed to

6:27

the narrative that people outside Putin, I

6:31

have to say that as soon as there was that

6:33

coverage, a lot of the international media then

6:35

switched their focus very rapidly to

6:38

the price paid for this raid and

6:40

to concentrate on the dozen

6:43

scores, even couple of hundred of

6:45

Palestinians who were killed in that raid.

6:47

I mention it because it's that

6:50

twin experience is what it is to

6:52

be following this from outside. In Israel,

6:55

I suspect that the attention goes immediately just to

6:57

the fore and new people want to have interviews

7:00

with the family and so on. But outside

7:02

there's always that twin track in

7:04

the coverage. And so it was in this case, I think we're

7:06

gonna get into that when we speak

7:09

with our guest, Amal Tarell. Yeah,

7:11

I think so. I mean, to me, of course,

7:14

always sort of also aware of

7:16

what is going on outside Israel, but that

7:18

realization, right? The people criticize Israel for trying

7:20

to rescue its hostages. And then

7:23

Hamas shooting at the people trying to rescue the

7:25

hostage inside a very, you know,

7:27

dense area of Gaza, idea of

7:29

shooting back and then Israel being blamed for

7:31

all that. I know the common sense has

7:33

become quite scarce since October 7th, but this

7:36

was a new height

7:38

to that. Obviously we'll get into all

7:40

that with our special guests. Listen, there are a lot

7:42

of other things happening in Israel this

7:45

week as well, as we said, and

7:47

we teased this for a few episodes,

7:49

also last episode, Benny Gantz finally

7:51

leaving the Netanyahu government,

7:55

saying that Netanyahu is politicizing the war,

7:58

saying there must be a leg. saying

8:01

there also must be a commission of inquiry. This

8:03

is not the way Benny Gantz wanted to leave

8:05

the government. I think he wanted to leave earlier

8:07

and he definitely wanted his departure

8:10

to have a larger effect on

8:12

the Israeli public. As it stands,

8:14

he is in the polls relatively

8:16

losing some power compared

8:18

to what the situation was in two

8:21

or three months ago. I definitely wanted it to have

8:23

another effect, but we're still in the sort of in

8:25

this event happening. It's not

8:28

only a political event. It's also on

8:30

the diplomatic level. This is important. This was

8:32

the moderate side of the government. Remember, Netanyahu

8:34

always likes to have this leverage where he

8:36

has the more moderate side of his government,

8:38

the more far right side of his government.

8:41

Always this is what he would do, right? He would talk to

8:43

the right side and say, but listen, the left is pressuring me

8:46

or talk to the left side and say the right is pressuring

8:48

me. He doesn't like to be in the situation where he is

8:50

actually the left flank of his government

8:52

now that the moderate side of it has left

8:54

the building. The dynamic

8:56

that we'll be watching very closely is between

8:58

him and his defense minister,

9:01

Yov Galant. Galant

9:04

isn't easily put in a box left or

9:07

right because sometimes he has been the most

9:10

hawkish voice around the table.

9:12

We're told that immediately after October 7, it

9:14

was he, I think three or four days

9:17

later, who wanted to launch an offensive on

9:19

the north and he was held back by

9:21

Netanyahu, Gantz and Eisenhower against that too. It

9:25

doesn't fit the and yet on other issues, including

9:27

ones we're going to talk about, he has been,

9:29

as it were, on the left of those issues.

9:32

So in this dynamic of the two of them is going

9:34

to be very, very interesting to watch. But

9:36

no, I mean, I think we've said before,

9:39

I think Gantz lacks one of

9:41

the great political skills, which is timing. Which

9:43

is politics. He doesn't really have

9:46

much in the way of politics. But timing is

9:48

so important and it does feel as if this

9:50

would have been a very powerful

9:52

move in January or February. Instead,

9:54

you know, he let it pass the

9:56

moment where it was passed ripe. It

10:00

has a limited effect. In

10:02

a way, it doesn't endear him to either the left or

10:04

right because the left think you left it too late. The

10:06

right think you've abandoned the helm of the ship. So

10:12

it's a limited effectiveness. So once

10:14

again, I think it has been,

10:17

unfortunately, in other ways too,

10:19

a week that has left the prime

10:21

minister as it were and quite literally smiling. We'll

10:23

talk about all of that. I

10:25

should mention that when Netanyahu, I'm sorry, what Gantz

10:27

and Isincol tried to do really is to bring

10:29

back the hostages. And they thought this is also

10:32

not a very good sign. They thought as

10:34

long as there is a chance for them

10:36

to do that, they should stay. This either

10:38

says this enough is enough or

10:40

that they think that the fact that they would

10:42

reign in the government wouldn't make a difference. That's

10:45

also a big tragedy because after saying everything we

10:47

did about the rescue mission, it's very clear that

10:49

the large bulk of the hostages that can come

10:51

home will come home with a

10:53

deal and that we don't see in the horizon

10:55

right now. Another important development politically is

10:57

the vote in the Knesset about the

10:59

draft bill. We should just rewind that

11:02

a little bit and say there was,

11:05

there's a conscript army in Israel, mandatory

11:07

service. The ultra-orthodox are for the large

11:09

part exempt from that for all sorts

11:11

of historical reasons. But the bill that

11:13

kept them exempt from military service expired.

11:15

It's needed, what is needed is to

11:18

write a new bill, but we are

11:20

in the middle of the war. So

11:22

all this is becoming very, very contentious.

11:24

The High Court of Justice telling the

11:26

government, if you don't write a new

11:28

bill quickly, two things might

11:31

happen. The ultra-orthodox that have been exempt

11:33

thus far will be conscripted and the

11:35

funding for the Yeshivot where they study

11:37

Torah is going to be cut. Two

11:39

things that the ultra-orthodox party is part

11:41

of the coalition and the Yawz coalition

11:43

can't accept. Now, Netanyahu pulled something of

11:45

a trick. We explained this a few

11:48

weeks ago. What he did was take

11:50

the exemption bill written in

11:52

the last government, the Bennett government. It

11:54

was presented by the then Defense Minister

11:57

Gantz. And Netanyahu was essentially saying, hey, I'm going to bring

11:59

this bill. this as the new bill. To

12:01

do that, he needed a continuation vote

12:03

saying that you can continue the legislation

12:06

from where you left it in the

12:08

last government, and he won in that

12:10

vote this week. The problem with this

12:12

being, first of all, we should note

12:14

that Defense Minister Galant, you said you

12:16

can't easily put him in a box.

12:18

He voted against that continuation, which is

12:20

very significant because you have the head

12:23

of the defense system, Defense Echelon, saying,

12:25

I'm not agreeing to this bill at

12:27

all. And this is a bad look

12:29

for Netanyahu. You saw that smile he

12:31

had on his face. He was very

12:33

pleased with the vote itself. This is

12:35

not good for him in

12:38

his own base, the Likudvay specifically, basically

12:40

saying to Israelis as clear as you

12:42

can, all citizens are equal,

12:45

but some citizens are more equal than others.

12:47

This is not a particularly

12:49

good look for him at this point in

12:51

time. Yeah, I think one

12:53

of those things that people outside

12:55

the country often don't quite grasp

12:57

is how absolutely central this

13:00

compulsory military service is. And

13:02

the notion at wartime, when

13:04

everybody else is either

13:06

themselves risking their lives or sending their

13:09

sons and daughters to risk their lives, the

13:11

notion of a substantial percentage of

13:13

the population, 12% or so, who are

13:17

sheltered from that obligation, who do not

13:19

risk their children's lives. It is so

13:22

emotive at a time like

13:25

this. And as you say, that will be

13:27

felt not just on the sort of usual

13:29

suspects of the left. There'll be

13:31

plenty of old school Likudvotas who

13:33

think there has to be equality

13:35

of sacrifice, equality of burden. And

13:37

there's Netanyahu on the wrong side

13:39

of that issue. I mean, obviously,

13:41

I was hardened just by

13:44

seeing somebody in the Likud vote

13:46

against the Likud-led government. And Galant

13:48

doing that, I

13:51

wish there were more behind

13:53

him willing to do that, but

13:55

it was something. So

13:57

clearly a lot to talk about and a lot of going

13:59

on this week and I think we have a perfect guest

14:02

to do it with. Amos

14:10

Sorel is the military and defense analyst of

14:12

Arts newspaper and he has become, if he

14:15

hasn't before but definitely since the war, essential

14:17

reading for anyone interested in what is going

14:19

on. Inside Israel also a good friend of

14:21

this pod. Amos, thank you very much for

14:23

joining us today. Hi, thanks

14:25

for inviting me. Let's

14:27

start with the north. Obviously a barrage

14:29

of rockets over the northern

14:32

part of Israel after a targeted

14:34

killing of a Hezbollah commander. This

14:36

move by Israel, a strategic one,

14:38

tactical, opportunistic. How would you sort

14:41

of define this and where is this all

14:43

heading? It's much more

14:45

of a tactical move than a

14:47

strategic one and it may be

14:49

a result of the situation Israel

14:52

fights itself in after more than

14:54

eight months of fighting. As

14:57

you may recall, Hezbollah began launching

15:00

rockets at Israel a day after the

15:03

Hamas attack on

15:05

the Gaza envelope

15:07

communities. And since

15:10

then what you have is something

15:12

which is short of a full-scale

15:14

war, just beneath a

15:18

war if you'd like to define

15:20

it this way. And we've had

15:23

Israel and Hezbollah swapping blows.

15:25

We've had close to 60,000

15:27

Israeli refugees forced out

15:29

of their homes in about a zone

15:32

which is about three or four miles south

15:34

of the Lebanese border, something that we've

15:36

never encountered before. There

15:38

is an even bigger

15:41

number of Lebanese

15:43

refugees who fled towards the

15:46

Beirut area and the Baka area

15:49

as well. And this hasn't

15:51

been going on too well from

15:53

an Israeli perspective. There are tactical achievements

15:55

but there are no decisive victories

15:57

here. And the strategy, the strategy isn't

16:00

going anywhere. So I think

16:02

more than anything else this shows

16:04

that there's a level of frustration

16:06

among the IDF's top brass because

16:09

whatever we're doing it doesn't tend

16:11

to solve anything. Fighting

16:14

continues and Friesbala begins

16:16

every day with a barrage of rockets

16:18

and attack drones and Asala

16:20

has announced that there's no way a

16:22

ceasefire will be achieved in the north

16:25

before a ceasefire is reached in the

16:27

south. Out of this

16:29

frustration and growing criticism by the

16:31

public against both the army and

16:33

the government comes the

16:36

decision to strike harder. The

16:38

most recent attack on Tuesday night as you mentioned

16:40

was against a top Friesbala

16:42

commander, something like a division commander

16:44

in the Israeli army. This

16:47

is the leader, the commander of the

16:49

Nasser unit which is in

16:51

charge of this eastern part

16:53

of the border with Israel.

16:56

Once he was assassinated we've had

16:58

two days of massive attacks by

17:00

Friesbala, still not exactly full-scale war

17:03

and yet Friesbala picks targets that

17:05

are deeper inside Israel launching

17:08

rockets and sending drones

17:10

all the way down to the Sea

17:13

of Galilee all over the west

17:15

coast of the Sea of Galilee and

17:17

also I think

17:19

it was close to 300 rockets in the last

17:22

two days all across the Galilee. So

17:24

Haifa has not been hit yet, neither

17:26

has Tel Aviv and yet Nasrallah sends

17:28

a signal that this is from his

17:31

view unacceptable and that he will escalate

17:33

his reaction to Israeli

17:35

actions. I mean

17:37

you make the point that it's so

17:39

far tactical. I'm just wondering given that

17:42

Shia might have as well as Arsenal

17:44

the number of rockets it has dwarfs

17:46

anything Hamas have. What

17:49

would a strategic response

17:51

or plan against

17:54

Hezbollah in the north look like? An

17:57

Israeli strategic response against Hezbollah would probably

18:00

mean war. There are some generals who

18:02

say we can have a few days

18:04

of escalation, and then after

18:06

swapping these messages, Hezbollah may think

18:08

twice, the Iranian, his Iranian masters

18:10

may think again, and then maybe

18:13

a ceasefire would be reached, and

18:15

Amos Hochstien could do his magic

18:17

thing and reach

18:20

a final agreement. Hochstien is, of course, the

18:23

special envoy, Biden's special envoy

18:25

to the area regarding the

18:28

tensions on the Lebanese border.

18:31

And yet the danger is, of course,

18:33

that if you try something like that,

18:35

for instance, hitting Beirut, something we

18:37

haven't done yet, or hitting

18:40

in a more extensive way the

18:42

Baka Valley area, which is east of Beirut

18:45

and quite far away from the Israeli border,

18:47

this could probably very easily escalate into

18:50

a full-scale war. And that would mean

18:52

Hezbollah launching rockets, maybe 3,000 rockets

18:55

a day towards Tel Aviv, towards

18:57

Haifa, towards Central Israel, towards

19:00

Israeli infrastructure targets. That would

19:02

be very, very different than

19:04

anything we've encountered before. You

19:07

remember the last round of massive violence between

19:09

Israel and Hezbollah occurred in 2006. And yet

19:11

at that time, Hezbollah

19:14

had about 13,000 rockets, and

19:17

the most it could get was

19:20

hit the Hadera area, which is about

19:22

30 miles north of Tel

19:24

Aviv. By now, it's assumed

19:26

that they have somewhere between 80,000 and

19:29

130,000 rockets and missiles. A

19:32

few hundreds of those are considered to be

19:34

accurate. And also, they have

19:36

long-range missiles that could also reach even

19:38

a lot. It could hit actually every

19:40

target in Israel. This doesn't mean that

19:42

Hezbollah can actually win a round

19:45

of war with Israel. I think this is

19:47

not going to be the case. And yet

19:50

the damage is something that we haven't encountered

19:52

before. This is much more

19:54

significant than anything that

19:56

we've dealt with before. And the fact that

19:58

Israeli leaders have been... dealing

20:01

with this or thinking about this so hard

20:03

for so long has to

20:05

do exactly with that. The fear that

20:07

the home front would be hit

20:10

on a much larger scale than

20:12

we've seen before. And also there's,

20:14

I think, a slight worry that

20:17

even if the IDF does enter

20:20

southern Lebanon and hits

20:22

it using massive artillery

20:24

tanks, infantry units and so on,

20:26

that this could be costly. Perhaps

20:30

we would not progress as fast as we

20:32

can and actually that Hezbollah has been preparing

20:34

for that for many, many years and that

20:36

the outcome may be less than satisfactory from

20:39

the Israeli point of view. Everybody knows that

20:41

this would mean casualties both to the civilian,

20:43

both to civilians and to

20:45

the military, and yet it's unclear

20:48

whether Israel could reach a decisive victory.

20:50

And even if it does, there's

20:52

no flag on Iwo Jima here or

20:55

on the Reichstag. You don't go all the

20:57

way to Beirut. We've tried that with the

20:59

PLO in 82. It got us stuck for

21:01

18 years in Lebanon. I think most Israelis

21:03

would like to avoid that. However,

21:05

there is a small group

21:07

of rabbis that's organizing some

21:10

kind of conference on June 17th

21:12

regarding going back to Lebanon and

21:14

settlements there. So there you have

21:16

it. So

21:18

if we move from that extreme idea

21:21

for a moment, I don't want to

21:24

sound too despondent, but even if we are trying

21:26

to be very optimistic and to say this is

21:28

going to end with some sort of agreement, Hezbollah

21:30

is going to be pushed back, maybe not until

21:32

the litany, but it's going to be far away

21:34

and this will not escalate to an

21:37

all out war. But the problem

21:39

of Hezbollah, as you say, an arsenal

21:41

of so many rockets targeting Israel potentially.

21:43

How do you ever solve that? In

21:46

a sense, it's an issue

21:48

for the next two years, three years,

21:50

five years, but it is a proxy

21:52

of Iran sitting on Israel's northern border,

21:54

amassing so much weaponry. How do you

21:56

solve that without some sort of a

21:58

preemptive strike in an all out war? eventually?

22:01

First of all, sometimes you don't solve it.

22:03

Not all existential

22:05

threats could be made

22:07

to disappear. It's

22:09

a very difficult problem and it's no wonder

22:12

that Israel has tried to avoid dealing with

22:14

it for so many years. Remember,

22:17

after 2006, the Iranians

22:20

helped Hezbollah recover. Hezbollah was hit quite

22:22

badly, although the war itself ended in

22:24

a sort of a miserable draw. And

22:27

later on, it's quite clear that

22:29

what the Iranians did was rebuild

22:31

Hezbollah in such a way which

22:34

would help deter Israel from striking

22:36

their nuclear side.

22:38

That was the whole point, saving

22:41

or protecting the Iranian nuclear

22:43

program from an Israeli strike

22:46

by threatening Israel with Hezbollah's

22:48

power. Now, for many years,

22:50

I think that most Israeli

22:52

analysts and decision makers assumed

22:54

that, okay, there's

22:56

a sort of a mutually assured deterrence here.

22:58

Both sides are very strong. Both sides can

23:01

create a lot of damage to the other

23:03

side. The destruction would be horrible and therefore

23:06

they would try to avoid war. And

23:09

since Iran, at least

23:11

after the Obama administration

23:13

reached the

23:15

deal with Iran in 2015, it

23:18

seemed that we were not positively

23:20

going to a direct conflict

23:22

with Iran. So you could

23:25

build your force, prepare

23:27

for the worst case scenario, and yet try

23:29

to avoid it. What happened

23:31

after October 7th is, I think, first

23:34

and foremost, and we talked about that in

23:36

the pod before, Israelis

23:39

are more concerned. Once

23:41

we've seen Hamas, which is not

23:43

a strong enemy, storm through our

23:46

walls and fences and spread

23:49

so much destruction in Israeli

23:51

communities across the Gaza

23:53

border, one cannot avoid

23:56

the possibility or imagining the possibility of

23:58

a scenario in which Hezbollah, which is

24:00

much stronger, can do the same.

24:03

So this is actually

24:05

quite threatening from an Israeli

24:07

point of view. And then you

24:09

have the possibility that Iran

24:11

may have gained some appetite because of this.

24:14

Because if we look at the situation

24:16

after eight months, there's no clear victory

24:18

for Israel. We were hit very badly

24:20

on October 7th. We recovered. We

24:23

hit Hamas in an even worse

24:25

way. But we didn't solve the

24:28

problem. It's not the end of

24:30

the conflict there. And somebody

24:32

like Khamenei, who was 85 years old, can

24:35

think to himself, well, I have a few more years

24:37

in power. Maybe I should try. Maybe

24:39

I should go for the whole thing.

24:41

Maybe I should go for the great

24:43

plan to destroy Israel completely. He's been

24:45

threatening Israel with that for years. Now,

24:48

until October 7th, people like you and

24:50

me could have thought, OK, we're stronger,

24:53

very aware of this. This is, you know,

24:55

they're playing their own games for domestic reasons,

24:57

but they're never going to be as good

24:59

as they were. They're never going to be

25:01

crazy enough to try something like this. After

25:04

October 7th, I'm not so sure. And this

25:06

is why the Israeli decision makers are so

25:09

worried about the situation right now. And what

25:11

you have on the one hand are the

25:13

residents of those communities in the Galilee who

25:15

have been forced out of their homes and

25:18

are frustrated and are used to a much

25:20

stronger army, at least their perception of the

25:22

army, is of a much stronger entity that

25:24

could deal with everything. And suddenly people tell

25:27

them, well, it's complicated and we don't know.

25:29

The government is telling them

25:31

we don't know exactly when you're coming

25:33

back. Then you have the ultra right

25:36

wing parties who demand a total victory

25:39

over Lebanon. And then you have

25:41

the generals themselves who are torn in between. Some

25:43

of them say, no, this is

25:45

a national humiliation. We need to deal

25:48

with that. We can't

25:50

go on forever with hundreds of rockets being

25:52

launched every day. You know that almost

25:55

every night on the evening news, I see your

25:58

reports beginning with... with devastation

26:01

and destruction in Kibbutzim along

26:04

the border. This is something that's unheard of

26:06

for Israelis. And to have the

26:08

country not being able to solve that, it's

26:10

not only humiliating, it's troubling.

26:13

So this is one part of the problem.

26:15

The other is that some of

26:17

those generals and some of those retired

26:19

generals, like Yisrael Zif, for instance, who

26:21

you interview a lot on

26:23

Channel 12, are concerned and

26:26

are not necessarily sure that this

26:28

is the right way. And in fact, the IDF

26:30

could perform effectively on

26:32

both fronts, Gaza and Lebanon.

26:35

And that considering that we've been fighting for eight

26:37

months with mixed results at best,

26:40

maybe this is not going to go on

26:42

so well if we decide to finally strike

26:45

in Lebanon. Let me

26:47

ask about one of the, when you say it's mixed

26:49

results, one of the good bits of news that's come

26:51

out, one of the very few, and that is the

26:53

hostage rescue last weekend. You

26:56

know, Joni and I were talking about it before, how it went

26:58

around the world. I think there's

27:00

endless interest in this. People understand how

27:02

unbelievably difficult this is, densely packed area.

27:05

The risk for the soldiers doing

27:07

it, that just the minute they're present, the risk

27:10

would be that the captors could hear

27:12

them coming and decide to kill the hostages there

27:14

and then. That's the stakes

27:16

couldn't have been higher. So just tell

27:18

us what you can about how this came

27:20

about, who in the

27:22

military level deserves the credit for

27:25

it for this operation. And

27:27

I suppose a question a lot of people will

27:29

be asking is whether this is a one off

27:31

or whether this now suggests a kind of template

27:34

that could be repeated

27:36

with further rescues. Maybe

27:40

I should start with your last question. In

27:42

my view, it's probably close to a one off.

27:45

We have been able to release seven

27:48

hostages in eight months in three

27:50

different operations. We had all

27:52

of those hostages were found and released

27:55

above ground. We haven't seen a successful

27:57

attempt on the ground in the

27:59

Hamas tunnels. And since

28:02

Hamas has shown to be

28:04

a quick study, probably

28:06

Hamas will be able to learn its own, to

28:09

study what has happened and have its own,

28:11

draw its own conclusions from what has happened

28:14

and change the way it protects,

28:16

what it sees as its greatest assets,

28:18

those 120 Israeli hostages. So

28:23

I'm not so hopeful about the

28:25

possibility of doing this again. Some

28:27

people, most Netanyahu supporters,

28:29

using this as proof that the

28:32

opposition, their

28:35

demands for a deal are wrong.

28:37

This is the right way to go

28:39

forward and only military pressure and those

28:41

brave soldiers who bring results. In reality,

28:44

it's much more complicated and harder to

28:46

do. I hope that we'll see it's

28:48

not a miracle. It's a

28:50

military miracle, if you'd like. People who worked very,

28:52

very hard for this, I don't know if some

28:54

people prayed, but others worked very, very hard and

28:56

planned and then acted, as

28:58

you said, very bravely and courageously and

29:01

managed to get those hostages out.

29:04

It will be hard to repeat,

29:06

considering that the enemy has

29:08

its own way of learning from

29:10

such mistakes. Now, regarding the operation

29:12

itself, some people could bear it

29:14

to Antebbe in 76, and

29:17

of course, Netanyahu would like to ride that

29:19

kind of wave because of his family history.

29:21

And yet this is different. Antebbe

29:23

was, you know, they

29:25

released more than 100 hostages, if

29:28

I'm not mistaken, and it happened many,

29:30

many miles away from Israeli soil. This

29:32

happened those days, but as you said,

29:34

the most difficult thing to do here

29:37

was to act in a very densely

29:39

populated area. I

29:41

think in the end, this proves again

29:44

what the army, it's not only

29:47

the army, it's Shimbet, and in

29:49

this case, the actual unit operating

29:51

was the Yamam, the special anti-terrorist

29:53

force that belongs to the police.

29:56

Now, these guys are professionals,

29:58

and the way they... work

30:00

in such specific pinpoint operations,

30:04

I don't want to use terms like

30:06

the best in the world, but they're top

30:08

of their game. They're not far

30:10

away from the Brits or the Americans can

30:13

do in a similar situation. And

30:15

maybe, just maybe the Israeli

30:17

generals are willing to risk some

30:20

more considering the circumstances and everything

30:22

that has happened. So this has

30:24

been done very professionally.

30:27

Not a lot of people knew about it

30:29

in advance. I talked this week to the

30:32

division commander who was in charge of the

30:34

operation. He told me that he had to

30:36

keep a very close, small circle

30:38

of officers around him who knew the

30:41

secret. Others knew only

30:43

that the division was maneuvering into

30:45

the central area of the Gaza

30:48

Strip. It's called the central area

30:50

refugee camps, like Mr. Raat. And they didn't

30:52

even know that there was a hostage operation

30:55

planned. They only knew in the

30:57

last minute. So this is the way they

30:59

kept the secret. They practiced for a few weeks. Once

31:01

they had the full chance

31:04

of getting there, they actually went all the

31:06

way. We should of course

31:08

know that one brave officer was

31:10

killed during the operation. And your next

31:13

question, I'm pretty sure is going to

31:15

be about the human cost on the

31:17

other side. He knows

31:19

you well, Jonathan. He knows you well. Yes,

31:22

you read my mind there because inevitably, and

31:24

you only talked about it, you

31:26

know, while Jews around the world are

31:28

celebrating the release of those four hostages,

31:30

international attention goes on the price paid.

31:32

And some, obviously, there are different estimates,

31:34

some 200 Palestinians killed in

31:36

the process is one figure claimed.

31:38

My question is, could that have

31:40

been avoided? Is it possible to

31:42

rescue hostages without incurring that kind

31:44

of human cost on the other side?

31:47

Look, one of your British

31:49

colleagues actually asked an Israeli

31:51

spokesperson, why didn't you notify

31:54

the poor residents of the honest Iraq refugee camp?

31:56

We both agree that this, you know, in a

31:58

better world, maybe the could have been done,

32:00

but I'm not sure all of them would have been

32:03

convinced to keep a secret. Just

32:05

between you and me, we're coming this morning,

32:07

stay away. Look, it's extremely

32:10

complicated. And again, as

32:12

you know from the past, from our

32:15

conversations in the past, I don't like

32:17

to be squeezed into the Hasbarah corner.

32:20

You know, I'm not an official

32:22

spokesperson for Israel. And yet, I

32:24

think I would suspect

32:26

some of the details and

32:28

numbers coming out from the Hamas side.

32:30

We've seen that before on Rafa. Most

32:33

recently, we've seen that in previous

32:35

incidents that could be used by the

32:38

Palestinians. And of course, most famously, in

32:40

the attack on the Hanyunas hospital that

32:42

never occurred on October, if you remember

32:45

the case with the Islamic

32:47

Jihad rocket. So it's quite easy to play

32:49

with the numbers. I'm not trying to say

32:51

that there were not innocent civilians killed. We

32:54

saw the videos, some civilians

32:57

were killed, not everybody who died there

32:59

was a civilian. I saw

33:01

some of the videos, it was quite clear

33:03

that these were men of the right age,

33:05

so to speak. And as you know, Hamas

33:07

is not moving around

33:09

in uniform, in military uniform there.

33:13

Once you make that decision to act

33:15

in such a densely populated area, like

33:17

the other risks the Israelis were taking,

33:19

they were taking this risk as well.

33:22

And yet, again, Hamas decided

33:24

on the attack on October

33:26

7th made civilians

33:29

its main target, including old

33:31

people, women, innocent children,

33:34

and so on. And once

33:36

you operate in such an area, Hamas

33:38

decided to hide them inside

33:40

family apartments, among a

33:43

very crowded area with civilians. I can't

33:46

think, I don't think Hamas

33:48

can turn around and say to Israel it's

33:50

your fault. It's quite clear now that Hamas

33:52

is having it both ways. Look, the most

33:54

important piece of information I read this week

33:56

is the Wall Street Journal's story, the day

33:59

before yesterday. Somehow they were

34:01

able magically to obtain

34:03

some correspondence being made between Sinwar,

34:05

the leader of Hamas in Gaza

34:08

in the tunnels, and Hamas's

34:11

outside leadership in Doha. And

34:14

Sinwar is being quoted as saying that

34:17

actually he doesn't really care. We suspected

34:19

that all along, but he doesn't really

34:22

care about the price being

34:24

paid on the Palestinian side. This was

34:26

a necessary price. Compare that to the

34:28

war, the civil war in Algeria in

34:30

the 50s, and he said this

34:32

is a necessary sacrifice. He talks to Ismail

34:35

A'Nia, who lost three of his sons and

34:37

some grandsons in an Israeli strike,

34:39

and he said, well, it's a price

34:41

worth to pay for our freedom and

34:43

our independence and so on. He's

34:45

having it both ways in a way. Any

34:48

civilian killed in Israeli action

34:50

actually, to some extent, it helps Hamas.

34:53

And I think it's quite clear that

34:55

there's an absolute disregard by Hamas to

34:58

Palestinian lives. I have my

35:00

criticism regarding Israeli action. I've

35:02

talked about that and written about that

35:04

quite a lot in recent months. I

35:06

think that in many cases, the Israelis

35:09

should have been much more careful about

35:11

rules of engagement and so

35:13

on. And yet it's very, very hard

35:16

to play this in a gentlemanly

35:18

kind of way when you fight

35:20

against such an enemy, especially because

35:23

they work underground. We've talked about that

35:25

in the past again. When Sinwar talks

35:28

to his friends abroad,

35:30

what he says is we have the Israelis

35:32

exactly where we wanted them, meaning

35:35

stuck in Gaza, dealing with our underground

35:37

tunnels and unable to reach a final

35:40

decisive victory. This is exactly exactly

35:42

the case. So

35:44

eight months. And let's just sort

35:47

of pick up on how you ended that answer.

35:49

Eight months in, obviously, Israel bogged

35:51

down in Gaza. The United

35:53

States suggests this idea. It's

35:56

based on what Netanyahu agreed

35:58

to, to essentially. end

36:01

or at least temporary ceasefire,

36:03

some hostages coming out

36:05

as much as Israel can, and then

36:07

somehow reaching an agreement in the north,

36:09

everything is tied together. How close are

36:12

we to that? Because it seems like

36:14

we're still stuck on

36:16

the same argument between

36:18

Hamas and Israel. Hamas wants a ceasefire

36:20

to end the war. Israel just agrees

36:22

to a temporary ceasefire, and this is

36:25

going nowhere. This is

36:27

going nowhere. We're nowhere close to

36:29

reaching an agreement. In retrospect, and

36:31

some of this has

36:33

been said in real time, there was

36:35

sort of a golden window of opportunity

36:38

somewhere between January

36:40

and April. Hamas was hit pretty badly

36:42

at that time. Israel

36:44

needed to show

36:46

a lot of flexibility in order for

36:48

a deal to be reached. The final

36:50

deal would have meant an

36:53

end to all fighting and

36:55

a total Israeli withdrawal, but

36:57

it was both Netanyahu and to some

36:59

extent the army who refused many of

37:01

the demands and the suggestions raised by

37:03

even by the Qataris and Egyptians and

37:05

the Americans at that time. And it

37:07

was quite clear at that time that

37:09

Netanyahu wanted to avoid this because

37:11

of his political problems, because if

37:15

he went all the way and reached the

37:17

final agreement, that would have meant admitting

37:19

that the war was over, that we didn't win

37:21

this, and that would probably

37:23

have meant Benjamin Smartridge resigning from

37:25

the coalition. And the end of

37:28

his government as we know it.

37:30

Now, this opportunity was missed partly

37:32

because of Netanyahu, partly because of

37:34

Hamas's behavior. Now, we're at

37:37

a different page. By now, the same

37:39

Sinoal is feeling that he has the upper hand.

37:41

Of course, residents of Gaza are suffering. Of

37:44

course, Hamas itself has lost, I

37:46

don't know, between 15 to 20,000 fighters. And

37:50

yet this is not over. This is a price

37:52

he's willing to pay. And once he feels that

37:54

this is progressing the way he wants,

37:56

why should he make any kind of

37:59

concessions? Now, every time... we had the

38:01

possibility of the deal being

38:03

reached in February, March or

38:05

April. What we had

38:07

was that whenever there was a chance, Netanyahu

38:10

began leaking to the

38:12

press his reservations about the

38:15

possible outcome of an agreement

38:17

and some of the demands

38:19

that he was not going

38:21

to give regarding release of

38:23

prisoners and so on. Now

38:26

he doesn't even need to do

38:28

that because in war's latest demands,

38:30

this answer that he gave the

38:33

mediators two or three days ago, the demands

38:36

are so harsh that there's no way

38:38

Israel is going to go for it.

38:40

Now I suspect that in his heart

38:42

of hearts, Netanyahu is pretty happy about

38:44

this situation. This way no

38:47

deal is reached so he doesn't need

38:49

to make any kind of massive

38:51

concessions. Small troops in the bank

38:53

remain on board and even the

38:55

Americans are saying that this is

38:57

Sinoir's fault and not Netanyahu's fault.

38:59

So win-win for Netanyahu. The problem

39:01

is that this is not win-win

39:03

for Israel because as you mentioned

39:05

strategically we're going nowhere, we're stuck.

39:07

The whole idea was reach

39:09

a hostage deal, reach some kind of

39:12

ceasefire in the south and then let

39:14

Hochstann do his thing and reach some kind

39:16

of an agreement up north and perhaps

39:19

in the future when we're more ready,

39:21

we deal with both problems whether it's

39:25

Sinoir by assassinating him and I

39:27

have to say that personally I'm

39:29

hoping that this is the way

39:31

his life or his story ends

39:33

and perhaps even a strike, a

39:35

unilateral Israeli strike against

39:38

Hezbollah as well. But right

39:40

now it's quite evident that we're not ready

39:42

for this, that after eight months of fighting, the

39:45

public is exhausted, the soldiers are

39:47

exhausted, the top brass

39:50

want to rest and Netanyahu

39:52

himself is not on top of his

39:54

game right now. So

39:56

there are many reasons to suggest

39:58

that a better solution for Israel right

40:01

now is to accept that we haven't won this

40:03

round at all, that we've suffered quite

40:05

a lot. And yet we need

40:07

to make concessions in order to try and

40:09

improve our situation, especially because we

40:11

think of what's laying lurking

40:14

in the shadows right now, which is Iran, which is

40:16

the Iranian attempt to become

40:18

sort of a mastermind behind all of

40:20

those attacks from Iraq, from Syria, from

40:22

Lebanon, from Gaza and so on. And if

40:25

we're facing... And from Iran itself. Yeah, and if we're facing

40:27

a much bigger challenge, maybe we should

40:29

start dealing with the bigger problems and

40:32

not just with the fact that Hamas

40:34

has humiliated us and murdered our countrymen

40:36

and raped and mutilated people all across

40:39

the Gaza envelope. This is a serious

40:41

matter, but there are perhaps even greater

40:43

challenges. The problem right now is that

40:46

after Netanyahu wasted all of this time,

40:48

Sinoir himself is not willing to play along. And

40:51

now we're stuck between a rock and a hard

40:53

place. It's very hard to maneuver under

40:55

these circumstances. You

40:57

made that really interesting distinction between what's in

40:59

Israel's interest and what's in Netanyahu's interest. And

41:02

if we had more time, I would ask you

41:04

what you think has to change, what the Americans

41:07

could do in particular to change the calculus for

41:09

Netanyahu, to make it in his interest to

41:11

get this thing concluded and to

41:14

accept an even imperfect deal.

41:16

But because time is short, I'm going to plant

41:18

that thought. But I also just thought we should

41:20

ask your view on the departure of Benny

41:23

Kants and Gaddy Eisenkot from the government

41:26

and how what bearing that has on the

41:29

military decision making. I mean, Yoni and I, when

41:31

we were talking earlier, just said about these things

41:33

are quite finely balanced and Netanyahu quite like to

41:35

be in the man in the middle between

41:38

one side and the other. And now that's

41:40

got a bit more lopsided inside the war cabinet.

41:43

But in terms of just the prosecution of the

41:45

war, what impact do you

41:47

think it means that these two people,

41:49

you know, very with their own big

41:51

military history, their departure? What

41:53

does it mean? Look, they've

41:55

been hesitating for a long time, as you

41:58

know, Eisenkot was pushing for party

42:01

resignation from the coalition by

42:03

March. And Gantz, as usual,

42:05

was not happy to take a decision.

42:08

He kept delaying. He hoped that

42:10

something might happen, perhaps something

42:12

positive might come out of this. And

42:15

only under extreme pressure from Isakot and

42:17

others did he decide to resign

42:20

this week. About

42:22

the outcome, look, Netanyahu is

42:24

playing it in a sort of complicated

42:26

kind of way. For instance,

42:29

there's the war cabinet in which

42:31

both Isakot and Gantz were members.

42:33

He's actually reconstructing

42:35

the way decisions are

42:37

taken now, and there's not going to

42:40

be a war cabinet anymore because he

42:42

wants to avoid small teacher in Benkville

42:44

who demand to become members instead of

42:46

Gantz and Isakot. Now that's the last

42:48

thing that Netanyahu needs, to have

42:50

them in all those very serious

42:53

and long meetings with the top

42:55

brass from the army, Shinbet and

42:57

Mossad. So we'd like to avoid

42:59

that. They'll remain at the bigger

43:01

cabinet, and a small group of

43:03

people actually making the decisions would

43:05

include Galant, Deli, Dilma and Netanyahu.

43:08

And that's it. Will we

43:10

miss Isakot and Gantz? They

43:12

could tell you that during the last seven

43:15

or eight months, they had a contribution to

43:17

some important decisions, whether it was the decision

43:20

to block Galant's proposal to

43:22

strike Hezbollah in

43:24

Beirut on October 11th, four or

43:26

five days after the war started.

43:29

Later on, they pushed forward. They convinced

43:31

Netanyahu to go to the first hostage

43:33

deal. Remember at that time, many of

43:35

the right wing ministers opposed that. And

43:38

there were all kinds of discussions in which the

43:40

army, they didn't necessarily agree

43:42

on everything, but Hiltzia Levi, the

43:44

chief of staff, could enjoy

43:47

the support of his former

43:49

commanders, Gantz and Isakot, on

43:51

certain matters. This is not enough of

43:54

an excuse to remain in office,

43:57

considering the way that the war is

43:59

handled. and where we're going. And

44:01

it's not only about the war, it's about

44:04

Yarev Leving's attempts to go back

44:06

to the judicial overhaul. It's about

44:09

the way Bengvil has completely taken

44:11

over the police. It's

44:13

about police violence against quite

44:17

calm protests in Tel Aviv, against

44:19

the government. We're seeing very, very

44:21

bad signs everywhere. The question right

44:23

now is, will this lead to some

44:25

kind of a political turmoil? Will this

44:28

mean that actually finally people would march

44:30

on the streets the way they did

44:32

the night Galant was fired on March

44:34

23? Right now, Gantz

44:36

doesn't have the charisma to lead

44:39

a revolution here. It's not going

44:41

to march in the streets in

44:43

front of hundreds of thousands of

44:45

people. And yet, maybe the political

44:48

conditions are somewhat slightly changing in

44:50

a sort of gradual way. More

44:52

than anything else, it's about the draft law.

44:55

Think of what has happened two or three days

44:57

ago about this picture, this

44:59

photograph taken at night after

45:01

Netanyahu won the vote. You see him smiling from

45:04

ear to ear, considering the

45:06

fact that four soldiers' lives were lost

45:08

a few hours earlier in Rafah. Not

45:11

the right image that he should be projecting.

45:13

But this is the way it goes. Netanyahu

45:15

right now, it's all about Netanyahu.

45:18

There's nothing else there. It's

45:20

about surviving and protecting his

45:22

political future. And this

45:24

is very, very frustrating. Will that push

45:26

thousands or tens of thousands to

45:29

the streets? I don't know. But I'm talking to

45:31

Mille Mnics, to reservists who have been serving for

45:33

150 or 200 days in

45:36

the last year and know that

45:38

there's another call waiting them. And

45:41

they're frustrated. Now, the ultra-autodocs are

45:43

never going to come and volunteer

45:45

immediately and fight in Givati and

45:47

Golanie or replace religious

45:49

Zionists or secular kids

45:52

fighting in the paratroopers brigade.

45:54

OK, it's not going to happen anytime soon. And

45:57

yet the fact that the burden is not shared in

45:59

any... kind of way. This is

46:02

far too much for most Israelis to bear. Maybe

46:04

something good would come out of this. I'm not

46:07

sure that guns would lead the way, but perhaps

46:09

the combination of the two trends

46:11

might lead us somewhere. Amos

46:14

Sarel, you made us smarter. I'm not sure

46:16

you made us more optimistic, but we really

46:18

appreciate you coming on on Holi and

46:20

sharing your point of view. Thank you so much. Thanks

46:23

again. Thank you, Amos, so much. As

46:33

you say, always enlightening to speak

46:35

with Amos Sarel, even if it's

46:37

not necessarily cheering, but

46:40

the sort of

46:42

comprehensive take we got from him. There's

46:45

this line in Patrick Marber's play, Closer, where he

46:47

says, what's so good about the truth? Try lying

46:49

for a change. It's the currency of the world.

46:51

I mean, Amos speaks the truth, and sometimes it's

46:54

a bit depressing, but you need to listen to

46:56

it. I think there are two points just to

46:58

pick up on the end of what he said

47:00

in the draft bill and all of that conversation.

47:03

Two things we should notice. One is that Netanyahu

47:05

is trying, there's only one, he has an eye

47:07

on the date, and the date is

47:09

28th of July. That's when the Knesset goes into

47:11

its summer recess, and it's going to be very,

47:14

very hard to topple the government in

47:16

that period until it comes back for its

47:18

winter session, for the Knesset's winter session at

47:20

the end of October. He's very focused on

47:23

that. He's trying to buy time as much

47:25

as he can. That's why you saw this

47:27

draft bill continuation, but we

47:29

need to also keep our eyes on the

47:31

ball on what's happening next week. It should

47:33

be probably next week when the High Court

47:35

of Justice delivers its decision on

47:38

the fact that there is no draft

47:40

bill. And if, for example, the High

47:42

Court of Justice decides yes to enlist

47:44

all of the ultra-orthodox or thousands of

47:46

them that have not been enlisted thus

47:49

far, and you could hear the echoes

47:51

in the first deliberations where the judges,

47:53

even conservative judges like Noam

47:55

Sölberg saying things like, why only 3,000 ultra-orthodox

47:57

to be enlisted? We're in the middle of

47:59

the war. you might need more, I'm paraphrasing,

48:01

but that is essentially what he was saying. If

48:03

you have a decision like that, that can throw

48:05

a lot of turmoil, the government, into a whole

48:07

lot of turmoil and you don't know where that

48:09

is. Yeah, but

48:11

if the game is running out

48:14

the clock, there are a few

48:16

better maestros of that game than

48:18

Netanyahu and 26th of July will

48:20

look very achievable for him when

48:22

he's got that date ringed on the

48:25

calendar. Each

48:32

week we note how the war

48:35

on the ground is mirrored or

48:37

echoed very far away

48:39

in the debate, the argument that

48:41

rages around the world about the

48:44

war. That came to New York

48:46

in very dramatic fashion this last

48:48

week. An exhibition on

48:51

the Nova music festival opened in

48:53

the Financial District of

48:55

New York City, a very powerful exhibit

48:58

by all accounts, but a lot of

49:00

attention on these huge, loud and noisy

49:03

protests outside, people

49:06

protesting. I saw video

49:08

of one of the rally speakers who

49:12

said that it was a disgrace to commemorate

49:15

the people at the Nova

49:17

music festival because they were

49:19

the equivalent of people who

49:21

were dancing and

49:24

having a rave by the

49:26

gas chambers. That's what she said. She said,

49:28

if you've seen the film Zone of Interest,

49:30

this is beyond Zone of Interest, what happened

49:33

at the Nova music festival. It's

49:35

a pretty sick argument that was

49:37

made to great cheers by one of

49:39

the speakers outside. Obviously people will say, oh, there

49:41

are other protests who weren't the same. It

49:44

just gives you a little flavor of at least some

49:46

of the sentiment expressed by protesters.

49:48

And then separately, the

49:51

Brooklyn Museum, not a Jewish museum,

49:53

just the Brooklyn Museum, had had

49:55

protests outside the museum back in

49:57

May and had objected to the

50:00

those protests, as if in revenge

50:02

for that, four homes of

50:04

people linked to the museum, including the museum

50:06

director, Ann Pasternak, had

50:09

their homes vandalized

50:11

with fake blood, with

50:13

graffiti, with signs, absolutely

50:16

splashed with this red fake blood and

50:18

inverted red triangles, which said to be

50:20

a symbol that Hamas uses to

50:23

identify targets for violence.

50:26

In a statement put out as seemingly by

50:28

the people who were behind this, who

50:31

claimed to be artists and

50:33

cultural workers, rather than just random vandals,

50:35

they put out a statement saying the

50:37

Brooklyn Museum is an institution

50:41

tainted with the blood of

50:43

our martyrs. So,

50:47

violence and violent damage, as

50:52

well as noisy and raucous protests, outside

50:55

people who are not themselves

50:57

combatants, in one case, an

51:00

exhibition dedicated to the memory of those

51:02

killed at the Nova music festival and

51:04

taken hostage. In other case, not even

51:07

really related, but for

51:09

Jewish people linked to a

51:11

museum, having their homes

51:13

vandalized and covered in blood, it's

51:16

pretty alarming. Yeah, I mean,

51:18

and if we were all

51:20

under the impression that this antisemitism

51:23

that erupted after October 7th would

51:25

at some point die down, it's

51:27

been eight months, and if anything,

51:29

it just seems worse than it

51:31

did months ago. I

51:33

don't know what can be done besides more

51:35

and more people who aren't from the Jewish

51:37

community joining together and saying

51:39

enough is enough. And

51:41

obviously, all the criminal charges put it against

51:44

these people, but I'm really, I look at

51:46

this and I don't know what to do.

51:48

When you see these protests in front of

51:51

the exhibition about the Nova festival, which really

51:53

is ground zero for

51:56

us Israelis, and I think not only for Israelis,

51:58

I mean, what is, what. What more needs to

52:00

happen for this world to not be

52:02

so upside down? I really don't know. Yeah,

52:05

it's interesting your point about you had hoped

52:07

and that it would get calmer.

52:11

If anything, I'm afraid I think

52:14

the tipping point and the turning

52:16

point was the legitimation of the

52:18

word genocide in this context.

52:20

The ICJ interim judgment, they didn't say

52:22

it was genocide. They said that

52:25

they just accepted that there was

52:27

a case, that there was a

52:29

risk under the genocide convention, which

52:31

meant that Palestinians required protection very,

52:34

very differently. Just essentially we're saying we'll hear

52:36

the case, but that set

52:38

this sort of unleashed

52:40

this kind of rhetoric. And so

52:43

therefore you can, you see people

52:45

outside that Nova music

52:47

festival believing that they

52:49

and saying that somehow the people

52:52

at the Nova music festival, and

52:54

you've seen this on social media

52:56

too, require no

52:59

more sympathy than if there

53:02

was some Jewish resistance against Germans

53:04

in the period of the Shoah.

53:08

Like I said, I think it's pretty sick and it's morally

53:11

upside down to

53:14

think that somehow there is people,

53:16

young people dancing at a music festival

53:19

are some kind of legitimate target. But

53:22

I do think that this is, we're living

53:24

with the consequences of this escalation of

53:27

the rhetoric, this idea that's

53:29

now written about and said as if it's not

53:31

even contestable, a genocide is going

53:33

on and therefore your moral duty is to

53:35

stand against this. And

53:37

so I think it's going to get louder and louder until

53:40

in a way that argument is

53:42

rebutted and diffused. I

53:45

think I've said before, I don't think any of that

53:47

argument can really happen until this thing is over. While

53:49

it's ongoing, no one is thinking

53:51

straight and you're getting situations like this.

53:53

I think it's a very, very alarming

53:55

term. Meanwhile, this is the year

53:57

of elections all over the world. in

54:00

India, there are elections right now in

54:02

Britain, big one in November

54:04

in the United States, not yet in

54:06

Israel, somehow it's managing to hold out,

54:09

which we've said before is extraordinary. But

54:11

there was a round of elections across

54:13

the European Union, votes

54:15

tallied last weekend for the

54:17

European Parliament, 27 member countries

54:20

taking part. And again,

54:22

from the angle we look at the world, some

54:25

alarming developments there because

54:28

significant gains for parties not just

54:31

of the right, but of the far

54:33

right in Italy, France and Germany, significant

54:35

gains. For example, AFD,

54:37

the Alternative for Deutschland Party in Germany,

54:39

which has a sinister ring to it,

54:41

even just its name, the

54:44

party of Le Pen in France

54:46

coming top of the poll

54:48

there. In fact, in five of

54:51

the 27 member countries,

54:53

far right parties came first,

54:56

and they came second or third in five other

54:58

countries. It was liberal sort of

55:00

centrist, often green parties that were losing out.

55:03

Obviously, there is alarm for

55:05

that important caveat. In

55:07

countries where the far right have been in

55:09

government, either in the past or still, far

55:12

right parties did not do

55:15

so well in Poland and in Hungary,

55:17

for example. But

55:19

in those big countries, France and

55:21

Germany, it's certainly caught attention. Emmanuel

55:23

Macron has then rolled

55:25

the dice in an incredibly

55:27

high risk gamble by calling

55:29

early parliamentary elections there, which

55:33

if they replicated what happened last weekend, you

55:35

would be seeing a Le Pen led government

55:37

that he would have to swear in. And

55:40

that's an amazing idea. But he's

55:43

rolling the dice that everyone else will unite against

55:45

that, as they have done in previous elections. But

55:48

inevitably, a lot of attention on the AFD

55:52

in Germany, partly

55:54

because of its

55:56

history, the history of the country, but even the AFD's

55:58

history of the country. of seeming

56:01

to sort of soft soap

56:03

to slightly airbrush the

56:05

history. Plenty of AFD leaders have over

56:08

the years said, you know, enough of

56:10

this generation having to bear

56:12

the guilt of their fathers and

56:14

grandfathers that that's not fair. But

56:17

here's the twist on this, which is perhaps unexpected.

56:22

The AFD is positioning itself in

56:24

some ways as not

56:26

an anti-Jewish party, but on the

56:29

contrary, somehow pro-Jewish, because

56:31

it is saying its big issue is

56:33

Muslim immigration. And it

56:35

has been even targeting some looking for Jewish

56:37

support by saying that it's,

56:39

you know, as some of these far

56:41

right parties are pro-Israel, but

56:43

also very centrally anti-Muslim and trying to

56:47

stir Jewish support as a result. There is

56:49

even a sort of Jewish base of

56:51

support, a small but existent inside the

56:53

AFD. There are some Jewish supporters. So

56:56

these are complicated results, but I think very

56:58

troubling ones. So just one note

57:00

on a country that so far

57:03

doesn't look like it's having elections, but

57:05

when you look at that trajectory towards

57:07

the far right and what

57:09

is happening in Israel, phenomenons like Itamar

57:12

Benghvil, who used to be

57:14

ostracized from the political sphere

57:16

because of his opinions, essentially,

57:18

Kahane's opinions of the far,

57:20

far right, and the fact

57:23

that he is now the minister of national security,

57:25

obviously this has to do with Netanyahu's decision,

57:27

but also with the political power he himself,

57:29

Benghvil himself, has amassed. And that is because

57:31

of this political trend. It has to do

57:33

with that as well, the political trend or

57:35

the global trend of moving more to the

57:37

right in this populist far right leaders who

57:40

suggest a simple solution to the most

57:42

complicated problems and a lot of people

57:45

would vote for that. So I think it's also important

57:47

when you look at something like Itamar Benghvil here in

57:49

Israel to look at, to see that as part of

57:52

a global phenomenon. It

57:54

is awards time and nowhere in

57:56

the world loves giving itself awards

57:59

more than. and Hollywood,

58:01

and it is to Hollywood

58:03

that our Hutzberg category turns,

58:05

you need. Rather elegantly

58:07

done, Mr. Friedland. Yes, indeed.

58:09

We are dealing with the

58:12

Academy Museum of Motion Pictures in

58:14

L.A. Now, the story begins by

58:17

the fact that they have not had for

58:19

two and a half years, as

58:21

long as the museum has been open,

58:24

mention of the history of

58:26

the industry's Jewish beginning. Now,

58:28

just to pause on that

58:30

for a moment, to talk

58:32

about the history of Hollywood

58:34

without specifically mentioning Jews is

58:37

like talking about, I don't know, the history

58:39

of New York without mentioning Jews, the history

58:41

of Jews without mentioning Jews. I mean, it

58:43

is just impossible to do

58:45

that. So after two and a

58:47

half years of pressure, finally, the

58:49

museum decided to have an exhibition,

58:51

it's called Hollywood Land, Jewish Founders

58:53

and the Making of a Movie

58:55

Capital. The problem is that many

58:57

people noted that the way the

58:59

Jewish founders of Hollywood are treated

59:02

and depicted in this

59:04

exhibition is actually very, very problematic.

59:06

Now, a letter has come out, organized

59:09

by United Jewish writers, talking about the

59:11

fact that this is really vilifying the

59:14

people that you're supposed to be celebrating,

59:16

that the exhibition uses words like

59:19

womanizer, like oppressive, tyrant is another

59:21

word that's in that exhibition and

59:23

kind of saying, you know, you're

59:25

blaming Jews for a problematic past

59:27

that was true to all of

59:29

Hollywood, but specifically, you're you're now

59:31

writing this about them. So I've

59:34

been talking to a dear friend who has been

59:36

telling you this whole story for a few weeks now.

59:38

And he said, you know, the upsetting thing about this

59:40

is that, again, Jews have to stand there, the only

59:42

people who have to stand up for themselves and say,

59:44

listen, this is not OK. And

59:46

I think this in some way, they kind of

59:48

expected other people to join in on this. But

59:50

I think that the museum itself definitely

59:53

deserves the Chutzpah Award of this week. Yeah,

59:55

no, that's a good choice. I mean, I think it was

59:57

with David Badil on the podcast he was here talking about.

1:00:00

how weird it was that Hollywood

1:00:02

had a museum about Jews. It was

1:00:04

an example. He said that Jews don't

1:00:06

count, and yet when they go to

1:00:08

make amends, they criticize. And I

1:00:10

think this point has been made by some of

1:00:13

the critics. They criticized Jews in a way they

1:00:15

didn't do in any other group who were highlighted

1:00:17

in the museum. So there is a part of

1:00:19

the museum, I think about African Americans in Hollywood.

1:00:21

No one thought they would describe those individuals in

1:00:24

these very negative critical terms. It is somehow an

1:00:26

example, I think, of his. Jews

1:00:28

don't count logic there

1:00:30

in Hollywood land. For

1:00:33

our Mench Award, I think we're going to

1:00:35

go back to our European elections story, mainly

1:00:38

gloomy and troubling news, as we

1:00:40

were saying. But the party

1:00:42

of the French left, led

1:00:45

by, even for these European parliamentary

1:00:47

elections, by one Raphael Glückzman, a

1:00:49

Jewish writer, a filmmaker, did

1:00:51

rather better than expected.

1:00:54

They did better than they'd done before. They did better

1:00:56

than most of the European left in

1:00:58

these elections. And the reason why

1:01:00

it's particularly single out Raphael Glückzman

1:01:02

is very interesting, sort of charismatic,

1:01:04

younger figure. So he's

1:01:07

had to walk this line. He's come under

1:01:09

a lot of pressure from people on the

1:01:11

left in France to use, for example, the

1:01:13

word genocide in regards to the

1:01:16

treatment of Palestinians by Israel. And

1:01:18

he has refused to use the

1:01:21

term, instead saying he's extremely cautious

1:01:23

about when that word should be

1:01:26

used. Maybe that shouldn't

1:01:28

be a big deal, but in the current climate, the current

1:01:30

atmosphere, it is a big

1:01:32

deal. And he has shown a way,

1:01:35

amongst other things, to how this

1:01:37

far right surge can

1:01:39

be repelled. So a shout out

1:01:41

at the very least to Raphael

1:01:43

Glückzman of France.