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2:04

The infamous violence in Rwanda during the

2:06

1990s has long been a reminder of how quickly

2:09

social divides can turn into a

2:11

brutal genocidal slaughter.

2:14

In fact, in just 100 days in 1994, an

2:17

estimated 500,000 to 1 million

2:19

people were slaughtered by the ethnic Hutu

2:21

extremists. But who are the Hutu

2:24

targeting and why? I'm

2:26

your host, James Patton Rogers, this is Warfare,

2:29

and for this episode, I've invited Dr. Aaron Jesse

2:31

onto the podcast. Dr. Jesse is a senior

2:33

lecturer in history at the University of Glasgow

2:36

and is author of Negotiating Genocide

2:38

in Rwanda, the politics of history.

2:41

A true expert on this topic, together we

2:43

discussed the long history of social division in

2:45

the country, the impact of colonial

2:47

control throughout the 20th century, and

2:49

the eruption of violence that led to the worst

2:51

genocide of the 1990s, a genocide that unsurprisingly

2:55

continues to impact the people

2:58

of Rwanda to this day.

3:04

Aaron, welcome to warfare.

3:07

Take us back if you can, deep into

3:09

the history of Rwanda. When

3:11

did the seeds of this division start

3:13

in the country?

3:14

Yeah, that's a really, really good question. And there's

3:17

actually quite a bit of historical debate around

3:19

this very issue. I mean, genocide, obviously,

3:21

it's a very particular type of

3:24

political violence. And it's rooted

3:26

in a number of different things that grew up internally

3:28

within Rwanda, but were also internationally influenced.

3:32

I think the big thing that often gets pointed

3:34

to in a lot of the literature is the importance

3:36

of ethnicity specifically, for

3:38

the atrocities in 1994. As you mentioned, you know, this

3:41

is a genocide in which a group of

3:43

extremists associated with the nation's

3:46

ethnic Hutu majority

3:47

attempted to annihilate the nation's

3:50

ethnic Tutsi minority population.

3:52

And one of the things that is

3:55

often sort of pointed to as a

3:57

precursor to the genocide is the way that

3:59

ethnic

3:59

ethnicity in Rwanda came to be

4:02

understood.

4:03

Obviously there's these terms Hutu and Tutsi.

4:06

There's also a third ethnic minority in

4:08

the country known as the Batwa were very rarely

4:10

spoken about in relation to even the genocide,

4:12

let alone other aspects of the nation's history.

4:15

But in the literature often

4:17

the way that ethnicity is presented is though

4:19

as though it was the sole sort of driving

4:22

force of the genocidal violence. When

4:24

in reality, this was a really, really complex

4:27

moment in Rwandan history. Ethnicity was very

4:29

important obviously, but there were also a lot

4:32

of things happening politically, socially,

4:34

economically within the country that made the genocide

4:36

possible. But as I mentioned, one

4:39

of the things that often people will start with in

4:41

speaking about the genocide and the reason why it happened

4:43

is this idea that ethnicity was something that

4:46

was kind of introduced to the country

4:48

by the Belgian, the German colonizers

4:50

before them by European missionaries

4:53

who were trying to convert the country to

4:55

especially Roman Catholicism though there were

4:57

other religious organizations involved

5:00

as well. And it sort of goes back to this idea that prior

5:02

to Rwanda's colonial period, these

5:04

ideas, these terms, Hutu and Tutsi and Twa

5:07

existed within the country, but they existed

5:09

primarily as indicators of a person's

5:11

socioeconomic status. And

5:13

at least between the Hutu and the Tutsi,

5:16

they were also regarded as fluid. So for example,

5:19

if a person lived primarily

5:21

through subsistence farming, they would be

5:23

seen as a Hutu. Whereas if

5:25

they survived primarily through pastoralism,

5:28

through herding cattle in particular, they'd be seen as

5:30

Tutsi, right? And the idea then being

5:32

that over time, if a person became very wealthy

5:34

in cattle and land, to raise cattle,

5:37

they could become a Tutsi. And likewise,

5:39

if they fell from favor, if a disaster or

5:41

something wiped out their cattle herds, they

5:44

could become a Hutu, right? So there's kind of that

5:46

mobility. But what happened when

5:48

the colonial period began in Rwanda is

5:50

that

5:51

the German and Belgian colonizers sort of

5:53

looked at this general population in front of

5:55

them and they recognize these

5:57

terms Hutu and Tutsi. of

6:00

the way that they thought they perceived certain

6:03

morphological differences in the population. They

6:06

believed that the Tutsi, for example, tended to

6:08

be taller and finer

6:10

featured and lighter skinned. And of course,

6:12

all of this is being interpreted through this lens

6:14

at the time, this very sort of pseudo scientific

6:17

lens of European scientific racism,

6:20

right? I should be very clear about that. They

6:22

began to see the Tutsi as what

6:24

they considered the natural rulers of Rwanda.

6:27

And this was reinforced by the tendency

6:30

for a lot of the European visitors to the country at that

6:32

time to look at the monarchy that

6:34

existed in Rwanda and be very impressed

6:36

by the monarchy. It was primarily dominated

6:39

by the Tutsi. And so this led

6:41

them to believe that, yeah, I mean, the Tutsi are

6:43

not just the natural rulers of Rwanda because

6:45

of the monarchy, but also because of how they look and

6:47

how they behave and so on. They actually

6:49

started to intertwine it with sort of like biblical

6:52

mythology. And they came to believe that

6:54

the Tutsi were the semi-caucasian descendants

6:56

of the biblical figure, him. And so

6:58

that too sort of fed in then to this mythology

7:01

that the Tutsi therefore were somehow the natural

7:03

rulers in the country. And so they invested

7:05

in them and they gave them positions of power within

7:08

the colonial administration and so on.

7:10

And of course, all of this happened at the expense

7:13

of what the colonizers deemed to be the kind

7:15

of true African counterparts, all of this, the

7:17

Hutu and the Tua.

7:18

Over time, you know, they were discriminated

7:21

against. The Tutsi came to be seen sometimes

7:23

as colonial agents, right, as well as,

7:25

you know, having formerly dominated the monarchy. And

7:28

that this in turn then gave rise to all

7:30

of these ethnic tensions within the country that

7:33

then gradually sort of moved, as Rwanda

7:35

moved into independence through the first

7:37

and second presidential republics, that this just

7:40

led to a kind of building of ethnic tensions and

7:42

resentments that ultimately made it possible

7:44

for these Hutu power extremists to convince

7:47

the population to participate

7:49

in these genocidal atrocities against the Tutsi

7:51

minority. And so that's kind of a common overview

7:54

that you will hear, you'll see, and there's elements

7:56

of truth within it, but obviously it's also a

7:58

lot more complicated than that as well.

7:59

It's fascinating to hear because

8:02

this is something that you see in quite a lot

8:04

of regions of the world where you've had

8:06

colonial powers trying to really

8:08

force their own systems of belief,

8:11

their own systems of religion, and of course, to

8:13

try and gain power in the country. It's almost

8:15

an old-fashioned divide and conquer

8:18

mechanism. You see it in Haiti, for

8:20

example, if you go back to the Maluto elites,

8:22

this idea that you have this lighter-skinned

8:25

elite minority that will

8:27

work with the former colonial power

8:29

to continue to control the

8:31

country. It sounds like that's something that we

8:34

have here in Rwanda. When

8:36

does all of this start to come to a head?

8:38

Is it exactly as you say when we start to come to the

8:40

end of that colonial period, when the United

8:42

Nations mandates in the early 1960s

8:45

that Belgium must leave, that Rwanda

8:47

will become an independent country? Is it at this

8:49

point without that colonial support

8:52

that you see the Tutsis start to be turned

8:54

against and pushed out of the country? Yeah.

8:56

It ebbs and flows. There's

8:58

definitely a period in the late 1950s,

9:01

I should say as well. I think you're absolutely right. I mean, Rwanda

9:04

is not unique in having had this really negative

9:06

encounter. Colonialism,

9:08

trying to find ways of not just dividing

9:10

the population into easily quantifiable

9:13

and understandable communities,

9:15

but then in also working in ways to turn these

9:17

communities against each other whenever it was politically

9:19

expedient for them to do so. I

9:21

come from Canada. We have a similar history there with

9:23

our First Nations and Uyat and Métis communities in the way

9:25

that they were dealt with

9:26

by the French, by the British. This

9:29

is a very similar colonial card

9:31

to play, I think, in a lot of different contexts

9:33

internationally.

9:35

But in Rwanda, I mean, yes, in

9:37

some ways it does lead to periods of heightened

9:40

epic tension and even extreme political

9:42

violence. It's not just the colonial

9:44

administration, though, that's necessarily responsible

9:46

for a lot of that. I mean, missionary groups in Rwanda

9:48

also played a part, particularly in the

9:50

way that they often educated Rwandans.

9:53

For example, a lot of the mission schools that were created

9:55

in Rwanda, starting from around 1904, so they educated

9:58

the Tutsi and the Tutsi. the Hutu differently,

10:01

right? The Hutu they wanted to know

10:03

just enough to be able to like read the Bible and to be farmers

10:05

and this kind of thing. The Tutsi of course were

10:07

educated more for like administrative positions, positions

10:09

in government and this kind of thing. And so there was a

10:12

clear divide in how they treated people and this

10:14

fed through into the colonial administration. But

10:17

one of the things that began to happen with all of this education

10:19

is that there was this sort of emerging

10:22

middle class of Hutu in

10:24

sort of the 30s, the 40s going into the 50s

10:27

who

10:28

coming into contact with

10:30

European education were

10:33

exposed to ideals around human rights

10:35

and pan-Africanism and you know, and all of these

10:37

really important ideas. But the

10:40

way that they then interpreted these

10:42

against the backdrop of say everyday life

10:44

in Rwanda over time, you

10:47

know, had sometimes quite extremist elements

10:49

to it. The Tutsi for example, this

10:51

in part comes from colonization and the way that the Tutsi

10:53

were being understood at that moment in time, particularly

10:56

by the Belgian colonizers, was that they were foreign

10:58

invaders, right? Descendants of ham.

11:01

They would have come from Ethiopia. They would have immigrated

11:03

into Rwanda. You know, they weren't native

11:05

Rwandans in the same way that the Hutu and the

11:08

Twa were often regarded as native Rwandans.

11:10

And so as this emerging middle class of the

11:12

Hutu began to sort of internalize

11:14

these ideas, there's that moment's evidence

11:17

to suggest that they internalized a kind of inferiority

11:19

complex almost in relation to the Tutsi. But

11:21

then of course, it also bred this resentment,

11:24

right towards them. And so as

11:26

the Hutu majority then exposed to these

11:28

ideals of human rights and so on, began

11:31

to push towards independence and

11:33

wanting a democratic, presidential

11:35

republic, they did have a tendency

11:37

then to view the Tutsi as an obstacle, a group

11:40

of people that were going to be opposed to that. They'd want to preserve

11:42

the monarchy. They'd want to preserve their right to

11:44

rule in the country. And one of the ways

11:46

that they dealt with that in terms of political propaganda

11:48

at the time was to frame them as outsiders, as

11:50

colonizers, as invaders who

11:53

didn't belong there and who

11:55

then needed to be pushed out. And

11:57

so there are moments then as Rwandans moved

11:59

into the war. towards independence

12:02

in 1959, there's what's often referred to as like the Hutu

12:04

revolution. And this is where a group of

12:06

youth, especially associated with the political

12:08

organization at the time known as Parma Hutu,

12:11

attempted to push all of the

12:13

monarchists, most of whom were Tutsi, out of

12:15

the country using violence, destroying

12:17

their homes, killing their cattle, killing

12:19

Tutsi as well, where they were really deemed

12:22

to be a threat politically. And

12:24

so we end up with a massive population

12:26

of Tutsi who were living outside of the

12:28

country from 1959. They had

12:30

to seek refuge in other neighbouring nations,

12:33

because it wasn't safe for them to live in Rwanda.

12:35

And that in some ways set the

12:37

stage for regional instability,

12:39

right, in particular in places like Burundi and Uganda,

12:42

where the majority of them settled. There's then

12:44

a period in 63 and 64. So this is a couple years after

12:48

independence in 1962,

12:50

where some of these refugees

12:53

living outside of the country militarized and

12:55

decided to conduct incursions into Rwanda as

12:57

a way of destabilizing the government, then

12:59

led by Kaybanda,

13:01

and of course, of Hutu heritage.

13:04

When they began conducting these incursions, Kaybanda's

13:07

response was to begin perpetrating

13:09

massacres where there were small populations

13:12

of Tutsi still living within the country.

13:14

So a lot of people, a lot of Tutsi were killed in 63 and 64,

13:18

not necessarily for the same reasons as the violence in 1959,

13:21

but you know, associated with it for

13:23

sure.

13:24

Throughout Kaybanda's time and power,

13:26

it seemed whenever it was politically expedient for him to

13:28

do so, he would often demonize and

13:30

sort of stigmatize the Tutsi and had

13:32

policies in place trying to limit what's

13:35

called an ethnic quota, tried to limit their

13:37

participation in positions of government, education

13:40

and so on, as a way of, from his

13:42

perspective, kind of writing the drawings of the colonial

13:44

era, making sure that there were appropriate

13:46

numbers of Hutu moving into positions of leadership

13:49

across the country. And as

13:51

his political leadership began to

13:53

be questioned, he was accused of corruption

13:55

and these kinds of things moving into the sort of early 70s, one

13:58

of the ways that he tried to distract the population was

14:00

by expelling Tutsi from schools. And again,

14:03

there was political violence that went along with that,

14:05

moving them out of positions in government, for example,

14:07

in the military, in a lot of Tutsi fled again,

14:09

at that point, and ended up living

14:12

in refuge in neighboring countries. Right. And so

14:14

there are a number of little moments where

14:17

this kind of ethnic tension

14:19

was used to sort of whip up anti-Tutsi

14:21

hatred and cite political violence against

14:24

them.

14:25

So that's the kind of historical colonial

14:27

cultural side to this. And of course, we're bringing in the political

14:30

elements here. And so it leads me to ask that as

14:32

we're moving through this Cold War period,

14:34

how does the Cold War impact these

14:37

divides and this politics in Rwanda

14:39

during this time? Is it a matter of

14:41

the warring factions of the Cold

14:43

War in that bipolar world? Are they really

14:46

trying to incite and to set

14:48

a flame under this hatred more? Does it start

14:50

to move into ideological

14:53

divisions?

14:54

It's difficult to say because again, I mean,

14:57

the actual violence, the physical violence

14:59

that came around from all this ebbed and flowed.

15:01

I mean, you talked to Tutsi who lived in

15:03

the country during this period, because some Tutsi, of

15:05

course, were able to stay where they were living

15:08

in rural communities, where they were themselves

15:10

quite poor, you know, that kind of thing. They

15:12

didn't have any immediate ties to the monarchy

15:14

that had ruled Rwanda prior

15:16

to 1962. They could stay in the country. It wasn't necessarily

15:19

the easiest life. And people who lived

15:21

through the Kaei Bandha and later the Haber-Imana

15:23

regimes, I mean, they will talk about it as,

15:26

yeah, it was very difficult. You know, you needed a special permit

15:28

to be able to travel and you couldn't get an education

15:30

beyond sort of basic elementary education.

15:34

It was really hard for them as well. Like, you know, moving

15:36

into the military, moving into government, there were

15:38

so many limited opportunities for them. And

15:41

a lot of people would give up and actually, again, would end

15:43

up going outside of the country to get education,

15:45

you know, drawing on those links they had with people

15:47

living in the diaspora. But

15:49

amid all of that, it was relatively

15:51

peaceful for them. You know, in the day-to-day,

15:54

these occasional periods where things would kind

15:56

of flare up, the day-to-day, they could

15:58

live peaceful lives. You know, they could their small

16:00

businesses, they could take care of their farms or they

16:02

could take care of their cattle, and they could survive.

16:05

One of the things you'll often hear from people when they start talking

16:07

about the genocide when it happened in 1994,

16:10

when it really escalated, was it completely

16:12

caught them by surprise because

16:14

even though there was a civil war from 1990 to 1994, for a lot of

16:18

people that civil war was kind of off

16:20

in the north. They knew it was happening and they could

16:23

see tensions around them and so on, but it was over

16:25

there, you know. It caught them by surprise

16:27

when suddenly the violence really escalated and

16:29

the Hutu power extremists were then mobilizing

16:32

youth in their communities to go out and kill Tutsi

16:34

civilians. It really caught people by

16:36

surprise because unless they were on

16:38

the kind of front lines of the civil war, unless

16:41

their families have been negatively impacted by these

16:43

kind of sporadic episodes of extreme political

16:45

violence prior to that, didn't necessarily

16:48

negatively impact the quality of their day-to-day lives.

16:51

I don't know if I'm really answering your question, but it's quite

16:54

an odd situation in the sense

16:56

that yeah, you have some people who would

16:58

even go so far as saying, you know, well, Haber-Imana,

17:00

the president from 1973 to 1994, or Kae-Vanda, who was in power

17:03

from 1962 to 1973, you know, they

17:07

weren't really that bad to live under. Our lives were

17:10

relatively okay because if you weren't

17:12

a monarchist, if you weren't a political subversive,

17:14

you could actually live your life. Yes,

17:17

it was difficult and yes, there were challenges, but people

17:19

didn't necessarily see those challenges as all that

17:21

different from what their neighbors who were Hutu or Tua

17:23

were dealing with in the day-to-day. Does that make sense?

17:26

It does, but what doesn't make sense

17:28

then is what triggers this bout

17:31

of extreme violence. Violence

17:33

like had not been seen in that country. Like you say,

17:36

there was periodic bouts

17:38

of violence against the Tutsi people.

17:40

There were murders that were ethnically motivated,

17:43

and this is something that had been going on in the

17:45

country for a very long time. But when

17:47

we see what happens in 1994,

17:50

it's a very, very different story. And

17:52

so is this related to the civil war

17:54

that is going on at this period of time?

17:56

Yeah, I think the civil war helps

17:58

to explain it to some extent.

17:59

But again, I mean, it's not as simple as

18:02

the civil war. It's not as simple as ethnicity.

18:05

There's an economic crisis happening

18:06

in the country. I see. Starting

18:07

in about the late 1980s, the

18:10

prices of a lot of cash crops, coffee and tea

18:12

collapse. Right. And so there's a lot of

18:14

like landless, unemployed young men in

18:16

the country, especially. There's then,

18:18

you know, Haber-Imana, the president at the time,

18:21

his popularity was waning. He was becoming more and

18:23

more corrupt. Part of this may have

18:25

been his own doing as president, but he was

18:27

also part of a very powerful political

18:29

network associated with actually the family

18:31

of his wife, Agaf and Zika. Right. He

18:34

certainly wasn't, I think, solo operator

18:36

as president. He was answerable to a very, very

18:38

powerful two family. And,

18:40

you know, they also had their own sort of political

18:43

ambitions and things that were helping

18:45

to really, I think, diminish the effectiveness

18:47

of his government at a moment

18:50

where I think a lot of people in Rwanda were really

18:52

hoping for more stable leadership. Right.

18:54

And so it's kind of almost like, I mean,

18:57

the term that Jean-Paul Camonio uses, it's

18:59

like a perfect storm. There's the civil war

19:01

that's sort of again ebbing and flowing

19:03

since 1990. There's the economic

19:06

crisis. There's these ethnic tensions.

19:08

And politically, I mean, this is, I think,

19:10

another thing that maybe makes what

19:13

happens in 1994 with the genocide quite distinct

19:15

from what we've maybe seen at moments previously

19:18

in Rwandan history. Politically, there

19:20

is a real genuine threat

19:22

to

19:23

government that is predominantly Hutu.

19:25

And that threat just happens to be predominantly

19:28

Tutsi. And that is the Rwandan patriotic

19:30

front. This is the political party that

19:32

took shape in Uganda, sort of pulling in

19:34

members from these different diaspora

19:37

Tutsi communities located around the Great Lakes

19:39

region in Africa.

19:40

For years have been trying to figure

19:42

out a diplomatic solution to ensure

19:44

their right to return to Rwanda. Right.

19:47

As Rwandan citizens, people

19:49

who were born there and so on. But of course,

19:51

Haber-i-Mana, I mean, and he used all sorts

19:54

of excuses. The big one was that, you know, Rwanda is

19:56

a very densely populated country and there simply wasn't

19:58

room to allow all these refugees to come back.

20:00

He kept refusing them this right to return

20:02

and finally they settled on a military

20:05

solution. And that military solution

20:07

was to invade from Uganda into Northern

20:09

Rwanda in 1990. It

20:12

triggered a civil war and the

20:14

nature of that civil war and the nature

20:16

of the complaints that the RPF was

20:18

sort of raising against the Habi-Arina-Anuraghi

20:21

were taken seriously by the international

20:23

community.

20:24

And for that reason, the international community was willing

20:27

to engage in peace talks around this

20:29

idea of having a power-sharing agreement between

20:31

the RPF and the Habi-Arina-Anuraghi. And

20:35

that, combined with the violence of the civil war,

20:37

really radicalized some people, and especially

20:39

within Habi-Arina-Anuraghi's government. That's where the term

20:42

Hutu Power, the Hutu Power extremists,

20:44

this is where they came from, this early

20:46

period of the civil war.

20:48

So politically there's also something very different

20:50

happening in the early 1990s compared to

20:53

what we would have seen around earlier periods of ethnic

20:55

tension and bloodshed in the country.

20:59

I'm Matt Lewis.

21:07

And I'm Eleanor Janaga.

21:09

And together we bring you Gone Medieval

21:12

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week. This month we're telling the stories of four phenomenal

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21:22

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21:25

and was mother to two more kings.

21:27

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watching.

22:03

And so this sounds like it's a tinderbox

22:05

ready to ignite. And is it fair

22:07

to say that the events that happened

22:09

on April 6th, 1994, when

22:12

a plane carrying the president and his counterpart

22:15

was shot down, killing everyone on board,

22:17

is it fair to say that this was the match that

22:19

set this tinderbox alive?

22:21

Yeah, I mean, that's a fairly common interpretation

22:23

in terms of scholarship. Javier and I, on the

22:26

6th of April, the shooting down of his plane is

22:28

often sort of presented as this trigger

22:30

for genocide. But I mean, there's been some

22:33

recent research that suggests that,

22:35

I mean, yes, it absolutely had an impact.

22:37

But the decision to actually then commit genocide

22:40

was actually made a number of days later. So

22:42

I think it's accurate to say that, yes,

22:45

when Javier Imana died on the 6th of April, that

22:47

certainly created the opportunity

22:50

maybe that the Hutu-powered stremas needed

22:53

to take over the government, right? And

22:55

certainly, I mean, the genocide was planned

22:57

in the sense that, you know, there were youth militia groups

22:59

known as Interhamwe and Guzmugambe located

23:02

across the country that had been trained to kill, trained

23:04

to defend their homes, and possibly

23:06

even trained to kill civilians, to see civilians

23:09

in large numbers, right? There's evidence of that

23:11

coming to light with the UN mission that

23:13

was in the country at that time as part of the peace negotiations.

23:16

It's called Unimir. They were starting to hear

23:18

rumors and see evidence that,

23:21

you know, these youth militias were being trained to kill

23:23

as early as I think it was November of 1993, right? So the genocide

23:28

was very much planned, but that decision to commit genocide,

23:30

it seems, might have actually come a few days

23:32

later when they realized that, okay,

23:35

we've taken over the government, but with the RPF

23:38

now renewing its declaration of war

23:41

and committed to

23:43

a military victory over

23:45

this Interhamwe government that was taking shape.

23:48

The only way that that Interhamwe government of Hutu-Pau-Stromis

23:51

could hold power long term would

23:53

be to wipe out not only the RPF, but

23:55

any of the RPF supporters,

23:57

right? And so that's when the decision was made. to

24:00

wipe out the Titsi minority across the country.

24:03

So, you know, the genocide was very much planned,

24:05

but in terms of the trigger, it's likely

24:07

the realization, I think, that

24:09

they stood to lose the war, not just the peace

24:12

negotiations now, but the actual war, if

24:14

they didn't commit to this very, very extreme

24:17

plan to completely annihilate the

24:18

Titsi people within the country.

24:20

So this was about Hutu regime

24:23

survival and ensuring the balance

24:25

of dominance and power in the country.

24:27

And so when it comes to the shooting down

24:29

of the president's plane, was it the

24:32

RPF that shot this plane down? Do we know the

24:34

circumstances behind this? Or was this a

24:36

moment of political convenience

24:39

to demonize the group?

24:40

Again, that's a really, really tough question

24:42

because there's quite a bit of debate about this.

24:44

And I mean, it's a very, very politicized topic as

24:46

well. I mean, there's some people who argue it was the RPF

24:49

that shot down the plane. There's

24:50

also people on the other side arguing,

24:52

but no, it wasn't the RPF. It was actually Haber-Imano's

24:55

own people. It was these Hutu power

24:57

extremists, again, especially associated with his

25:00

wife's family, who basically because

25:02

he was willing to engage in these peace negotiations,

25:04

and because he was considering committing

25:07

to a power sharing agreement with the

25:09

RPF, that they finally just decided

25:11

that no, you know, Haber-Imano had to

25:13

go. And I think academic

25:15

consensus at this point is still

25:18

quite divided on the subject. It's,

25:21

yeah, I'm maybe not the right person to answer that

25:23

question because I haven't spent a lot of time looking

25:25

specifically at the evidence surrounding the plane

25:27

crash and who would have been responsible.

25:30

But there's a lot of debate on both sides.

25:32

It's a real, I mean, it's one of the big debates,

25:34

I would say, around the Rwandan genocide

25:36

that the academics are still quite immersed

25:38

in. Well, that's interesting in itself that

25:40

this history is still in many

25:42

ways left to be written and still unfolding.

25:45

But from your comments, Erin, one thing

25:47

that has shocked me is that when it actually

25:49

comes down to this genocide

25:52

of husbands killing wives,

25:54

of neighbours turning on each other,

25:57

of extreme violence, extreme sexual violence, this is the first time

25:59

that we've ever seen this.

25:59

This isn't a spontaneous breaking down of

26:02

society. This isn't even anarchy.

26:04

This is a meticulously organized,

26:07

government-supported, militia-based

26:11

violence that they've been trained

26:13

to do.

26:14

That's almost unbelievable.

26:17

This is something that has been in the political planning

26:19

for some time, if there are people

26:21

who are being trained in how to kill

26:23

civilians.

26:24

Yeah. And I mean, again, one

26:26

of the things that I think made the genocide

26:28

so effective, if I can use that term,

26:31

was that, yes, I mean, there were, again, the

26:33

Hutu power extremists after the invasion

26:36

in 1990, they began investing in

26:38

hate media across the country. They began

26:40

investing in the creation of these youth militia

26:43

groups. Initially, these militias

26:45

were allegedly created with the

26:47

purpose of helping people to defend their

26:49

homes against the RPA events.

26:52

But it becomes clear over time that the purpose

26:54

of these militias changes, right? And

26:56

that's where training youth to potentially

26:59

kill civilians begins to come into the picture.

27:01

And that was around sort of mid to late 1993,

27:04

most likely, from my

27:05

understanding of the primary source material. But

27:07

also, in addition to that, I mean,

27:10

making sure that these militia groups had the

27:12

necessary weaponry, right? Because Rwanda,

27:14

the genocide in 1984, tends to be referred to as

27:16

a kind of low-tech genocide, right? It's

27:19

not, you know, gas

27:20

change. Well, we're talking about machetes, aren't we? This

27:22

is a very visceral hand-to-hand

27:25

fighting slaughter of people,

27:27

or herding people into buildings and setting those buildings

27:30

alight.

27:30

Yeah, and a very intimate one as well. I mean,

27:33

it was often people in their own communities

27:35

who were being killed by people they knew really well, business

27:37

partners, family members, you know, and this

27:39

kind of thing. And again, that's a very different quality

27:42

to the violence than we maybe see in other genocides.

27:45

I mean, the obvious one being the Holocaust, right? Where it

27:47

was almost more bureaucratic, at least in terms

27:49

of once the death camps were created. The

27:51

military phases of the

27:52

Holocaust were quite intimate in terms of the Holocaust

27:54

by bullets. But in Rwanda, no, I mean,

27:56

it was a very, very intimate, close contact

27:58

form of killing in most cases.

27:59

and not everybody participated,

28:02

but there was certainly a lot of propaganda

28:05

encouraging people, inciting people to participate,

28:08

especially once Javier Imana had been killed,

28:10

but there was also a lot of social pressure and political

28:13

pressure. I worked for a while

28:15

in the prisons in Rwanda, interviewing people who'd

28:17

been convicted of genocide-related crimes,

28:20

and one of the things that became really

28:22

clear from these conversations was that

28:25

people weren't always motivated by

28:27

ethnic hatred in the way

28:29

that we might expect when we think of genocide,

28:31

right? And again, this is why when

28:33

I talk about ethnicity, I will say, oh yes, it's often talked

28:36

about as one of the real drivers of the

28:38

genocidal violence. It certainly was

28:40

important, but when you talk to people who were convicted

28:43

of genocide-related crimes, sometimes

28:46

they'll talk about the Tutsi in

28:48

ways that suggest that they've internalized

28:51

some of that propaganda, some of that anti-Tutsi

28:53

propaganda.

28:54

But often what they're

28:56

more sort of preoccupied with in the way that

28:58

they talk about how they came to be perpetrators

29:01

is the social pressure that surrounded them and

29:03

the need as this violence escalated

29:06

to be seen as good Hutu, because if you

29:08

weren't, you could also become a victim

29:10

of the violence. If you were identified

29:12

as a political subversive because you spoke

29:15

against the violence, you tried to rescue people,

29:17

you know, you could end up being killed

29:19

as well. And the fact that after

29:22

Habi Arimana died, I mean literally in the hours

29:24

after Habi Arimana's plane was shot down, so

29:27

much of the violence that people were hearing about

29:29

on the radio and seeing on the television so on

29:31

was actually violence towards

29:33

political moderates in the country. We

29:36

know now that Hutu weren't being killed. The political

29:38

moderates obviously don't begin to number the number

29:40

Tutsis who were killed in the genocide,

29:42

but they knew that Hutu were being killed too,

29:45

where they were perceived to be politically subversive

29:47

and going against this Hutu power agenda. And

29:49

so they often talked about how important it was to be

29:51

seen in their communities as good Hutu. And

29:54

so that meant if you were asked to join the roadblocks

29:56

or somebody came to you and wanted you to join a hunt or

29:59

go to somebody's house. and participate in a tap,

30:01

you couldn't necessarily navigate that and get out of

30:03

that in any kind of reasonable way without putting

30:06

your own life in danger and that of your family. And

30:08

so what would often happen was people would kind of succumb

30:10

to that peer pressure that's, and

30:13

at least initially, initially, they would

30:15

be kind of reluctant to participate

30:17

in these atrocities, but then it would become

30:19

easier over time, right? And so a lot

30:21

of the people who participated in the genocide,

30:24

maybe there was some degree of ethic hatred there, but

30:26

it wasn't necessarily the primary motivating factor

30:28

that drove them. It was fear, it was opportunism

30:31

was another really big one, right? If you participate

30:33

in these atrocities, you might get

30:35

a better job, right? Or you

30:37

get to loot the homes of the people who are being killed

30:40

or, you know, take personal possessions from them,

30:42

that kind of thing. So there was often also kind of an

30:44

economic motive, right? In a country

30:46

that's been reeling under an economic crisis for

30:48

a number of years, economic motivations

30:50

were really powerful for some people, especially in the rural

30:53

communities where people lived off of very, very

30:55

little a day. So there's a lot

30:57

that kind of played into making the genocide possible

30:59

on the perpetrator side of things as well. That's

31:02

a lot more complex than just that sort of common

31:04

explanation of, oh, it's about ancient ethnic hatreds,

31:07

right? That's the term the media often used

31:09

at the time when

31:10

these atrocities were unfolding. Well, Erin,

31:12

you say that the violence was unfolding. How quickly

31:14

did this violence unfold and how long did it last?

31:17

That depends on region by region

31:19

in a lot of ways. I mean, there are moments

31:21

where the violence erupted almost

31:23

instantaneously. So literally, you

31:26

know, within hours of the radio

31:28

reporting, for example, that Javier and Manus plain had been

31:30

shot down, that he had been killed. One of the first things

31:32

that the Hutu power extremists did in

31:34

terms of that hate propaganda was to say that

31:36

the Tutsi were responsible, the RPF was responsible

31:39

for Javier and Manus' death, and that Hutu should avenge

31:41

their president's death, right? So inciting

31:43

people to pick up arms. So there are moments

31:45

around the country where hearing that people

31:48

spontaneously decided to commit

31:50

massacres, right? And so one of the first

31:53

things that we see happen often in many communities

31:55

was well, okay, where they were really prominent Tutsi

31:57

business people or Tutsi who were

32:00

in other ways really significant in the communities

32:02

and perhaps people were resentful of their wealth,

32:05

that sort of thing. These would be the first people that would be killed

32:07

in these kinds of spontaneous killings. But

32:09

in other communities, it took longer. People had

32:12

really waited to see what was happening. And

32:15

sometimes it was because of a political leader, maybe

32:17

at the level of the municipalities, sort

32:19

of saying, no, no, no, like I don't endorse these killings.

32:22

But in other cases, I mean, generally, people

32:24

just sort of rallied around each other. And it

32:27

took the presidential guard or

32:29

the military coming in and almost

32:31

at gunpoint, sort of forcing people to

32:33

commit massacres for civilians

32:36

to then get involved in the violence, right? Because again,

32:38

these were really tight knit intimate communities.

32:40

Many of these people, they've been living together for generations,

32:43

they may be intermarried, have businesses

32:45

together, they shared and building each other's

32:47

homes. You can't just turn

32:49

people against each other instantly. And in a lot

32:51

of cases, it took a lot of pressure

32:53

to convince people.

32:55

So in some places, it took a couple of weeks.

32:58

In terms of then how long the genocide

33:00

would last, it really depended

33:03

on where in the country you're talking about

33:05

the RPF, for example, through

33:07

the peace negotiations were based in Kigali,

33:10

they had troops in Kigali, when the genocide

33:12

began. And so after a couple of weeks, they'd more

33:14

or less rested control of the city. So the

33:17

genocide there was extremely intense just by virtue

33:19

of the population density and so on. And that's

33:21

where a lot of the political moderates were killed as well.

33:24

But it didn't last that long because the

33:26

RPF was able to take control and

33:28

enforce a state of peace, if

33:30

you can call it that. But then the rural communities

33:33

might take longer. In terms of the length

33:35

of the genocidal violence, the region of Rwanda

33:37

that was actually the hardest hit would have been the western

33:40

part of Rwanda. In the West,

33:42

I mean, this was partly because the Hutu power

33:44

extremis as they fled Kigali, they moved

33:46

first to Gitarama and then made

33:48

a run for the Democratic Republic of Congo.

33:51

So fleeing into that kind of western border

33:53

area of Rwanda. So it was partly

33:56

that, but there was also a French, a so-called

33:58

humanitarian mission operation.

33:59

was that was put on the ground during

34:02

the genocide. The French had

34:04

for a fairly long period of time

34:06

been aligned with the Javier Imano regime

34:09

and had certain sympathies, I think, with

34:11

the interim government as well. And the

34:13

presence of those French troops in that western

34:16

region created a kind of what was called a safe

34:18

corridor that the Hutu power extremists could

34:20

use to flee to the DRC. But along

34:23

the way, the massacres of Tutsi civilians

34:25

continued. And I mean, a lot of the communities

34:28

in that region, it's a region where I've worked quite a bit over

34:30

the years. I mean, the Tutsi survivors there

34:32

will say straight out that the French aided

34:34

and were complicit in a lot of those killings.

34:37

So the killings, because of the French presence

34:39

in the region, continued pretty much

34:41

right until RPF declared its

34:43

full military victory in July 1994. So

34:47

you know, you talk about the kind of rough hundred days of the

34:49

genocide

34:50

that was really in the western parts of the country.

34:52

In other parts of the country, the genocide

34:54

was stopped more quickly. And how do we know

34:57

the French were so heavily involved there and

34:59

not so passively either? I mean, it's not like the French

35:01

have a particularly good reputation in

35:03

terms of their colonial rule or their meddling

35:06

across the African continent. And we still see

35:08

that playing out across the Sahel today

35:10

and in fact, right at this moment in time.

35:13

But do we know for a fact that the French, I mean,

35:15

they weren't there in a UN capacity. This is a

35:17

national military capacity that they were actually

35:20

aiding and abetting. I

35:22

would say in terms of testimonial evidence,

35:24

there's quite a bit of that. And I

35:26

know, I mean, in a court of law, right? Testimonial

35:29

evidence is often regarded as suspicion, at least unless there's

35:31

other kinds of corroborating evidence to reinforce it.

35:34

But the clearest example of

35:36

French complicity in the atrocities would be probably

35:39

around Bissessaro, which is a community

35:41

in the west of Rwanda. It's kind of up in the mountains.

35:44

And it's become quite famous as an

35:46

example of resistance, to see resistance

35:50

towards who to power extremists.

35:51

And with Bissessaro then,

35:54

basically a handful of

35:56

Tutsi elders who had a high degree

35:58

of military experience.

35:59

basically, courage people to come

36:02

up into the mountains, you know, be in easily defensible

36:04

position. And they set

36:06

up there, they didn't really have much in the way of weapons,

36:09

but they sort of trained people. There's a

36:11

wonderful book about this by Oscar Gassana

36:13

for those who are interested in reading further,

36:15

but they basically trained civilians

36:18

who would come there seeking refuge

36:20

from the Hujupar stromas in

36:22

hand-to-hand combat and, you know, had to

36:24

rush into a group of Indrahamwe

36:27

to confuse them so they couldn't use their guns, they couldn't

36:29

really use their machetes, and they just

36:31

overwhelmed them with bricks and stones and whatever

36:33

other materials they could get their hands on. And

36:36

over time then, as they managed to fight back, they

36:38

were able to take weapons off the people that they killed

36:41

and gradually built a more sustained

36:44

and more powerful resistance. And I

36:46

don't remember the precise date that it happens.

36:48

I'd have to go back and check my notes. But

36:51

a lot of the people that I've interviewed who survived

36:53

from Bissisero or the surrounding area associate

36:56

the arrival of French troops at

36:58

the particular hill in Bissisero

37:00

where they were all sort of wading

37:03

out the genocide as a moment where

37:05

they were basically betrayed. They were told

37:07

by the French troops that they were under French

37:09

protection if they gave up their weapons, you

37:11

know, and so on, and agreed to stand down in

37:13

the conflict with, you know, the surrounding communities,

37:16

that there would be no more killings. And so

37:19

they agreed. And I mean, there's photographic

37:21

evidence of the French meeting on the hill,

37:23

even once the French

37:25

had collected the weapons they left and shortly

37:28

after the inter-homes returned and they

37:30

wiped out, I mean, hundreds, if not

37:32

thousands of the people who had survived up until

37:34

that point. It's a horrible, horrible

37:36

story, but that's certainly one of the examples

37:39

that people in the region will often point to as

37:42

a moment where it's like, no, clearly the French were there.

37:44

Clearly they told people these things. There's all these different survivors

37:46

who corroborate this. When the French had weapons,

37:49

they were there. They could have stopped

37:50

the killings and they chose not to. So

37:52

I would say that's probably a classic example. But

37:55

this leaves us with a looming question, Erin.

37:57

You mentioned that the United Nations are in

37:59

the country. What are they doing at

38:02

this point? What are the peacekeepers doing? Yeah,

38:04

that's a good question. I mean, Unamir,

38:06

I think the commander Romeo de l'Air would

38:08

probably agree with this. It was a flawed mission

38:11

right from the get-go. I mean, he's got his memoirs and

38:13

there's been various studies as well

38:14

that have sort of revealed the extent

38:16

to which Unamir was created with

38:18

a very limited mandate without really

38:20

the power to fire in defense of civilian lives

38:22

or in other ways tried to protect civilians as they came

38:25

under attack.

38:26

So their presence was merely one

38:28

of overseeing the terms of the Arusha Peace

38:30

Agreement as it was being implemented. Once

38:33

the interim government committed to this plan of genocide,

38:35

they really didn't have the power to do anything,

38:37

at least in terms of their sort of official mandate.

38:40

Individually, I think there were moments

38:42

where members of the Unamir mission did do what

38:44

they could to protect Tutsi who came

38:47

to them for help. Likewise, there are embassies

38:49

in the country, the US embassy, that did what they could

38:51

to help people evacuate from Rwanda, not

38:53

just their own civilians like American civilians,

38:56

but helping political moderates

38:58

and Tutsi civilians to leave where they could. But

39:00

I mean, a drop in the bucket compared

39:03

to what might have been possible had

39:05

Unamir been given a mandate to

39:08

protect civilian lives. And again,

39:10

I mean, this is something I think Delir's talked about

39:12

at length that if he'd had even 500 troops,

39:14

I think is the number he's used that had that mandate,

39:17

that they actually probably would have been able to stop

39:19

a lot of the violence because, yes,

39:22

you know, the Hutu power extremists were very committed to

39:24

this idea of genocide and it's been planned

39:26

for some time. But at the same

39:28

time, faced with military

39:30

force, they often weren't that well trained and

39:32

they perhaps didn't also have the stomach for

39:34

this kind of fighting, right? It's

39:37

one thing killing civilians, it's another thing being

39:39

in battle with an armed and trained and disciplined

39:41

combatant group. So it's understandable

39:43

why you would think that way, you know.

39:44

And of course, peacekeeping is

39:47

about having impartiality in the country.

39:49

We have to talk about the kind of founding pillars

39:51

of UN peacekeeping here. It's about documenting

39:54

the atrocities so that charges

39:56

can be brought later. And of course, we

39:58

will talk about the truth and rights of the United States.

39:59

reconciliation, the justice process that is

40:02

put into place after the genocide.

40:04

But UN peacekeeping does change as a

40:06

result of this. It takes a long time. It takes

40:09

other genocides in places like Srebrenica,

40:11

which have quite disturbing echoes

40:14

from what you're talking about here today to

40:16

create more robust peacekeeping mandates,

40:19

many of which we see today, but also,

40:21

of course, this pillar of the responsibility to

40:23

protect. The United Nations changes

40:26

its entire system to provide

40:28

a new justification for

40:29

why nation states can legitimately

40:32

go to war. It's not just self-defense anymore.

40:34

But if a nation state does not fulfill its primary

40:37

obligation to protect its civilians, then

40:39

the international community can come together to,

40:41

well, in many ways violate the sovereignty of that country

40:44

to protect those civilians. Now, that, of

40:46

course, has many of its own legacies in

40:48

places like Libya, and is to

40:50

many a bit of a dirty word today with

40:52

R2P and that responsibility to protect. But you

40:55

can see those lasting legacies of

40:57

Rwanda, of Bosnia, coming through

40:59

at

40:59

that period of time.

41:02

But with all that being said, this isn't

41:04

much of a comfort to those in Rwanda

41:07

at that period of time. So when does the

41:09

violence end? And when do we move

41:11

through to this period of trying to bring justice

41:13

for the victims?

41:14

I mean, technically, people would say that it was

41:16

the military victory of the RPF that formally

41:18

stopped the genocide. But again, I mean,

41:21

this is a slightly tricky question because the

41:23

political instability in Rwanda

41:25

and especially in the West, I mean, that continued

41:28

for years. There are moments where Hutu

41:30

power extremists who'd managed to make it to the DRC, they

41:32

conducted incursions into the country, they killed

41:34

civilians. And I think the official date

41:36

that people recognize as being the end of the genocide

41:39

is about the 17th, 18th of July. This

41:41

is when the RPF declared its military victory.

41:44

But it's important to note that the political violence

41:46

continued for a time, especially in the western

41:48

part of the country, because there were all these Hutu power

41:50

extremists now based in the DRC

41:52

and living in these refugee camps. Again, they

41:55

use the camps to militarize people and continue

41:58

to conduct incursions over the next couple of years.

41:59

years during which more civilian lives were lost,

42:02

right? So

42:03

the political instability that kind of threat

42:05

to peace and security in the country would continue

42:08

through two Congo wars, right? And

42:11

really, I think a state of actual

42:14

stability in the country wasn't realized much

42:16

before probably about 2000, 2003, even

42:18

there was just so much turmoil in

42:21

the country politically.

42:22

And during that period, you know, the infrastructure

42:25

in the country, everything else was really, really slow to recover,

42:27

understandably, I mean, you can only imagine like

42:29

the challenges that a transitional government

42:32

faces in the aftermath of genocide,

42:34

you know, in terms of the numbers of people killed,

42:36

but also that you mentioned the high rates of sexual violence,

42:39

the very, very widespread rates of post

42:41

traumatic stress disorder, traumatic experiences

42:44

among the population. It was a

42:46

number of years before, I think, realistically,

42:49

the people, the government were ready to invest

42:51

in any kind of actual transitional justice

42:53

mechanisms. But when they were ready,

42:56

it took various forms. I mean, the Rwandan government

42:58

decided to pursue a policy of what they called at

43:00

the time universal accountability. Basically,

43:04

this is this is very different from what we see in a lot

43:06

of other genocide affected contexts, in

43:08

that rather than just going for the big fish,

43:10

you know, those individuals who are deemed to have

43:13

the highest degree of criminal responsibility

43:15

for the atrocities, the Rwandan

43:17

government decided that they wanted to try to prosecute

43:19

everybody who had any degree of criminal responsibility.

43:22

And so they broke criminal responsibility down into

43:24

four categories, ranging from what we're

43:27

seeing as the most serious crimes, mass killings,

43:29

sexual violence, and so on, right

43:31

down to looting and informing

43:34

on people who were in hiding, for example. And

43:37

they arrested as many people

43:39

as they could on the basis of allegations

43:41

usually coming out

43:42

of the community, though the kinds

43:44

of crimes they committed across these four categories.

43:47

And then they began

43:49

trying to prosecute them. And so the really

43:51

high level individuals were either

43:53

sent to the International Criminal Tribunal

43:55

that was created by the UN and with

43:58

support from various governments to deal with really,

44:00

really significant, like internationally

44:02

renowned perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide.

44:05

But then the Rwandan national court system,

44:07

as soon as it was ready, as soon

44:09

as it had recovered to the point where it could start to prosecute

44:11

people, they also took on a number of the

44:13

high level

44:14

perpetrators. And then at the

44:16

community level, to ensure accountability

44:18

in each and every community across Rwanda that

44:20

have been negatively impacted by the genocide, the

44:23

government also invested in what they

44:25

called gachacha. And this

44:27

is, it roughly translates to kind of

44:29

justice on the grass. And this is basically

44:31

a group of community judges,

44:34

lay people judges, often elders,

44:36

respected numbers of the community who had no

44:38

degree of criminal responsibility for the genocide.

44:41

They would sit and they would listen

44:43

to the allegations, they would listen to people's testimonies

44:46

and make decisions then about whether or not

44:48

a person merited release, whether

44:50

they were innocent or whether they had in fact committed these

44:52

atrocities. And gachacha

44:55

addressed something like 1.9 million

44:58

allegations, charges related to the genocide,

45:01

not 1.9 million people, but cases. Because

45:03

of course, a case could be brought against somebody and then

45:05

a few years later, more information

45:06

could go forward, more cases could go to gachacha.

45:10

And in some ways, it was kind of ingenious

45:12

because it's widespread legal accountability

45:14

of a kind, reparative justice of a kind, and

45:16

drawing upon a format that was

45:18

quite familiar to Rwandans. Gachacha

45:21

historically had been used probably at least

45:23

since the 16th century in the country, or

45:25

maybe the 17th century,

45:27

to address community

45:30

interpersonal conflicts and these kinds of things. It

45:33

was a long standing dispute resolution mechanism in

45:35

Rwandan communities.

45:37

So it was a format very familiar to Rwandans

45:39

and ones that they could see play out right in front

45:41

of them. You needed a quorum to hold a trial

45:44

of about 100 people ideally. And

45:46

so people would come and they would participate,

45:48

they would watch. And yeah, it

45:50

was one way of trying to promote a

45:53

kind of accountability unlike I

45:55

think anything we've seen in any other genocide-affected

45:57

context internationally.

45:59

What was this rebuilding

46:01

a stable society, a society that

46:03

can move past this together and

46:05

to build a more cohesive, stable

46:08

nation?

46:09

Yeah, again, I mean, that's a real point of debate

46:11

in the scholarship. There are some scholars,

46:14

and certainly the Rwandan government's position is that

46:16

Gachacha was extremely successful and it

46:18

has reconciled the population and they have moved

46:20

past

46:21

these allegations, these resentments. You know,

46:23

it is now a post-ethnic society. We are

46:25

all Rwandans, right? Yes, certainly how

46:27

the government regards the situation at present, but

46:29

there are a number of scholars over the years who have done really

46:32

in-depth studies of Gachacha,

46:35

most notably probably would be the work of Bert

46:37

Ingolary.

46:38

And it's complicated. I mean,

46:40

for a country, for people to move past

46:43

genocide, right, that's a pretty tall order in the first

46:45

place.

46:46

I suspect a lot of us are capable of it, you

46:48

know what I mean? Like you've gone through an experience that traumatic.

46:50

Your closest loved ones, friends, family,

46:53

business associates, etc., have all been murdered.

46:54

So recently, Erin, I mean, this was less

46:57

than 30 years ago.

46:58

Well, precisely. Like, I mean, how an individual

47:00

moves past that is...

47:01

It's beyond me.

47:02

I don't know the answer to that. So I think we need to be really

47:04

careful in managing our expectations, right? But

47:08

it was hard. I mean, as you would expect, it was really

47:10

hard for people to sit there and listen to these stories,

47:12

and especially where there was

47:14

often this tension between the accused

47:16

perpetrators who were told

47:19

that, you know, well, if you confess, if you give information

47:21

about where the bodies of your victims are buried, for example,

47:24

and who else participated in these atrocities with you,

47:26

you could get maybe a reduced sentence and these kinds of things.

47:29

I think a lot of survivors had the expectation, certainly

47:31

a lot of the people I've interviewed over the years have the expectation

47:34

that this would lead to a kind of airing of

47:36

the truth. And missing and murdered

47:38

loved ones would be found, they'd be

47:40

able to rebury them with respect, you know, that

47:42

there'd be... And that in and of itself maybe could

47:44

lead to a kind of personal healing for a

47:46

lot of people.

47:47

But the reality in the trials, I think often,

47:50

not always, but often was that the perpetrators

47:53

still lied or they didn't give up as much

47:55

information as they could.

47:56

And in the process of them talking about the crimes

47:58

they did admit to.

47:59

or that they were forced to acknowledge.

48:02

I

48:02

mean, it was horrific. This is incredibly intimate,

48:05

close contact killing. It was often very graphic.

48:08

There was often an almost performative quality to

48:10

it, like especially where Tutsi elites were

48:12

concerned, especially beautiful women, like they were

48:14

just killed, like they were mutilated in just horrible,

48:16

horrible ways. In some communities, I mean,

48:19

it was a period of months, and at least

48:21

once a week, you're sitting there and you're listening to this. It opened

48:23

a lot of wounds. It kept the wounds raw for people.

48:26

And then if people weren't satisfied with the

48:28

outcome, if they decided the judges had been too

48:30

lenient, for example,

48:32

or a person was allowed

48:34

to be released back into their community on

48:37

the basis of time served, right? It

48:39

was hard for people.

48:41

There were also moments where Kachacha created conflict

48:43

in the community. One of the communities where I've worked,

48:45

the person who was responsible for organizing Kachacha

48:47

and sort of overseeing it at the district level,

48:49

he was basically attacked with his wife, somebody

48:52

threw grenades at them,

48:53

because they were upset with the work that they were doing

48:55

for Kachacha, right? So there are also moments

48:58

where it really created problems in a community. And

49:00

Kachacha formally concluded in 2013. And

49:03

a lot of the

49:04

Rwandans I knew

49:05

at that point

49:07

just kind of almost breathed a sigh of relief. It's

49:09

like, it's done now. And now

49:12

we can start to focus on other things. And we will keep hearing

49:14

the stories

49:14

we won't. And again, maybe that's

49:16

unrealistic as well. Because a lot of the survivors I know,

49:19

it's hard for them not to talk about what they went through

49:21

during the genocide, understandably, as part of how they

49:23

process,

49:24

but certainly Kachacha, I think, kept a lot of

49:26

those tensions right at the surface. So

49:30

can we say that it's successfully reconciled?

49:32

People, I mean, I think in the first instance, I

49:34

don't know how possible that is, right? Or

49:36

whether it's realistic to expect that of something transitional

49:39

justice related. Scholars

49:41

like Kirsten Dowdy, who've argued that these are

49:43

just inherently really messy, complicated processes

49:46

and is perhaps unfair to expect everyone

49:48

to experience catharsis and healing from them.

49:50

But people, I think, are living

49:53

together, which is the important thing.

49:55

Maybe not always trusting each other

49:57

and maybe not always free from the fear that they

49:59

these kinds of violence could overwhelm the

50:02

country again, right? Because even

50:04

though earlier periods of ethnic and political violence

50:06

in the country were maybe very different from the genocide

50:08

in 1994, most Rwandans

50:11

who are alive today, I mean,

50:13

youth aside, obviously, they've experienced

50:15

a number of different periods of violence they

50:17

know that can happen again. And I think

50:19

people don't want to see that happen genuinely

50:21

on all sides of the conflict. People don't want

50:24

to see that happen. And they'd much rather live in

50:26

peace. But

50:27

I think they know it's a possibility, given the

50:29

right circumstances. Well, Erin,

50:31

thank you so much for putting the

50:33

Rwandan genocide into its proper,

50:35

broader historical context

50:38

and informing us about the struggle

50:40

that continues in Rwanda to

50:42

this day. Tell us, where can we read

50:44

more about this history? Where can

50:47

we read more of your work?

50:48

Well, in terms of my work, I have a book,

50:50

Negotiating Genocide in Rwanda, The Politics

50:52

of History that came out in 2017. And that

50:55

is grounded primarily in interviews that

50:57

I conducted with Rwandans from different

50:59

sides of the conflict. That's partly why

51:01

I mean, I talk about the genocide in the way that I

51:04

do sort of acknowledging, you know, people who are dentifed as perpetrators,

51:06

but also survivors, of course, people who

51:08

cross those boundaries as well. But there's a

51:10

great deal of work. It's a bit like the Holocaust

51:13

Rwanda has been really widely studied, which

51:15

is wonderful in some ways, also means it's a pretty

51:17

tall order. There's

51:18

some phenomenal work being done by Rwandan scholars,

51:20

although it's very challenging for them. Because

51:23

of course, there's this political pressure,

51:25

quite strong political pressure in Rwanda

51:28

these days to speak about the genocide

51:30

in a very particular light. But yeah, I

51:32

mean, it is I think, important to note the challenges

51:34

for Rwandans and for international researchers

51:36

alike in studying the genocide.

51:39

I mean,

51:40

as with many genocides, as with many highly

51:42

politicized topics,

51:44

this is a situation where the government that's

51:46

empowered today wants to promote a particular

51:48

understanding of the genocide. For example,

51:50

I mean, even how you talk about the genocide, the label

51:52

that you use in Rwanda, the

51:55

preferred official parlance is the 1994 genocide

51:57

against the Tutsi and they clearly

51:59

highlight

51:59

that, you know, the two CR, the primary victims

52:02

of these atrocities, survivors organizations

52:04

that are aligned with the government, they use

52:07

this label and, you know, they really

52:09

assert that everybody should use this label as well.

52:11

But of course, it makes some people uncomfortable, not

52:14

because they don't want to acknowledge the Totsi, where the primary

52:16

victims, but because again, it gets into

52:18

these ethnic tensions, right? Where you're only recognizing

52:21

one victim group and they may be the main

52:23

victim group, but

52:24

there were other forms of political violence that happened

52:27

concurrently with the genocide. And to

52:29

not acknowledge that broader range

52:32

of atrocities, I mean, there are quite a few

52:34

scholars, there are quite a few Rwandans who fear

52:36

that again, that's feeding into these ethnic tensions

52:39

in ways that can be potentially dangerous down the line.

52:41

And the pressures then that come along with how

52:44

you talk about the genocide, what you acknowledge

52:46

as part of the genocide,

52:47

there's certain topics around the

52:49

RPF military advance and the prospect that

52:52

they may have committed atrocities against

52:54

Hutu civilians in some of the communities as they

52:56

arrested control of the country. I mean, it's completely taboo

52:58

to talk about this in a meaningful way in Rwanda

53:00

today.

53:01

So yeah, for people who don't

53:03

hold that official line and talking

53:06

about the genocide, there can be really negative

53:08

consequences from attacks on social

53:10

media. Sorry, I mean verbal attacks, I should

53:12

declare about that, verbal attacks on social media

53:15

and in public talks that you may be give. But it can

53:17

also mean people deal with research access

53:19

being cut off, right? They'll be told you can't do research

53:21

on the genocide anymore. You can't come back

53:23

to Rwanda anymore. And yes,

53:25

I mean that's quite inconvenient for foreign

53:27

researchers, but the other reality of this is that

53:30

often, I include myself

53:31

in this category, we rely, our

53:33

research relies very much on Rwandan researchers,

53:36

right? Assistants, translators, transcribers and

53:38

so on that we work very closely with

53:39

in the work that we do. So while it may be inconvenient

53:42

for foreign researchers to be told, okay, well you can't

53:44

go back and do this work. I

53:46

think we also always have to be mindful about the Rwandans

53:48

who make that work possible and what it means for them around

53:51

the consequences for them where they don't speak

53:53

about the genocide in the right way or where they're seen as

53:55

feeding into a narrative that contradicts

53:57

the preferred official narrative in the country.

53:59

risk much more serious consequences

54:02

such as imprisonment. Eventually, you know, some

54:04

of them end up leaving the country, then they worry about the family

54:06

that remained, right? So there could be pretty

54:08

serious consequences on that side where people go

54:11

against that official narrative. Well,

54:12

Erin, thank you so much for your time,

54:14

for bringing us this vital, important

54:17

history and for coming on the Warfare

54:19

Podcast.

54:19

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54:22

you for hosting. Thanks

54:24

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