0:01

This episode is brought to you by UiPath. Human

0:04

achievement can be slow. 200,000

0:06

years to go from the wheel to your jalopy. Really?

0:09

But today, 90% of the Fortune

0:11

500 are accelerating human achievement simply.

0:14

When AI is everywhere, every process

0:16

can be automated and accelerated. Accelerated.

0:19

Accelerated. Accelerated. UiPath.

0:22

The AI Everywhere Foundation of Innovation. Those

0:28

that shaped the world, uses dynamic,

0:30

immersive audio to depict scenes

0:32

of warfare. Listener discretion

0:35

is advised. All

0:51

the families were on the dockside,

0:53

bands playing. As

0:56

we slipped away from the keyside, our band was

0:58

playing. Rod Stewart. We

1:01

are sailing. We

1:03

slipped out just at last light. This

1:06

wall of noise hit the side of the ship. The

1:09

general public sending us off to sea. It

1:29

was Monday, the 5th of April, 1982. And

1:33

Britain was going to war. As

1:36

afternoon turned towards evening, a

1:39

hastily assembled task force slipped anchor in

1:41

Portsmouth Harbour. Sailors

1:43

lined the decks of the two aircraft carriers,

1:46

HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible.

1:50

Bands played on board and on the dockside. Rule

1:54

Britannia was a popular choice as

1:56

the crowds waved little paper Union

1:58

Jack. The

2:03

entire venture at the width of a

2:05

colonial war, Great Britain's

2:07

last hurrah. Ahead

2:09

of the task force lay an 8,000 mile

2:11

voyage deep into the South Atlantic to

2:14

a far distant outpost over which

2:16

the Union Jack was supposed to

2:18

fly. From on board

2:21

HMS Glamorgan, David Tinker wrote

2:23

home. We're off to the Falcon

2:25

Islands to bash the Argentines. Very

2:27

much a 1914 affair with the Royal

2:30

Navy going off to defend the colonies or

2:32

shall I be thinking of Suez? Of

2:34

course the whole thing may blow over in

2:36

a week but the thrill of some real

2:38

confrontation in the colonial war away from the

2:40

nuclear bombs is quite exciting. This

3:15

is wars that shaped the world. Britain

4:42

may have been taken for fools as April

4:44

1, 1982

4:46

merged into the second and

4:48

Argentine troops poured ashore in Port

4:51

Stanley. It

4:53

left Margaret Thatcher and her government

4:55

chasin, shame-faced even.

4:58

Across government mistakes had been made. There

5:01

was a demand for heads to roll. John

5:03

Knott, the defence secretary, offered to place

5:06

his on the block, but instead

5:08

it was the Foreign Secretary, Lord

5:10

Carrington, who stepped down. It

5:12

did not take long for Thatcher to muster a

5:15

response. The task force

5:17

set sail three days after news of

5:19

the invasion reached London, followed

5:21

three days later by troopships

5:23

carrying Royal Marines and paratroopers.

5:26

The men charged with taking the Falklands back.

5:29

Should it come to that. There

5:32

remained an expectation around the cabinet it wouldn't

5:34

come to an actual fight. It

5:37

would take weeks for the task force to steam sail.

5:39

Plenty of time for a diplomatic solution.

5:43

And even if that came to Knott, surely

5:45

the site of British warships steaming into view

5:47

would send the Argentines hurrying home. Wouldn't

5:51

it? in

6:00

the blink of a military eye, was

6:02

no mean feat, especially for

6:04

an armed forces reeling from a barrage

6:06

of cuts, and a

6:09

military focused ever more tightly on

6:11

one threat, the Soviet

6:13

Union. By 1982

6:15

the Royal Navy was first

6:17

and foremost a submarine and

6:20

anti-submarine force. Indeed

6:22

the two main Navy men involved

6:24

in the Falklands campaign, John

6:27

Sandy Woodward and John Fieldhouse,

6:29

were both submariners by trade. Fieldhouse,

6:34

commander in chief fleet, appointed

6:37

the 50 year old Woodward to

6:39

lead the task force. Wondered

6:43

a sceptical John Knott, but

6:45

Fieldhouse was adamant this son of a Cornish

6:47

bank clerk was the man for the job.

6:54

A keen chess player, Woodward

6:56

was clever and self-confident. He

7:03

was, it was said, admired more

7:06

than liked by those who served under him. One

7:11

officer was to remark after Woodward's eve

7:13

of battle address. Others

7:15

suggest that he treated the men like

7:18

idiots in underplaying the Argentine threat. Woodward

7:21

was given two aircraft carriers. Air

7:24

power would be crucial in a battle 8,000

7:27

miles from home. Neither carrier

7:29

was ideal. HMS

7:32

Invincible was small, HMS

7:34

Hermes, oh, on her last sea

7:37

leg. Each was loaded

7:39

to capacity with sea harriers, but

7:41

it still left Woodward with the minimum necessary

7:44

air support. Air

7:46

defence was also critical. He'd

7:49

three Type 42 destroyers equipped

7:51

with state-of-the-art sea darts, Coventry,

7:54

Glasgow and Sheffield. Ships

7:57

that for a time were to become better known to

7:59

the world. British public than

8:01

the cities they were named for. There

8:10

was a similar scramble to assemble the land

8:12

forces. Three Commando

8:14

Brigade was Britain's rapid response force,

8:17

led by Brigadier Julian Thompson. Many

8:20

of his staff were in Denmark preparing for

8:22

a NATO exercise, and spent

8:25

day one pestering British Airways for seats

8:27

on any flight out of Copenhagen. As

8:29

the Marines hurried back to Plymouth, in

8:32

Hereford, home of the SAS, Lieutenant

8:34

Colonel Michael Rose placed his men on standby

8:37

as soon as he saw the news on

8:39

the BBC. He reached for the

8:41

telephone and rang Thompson. That

8:48

same night, Major Ewan Southby Talia was

8:50

at a cruising club dinner in London.

8:54

He was summoned the next morning because

8:56

the Falklands was Southby Talia's patch. He'd

8:59

commanded the Marine garrison and

9:01

fallen in love with the island, enjoying

9:03

what he saw as the ruggedness of

9:05

both terrain and inhabitant. He

9:09

knew its coastline like the back of

9:11

his weather-beaten hand. An Arabic-speaking adventurer, he

9:13

was straight out

9:18

of central casting. The

9:20

staff car rushed him to Marine HQ on

9:22

a hill outside Plymouth, where

9:24

Thompson waited impatient. An

9:48

air of excitement gripped Marine HQ

9:50

as planning began. Planning

9:52

with the foot pressed firm to the accelerator.

9:54

This time was one of the best I've

9:56

ever spent. Everybody was

9:58

so elated. Everyone

10:00

was working so hard for a common end. We had

10:04

nothing but help from the army. The navy, the

10:06

dockyard. I

10:08

found people crossing the roads to salute. Even

10:11

the children seemed to catch the mood. There

10:13

was still one significant problem to solve. How

10:17

to transport the soldiers those 8,000 miles. The

10:21

planners pored over the listings of merchant

10:23

navy ships. Many were suitable

10:25

for a chow crossing, but this was no

10:27

D-Day dash to fran. It

10:30

was the Ministry of Defence who came up with the

10:32

answer. Canberra,

10:35

a 45,000 ton cruise liner, was to

10:37

be requisitioned. The navy

10:39

dispatched a small team in civilian clothes

10:41

to join the liner coming back from

10:43

Gibraltar. Amid bemused

10:46

holidaymakers, they scouted the

10:48

ship to determine where helipads, hospitals,

10:50

command centres and so on would

10:53

be located. Six

10:55

days after Argentina invaded, the

10:58

Canberra, holidaymakers ditched, was

11:01

ready to take the marines to war. In

11:04

Plymouth, South Bitalia briefed the

11:06

marine commanders. The marines

11:08

were Britain's winter warriors, but

11:11

the Falklands would offer a different challenge. There

11:14

was no cover. It was boggy,

11:17

it was cold and the wind chill

11:19

made everything worse. All

11:21

food and water would have to be brought in

11:24

and carried into battle. This was

11:27

alien terrain. The

11:30

soldiers who boarded the Canberra were the cream

11:32

of Britain's armed forces. The Parris,

11:34

the Marines, the SAS, the special

11:37

boat service. The

11:39

task force sailed on Monday the 5th of April.

11:42

Crowds packed the sea front and

11:44

an armada of small ships saw it off. People

11:48

cheered, people cried. It

11:51

was, thought some, like the

11:53

clock had been turned back to a British war

11:55

of old. The Daily Express

11:57

printed a photograph of the Falkland Islanders.

12:00

gathered outside government house in Stalin.

12:02

Our loyal subjects, we must defend

12:05

them. demanded the headline.

12:08

In the House of Commons, even Michael Foote

12:10

struck a bombastic note. I know a fascist

12:13

when I see one. Hey, hey, hey, hey!

12:16

Later that day, Julian Thompson and

12:18

his staff bundled their kit into

12:21

helicopters and took off

12:23

into a gloomy, wet Devon Day.

12:26

They landed on HMS Fearless, found

12:28

their bunks. It was so crowded

12:31

South Bitalia slept in a bathtub and

12:33

settled down to work out how they were going to

12:35

land on the forklift. Three

12:38

days later, Canberra sailed

12:40

from Southampton, amid similar

12:42

scenes. Bands played, more

12:44

flags waved and the Royal Marines

12:46

went off to war. In

12:50

the meantime, enter stage

12:52

right, the diplomat. Both

12:55

sides began an intensive charm offence.

12:58

The Battle of Hearts and Minds had to be

13:01

won at the United Nations. Sir

13:06

Anthony Parsons, Britain's ambassador to

13:09

the UN, paced the

13:11

long corridors of its New York

13:13

headquarters, knocking on doors, cajoling,

13:16

convincing. He

13:18

put forward a resolution demanding

13:21

immediate Argentine withdrawal. To

13:24

secure it, Britain needed ten

13:26

of the fifteen votes on the UN

13:28

Security Council. There

13:30

was a clear five for and

13:33

five against, so Britain

13:35

needed the rest. Jordan,

13:38

Togo, Zaire, Uganda

13:41

and Guyana. Parsons

13:43

worked his persuasive powers to the

13:45

bone, made it to nine, but

13:49

Jordan refused, until

13:51

Margaret Thatcher phoned King Hussein

13:54

and pleaded Britain's case. Now,

13:57

everything rested on the Soviet Union.

14:01

Would it use its veto? The

14:03

Argentinian delegation were locked in a room with

14:06

the Soviets. Surely

14:08

the Soviets would go against the British and

14:10

veto the resolution. But,

14:13

come the vote, the Soviets

14:15

didn't play their trump card. Britain

14:18

got its ten and the resolution 502

14:20

was passed. Argentina

14:30

should withdraw their troops at once and

14:33

both sides were to make all efforts

14:35

for a negotiated solution. It

14:38

was Britain's greatest diplomatic success of

14:40

the post-war era. France

14:43

promised its unwavering support and

14:45

promised to no longer supply arms to

14:48

Argentina. Germany backed

14:50

Britain and the EEC

14:52

followed collective suits. Economic

14:55

sanctions were imposed and

14:57

most painfully of all, global

14:59

banks stopped lending to Argentina.

15:03

This was a grievous blow. Without

15:06

foreign loans there was no road

15:08

to recovery for Argentina's spluttering economy.

15:11

As with any post-war conflict, America's

15:14

response would be decisive. US

15:17

support for the UK was

15:19

no given. Some

15:22

in the administration preferred to back South

15:24

American neighbours. Quietly,

15:26

the White House offered behind the scenes

15:28

support to Britain. In

15:30

public, Alexander Haig, Ronald

15:33

Reagan's Secretary of State, led

15:35

attempts to bring about a negotiated settlement.

15:39

After all, were Britain and Argentina

15:41

really prepared to go to war, to

15:44

spill blood, over fewer than 2,000

15:47

people on a tiny cluster of barren

15:50

islands far from anywhere? Haig

15:52

flew to London to begin an intense

15:54

period of diplomacy. it

16:00

did not get off to a great start. While

16:03

he was airborne, Britain declared a 200-mile exclusion

16:06

zone around the Falkland. Haig

16:08

pushed for a military stand-down by both

16:11

sides, followed by temporary

16:13

administration for the Falklands while a

16:15

long-term settlement was found. No,

16:18

said Thatcher. Nothing would

16:21

happen until Argentina responded to UN

16:23

Resolution 502. They

16:26

must, insisted Thatcher, get

16:29

off our land. Haig

16:31

flew to Buenos Aires to be

16:33

greeted by huge demonstrations. Thatcher

16:36

was depicted everywhere as a pirate, black

16:39

patch over one eye. Haig

16:42

had to use a helicopter to get in

16:44

and out of the Casa Rosada, such were

16:46

the crowds. Galtieri swigged

16:48

whisky through his meetings with America's

16:50

Secretary of State. A

16:52

top-secret British briefing paper suggested

16:55

Galtieri was an alcoholic. The

16:58

junta remained convinced the British

17:00

were bluffing. The

17:02

US team were not optimistic. Like two

17:04

schoolboys itching for a fight, they'll not

17:07

be satisfied until there's some blood on

17:09

the floor. On the flight back to

17:11

London, Haig telephoned Reagan.

17:14

He was already getting desperate and

17:16

floated a desperate idea to the

17:18

President. If the Brits could sink

17:20

one Argentine ship, would that satisfy

17:23

their bloodlust? Britain refused to come out

17:25

from behind Resolution 502 and

17:29

insisted on the islanders' right

17:31

to self-determination. On

17:33

Sunday, the 18th of April,

17:35

Haig confronted the junta. Negotiate,

17:39

or the US would back Britain. Simple

17:41

as. Admiral

17:44

Anaya, head of the Argentine Navy and the

17:46

man who came up with the invasion plan

17:48

scoffed at Haig. Anaya,

17:51

like many in and around the junta,

17:53

had convinced himself the British were lying. It

17:56

was nothing but a bluff. He

17:59

smiled. and leaned towards Haig. We

18:02

don't believe you, he told the stunned Haig. You

18:06

are lying too." General

18:10

Galtieri blew with the South Atlantic wind,

18:13

agreed a point with Haig, then stepped

18:15

outside the Casa Rosada to wave to

18:17

cheering crowds, and changed his

18:19

mind. His

18:22

men would stay on the Malvinas.

18:49

In London, attention turned from talking.

18:53

All eyes back on the task force as

18:55

it prepared to depart Ascension Island for the

18:57

final leg of its journey. Ascension,

19:01

a lump of lava far from anywhere, and

19:03

like the Falklands of British Overseas Territory,

19:06

had become the centre point of the

19:08

largest British supply operation since the Second

19:11

World War. The

19:17

planners huddled over their mats in supply

19:19

charts. Their plans

19:21

changed, evolved. They

19:23

had to. Such had been

19:25

the rush to leave the UK. Exactly

19:28

what they had, and didn't have, only

19:30

became clear once they approached the dangers of.

19:33

We were a one-shot operation, you see. It

19:36

couldn't be like Diap, where if we tried

19:38

and it didn't work, we should make sure we did better

19:40

next time. We had to get

19:42

it right in one go. The

19:44

admirals and generals were outwardly confident,

19:47

but inwardly concerned. Britain's

19:50

kit, the ships and aircraft and armaments

19:52

they were sending their men to war

19:54

in were, well, not

19:57

all they could be. We

20:00

went into the Antarctic winter and we didn't

20:02

feel prepared. We

20:04

wore our work gear and overalls, then

20:06

any sivvy jumpers we had. Sometimes

20:09

we folded newspapers between the layers just to

20:12

keep warm. Air cover

20:14

was thin. There were

20:16

sea harriers, fine aircraft but untested

20:18

in combat, and the

20:20

worry was they'd be no match either in

20:22

quantity or quality for the phantoms

20:24

and mirages of the Argentine Air Force. Of

20:29

even greater concern was the

20:31

lack of an airborne early warning system. One

20:34

ship's captain said he was waiting for the big

20:36

reveal as they steamed south, because

20:39

surely they wouldn't be sent to war without an

20:41

early warning system. But

20:44

they were. The radar system

20:47

was a generation out of date. On

20:50

the Canberra, one officer bought every tin

20:52

of nivea he could find in the ship's chimp.

20:55

He thought it might help give his men some

20:57

protection from the cold. No

21:00

one knew quite what to expect. On

21:11

21st April, two Wessex helicopters took

21:13

off from HMS Antrim. On

21:16

board, the Mountain Troop of D

21:18

Squadron SAS, destination South

21:21

Georgia. The

21:23

mission to determine Argentine strength

21:25

and suitable landing areas. They

21:32

were flying into a snowstorm. The

21:40

chopple touched down high on the Fortuna

21:42

Glacier. Conditions would

21:45

dire. This was

21:47

what the SAS was supposed to do. Deal

21:50

with extremes. South

21:53

Georgia, 800 miles beyond the Falklands, was

21:55

of no tactical importance. Military

21:58

thinking expected that once the the Falklands were

22:00

dealt with, a small Argentinian

22:02

force would surrender. But

22:04

in London, there were political

22:07

considerations to be made. It

22:10

was two weeks since the task force sailed in

22:12

a blaze of red, white and blue glory. The

22:15

public were impatient, parliament

22:17

was impatient, and across

22:20

the Atlantic doubts were simmering over whether the

22:22

British threat was anything more than bluff and

22:24

bluster. Take back

22:26

South Georgia came the order from London,

22:30

and get on with it. I

22:34

recall opening my window, looking

22:37

down, about to go

22:39

shaft, and

22:42

into the bluish, icy, nothingness. I

22:46

have no idea how deep it was, and I

22:49

was trying to place a helicopter

22:51

down. It

22:54

was the most unpleasant

22:57

and disorienting experience. There

23:00

was a snow bridge crumbling under

23:03

us, as the SAS leapt out. I

23:07

was scared to shut loose,

23:09

and I looked proud as well. The

23:12

SAS were dropped in atrocious conditions, a whiteout. It

23:18

took five hours to make 500 metres across the glacier. The

23:23

snow, whipped up by 100 mile an hour

23:25

winds, blocked their machine guns. It

23:29

was a struggle to even get their tents up. One

23:32

was blown away. Through the night they took it in turns to

23:35

dig away snow at the entrance every day. By morning,

23:37

even the SAS, the elite of the elite, had had

23:39

enough. Helicopters

23:48

were sent to get them out. The

23:53

first Wessex was hit by a sudden whiteout, the crash. The

24:01

second landed and the SAS and crew

24:03

from the crashed helicopter scrambled aboard. It

24:06

took off only to be

24:08

enveloped in another whiteout. The

24:11

pilot could see nothing. The

24:13

crash was inevitable. A

24:18

signal flashed from HMS Antrim back to

24:20

London. Two helicopters

24:22

down, casualties

24:24

unknown. In

24:27

London, Sir Terence Lewin, chief

24:29

of the defence staff, was

24:31

later to describe it as one of his darkest

24:33

moments. The

24:36

first action of the conflict and

24:39

disaster. Lewin

24:41

crossed the Downing Street to pass on the

24:43

grim news. Thatcher

24:47

was dumbstruck, shocked

24:49

at the potential loss of a handful of

24:51

her boys, as she'd taken to calling them.

24:55

This was the reality of war.

24:58

For an hour, they waited for

25:00

further news. And then, a

25:03

minor miracle. One delivered

25:06

in three remarkable parts. Lieutenant

25:09

Commander Ian Stanley took another

25:11

Wessex and in appalling conditions

25:14

made it down on the glacier. Minor

25:16

miracle one. Miracle

25:19

two, there had not been

25:21

a single casualty from the two crashes. Miracle

25:24

three, Stanley made it back

25:27

to the Antrim, landing the Wessex

25:29

on its helipad, as the ship

25:31

rolled and swayed on angry seas. But

25:35

South Georgia still needed to be taken.

25:39

The second attempt was barely more successful.

25:42

Trying to land by five inflatables,

25:44

two suffered engine failure and were

25:46

swept away into the South Atlantic.

25:50

It wasn't until the following morning that

25:52

the frozen SAS men of one boat

25:54

could be rescued. The

25:56

other was not found until the following day. A

26:00

day later, and British fortunes took a

26:02

turn for the better. There

26:04

were reports an Argentinian submarine was in

26:06

the area, and early on the

26:09

morning of the 25th of April, it

26:11

was sighted. Three

26:13

helicopters were dispatched to attack, with

26:16

depth charges, torpedoes, missiles

26:20

and machine guns. We've

26:23

gone into the attack and I

26:25

aim. I think it must

26:27

have landed as we... ...the sub. The

26:30

data needed instantly because... ...of

26:34

this noise it made. Somehow

26:41

the Santa Fe, a guppy class

26:43

submarine, was not sunk. But

26:45

it was crippled, and limped back

26:47

to South Georgia, where it beached

26:50

and its crew ran for cover. The

26:53

140 strong Argentine garrison appeared

26:55

panicked by the attack. The

26:58

company of Royal Marines being sent to carry out the

27:00

attack was still more than 100 miles away, but

27:04

the officers on the spot saw their chance. They

27:07

mustered 75 men, every

27:09

Marine, SAS and SBS on

27:11

the Antrim, and attacked. The

27:15

Antrim bombarding the Argentine positions,

27:18

the British assault was virtually their own.

27:21

Although en route, they

27:23

mistaken the attack to her development. The

27:27

real enemy soldiers surrendered at once, and

27:30

by quarter past five, Sergeant Major

27:32

Lofty Gallagher pulled a Union Jack from

27:34

his pack and ran it up

27:36

the flagpole. A

27:39

day later, and the Argentine garrison

27:41

at Leith surrendered. They

27:44

were taken prisoner along with the scrap metal

27:46

dealers who'd caused so much trouble. From

27:49

disaster to triumph, step one

27:51

of the Falklands mission had been achieved without

27:53

a single casualty. Just.

28:00

Secretary of State for Defence has just come over

28:02

to give me some very good news, and I

28:04

think you'd like to have it at once. The

28:08

message we've got is that British troops

28:10

landed on South Georgia this afternoon,

28:14

shortly after 4pm London... Back home,

28:17

Thatcher stood on the steps of Downing Street

28:19

and ordered the media pack to... ...to join

28:22

us at that news and

28:24

congratulate our forces and the

28:26

Marines. It

28:29

was a celebration as much in relief

28:31

as anything else. Now

28:33

attention once again turned back to the

28:36

Falklands, as Admiral Woodward juggled

28:38

his metaphor. South Georgia was the

28:40

appetizer. Now this is the heavy

28:42

punch coming up behind. My

28:44

battle group is properly formed and ready

28:46

to strike. This is the run-up to

28:48

the big match, which in

28:51

my view should be a walkover. They

28:54

were supposed to be a tough lot on South

28:56

Georgia, but they were quick to throw in the

28:58

towel. We will isolate the

29:00

troops on the Falklands, as those

29:03

on South Georgia were isolated. The

29:05

task force steamed South, preparing for

29:07

war. The mood

29:09

changed, wills written, insurance

29:12

papers signed, weapons

29:14

armed amid practice, practice,

29:16

practice... practice for the

29:18

real thing. House

29:20

clearance drills were carried out on one deck

29:22

of the Canberra, the cabin door

29:25

thrown open and with a shout of

29:27

grenade, an orange lobbed in. Brought

29:39

on by a right-wing tabloid press.

29:42

No surrender declared the express. Stick

29:45

it up your junta, funded the sun. Thatcher's

29:48

government took stock. While

29:50

one part of the media seemed hell-bent on

29:53

wishing for war, others

29:55

were more circumspect, and

29:57

some, such as the Guardian, opposed.

30:00

Public opinion was not as black and

30:03

white as red-top voices portrayed. Around

30:06

garrison towns and naval ports there

30:09

remained doubts as to whether it was worth

30:11

their men dying for this. Further

30:15

conflict was not certain and

30:17

there were many who expected the task

30:19

force's imminent arrival of the Falklands to

30:22

spark an Argentine climb down. On

30:33

the 22nd of April, as the

30:35

SAS were landing in South Georgia, Francis

30:38

Pym, Carrington's replacement as

30:40

Foreign Secretary, took a

30:42

concord flight to New York to meet Hague. Five

30:46

days later, Hague delivered his

30:48

final offer to London and Buenos

30:50

Aires. Eventually

30:52

an answer came from Buenos Aires.

30:55

The bunch of thugs, as Hague was

30:57

overheard calling the junta, said

30:59

no. A

31:03

signal flashed from task force HQ into

31:06

the South Atlantic where Woodward's fleet

31:08

had reached the edge of the exclusion zone.

31:13

As April turned to May, Flight

31:15

Lieutenant Martin Withers of 101

31:18

Squadron, Strike Command, eased

31:20

his Vulcan bomber off the runway on

31:22

Ascension Island and set a course

31:24

for Stann. Shortly

31:27

after 4 a.m. he climbed to 10,000 feet

31:30

and began his bombing run. Only

31:33

one of his thousand-pound bombs landed on the

31:35

target, the runway at

31:38

Port Stanley Airfield. Nevertheless,

31:41

a message had been sent. The

31:43

British were coming. That

31:46

night the fleet steamed within flight distance

31:48

of the Falklands and once

31:50

Withers was done, the sea harriers

31:52

took off. They

31:55

came in low and split up to find

31:57

their targets, including the Argentine

31:59

Foreman. horses at Goose Green and

32:01

another go at the airfield. The defences

32:04

had been walking up my heart. I

32:07

came in and looked like we were watching a

32:09

child sparkle and going for oxenite. Now

32:13

it was the Navy's turn. Three

32:16

ships, Glamorgan, Arrow

32:18

and Alacrity, sailed to within

32:20

12 miles of Port Stanley and

32:23

opened fire on Argentine positions. At

32:27

1.25pm came the eyes of Sam's boss.

32:30

Four mirages swept in low from the

32:32

west. We

32:35

lay flight on the deck. Pin helmet sauce,

32:37

fingers in ear. First

32:40

came the screams of, aircraft, aircraft!

32:42

Over the armament broadcast. Bangs

32:44

as we fired shafts. Wooshes as all 16 chaff

32:47

rockets were fired. Then, stack attack from the

32:49

aircraft. Bang, bang, the bombs

32:51

went off by the stirrer. Lifting the screws

32:53

right out of the water. We

32:56

thought we'd been hit and then whoosh, whoosh, whoosh,

32:58

whoosh. The rocket went whoosh,

33:00

whoosh, whoosh. As

33:02

the mirages turned for home, the Harriers

33:04

swooped. Two of the four

33:06

were shot down. The listening

33:09

ship's radios filled with the shouts of

33:11

the Argentine pilots and

33:13

abrupt silence as the Harriers' missiles. What

33:18

followed next remains the most

33:20

contested and most deadly moment

33:22

of the entire conflict. The

33:25

cruiser, General Belgrano, was the grand

33:27

old dame of the Argentine Navy.

33:30

Despite her age, this was

33:33

a warship capable of threatening the British

33:35

fleet, a key ship

33:37

in Argentina's naval armory. On

33:39

the afternoon of the 1st of May, Chris

33:42

Refford Brown, commander of the submarine

33:44

Conqueror, sighted the Belgrano

33:46

and two escorts, an

33:48

exorcet armed to destroy us. The

33:51

following morning, a Sunday, Terence

33:53

Lewin, chief of the defence staff, was

33:56

driven to check at the Prime Minister's

33:58

weekend residence. He

34:00

put the Navy's case to the war cabin. We

34:03

want to sink the Velgrana. It's

34:06

a direct threat to the fleet. It

34:08

could cost British lives. It

34:11

could imperil our mission.

34:15

Thatcher led the discussion. By

34:17

lunchtime, the decision was reached. It

34:20

was unanimous. Sink

34:24

the Velgrana. At

34:32

nine minutes past six, according to the captain's log, Reford

34:36

Brown called his men to action station.

34:40

The Velgrana was 35 miles

34:42

outside the exclusion zone. Reford

34:45

Brown decided to launch three torpedoes

34:48

and spent the next half hour manoeuvring

34:50

into position. At

34:53

1854, he took a

34:55

last look around. All good.

34:58

He had a clear shot. Two

35:01

minutes and 45 seconds later, he

35:03

gave the order. Dubed

35:08

six, one and two

35:10

opened, and three Mark

35:12

8 torpedoes arrowed through the water.

35:29

Reford Brown watched via his periscope.

35:32

Orange fireballs seemed just off the set of

35:34

target. He lied with

35:36

laughter, boss. Second explosion

35:38

heard about five seconds after. I

35:41

think I saw a spurt of water after, but it

35:43

may have been smoke from the first. That

35:46

explosion heard, but not seen. Job

35:49

done. Reford Brown ordered Conqueror

35:52

to dive. It was

35:54

time to take evasive action in case

35:56

the Velgrana's destroyer escorts came hunting. Back

36:06

on the surface, the Belgrano was

36:08

in its death row. The

36:10

torpedoes had struck the bow and stern,

36:13

trapping and killing 200 men. As

36:17

the old cruiser listed to port, the

36:20

surviving crew scrambled to get on deck and

36:22

launched the lifeboat. Others

36:25

were burnt badly, others clung to

36:27

photos of wives, girlfriends, children.

36:32

Those that survived were to face 30 hours

36:34

in lifeboats in freezing conditions. The

36:37

escorts had disappeared. 368

36:40

men died. Jose

36:43

Luis Ferreira was 17. I'll

36:46

make every second. I

36:51

wanted to get out alive. I didn't

36:54

want to die. The lifeboats were made

36:56

of rubber. We jumped into them. The

36:58

ship was listing, making wear pools, and the

37:01

wind was pushing us against it. The

37:04

anchor fell into a lifeboat. It was like squashing

37:06

a snail. Nobody got out of

37:08

there alive. The north lifeboat burst

37:10

and we had to throw ourselves into the

37:12

sea. I tried to kick off my boots

37:14

and swim towards another lifeboat. I

37:17

came across a friend who couldn't swim. He

37:21

was shouting, help, help. He was

37:24

covered in oil. He

37:26

kept going under. I

37:28

managed to get him onto

37:30

a lifeboat. I

37:33

saw the vagrano disappear into the water. I

37:36

saw it kill over and that was it. The

37:39

silence was deafening. There

37:41

we were in the middle of nowhere, just

37:43

water and sky. Barrera

37:55

and his comrades were rescued the following

37:58

day, by which time conquering.

38:00

had long since flashed a signal back to

38:02

Northwood, from where it was conveyed

38:04

to Downing Street. The

38:06

Belgrano was sunk. Gotcha,

38:10

as the sun's infamous headline put it. On

38:16

HMS Sheffield, the crew on watch cheered

38:18

when the news came in. But

38:21

not for long. Mike Norman walked in

38:23

as the lads were cheering. They're

38:25

sailors like us, he said. There's

38:28

500 men trying to swim around in the

38:30

water and stay alive. They could be dead. They

38:33

could be freezing. And tomorrow, it

38:36

could be us. On HMS Yarmouth,

38:38

the news was greeted even more

38:40

solemnly. No one clapped or

38:43

cheered. We just

38:45

looked at each other. That

38:48

was when reality struck that approximately 360

38:51

fellow marinas had just died. The

38:56

Argentine spokesman hits on a neat

38:58

line. Rita may not run the

39:00

waves, but she certainly waves the

39:02

breeze. The

39:15

attack on the Belgrano shocked the

39:18

international community. An

39:20

act of aggression committed outside the

39:22

exclusion zone on a ship

39:24

sailing away from the British fleet. Britain's

39:27

allies swallowed hard. Many

39:30

in Britain were appalled at the number of lives

39:32

lost. Those that took

39:34

the decision stood by it. The

39:37

Belgrano had to be sunk. She

39:39

was a real and significant threat to the

39:41

task force, to the lives of

39:43

Britain's sailors. This

39:46

was war. And

39:48

the experience on the front line was far

39:50

removed from the tabloid saber rattling back home.

39:54

The following day, Alan Rich,

39:56

a helicopter pilot, sank an

39:58

Argentine boat. patrol vessel. When

40:02

he stepped back onto the deck of his ship, he

40:05

was shaking. A

40:07

day later, and 32-year-old Nick Taylor

40:10

became the first British combat fatality

40:12

of the war, when

40:14

his Harrier was shot down by anti-aircraft

40:16

fire while attacking Goose Green.

40:21

It was soon to get a lot worse for

40:23

the British. It was

40:25

a clear morning, visibility good. HMS

40:29

Sheffield was stationed on the task

40:31

force's southwestern corner. In

40:34

the operations room, Sheffield's radar picked up

40:36

something to the west. But

40:39

what? The returning Harrier?

40:41

Or abandoned? Up on

40:43

the bridge, the watch officer spotted smoke on

40:46

the horizon. Smoke over there. Look,

40:49

over there.

40:52

It's a missile! One

41:07

excess then hit the Sheffield just above the

41:09

water. A split

41:11

jagged across the hull. Thick black

41:13

smoke filled the ship's lower deck.

41:16

The explosion smashed the ship's water supply,

41:18

so there was nothing to fight

41:21

the fire. Men, faces

41:24

blackened, clustered on the upper decks.

41:27

They could feel the heat from below. As the

41:30

heat began coming up the decks, we

41:33

started throwing all the ammunition

41:35

out. Bullets, rockets, torpedoes, deck

41:37

charges, all over the sign. Captain

41:41

Sam Salt was directing everything. Sam

41:44

was an experienced captain with loads of respect.

41:47

He was like a father figure, but we

41:50

could see the shock on his face. For

41:53

hours they tried to fight the fire with

41:55

seawater and hand pumps, but this

41:58

was a battle they would not win. Four

42:00

hours after the missile hit, Sam

42:03

Salt gave the order. Salt,

42:20

face and body blackened like most of his

42:22

men, was winched by a

42:24

Sea King helicopter to a neighbouring ship. Twenty-one

42:28

of his men were dead. The

42:31

loss of the Sheffield alarmed everyone in the fleet

42:33

from top to bottom. Woodward

42:36

worried about losing an aircraft carrier. To

42:38

do so would be crippling. The

42:41

fleet pulled further out to sea. Woodward

42:45

was to keep his distance from then on. More

42:48

dire news followed. Two

42:50

Harriers disappeared, believed to

42:52

have collided and plunged into the Atlantic.

42:56

These were losses the British could ill

42:58

afford. The fleet's

43:00

own air defence missiles were proving erratic,

43:03

computer systems struggling to cope with more

43:05

than one target. HMS

43:08

Glasgow was hit by a bomb, holding

43:10

the destroyer just above the waterline. But

43:13

it failed to explode. That

43:16

saved ship and crew. Nevertheless

43:19

it was the end of Glasgow's involvement.

43:23

Woodward had lost another ship. Tension

43:27

gripped the fleet. Submarine

43:30

attacks were expected. Instead

43:32

whales caused false alarms. The

43:36

days passed. A week, two

43:38

weeks and little changed.

43:41

The task force was not achieving its

43:44

first task, winning the air

43:46

battle to clear the way for a landing. The

43:49

Argentine Navy remained in port. The

43:52

Argentine Air Force committed few planes. They

43:55

were waiting for the landing. The

43:58

plan was for the aerial threat. to be

44:00

contained before the Marines in Paris were sent

44:02

home. That was not

44:05

going to happen. But

44:07

the landing still had to. Had

44:10

to, providing there was

44:12

not a last-minute diplomatic solution. Behind

44:19

the scenes, Hague was still trying, feeding

44:22

a plan to Peru. The

44:24

seven-point Peru plan was proposed by

44:26

its president, Belonda Terry.

44:29

In the wake of the Belgrano sinking,

44:31

Thatcher was keen to be seen considering

44:33

peaceful moves. But

44:35

the Junta turned their noses up at

44:38

Belonda's proposal. The clock

44:40

was ticking again. The

44:43

details of Operation Sutton, the

44:45

landing on the Falklands, were presented to

44:47

the War Cabinet in London and

44:49

a date set, the weekend of 21st

44:51

and 22nd May. The

44:55

UN made one last bid to bring both

44:58

sides to the table. The

45:00

Spanish UN official cornered an Argentine

45:02

envoy. You do realize

45:04

that the British are going to keep the

45:07

hell out of you. Thatcher

45:11

addressed Parliament to coincide with a

45:14

white paper, branded a

45:16

red, white and blue paper, making

45:19

the government's case for what was going

45:21

to happen next. Labour leader

45:23

Michael Foote, no warmonger to find

45:25

no hope. There would be

45:28

no peaceful solution. Next,

45:36

on Wars That Shaped the World. They

45:39

treated us as officers. They would leave us in

45:41

the dog-out. It was

45:43

very cold. We weren't used to the cold and

45:47

hungry. And they would go

45:49

back to our house and eat and stay

45:51

warm. And if we did anything wrong, the

45:53

smallest thing, they would punish us. Make

45:56

us stand in the cold. I think

45:58

we all wanted to go home. Wars

46:01

That Shape the World was a Goldhanger

46:03

Podcasts production. It was

46:05

produced by Holy Smokes. This

46:07

series was written by Robin Scott Elliott. It

46:10

was narrated by Paul Waget. The

46:13

producer was Neil Fern. The

46:15

executive producer was Tony Parson.

46:24

Holy Smoke.