0:00

The New Statesman

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Hello I'm Katie Stallard and you're

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listening to World Review from The New Statesman,

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a twice weekly international news podcast.

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Every Monday we interview a guest for their

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unique perspective and expertise. Then

0:23

later in the week we come together to unpack

0:25

some of the most significant stories in world

0:27

affairs. Today I'm speaking

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to Paul Huang, a research fellow

0:32

at the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation

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and a journalist based in Taipei who

0:37

focuses on defence and politics. We'll

0:40

discuss the fallout from Tsai Ing-wen's

0:42

meeting with Kevin McCarthy in the United

0:44

States and the outlook for Taiwan's presidential

0:47

election in January.

0:53

Paul thank you for joining me. It's

0:55

great to have you on the podcast. Thank you Katie.

0:57

Thank you for having me. So we last

1:00

spoke in an amazing

1:02

cafe in Taipei where

1:04

we had, I don't even know how

1:07

to describe the amazing food we ate. It was

1:09

some sort of fried breadsticks wrapped in

1:11

pancake. It was amazing. But

1:13

one of the things I took away from our conversation

1:16

there was

1:17

just how much in general we,

1:20

particularly in the foreign media, are

1:22

missing outside Taiwan.

1:24

So I wanted to start by asking you firstly, I should

1:27

point out that we are recording this as

1:38

Tsai Ing-wen is still in the United

1:40

States and Ma Ying-jeou,

1:43

the former president and member of the rival

1:45

KMT, is still in China. So we don't

1:47

yet know what reaction there

1:49

will be from Beijing to Tsai's activities

1:52

here. But

1:53

as a starting point, could you talk

1:55

a little bit about how those visits

1:58

are being watched in Taiwan? and how

2:00

much attention or not people

2:03

are paying to them. Well, with regard to

2:05

President Tsai's transit through

2:07

the US and her visit to Taiwan,

2:10

several diplomatic allies in

2:12

South America, Central America, her visit

2:14

is not being discussed as widely as she

2:17

and her administration can call, just because

2:19

there's nothing new coming

2:21

out of it.

2:22

She's not meeting with Biden, she's not meeting

2:24

with Anthony Blinken,

2:26

she's not meeting with any high-level US

2:28

officials, she's not making any breakthrough. So

2:31

that's pretty much the end of it. The Taiwanese public

2:34

have for years seen these

2:36

kind of overseas

2:38

visits to Taiwan as a very few diplomatic allies.

2:41

Their reaches are useful, the limit

2:43

is useful, I'm sorry to say it, it's just

2:46

that people are not buying that

2:48

show anymore. The people know we

2:50

are losing then, and the speed as

2:52

they were seeing before, something once

2:54

every year or even two every year, and her

2:57

visit to the US,

2:59

from the US, from the

3:01

table to McCarthy, isn't going to boost her

3:04

support domestically anyway.

3:06

On the other hand, President Ma Yingzhou visited

3:08

me, like many other analysts,

3:11

observers, but also didn't have much

3:14

expectation just because he's not really

3:16

a shock-holder in Taiwan. He's a former president,

3:19

he's a member of the KMT, yes,

3:21

but he's questionable for the kind of influence

3:23

the status he has

3:25

within the KMT. He's not a major player anymore,

3:28

that is for sure. However, in

3:30

the past few days, he's visited to

3:32

China, his speech at the University

3:35

of Hunan, his talks at

3:37

various places, meeting

3:39

with the Chinese Communist Party officials,

3:42

the Chinese government officials, he has been building

3:44

a sting. The kind of things that he's been

3:47

saying

3:47

is in the goal pose,

3:50

it is what they think are the

3:53

goal pose, such as mentioning

3:55

the

3:55

Taiwan's official name, the Republic of China,

3:57

which is

5:48

although

6:00

as you point out, no former president

6:02

and certainly not likely to

6:04

run for office again. On behalf of the KMT,

6:08

offering this vision of what

6:10

could happen if there was a better relationship

6:13

with China. Even the DPP, even Tsai

6:16

Ing-wen,

6:17

since even as early as 2016, when

6:20

she took office,

6:21

said they have been saying that we don't

6:24

necessarily oppose good relations

6:26

with China. We want

6:28

dialogue with China, we want engagement

6:30

with China.

6:31

However, Beijing refused to talk

6:33

to them. Why? Because

6:35

they see them, they see Tsai, they see DPP

6:38

as having an agenda that is

6:40

pro-Taiwan independence,

6:43

the dual independence. Even so

6:45

for Tsai Ing-wen's administration at least, it's

6:48

just not the case. She has no such agenda

6:50

that we can be sure. She

6:52

has done literally nothing to

6:54

move the goalposts in terms

6:56

of Taiwan's digital independence

6:58

anywhere more than they

7:01

already were. But

7:03

because of this preconception that

7:05

Beijing had, and also because

7:08

Beijing had no reason

7:10

not to go in, it doesn't

7:13

need to talk to Tsai government

7:16

as much as Tsai needs to talk to them. So

7:18

they can choose who they talk to. So

7:21

you see how it turned out

7:23

that Beijing is using its relation

7:25

with Taiwan, this is cross-relation

7:28

as

7:29

Tsai-ge-beetle saying, we don't like this government

7:31

power, so we're not going to talk to you. And

7:34

that really hurt

7:35

the DPP and Tsai in the long run in

7:38

the last few years. Tsai

7:39

is term limited. So

7:42

she, as you said, came to power in 2016, but

7:44

will stand down at the next

7:46

election.

7:48

Can you give us a sense of how closely contested

7:51

that election is likely to be?

7:53

And whether

7:56

at this stage it looks like the DPP

7:58

will stay in power, or if there's a rule,

9:48

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now wherever you get your podcasts. That

10:46

was a great

10:49

dinner.

10:53

So great. I

10:55

just got a car. Oh, the one I just sold at Carvana. What?

10:58

When did you do that? When you were still looking at the menu,

11:01

I went on Carvana.com and all I had to do was enter

11:03

the license plate or VIN, answer a few questions

11:05

and got a real offer in seconds.

11:06

You picked up the car already? No, I parked around

11:08

the corner, but they are picking it up tomorrow and

11:11

paying me right on the spot. Oh, no wonder you

11:13

picked up the check. About that, I thought

11:15

we were going halfsies.

11:32

Do you think there is a balance for

11:35

Beijing to strike in its response

11:38

to Tsai's meeting with McCarthy

11:41

in

11:42

terms of if it reacts very

11:44

strongly, is there a

11:46

danger that it could push

11:49

voters who, as you say, are

11:51

now a little bit re-examining the

11:53

DPP and their record over the last eight

11:55

years? If Beijing reacts too strongly,

11:58

does that actually help? the DPP's

12:01

case push voters towards

12:03

them. What do you think the calculation will

12:05

be? For starters,

12:06

I don't think Beijing's calculation

12:09

is based

12:10

on the calculation

12:13

on when to actually

12:14

move on to Taiwan, to attack

12:17

Taiwan, to go to

12:19

that final military

12:21

option. I don't think that decision

12:23

rests on

12:26

Tai's visit to some country or

12:28

her talk with some

12:31

US politicians.

12:32

That's not how Beijing made

12:34

its decision. They

12:36

don't want to be pushed. They don't want to

12:39

be pressured into

12:41

doing something as big as invading

12:43

Taiwan.

12:44

On that one, they have

12:46

their own timetable, which

12:49

again I don't have no idea nor

12:52

do any of these US

12:54

observers, analysts, or even

12:56

officials, who claim they have some

12:59

magical number, 2025, 27. No,

13:01

still

13:02

exists. Only Beijing, only

13:04

decision makers in Beijing know.

13:06

And we know

13:10

that the calculation

13:12

is determined by factors

13:15

that's really

13:17

more have to do with fundamentals. The

13:19

fundamental means the

13:21

military balance

13:23

between Taiwan and China across the

13:25

street,

13:26

or the imbalance, or how in balance

13:29

that is. We know the Chinese People's Liberation

13:31

Army has already surpassed Taiwan's military

13:34

in

13:34

both quantity and quality,

13:37

but

13:37

by how much? They increase the

13:39

edge over Taiwan every year. At some

13:42

point, they're going to look at it and say,

13:44

this

13:45

is probably enough. We don't need any

13:47

more. Not

13:49

just edge over Taiwan, but over the United

13:53

States as well. Some people would say catching

13:55

up to the United States. In many areas,

13:58

the Chinese POA over the United States,

13:59

already surpassed the

14:01

US military or

14:03

the

14:04

US allies military.

14:06

The Japan South Defense Force,

14:09

even countries like Australia,

14:12

those VOA, they're more capable,

14:17

they're more numerous, they're more in a better

14:20

position to strike than the US and its allies

14:22

in the region. That's just a fact. I

14:25

think that as the military imbalance

14:27

increases, it

14:31

becomes more

14:33

and more likely that China will strike. They will

14:35

not be reacting to, say,

14:37

Tsai's

14:38

meeting with Karsi.

14:41

Just because of that, they attack. Not

14:43

really how they made that decision. You

14:45

write a lot about the military, have a lot of expertise

14:48

in this area. I think, particularly from

14:50

where I am here in the US, there is this perception

14:52

that the Ukraine war has

14:55

marked this really important change.

14:58

There is now a concerted shift taking place

15:00

and Taiwan is moving rapidly

15:02

towards asymmetric capabilities. It's

15:05

building up its training, it's undergoing

15:07

reforms.

15:09

But from what you see

15:11

there, how accurate a picture is that? What

15:13

do you think is the reality of the pace at which

15:16

those reforms are taking place?

15:18

Oh, it's all talks. There

15:20

is no change. It's not even

15:22

a symbolic change. All

15:24

that we have seen is

15:27

just public relations. They create something

15:30

to mislead international media,

15:32

to mislead foreign observers,

15:35

and concerned parties such as the United States

15:37

government, the American Institute

15:39

in

15:40

Taiwan, supposedly showing

15:43

them that Taiwan had made some changes in

15:45

improvement. When there is not, they are still doing

15:47

the exercises the same way they have been doing it. That

15:51

was 10, 20, 30 years ago, nothing has been changed.

15:54

They are still pretending the POA

15:57

today is the same as the POA 20, 30 years ago.

15:59

as for other things that they

16:02

have put in their propaganda

16:04

such as the reform on the resources.

16:06

I can tell you there's no reform in the resources and

16:09

everything's still since then.

16:10

It's the same thing that

16:13

we have seen

16:14

over all these years. The Taiwan's

16:16

administrative national defense and the politicians

16:19

in charge

16:20

which right now is the Taiwan government,

16:23

they are not committed

16:24

to reform. I made this

16:27

statement based on my years of research

16:29

and observation

16:31

as a defense analyst.

16:32

I have nothing any change in that direction

16:35

that that will matter. I don't

16:37

see a commitment there. I don't see it

16:39

sincere and

16:41

I see the problem being the

16:43

ruling government, the Thai government.

16:46

It's just not committed. It's all about

16:48

show. They're

16:49

too tough but they don't act tough

16:52

and that's the

16:54

fundamental problem with Taiwan's defense

16:56

and security today. There doesn't seem to

16:58

be any adult in charge

17:00

of Taiwan's military and

17:02

security apparatus. There's

17:05

no one that is there to

17:07

to outline the strategy. We

17:09

know the military balance is going up.

17:11

The ink balance is going off the chart.

17:14

Something needs to be done. So

17:15

some people, some

17:18

responsible and smart people have come

17:20

up and spoken now

17:22

about this. They have proposed various

17:25

alternatives and strategies such

17:27

as the overall defense concept

17:30

and other framework. They have their

17:32

opposing cons. They have their

17:35

strengths and weaknesses. But those

17:37

people, they are sincere

17:39

people. They want to propose these kind of changes.

17:42

The issue is the Ministry

17:44

of National Defense

17:45

and Taiwan's government. They don't take any of this

17:47

seriously. For them, at the end of the

17:49

day, it just all

17:50

comes down to

17:53

press release, a parade for

17:55

media and

17:57

some Facebook posts. to

18:00

get the politicians elected in the next election.

18:02

And that's all I care. I think looking at

18:04

this from outside Taiwan, there is a tendency to

18:06

reduce the main issue to be

18:09

fundamentally security, first, second,

18:11

third. What should we understand

18:13

about actually where security ranks

18:16

in terms of voters' concerns? What are the

18:19

other important issues

18:21

that people are looking at as they approach the next

18:23

election or likely to be?

18:25

I think people are, despite government's

18:27

best efforts in misleading the

18:29

public over the years,

18:32

I think more and more people are beginning to see

18:35

the things are not what they have been told. What

18:37

our polls found last year

18:39

that more people say that they are not

18:42

confident in Taiwan military's

18:44

ability to resist a Chinese invasion.

18:47

And then the majority of people

18:49

always say

18:50

they are not confident Taiwan can stand on

18:52

its own. They cannot defend

18:54

against China if the United States is intervene.

18:58

In addition to that, there are also other indications

19:00

such as

19:01

most majority of people, they don't

19:03

believe that the United States will intervene

19:06

militarily to defend Taiwan, in

19:08

China and Taiwan. So all these polls, they

19:11

told us that the

19:14

Taiwan's public, they are more and more

19:16

aware,

19:17

becoming aware that

19:20

there is a problem there.

19:24

They knew that China has been growing

19:26

economically, technologically and militarily,

19:29

and something is not going right with Taiwan's

19:31

military, Taiwan's preparation.

19:34

And so at some point that

19:36

this public leg of confidence

19:38

going to Taiwanese

19:40

public's political preference,

19:42

they're going to say, since our partition,

19:45

just don't, they don't

19:47

seem to be serious, they don't seem to be

19:49

serious in fixing our military, then maybe

19:51

we need to consider

19:53

what we are voting for, what we are calling

19:55

our politicians to do, but

19:58

in short, then

19:59

That's a really bad thing because we know

20:02

the majority of Taiwanese public,

20:06

the majority position is they

20:08

want Taiwan to be independent in

20:11

the long term.

20:12

Majority of Taiwanese say they are Taiwanese.

20:15

They're not Chinese, they're not Chinese or Taiwanese,

20:17

just Taiwanese. And therefore, in response

20:20

to what Taiwan's politicians are responsible,

20:23

the

20:24

thing to do will be to

20:25

see their opinion for what, for their

20:28

consensus for why it is.

20:30

And to formulate a strategy to

20:32

defend, to if not pursue

20:34

a long term independence, at least to build

20:37

out some sort of

20:38

capability of Taiwan can say

20:41

like this forever and not be taken,

20:43

not be subjugated by China. But

20:45

that's not what the current government is doing, talking

20:48

tough and doing nothing. It's not going to help. Unfortunately,

20:50

we are out of time. So let me thank

20:52

you so much for your expertise and

20:54

say thank you to Paul Huang for joining me today.

20:57

Thank you, Katie.

21:01

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